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AN ESSAY ON PARADIGMS AND POLITICAL
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POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICAL MAN:
AN ESSAY ON PARADIGMS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

by

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requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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"Often . . . a point is reached in an inquiry at which no further progress can be made unless there is some more or less substantial change in the epistemological attitudes which set limits within which the inquiry is proceeding. "

Angus Sinclair
The Condition of Knowing: An Essay
Towards a Theory of Knowledge
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951
p. 16.

PREFACE

To be "radical," according to Webster's unabridged dictionary, is to challenge basic assumptions. It is to attack fundamental propositions. To be radical is to "go to the root of things." On epistemological questions, and on their relationship to the study of political phenomena, the following essay meets that description. Although on two or three occasions physics students have accused me of belaboring the obvious--of beating a very dead horse--just as often students of political science have wondered if I could possibly be serious. Only rarely has one of the latter viewed the proposals to be presented as among the conventional. This, then, is a radical thesis; at least I believe that is how it should be introduced to the political scientist.

Yet, while radical, it can hardly be considered an "original" work. Readers of Thomas S. Kuhn's little book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions will recognize my debt to him throughout, even when I neglect to acknowledge it. Moreover, I doubt if my essay contains a single major premise or conclusion relating to what I have called the twentieth century epistemological paradigm which is not stated explicitly in W. Angus Sinclair's stimulating treatise The

Conditions of Knowing, written in 1951. The reader may also note the influence of J. Bronowski, P. W. Bridgman, A. S. Eddington and numerous others. The arguments themselves are not new. It is only that I have applied them to a new area of inquiry; namely, political science.

It will be my contention that there are essentially two distinct theories of knowledge or epistemologies available to the student of political events. The first is that set of premises sometimes referred to as "the scientific method." However, we will find it is much more than a method to be looked at and consciously used; it is a conceptual framework or paradigm to be looked through and unconsciously acted upon. We will also discover that by so doing, by taking its worth for granted, the student of politics is prompted to make many observations, to draw many conclusions, which are wholly inconsistent with the second epistemological paradigm to be covered--the one which underlies the best of twentieth century physics.

One paradigm, that of nineteenth century physical science, premises single "real" or "true" forms external to the observer, independent of the observer, yet able to be discerned by him. It premises an "objective" viewer--one engaged in contemplating "true" forms--and a "non-objective" viewer--one erring about their "real" structure. Consequently, while it favors the presentation of conflicting ideas (proposing "truth" is most apt to evolve from

their meeting openly in the market-place), it also prompts a concern for "false-prophets"--individuals who misread the facts but argue so persuasively they may win large numbers of adherents and give rise to a "reign of error."

The other epistemological paradigm envisions no separation between observer and observed; it premises no external forms to be wrong or non-objective about. Instead, man is said to cut his universe up into objects and events, and into categories of objects and events, according to his experience (now synonymous with fact), and what he wants to do with it (value). Furthermore, these two categories, experience and what one wants to do with it (fact and value) are also parts of a whole; to alter one is invariably and inevitably to alter the other. It is possible to distinguish between them for given purposes, but they are not "naturally" distinct.

As for descriptive statements, the paradigm proposes men give words particular meanings according to their particular experiences. Since each descriptive word or combination of words is tied by the observer to a specific experience or complex of experiences, each description is as true as any other. In other words, to be true a descriptive statement must only be relevant to our experience and what we wish to do with it, and that which is relevant is true.

When experiences (facts or truths) are shared, word meanings are shared, and communication flows smoothly. When

experiences are not shared, meanings fail to be shared and men are found to talk around or past one another. A disturbing implication of this paradigm is that any restriction of expression must now be seen as a restraint of someone's truth. It is no longer possible to insist one is merely curbing the activities of a false-prophet; the paradigm countenances no such creature.

To contrast truth as it is contemplated by the two alternative paradigms: for the first, a truth is "true" by virtue of existence and discovery; for the second, a truth is "true" by virtue of experience and definition.

As for endorsing one or another of the two paradigms, if the political scientist chooses the first, he can justifiably speak of discovering the "true" nature of political activity; he can talk of "true," or on the contrary "false," readings of any given economic, social or political phenomena; he can honor some views as "objective" and dismiss others as value-laden and irrational. He may do all these things and remain consistent with his initial assumed premises.

If he adheres to the second paradigm, the student of politics may discount a view as irrelevant to his own experience and goals but he can never argue it is less objective; he may contend a proposed schema is too simplistic or too complex for realizing his particular set of objectives, but he can not assert that it oversimplifies or complicates some purported "true" state of affairs;

he may insist persons who push truths which he personally dislikes ought to be discriminated against or even repressed, but he can not pose as a champion of free expression and then deny equal time to views which he contends "distort" the "true" nature of things. These are but a few of the divergent implications of the alternative frameworks.

The format of the essay is as follows: In Chapter One I have detailed the nineteenth century paradigm and attempted to show the logical connections between the various premises. Chapters Two and Three are concerned with implications of that framework for the study of political events; the hints and instructions it provides the student of politics; the kinds of questions it tells him are important and the sort of answers it tells him are acceptable. Chapters Four and Five deal with inconsistencies, inadequacies and anomalies of the paradigm, Chapter Four with ones of a general nature and Chapter Five with those which apply in a rather especial manner to political science. The next three chapters, Six, Seven and Eight, describe various reactions of students of politics who have become aware the paradigm has major flaws. To a great extent such reactions involve proposals for reform of the conceptual framework, for paradigm modifications. Reform, however, is not enough as I will try to show. Nothing less than a new paradigm is required. In Chapter Nine I have outlined the kind of relativistic replacement I believe political scientists

need; its implications for the field are covered in Chapter Ten.

Ironically, if the paradigm is a sound one, it can expect to meet with non-acceptance by most members of the political science community. In immediate terms, it predicts the likelihood of its own rejection, for reasons which are made clear in Chapter Ten. Just as certainly, a few will find it a highly compelling framework, its premises rather obviously "true." Hopefully, even those who reject it will be stimulated to turn to the weaknesses inherent in their own paradigm.

Individuals who endorse the nineteenth century epistemological (and metaphysical) paradigm with greatest ardor can expect to find this essay negative in attitude. It is only natural that one would see as malignant and destructive a force which threatens to bring his own house down. On the other hand, "the few" referred to above will consider it an extremely positive approach, as I do. Perhaps its major value is that it raises questions (and even supplies a few answers) which have gone too long ignored.

Needless to say, it is my belief that a relativistic epistemology will become a widely held "truth" in the not too distant future. Some will no doubt view this as a misfortune for man. In a certain sense perhaps it is, akin to that suffered when the earth was removed from the center of the universe, or when man was linked genetically with other life forms, or again when the particular attention of a deity

and the promise of an afterlife were removed. Yet overall I cannot but think man has profited by such misfortunes. His willingness and his even greater ability to perpetrate brutalities notwithstanding, I believe man is a slightly more tolerant creature than he was in centuries past. It may be that his frequent humiliations have brought him humility. At any rate, about one thing we can seemingly be confident. The loss of static "truth" will not be his final humiliation.

I would like to acknowledge my profound debt to the many persons who played crucial roles in giving this thesis its finished form; to George Kent, who had a hand in the development of some of the ideas in Chapters Six and Seven; to Florence Perkolup who did most of the proofreading; Joan Stover, who typed the final draft; Winnett Hagens, who over a period of two years spent numerous afternoons and evenings arguing one or another point with me (every scholar is aware of the value of a bright but doubting friend to point out the weak spots in an argument); and above all, to Professor E. Lane Davis, who provided many valuable critical comments and, most importantly, gave the encouragement without which this essay would never have been written.

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I. THE PREVAILING PARADIGM: A NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNDERSTANDING?¹

It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding.²

--George Berkeley

Underlying much of contemporary political science are several key assumptions about the nature of the universe. Tied to-- indeed, derived from--these basic postulates are other assumptions having to do with the character of scholarly endeavor and with the personal attributes which the political scientist thereby concludes he as a scholar should aim for. These last, in their turn, frequently prompt the student of politics, particularly one with a scientific bent, to endorse a series of procedural techniques to be adhered to. Collectively, such assumptions and sub-assumptions constitute what I have here chosen to call the nineteenth century conceptual

¹Lewis White Beck, "The 'Natural Science Ideal' in the Social Sciences," The Scientific Monthly, LXVIII (June 1949), p. 386. White accuses the contemporary social scientist of pursuing "the past glory of the great edifice of nineteenth-century physics."

²George Berkeley, R. J. Hirst, ed., Perception and the External World, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 248.

framework, or paradigm, of natural science. I think the label appropriate enough. The paradigm is that very one which enabled the natural sciences of a century past to reap such great successes. It is also the one which failed the twentieth century physicist in dismal manner.

My purpose in this chapter is simply to detail the paradigm in question and to show the unity of its parts: the logical connections between one assumption and another. Before starting that task, however, I would like to present a few quotations gleaned in a matter of minutes from political science works selected at random from my bookcase. The quotations offered are intended to serve as introductory evidence that political scientists do employ the particular conceptual framework I am about to describe. The citations read as follows:

- A. Speaking of foreign policy decision-making, an author comments: "The decision may be the product of ignorance of all the facts. Or the pressures of the moment may distort judgment."³
- B. "When initially advanced, and for many months thereafter, the stereotype of Soviet influence or control was grossly at odds with the facts." Here the reference is to United States attitudes toward the Cuban revolution.⁴

³Harry Howe Ransom, ed., An American Foreign Policy Reader (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1965), pp. 2-3.

⁴William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Delta Book, Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1962), p. 5.

- C. "It can thus be seen that the Marxist interpretation of fascism in terms of class (identifying fascism with capitalism in decay) is not borne out by the facts."⁵
- D. "It may be well to ask whether such an approach to international affairs would reveal aspects of empirical reality that are not fully uncovered by present approaches." The writer is discussing a possible approach to the study of international relations.⁶
- E. "The second and related organizing concept here employed is that of the divergence between the images that nations entertain of world affairs and of each other and the international realities as they actually are."⁷
- F. "A good case might be made for the view that if Hitler had recognized the real qualities of his enemies, instead of being misled by false and inadequate stereotypes, he might have made very different decisions, and the whole course of history might have been affected thereby."⁸
- G. "We speak of international society and of international organizations as if they were groupings of people; we discuss the international equivalents of law and morality; we discern the rights and duties of states; we analyze the organs of international institutions in terms analogous to the traditional three branches of government. Needless to say all these analogies are defective."⁹

⁵William Ebenstein, Today's Isms (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 105.

⁶Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p. 6.

⁷John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 5.

⁸Otto Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 41.

⁹Joseph Frankel, International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. viii.

- H. "Preoccupation either with the process of foreign policy-making within the state or with the international system as a whole, however, may lead to distortions."¹⁰
- I. "Facile but unfounded comparisons between heterogeneous political systems are always a temptation to historians and political scientists."¹¹
- J. Finally, one author argues the need for books which clarify a democratic socialist approach to the world's ills, and adds: "Whether the books of such a literature will in fact succeed in helping their readers to keep in touch with reality is of course another matter."¹²

What sort of a paradigm is manifested in all of the above statements? I believe I can give a fairly meaningful description of it. Beginning with those assumptions which were said to be made about the nature of the universe, the scholar is found to take as his own the belief that there is a "reality", made up of objects and events having single "true" or "real" forms. In other words, the objects and events of our universe possess forms which are independent of any and all observers. They are there to be "discovered" by the scholar, but in no way "created" by him.

A sharp line is drawn between the viewer and the viewed.

Objects which are external to us (the facts) are genuine, it is

¹⁰Walter C. Clemens, Jr., ed., World Perspectives on International Politics (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 4.

¹¹Joel Larus, ed., Comparative World Politics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1964), p. 12.

¹²John Strachey, The End of Empire (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 9.

insisted; they are not to be regarded as mirages, nor as "fleeting and fugitive appearances." In short, "facts are facts, and if it happens that they satisfy a prediction, this is not an effect of our free activity."¹³

In support of this position, Morris Cohen has argued,

. . . if sanity requires me to believe that other human beings exist apart from my ideas or impressions of them, and existed long before I was capable of knowing anything, why suppose that their physical bodies exist only in my perception?¹⁴

Why indeed? No, human bodies, like all facts, are there.

After all, what else could the search for knowledge be about if not first and foremost the discovery of facts?

So much for the prime assumption. Along with it goes a belief that these facts (the objects and events of our universe) fall into "natural" categories. To be sure, Cohen acknowledges, one can insist that even the cell division of an amoeba or the dropping of a stone can never be duplicated "exactly." One occurrence will never be wholly identical to another. Nevertheless, he continues, it is

equally obvious that there is no sense in speaking of repetition unless the events repeated are in some respect identical. If the identical stone (or any other of the same volume) is repeatedly dropped, its (abstract) velocity is the same. So there are elements of identity which make us call events in different organisms the cell division of an amoeba . . . it

¹³Henri Poincare, The Foundations of Science (Pennsylvania: The Science Press, 1946), p. 333; Poincare, The Value of Science (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1958), pp. 122, 138.

¹⁴Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931), pp. 312-313.

ought to be obvious that the application of laws to phenomena presupposes the existence of real classes, that many things and processes are really alike.¹⁵

"Many things and processes are really alike." Hence there are correct or right classifications and there are incorrect or wrong ones. If it is the mark of a scholar to put like things together, it must also be the mark of a scholar to assume that some objects and events are inherently alike. "Let us make explicit," says Robert M. MacIver, "the hypothesis that . . . things belong together in systems because it is their nature to do so."¹⁶

Note how the first premise (that reality has one "true" form) is tied up with the second. For if reality has "real" structure, and if it is that structure we are beholding when we view other beings, or stones, or amoeba, it follows that the similarities we contemplate must also be real. To accept the former is to accept the latter. Thus we find a logical connection between the references to "reality" and "the facts" in quotations A, B, C, D, E, and J and the observation in quotations G and I that some observers put dissimilar things together, draw erroneous analogies.

A third assumption which followers of the prevailing paradigm make, again, a logically related assumption, is that all the facts

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 101, 153.

¹⁶Robert M. MacIver, Social Causation (Massachusetts: Ginn and Company, 1942), p. 99.

(objects and events) of our universe are caused, that they are "naturally determined."¹⁷ Spelled out, this means that every conceivable phenomenon, from social, to psychological, to physical, is caused. The causes may be few or many, but they exist. Not only is there a cause for each and every event, but like causes will always result in like effects.¹⁸ To be more precise, it is held that the same forces will, under the same conditions, produce the same effects; which is to say all things obey laws.

There are some who hedge on this last point. They may argue that human behavior "depends on free will and can never be foretold with certainty."¹⁹ Nevertheless, unless they are willing to relinquish the nineteenth century natural science paradigm entirely or declare it inappropriate to the study of social phenomena they must at least go on to add that man's activity "is not wholly capricious; it is predictable to a certain extent. It embodies at least statistical regularities, regularities which show up in the long run."²⁰

¹⁷Carlo L. Lastrucci, The Scientific Approach (Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1963), p. 37.

¹⁸Harold H. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy (New York: American Book Company, 1946), p. 94.

¹⁹Gladys Sellev, Paul Hanly Furfey, William T. Gaughan, An Introduction to Sociology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 4.

²⁰Ibid.

Moreover, a "true-believer" in the paradigm, whom we are concerned with here, would not be apt to accept such a qualification. He might well dismiss it as the rationalization of one whose religious conviction or just plain personal preference battled with his objectivity. Others are inclined to substitute words such as "reason" for cause when speaking of human conduct.²¹ "Reason," the justification goes, is more suggestive of "purposive and rule-following" behavior. Again, however, to the extent this kind of substitution is meant to imply a bond of greater flexibility, one which is less rigidly deterministic than that usually said to exist between "cause and effect," (and this is often the case), strong proponents of the prevailing paradigm will take issue. This is understandable. As with the preceding qualification, this last is nothing other than a partial denial of the validity of the conceptual framework being outlined, or a suggestion that it will bear less fruit when applied to the social world than it has when applied to the physical. Furthermore, if those who speak of reasons in preference to causes mean to suggest that given reasons will invariably lead to particular kinds of activity (and can therefore be used to explain that activity), they have merely made the word reason synonymous with cause, and the relationship they postulate is every bit as rigidly deterministic as before. The only difference is that it includes the act of choosing.

²¹See the discussion by Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 23-26.

In what way is the idea of causality tied to the first two assumptions? In this way. Cohen said "the application of laws to phenomena presupposes the existence of real classes." Now we can simply reverse that and say "the existence of real classes presupposes the existence of laws." How? Because we only know objects and events by their relationships to other objects and events. We know an amoeba, for example, by the way it relates to things external to itself, and we define it in just such a manner. So too, we call a second object an amoeba because it appears to duplicate the relationships of the first. Now when we speak of like objects or events having like relationships with other objects or events we are speaking of lawfulness. And what are lawful relationships between objects and events if not causal sequences? To assume the existence "out there" of "true" or "natural" forms is to assume as well the existence of "true" or "natural" similarities or classes, laws and causes. As I remarked at the outset, the paradigm has an impressive consistency to recommend it.

Summing up the first three premises we find an advocate of the nineteenth century conceptual framework entertains a belief that our universe is orderly. Once he has said objects and events possess forms which are independent of any viewer, that they fall into natural categories or classes, with constant causal relationships existing between and among them, he must go on to add that he holds the universe to be an orderly one. And he does. Thus Alex Inkeles

refers to the scientific perspective which makes "the assumption that there is order in nature, and that it can be discovered, described and understood."²² And Henri Poincare talks about the "internal harmony of the world."²³ Clearly, Inkeles' "order" and Poincare's "internal harmony" refer to the facts, the laws, the causes. For a scientific observer, then, the trick is to discover the "real" forms of such things. But here is the rub. To do so the investigator himself will have to possess certain personal attributes. Which is to say that the consistency of our prevailing paradigm extends to assumptions made about the character of a "truly" scholarly observer.

Let me point to the logical step involved here. Objects and events exist "out there" in natural forms. So do laws and causes. Yet we find that men do not always agree upon the shape of these forms. Regarding economic, social and political questions, dissension is often the normal state of affairs. It can only be, therefore, that some men must come closer to discerning the "truth" than do others. Now the recognition of "true" forms is said to necessitate objectivity, a personal trait. So much for the connection.

A scholarly observer, the argument goes, will be "objective." The good investigator is said to be detached, at least while he operates

²²Alex Inkeles, What Is Sociology?, Foundations of Modern Sociology Series (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), p. 25.

²³Poincare, The Value of Science, p. 13.

as an investigator. Inkeles puts it this way:

In the best of all possible worlds, scholars would avoid too deep a personal identification with any one model [by model Inkeles means descriptive or explanatory paradigm, or framework] and would freely abandon their picture of the world as soon as a better one came along.²⁴

In other words, the scholar minimizes, ideally eliminates, any personal bias or prejudice.²⁵ Essentially what is demanded is a state of mind which one author has called "ethical neutrality." He describes it as an interest "not in what is right or wrong or good or evil, but only in what is true or false."²⁶

This is not to say that the observer has to refrain from evaluating or judging. He must judge, of course. However, his evaluations, according to defenders of the going view, should not be of an ethical nature.²⁷ Observe, says George A. Lundberg, that in the proposition "if the spark (and all the other necessary and sufficient conditions), then, the explosion, such a statement can never carry any ethical implications regarding the social desirability of explosions."²⁸

²⁴Inkeles, p. 29. See also: Robert Bierstedt, Eugene J. Meehan, Paul A. Samuelson, Modern Social Science (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 12.

²⁵Cohen, pp. 347-348. See also: Inkeles, p. 39; Lastrucci, pp. 6-7.

²⁶Robert Bierstedt, as quoted in William P. McEwin, The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge (New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963), p. 39.

²⁷George A. Lundberg, "Alleged Obstacles to Social Science," The Scientific Monthly, LXX, (May, 1950), p. 304.

²⁸Ibid.

The investigator simply makes a sharp division between his citizen and scholar roles. It is as a scholar that he is unconcerned about the goodness or badness of explosions. As a citizen he may be very concerned indeed.

It is really only saying the same thing to insist that the scholar must be able to distinguish between "fact" and "value." If one is to concentrate on finding out what is true, rather than what is good, one must be able to keep his desires from clouding his vision; for what one wants to be will have nothing to do with what is, save by chance. Hans Kelsen has stated the argument well. He asserts:

The judgment that something is true or false is the ascertainment of the existence or non-existence of a fact; and such a judgment has an objective character insofar as it is independent of the wish or fear of the judging subject and is verifiable by experience of the senses controlled by reason.²⁹

Kelsen concludes with the comment that judgments concerning reality can never be contradicted by judgments which concern values. The two realms, values and realities, are and will remain distinct. Facts, we must remember, are outside the perimeter of our desires; we have no control over them. Bertrand Russell says it: "I mean by a 'fact'," he states, "something which is there, whether anybody thinks so or not."³⁰

²⁹Hans Kelsen, "Science and Politics," The American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), p. 642.

³⁰Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), p. 143.

Again, the same general point is being made when it is suggested the scientist separates "opinion" from "fact," or when it is declared that "is" and "ought" are, and must be kept, apart from one another; or yet again, when "normative" as opposed to "descriptive" statements are referred to. The scholar qua scientific scholar is only concerned with "facts," with "objective description," with what "is." Listen to William H. George speaking about The Scientist in Action.

The Should-Ought Mechanism has no place whatever in research technique and its complete and unconditional abandonment is one of the foundation stones of science . . . now one of the most extensive uses of the Should-Ought Mechanism is in the field of ethics or morality. If it be accepted that the complete and unconditional abandonment of the Should-Ought Mechanism is one of the fundamentals of research technique, it follows that whenever a scientist is making a statement of what is, for example, moral or immoral, he is not speaking as a scientist.³¹

Countless other writers could be cited regarding this characteristic of the "scientific" scholar, but nothing would be gained by it. Suffice it to repeat that the scholar is reputed by adherents of the prevailing paradigm to draw a fast line between "is," "description," "fact," on the one hand, and "ought," "prescription," (or normative statement) and "value" on the other.

Once we have described the scholar of the nineteenth century natural science paradigm as an individual who in his work gives facts

³¹William H. George, The Scientist in Action (New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1938), pp. 63-64.

priority over values, have we not said he will hold a love of knowledge to be of primary worth? Thus spokesmen for this paradigm are wont to insist that

. . . a common feature of all scientific investigation and analysis, the feature which distinguishes scientific statements from engineering and normative statements, is the quest for knowledge without regard necessarily to the practical uses to which such knowledge may be put.³²

Knowledge is to be sought not so much because of what we might do with it as because it has intrinsic worth.³³ This last thought was Cohen's, though Cohen put it more poetically. "In the end," he said, "we must remember that the knowledge of the truth, like the vision of beauty, is a good in itself."³⁴

So far so good. An investigator, if he would be a scholarly investigator, must aim to acquire knowledge. What is knowledge? It is nothing other than information about individual facts, about laws and about causes. At this point a critical question arises; namely, given what has been said, how does one distinguish the scholar from the non-scholar? After all, every observer of necessity attempts to

³²Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963), p. 28.

³³There are many, of course, who argue the primary value of knowledge is its utility.

³⁴Cohen, p. 350. See also Henri Poincare, The Foundations of Science, p. 366.

explain phenomena by reference to "reasons why," "precipitating factors," "precedents," "things which led to," in a word, in terms of "causes." Every observer builds his descriptive as well as his explanatory statements out of bits and pieces which at least he considers factual. And every observer in postulating a causal relationship simultaneously postulates a lawful connection whether he is aware of it or not. How, then, does one recognize the scholarly investigator? More importantly, how does one go about becoming such a creature? Such questions are not easy for supporters of the prevailing paradigm to answer. There is still a debate going on over whether the "scientific" scholar does different things, or just does things differently. However, there appears to be a significant amount of agreement that he will employ some or all of the following techniques, practices and sub-assumptions. He who is scientifically oriented will, it is suggested, (a) Control emotions. Truth's form, that which "is," can best be discovered through the use of reason. Emotion, on the other hand, is essentially in opposition to science, a threat to objectivity. Is it not in respect to our desires, our "oughts," that we usually become emotional? To acquire scientific objectivity, then, is to "learn to control our emotions and impulses, . . . to take the long view, to do the rational thing instead of the emotional. . . ." ³⁵

³⁵Leo E. Saidla and Warren E. Gibbs, Science and the Scientific Mind (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1930), p. 17.

"In scientific work clarity of mind is dependent, to a high degree, on [an] ability to free one's observations and interpretations from emotional bias."³⁶ "[An] objectionable idea to the scientific mind is that a decision should be made under the influence of emotion."³⁷ Some observers even go so far as to caution the scholar against over-enthusiasm, arguing it is "exactly when his enthusiasm for some result runs highest, [that] the chances for mistakes arise."³⁸

Another characteristic of the science-minded scholar is the tendency to:

(b) Strive for methodological precision. This is understandable, it is consistent; for science, according to the nineteenth century paradigm, "is an effort to eliminate baseless opinions" and replace them with knowledge.³⁹ Above all, it is "certain knowledge" which the scholar wants.⁴⁰ How can he insure that the knowledge he possesses is certain? He cannot do so, of course. He can, however, make

³⁶Paul Freedman, The Principles of Scientific Research (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1960), pp. 66-67.

³⁷C. E. Kenneth Mees, The Path of Science (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1946), p. 232.

³⁸Gerald Holton, Introduction to Concepts and Theories in Physical Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1952), p. 245.

³⁹Cohen, p. 83.

⁴⁰Ibid.

certainty more probable. Hence the need for precision.

"Science," it is said by the defender of the prevailing paradigm, "aims at greater exactness than that which characterizes ordinary common sense."⁴¹ Regardless of his area of inquiry, the scientific investigator "is a man who is engaged in the application of a rigorous method in the pursuit of knowledge."⁴² Indeed, "science may be distinguished from ordinary common-sense knowledge by the rigor with which it subordinates all other considerations to the pursuit of the ideal of certainty, exactness, universality, and system."⁴³ What does methodological precision mean in terms of actual operations?

Various things; for instance, one should

(c) Make definitions clear and concise. Words should be given meanings which are widely accepted within, if possible universally accepted by, the scholarly community. Toward this end

concepts and constructs should be defined either (a) objectively or (b) operationally--i. e., they should be defined (a) in terms of empirically verifiable and standardized referents (such as rulers, thermometers, scales, etc.) which leave little room for dispute among competent observers; or they should be defined (b) in terms of specific operations, behaviors, processes or effects which likewise leave little room for

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Robert Bierstedt, The Social Order (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1963), p. 17.

⁴³Cohen, p. 83.

serious dispute.⁴⁴

Ambiguity is incompatible with science. Therefore, whenever possible one is advised to

(d) Employ instruments in the "observational process." By so doing, scholars can minimize the likelihood of incorrect observation. "The danger of biased observation exists in all fields and in all sciences. We protect ourselves against these human tendencies to error on the part of the observer by the use of instruments."⁴⁵ Now understandably, if investigators are to know the value of given instruments, and if they are to be able to use them properly, they must be trained. And so we find that

(e) The scientific observer will be a "trained observer." Truth, we noted, is seldom obvious to just anyone; extensive preparation is usually needed.

Although essentially the same set of mental abilities and processes are used in the acquisition of both science and common knowledge, it is clear that the scientist uses them in a much more sophisticated manner. He begins by making a thorough study of the knowledge previously acquired in his particular field. This usually involves some years of graduate study under competent teachers at a university.⁴⁶

But the time spent in this way is well worth it; for it is the person

⁴⁴Lastrucci, p. 80.

⁴⁵Lundberg, "Alleged Obstacles to Social Science," p. 300.

⁴⁶Paul Hanly Furfey, The Scope and Method of Sociology: A Metasociological Treatise (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 53.

trained in the methods of scholarship, in scientific method, who will be best prepared to distinguish fact from opinion.⁴⁷

We have to insist on qualified observers. . . . With or without instruments, scientific training in a specified field consists in large part of learning to see (hear, feel, smell, etc.) phenomena we can't see at all until we are trained.⁴⁸

Training is liberating. The educational process brings one out of the cave so to speak. It makes one more objective. It increases one's chances of finding "truth," of uncovering reality. All of which leads us to the premise that at any given time we can

(f) Assume the objective view is most likely to be what the body of adequately trained observers say it is. "Such, therefore, is the first condition of objectivity; what is objective must be common to many minds and consequently transmissible from one to the other."⁴⁹ That is, objectivity demands consensus. Not a consensus among any sort of minds, however; we must remember the need of scientific, scholarly training, recalling that it is such a one who "sets up rigorous criteria by which he distinguishes fact and truth from myth and falsity."⁵⁰ Admittedly, a collection of trained minds may agree

⁴⁷Lastrucci, p. 80.

⁴⁸George A. Lundberg, Clarence C. Schrag, Otto N. Larsen, Sociology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 38.

⁴⁹Poincare, The Value of Science, p. 136.

⁵⁰Lundberg, et al., Sociology, p. 37.

about a fact or truth and yet be in error; it has happened, and therefore the good scientist remains humble. Nevertheless, such a group of minds are less likely to err than are untrained ones, or a trained one with whom no one else agrees.

The facts and truths to be distinguished exist, argues the paradigm, "out there." Because of this the scientist must continually refer to what's "out there." Or in other words, he must

(g) Be an empiricist. Stated simply, being an empiricist involves a continual checking of one's theoretical formulations against the "real world." It means making an extensive use of observation and re-observation. To the believer in the prevailing paradigm it is the rejection of blind faith and the maintenance of an empirical frame of mind which most sharply distinguishes science from religion.

There was a time when theologians and philosophers dominated nearly all intellectual pursuits. Few dared to challenge their views relating to the nature of man and his universe. Whatever they said was accepted as truth by virtue of who they were and what they represented. It was

against this decadent scholasticism and barren belief in authority [that] the pioneers of science took a firm stand. They abhorred ontological speculations and the fabrications of rationalistic deductions. They distrusted dialectics and placed no faith in "authority." Leonardo da Vinci struck the keynote of the new era when he said: "All sciences are vain and full of errors which do not terminate in observation; that is, whose origin or middle or end does not come

through one of the five senses."⁵¹

Empiricism, to repeat, means observation; and observation means seeing, hearing, feeling and the like. It means "sensing." Harold H. Titus has spoken of the "principle of empiricism," according to which "the investigator assumes that his sense impressions are correct and that the test of truth is an appeal to the 'experienced facts'."⁵²

In the last analysis it is empiricism which assures us that the world we live in, our daily reality, is an objective one.

Through the communications that we have with other men, we receive from them ready-made reasonings; we know that these reasonings do not come from us and at the same time we recognize in them the work of reasonable beings like ourselves. And as these reasonings appear to fit the world of our sensations, we think we may infer that these reasonable beings have seen the same thing as we; thus it is that we know we have not been dreaming.⁵³

Thus it is too that we know we are being objective, that we know we are coming up with the facts. For a believer in the paradigm being described it is almost impossible to over-emphasize the importance of empiricism. Indeed, he is likely to conclude that "the final test of a theory's validity does not lie either in polemical exegesis

⁵¹W. H. Werkmeister, A Philosophy of Science (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), p. 15.

⁵²Titus, p. 94.

⁵³Poincare, The Value of Science, p. 135

or even in logical analysis. It lies in the ability of the theory to withstand the rigorous test of empirical proof."⁵⁴

Now if the scientist is to place so much stress on observation, if he is to look and then look again, and then implore others to look, it follows that he will, of necessity, have to

(h) Study general, not unique phenomena. The scientist, the scientific scholar, can only study "reproduceables."⁵⁵ About the unique he can say nothing. Admittedly, nothing is ever reproduced "exactly"; things are never found to be completely identical. However, as we have observed, the investigator is able to assume that some objects and events are similar. Some are so similar, in fact, they form natural categories and can, for the purposes of science, be called one and the same. That is, they can be looked upon as though they were identical even when they are not. Obviously, in any given instance this very premise can itself be empirically tested and defended. A scholar has only to call upon his colleagues to look for themselves and see if it is not so that A is like B but different from C.

Another principle results from this brief discussion; if

⁵⁴Heinz Eulau, Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., A Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), p. 100.

⁵⁵Lastrucci, p. 86. Also: Poincare, The Value of Science. Poincare observes that "an isolated fact has by itself no interest; it becomes interesting if one has reason to think that it may aid in the prediction of other facts; or better, if having been predicted, its verification is the confirmation of a law." p. 122

objects and events are never the same yet must be treated as such (since science is the study of reproduceables), the scientist must have a standard for judging whether things are alike. In other words, the scientific scholar will

(i) Employ models. A model is something which all cases in a category are "similar to," but none are "identical with." Models are "hypothetical" situations or entities, useful when it comes to classifying.⁵⁶ Physical science, the argument goes, has reaped profit from their use. Examples are the perfect lever, the ideal gas, the complete vacuum and so forth. Models, by enabling the scientist to classify and categorize, to order and organize, throw light on "the intolerably complex relationships of both physical and social phenomena as they exist in unclassified and uncontrolled nature."⁵⁷

There are other techniques and sub-assumptions the scientist can employ to cut through the complexity of our universe; he is strongly advised to do so. He should, they say,

⁵⁶The word "model" is not always used to refer to hypothetical entities. On occasion it is applied to actual physical structures, as "model" airplanes, or a model of the Empire State Building. Most often, however, when scholars speak of "model-building" they mean the former operation. For a discussion of models, see: Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 258-93; also: Van Dyke, pp. 104-7.

⁵⁷Lundberg, "Alleged Obstacles to Social Science," p. 300.

(j) Isolate systems.

Certainly every event in nature is related to an untold number of others, perhaps even to everything else in nature. But by abstractions and material isolation, we are able to reduce the effects of most of the others to negligible quantities, and to attend only to the functional relations of certain chosen events.⁵⁸

It is to achieve material isolation that the chemist and the biologist put things into containers. A physicist wishing to check the efficiency of heavy water as a medium for slowing down neutrons, materially isolates D_2O from H_2O and gets on with the test.

The reason for material isolation is so obvious that it hardly needs to be stated. If one wants to observe the effect of variable A upon variable B his work is made exceedingly easier if he is able to isolate these factors away from variables D, E, F and so on. In such a situation he can take for granted it is not D, E, or F which is bringing about noted alterations in B.

In each and every case of material isolation some abstraction is also involved. Complete isolation is never possible in a material sense. Nothing eludes gravity, for instance, or the impact of sub-atomic particles arriving from outer space. But to the degree that such variables can be treated as constants (gravity) or of negligible influence (sub-atomic particles) one attains isolation by abstracting. To put it simply, one ignores such factors.

⁵⁸Lewis White Beck, pp. 387-88.

Fortunately for the scientist, observes Lewis White Beck, "nature not only has serial order which can be studied in relative isolation; the things of nature also come in 'vertical' arrangements, or wholes with contemporaneous parts."⁵⁹ In other words, nature has made the scientist's task easier by ordering many things for him; by partially isolating on her own the objects and events of this universe of ours.

Isolation, then, is another of the means by which the scientist deals with complexity. Still another, likewise widely proclaimed, has been called the scholar's inclination to

(k) Theoretical parsimony. "Parsimony has to do with simplicity. It means that when one explanation is adequate to explain a phenomenon, two or more are superfluous."⁶⁰ Which of the two or more should be chosen? Again, parsimoniousness is the guiding precept. From among a number of theories each of which is sufficient to explain a given phenomenon one is usually well advised to select the least cumbersome, the least involved, the simplest hypothesis. Looking backward, we find that among natural scientists this has generally been the practice. Thus, "what gave the Copernican theory distinction above that of Ptolemy and finally led it to victory

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 388.

⁶⁰Bierstedt, The Social Order, p. 21.

and general acceptance was its pervading simplicity. . . ."61

Do not suppose the rule just posited is unrelated to the rest of the paradigm. Once more, the logical connection: if the universe is made up of "naturally" similar forms relating to one another in "naturally" similar manner, have we not suggested there is a "natural" simplicity characterizing it?

In the words of Alfred North Whitehead, "the guiding motto of every natural philosopher should be, seek simplicity and distrust it."62 Or, to say much the same thing:

(1) Attempt only the confirmation or refutation of easily understood hypotheses, and remain skeptical. The first part is usually interpreted to mean that an hypothesis should be "impartially (scientifically) tested" rather than "proved by appropriately selected data and reasoning."63 And the second part is considered to be a plea for tolerance and humility. If one is skeptical he is not likely to put undue confidence in any theory, his own or someone else's. He will be cognizant of the tentative nature of all theory, and hence, will

⁶¹Henry Margenau, Open Vistas: Philosophical Perspectives of Modern Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 13.

⁶²Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (London: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 163.

⁶³Lundberg, "Alleged Obstacles to Social Science," p. 304.

avoid dogmatism and the closed mind.⁶⁴

And so we have come almost full circle. To argue that the scientific scholar aims to substantiate or refute an hypothesis rather than defend personal preferences is to repeat that he seeks knowledge, not converts. It is to say once more that while he operates as a scholar he "has no ethical, religious, political, literary, philosophical, moral or marital preferences."⁶⁵ "In his professional capacity," he does not take sides on issues of moral or ethical significance," he does not espouse goals or objectives. It is to describe the scholar as a specialist in "means" rather than "ends," one who is most deserving of our admiration and respect when he sticks to making "if--then" statements: "if this is your objective, then, use that means." And ideally he will add, "I cannot tell you what your aim should be"; thus he is, the model investigator of the paradigm of the nineteenth century physical science--an advocate of truth, a lover of wisdom, and the possessor of an "aloofness" which "is the condition of that liberality which makes man civilized."⁶⁶

⁶⁴According to Lastrucci, "In order to avoid the all-too-human tendency to be satisfied with the status quo, the scientist guards himself by a cloak of critical doubt. In this sense, science can never offer the comfortable surety of omniscient systems of belief." p. 10.

⁶⁵Bierstedt, The Social Order, p. 20.

⁶⁶Cohen, p. 350.

There is one more thing I might add in concluding this brief outline of the prevailing view. Along with all of his other qualities and characteristics, the successful scholar will be "creative." What does it mean to be creative? It means that one has a better than average ability to detect the adumbrations of truth. To no small degree eminence in a field will be contingent upon one's creative powers. It is creativity that tells one which facts are of paramount importance and how they might be ordered most profitably. "It would not be entirely honest to say: 'I let the facts speak for themselves.' Facts may speak for themselves, but they cannot select themselves."⁶⁷ Nor can they reveal their true relationships. It should be clear by now that according to this view the scholar is considered to be, in a very real sense, a "discoverer." Creativity merely makes it more likely that he will chart a productive course.

Unlike the other attributes of the scholar, creativity, the argument goes, cannot be had by sheer diligence and desire.

The history of science indicates . . . that fruitful hypotheses have generally come to certain gifted minds as musical themes or great poetic expressions have come to others. You may call them the gift of the gods to their favorites.⁶⁸

If creativity has to do with the uncovering of new "truths,"

⁶⁷Inkeles, p. 3.

⁶⁸Cohen, p. 80.

then, all disciplines are well advised to encourage scholars to exercise their creativity. Unfortunately this introduces a rather vexatious problem. For to the degree that a new "truth" is new, a creative product is creative, it will conflict with some, perhaps many, established views. In so doing, it stands a chance of being rejected as both untrue and uncreative. This has happened time and time again. A moment's reflection brings to mind names such as Galileo, Lavoisier, and Pasteur. And yet, if scientists made no attempt to weed out the cranks and false prophets from their midst, who would protect the unsophisticated public? Asks one author, "What about the long-run effects of non-medical books like Velikovsky's and the treatises on flying saucers? . . . Who can say how many orthodox Christians and Jews read Worlds in Collision and drifted back into a cruder Biblicism because they were told that science had reaffirmed the Old Testament miracles?"⁶⁹ To be sure, "the martyrs of science have sometimes been victims of the faithful rather than the infidels," still, "for every resisted scientific genius there are numberless crackpots, for every martyr to the truth there are countless victims only of their own paranoid delusions."⁷⁰ The costs of a gross misreading of the "truth" can be so very excessive, many endorsers of the prevailing paradigm

⁶⁹Martin Gardner, "In the Name of Science," Samuel Rapport and Helen Wright, eds., Science: Method and Meaning (New York: New York University Press, 1963), p. 33.

⁷⁰Kaplan, pp. 4-5.

conclude, that perhaps a "certain degree of dogma--of pig-headed orthodoxy--is both necessary and desirable for the health of science. It forces the scientist with a novel view to mass considerable evidence before his theory can be seriously entertained."⁷¹

So runs the "conventional wisdom" concerning science and scientific investigation. It would be helpful if the reader tried to keep in mind the meanings of key words which are implicit in this paradigm. Objectivity, for instance, is made almost the antithesis of subjectivity. To be objective is to employ reason rather than emotion. It is to concentrate on the truth of matters and not on one's own preferences and predilections. To be objective is to deal in fact as opposed to fancy. It means to be motivated by a desire to know rather than to manipulate. In a concrete situation, the objective position is that which is held by a qualified group of investigators.

Subjectivity, on the other hand, suggests opinion, and of a personal variety. To be subjective is to permit emotion to gain undue influence; it is to be inadequately committed to the employment of reason and rationality.⁷² It is to care more about how one "sees" things than about how they "really" are. Reality, naturally, is made

⁷¹Gardner, p. 38.

⁷²The word "subjective" is of course also used to refer to a private view and in this sense a "subjective" fact may be an "objective" fact as well.

up of the "facts" of our universe and the relationships between them. To know the variables involved in an event, plus the manner in which they relate to one another, is to know the reality of the situation. The whole of reality is comprised of all the facts in the universe along with all of the laws.

Cause, and this is an important definition to remember, refers to that variable (those variables) which must have accompanied or preceded the existence (occurrence) of an object or event in question in order for it to exist (occur) just as it does at a given time and place in space; the variable or variables, then, whose existence will seemingly guarantee a repeat performance. Commonly, the definition is further broken down into "necessary" and "sufficient" causes.⁷³ Necessary causes are those factors or variables which must be present if a given object or event is to exist but which, in and of themselves, are not enough to bring that object or event into being. They are, that is, necessary but not sufficient. The sufficient causes of an object or event are just what the word implies. If they are present (along with the necessary causes, naturally), it can be assumed that the object or event will automatically follow.

The word cause has on occasion come under some disrepute.

⁷³See: Lastrucci, pp. 54, 188. Furfey defines cause as "that which determines the condition or existence of a thing." p. 70.

It has been suggested, for instance, that an investigator can do no more than demonstrate that under given circumstances B will succeed A. It cannot be shown A somehow creates B, which the word cause implies. The dispute, however, is a pointless one. One can simply ask what those who make the argument mean by the word "create." Scholars want to be able to make "if A, then B" type statements, just as they always have. And A, in such a case, might as well be labeled a cause. The alternative is to use terms such as "reason," "precedent," "precipitating element," which is not really an alternative at all, since they are but made synonyms for cause.⁷⁴

Then there is the word understand. To understand something is to be able to explain it; and to explain it is to point to the laws and causal connections which are operative. Thus to understand why water boils is to be aware of laws such as the one which says "water, when heated (under certain conditions), boils."

Words such as reason, fact, bias, distortion, and error also have distinct meanings. Reason suggests a rational process. To employ reason is to think in a more or less detached, analytical manner. It is to hold one's emotions, one's desires in check. A fact is a piece of reality. Bias refers to intellectual error, prompted more than likely by the influence of emotion. To be biased, according to the paradigm, is to be biased away from the facts, or truth, or

⁷⁴Furfey, pp. 68-70.

reality. So too, distortion implies a warping of reality. To distort is to misread, misinterpret, or misrepresent the fact. A distorted description is one which is inaccurate or in error. To be in error is to be wrong and to be wrong is to be wrong about truth or fact, etc. Ends have to do with objectives and are something the scholar operating as scientific scholar does not concern himself with. A means, on the contrary, will be an "is," and does indeed arouse his interest.

Polemic and dogmatic are words of pejorative connotation. To use a polemical approach is to select facts in an effort to establish or defend some preconceived notion; it is to build a case in the manner of a lawyer, a desired outcome determining what is relevant and what is irrelevant in the way of information and fact. This is in sharp contrast with the scholarly endeavor which involves collecting facts and formulating theories with no other objective than that of representing reality. The dogmatist is one addicted to pet ways of viewing things. He is characterized by an unwillingness or an inability to look at matters from a different angle or through a different framework. Whereas the scholar loves and aspires to truth, using any given theory only as a means or tool to be discarded when it no longer seems to point in that direction, the dogmatist will be found to hold reverse values, to worship a theory or outlook and to discard truth when it conflicts with his especial commitment. The dogmatist is quick to dismiss the formulations of others, and does this in an offhand manner.

Needless to say, one who is dogmatic is often polemical.

For a piece of data, a comment, or an entire study to be relevant is to be relevant to some external "reality." Scholars are commonly found to label some tendered observation or finding relevant (or irrelevant). Seldom do they say "to what." If they think in terms of the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm we would not expect them to. The "to what" is taken for granted. Relevant to the "fact" or "truth" of the matter, naturally.

Finally, to be creative is to have a facility for putting facts together in ways (for formulating hypotheses) that make truth to relinquish her secrets about the structure of other facts, and about the lawful relationships among them. To be creative is to have a touch of genius. And although every scholar owes a large debt to his predecessors and his contemporaries, at the time of its occurrence the act of genius, the creative act, is nevertheless an individual product. By this I mean it is the individual who is being creative, who is demonstrating genius; the community at large simply recognizes him as such.

An impressive paradigm, is it not? Its many pieces fit together into a fairly coherent whole, assumption integrated with assumption, the techniques and sub-assumptions following in a logical manner. But there are inadequacies too; flaws in the structure which are unquestionably serious ones. And ironically, while consistency

has rendered the paradigm strong, it is also its Achilles heel. The destruction of a single major assumption threatens to bring the entire edifice toppling down; an event I believe will, for the political scientist, take place in the very near future. But that is running ahead of the story. First we must attempt to answer this question: "To what extent do contemporary political scientists pay tribute to the conceptual framework I have outlined?"

Before turning to answer the last question I want to make the following points which are central to an understanding of this essay. While I have detailed a set of premises, argued they are logically connected, and proposed they constitute a conceptual framework or paradigm, I have no idea whether anyone, physical scientist, social scientist, philosopher or layman has ever consciously endorsed the entire paradigm as presented, or will ever do so. Moreover, many of the individuals referred to as supporters of the paradigm would take strong issue with some parts of it, Lundberg in particular. He was cited as arguing the independence of fact and value and called a defender of the framework. Yet, Lundberg has forcefully denied the existence of "true" forms external to the observer as we will note in Chapter VI.

If no one speaks for it, if there is no indication that anyone will in the future, by what right do I speak of a Nineteenth Century Epistemological Paradigm, by what right do I contend there is such

a thing?⁷⁵ The complete answer to this question will have to be postponed until Chapter IX. There is no avoiding putting it off because to understand it will necessitate looking through the alternative paradigm to be described at that time. By way of setting the stage, however, I might note that what I have done in this chapter is done every day by political scientists, natural scientists and laymen. To illustrate by reference to the former, in the classroom and in their texts students of politics describe democracy by citing ideas and arguments of countless numbers of individuals, none of whom would be likely to agree with any given description as a whole, many of whom would attack it with vehemence.⁷⁶ Political scientists delineate the Marxist paradigm by bringing together various statements of Marx, Engels, Trotsky, Lenin, Mao and Khrushchev.⁷⁷ Yet, these and

⁷⁵I cannot justify my action by claiming to have described some external "truth" which is there whether anyone recognizes it or not, since I intend to argue that "truth" never exists independent of the "truth-seeker."

⁷⁶The point being made here seems to me so non-contentious as to make documentation needless. As a for-instance, however, the reader might look at Charles E. Merriam's portrayal of the "Assumptions and Program" of democracy. In building his argument Merriam quotes Rousseau and Bentham among others. Anyone familiar with the writings of these two individuals is well aware they would take violent issue with much that Merriam says about the nature of democracy. The New Democracy and the New Despotism (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939)

⁷⁷The reader might also note how William Ebenstein structures the categories "Communism", "Fascism", "Capitalism" and "Socialism". Not only self-proclaimed communists, fascists, capitalists and socialists would disagree with the form of his categories, many of his colleagues would do so as well. See: Ebenstein, Today's Ism's.

other noted proponents of Marxist doctrine have had no success agreeing among themselves as to the structure of that doctrine, and we would hardly expect them to unanimously accept any given Western presentation. Nevertheless, we put them forth, and in varied and conflicting forms.

Within the Western political science community one hears talk of the behavioral approach.⁷⁸ But every statement made to describe it is modified or denied by some reputable investigator who calls himself a behavioralist. Behavioralism itself is said to be derived from logical positivism, and attempts are made to describe the latter philosophy. On their part, logical positivists have never been able to agree just what their philosophy is. Finally, political scientists write volumes on the nature of politics and political science, actively quoting and paraphrasing one another. Just as actively, they dispute each other's analyses and conclusions. Even the most basic concepts and ideas are contended. For instance, it is said that politics has to do with "power" relationships. But political scientists argue over the meaning of the term "power," and over

⁷⁸Generally social scientists have seemed to distinguish behavioralism from behaviorism by stating that the latter does not consider conscious phenomena, while the former does. Here too, unanimity has not been achieved. Mapheus Smith, for example, speaks of "extreme behaviorism" as opposed to "a revised behavioristic approach" which would include conscious data. "A Revised Behavioristic Approach to Social Psychology", Sociology and Social Research, Vol. XXVI (Jan. - Feb., 1942), pp. 222-31.

the nature of a power relationship. Some even suggest the word is so vague as to be useless, thus concluding politics does not have to do with power relationships. The same observation could be made about all the other concepts common to the field. To ask by what right I offer the Nineteenth Century Paradigm, then, is to ask by what right all of these other offerings are made. As I have promised, my answer to this question will be given in Chapter IX.⁷⁹

On the above issue, an advocate of the Nineteenth Century Paradigm would probably reason this way: While political scientists seldom if ever reach complete agreement, quite often they agree in a "more or less" fashion. They can agree descriptions of Western democracy produced in the United States are more "accurate" than those produced in the Soviet Union. They can agree that Western accounts of China's involvement in Southeast Asia are less "distorted" than those coming out of China proper. They can agree that categorizing former President Dwight D. Eisenhower as a communist is

⁷⁹What I mean to say is that it will not be spelled out until Chapter IX. However, many readers will have the answer long before then. When it comes to categorizing individuals as Marxists, Democrats, Behaviorists, Nineteenth Century Paradigm adherents or anything else, it is obvious that where we place individuals is not determined by where they place themselves. If it was, most of the world's despots would have to be called democrats. Birchites would have to be put in the category "Defenders of the American Way," and the Nazis of World War II Germany would become "Creators of an Improved Humanity." Self-placement is clearly not the answer to the question "How do we presume to build categories and put people into them?"

less "rational" or "objective" than placing him somewhere in the category liberal democrat, and so on. In short, they have little difficulty agreeing that certain categories--and the descriptions of political situations and events which they lead to--are "essentially true" ones, others are "straw-men," that particular accounts are "fairly objective," and others "bias-ridden." Hence, the more an investigator's colleagues inter-subjectively agree his categories are sound, his descriptions correct, the more he has a right to feel justified in putting them forth. Even if this were acceptable reasoning, it does nothing to solve our basic problem. The implicit suggestion is that one ought to accept those categories, and hence those categorizations, which have the greatest popularity. It is to argue that if one's colleagues take up the categories employed by Birchites, Marxists, or whatever, one ought to follow suit. I doubt that many scholars would seriously endorse such a principle. And the reason why is clear. To use another's categories is of necessity to wind up with his categorizations (his descriptions). To think in his terms is to think like him. The principle being tendered, then, is in direct contradistinction to the more popular one which counsels us to hold fast to our own "truths" though all the world oppose us.

Anyway, such reasoning is wholly out of place here. It assumes there are such things as "accurate" descriptions versus "inaccurate" ones, "natural categories" versus "unnatural categories",

"straw-men" and "caricatures" as opposed to painstaking descriptions of "reality." It assumes, in other words, the validity of the major premises of what I have termed the Nineteenth Century Epistemological Paradigm; it assumes the worth of the very hypotheses being challenged in this essay.

II. THE PREVAILING PARADIGM: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE

In a democracy, there is a deep-seated feeling that there is such a thing as "objective truth."¹
--Roy V. Peel

Belief in Political "Reality"

There are essentially two overriding points to be made in this chapter and the one which follows. First, political scientists, almost without exception, make use of the sort of conceptual framework I have outlined. If distinctions are to be made among members of the field they are not so much between individuals who endorse the nineteenth century paradigm and ones who reject it as between those who endorse it in full and those who accept it only in part, and between those who abide by it more or less consciously, as opposed to those who simply take its validity for granted. And second, by adhering to the paradigm in question political scientists are led to a particular understanding of their field, are prompted to ask certain types of questions, seek certain kinds of answers, make specific sorts of observations, which follow in a logical manner from the initial assumed

¹Roy V. Peel, in Roy V. Peel and Joseph S. Rousek, eds., Introduction to Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1941), p. 26.

premises. In a subsequent chapter I will show that to exchange the old paradigm for the twentieth century physics model would be to operate in a markedly different world.² It would involve the alteration of questions, answers, observations, and a significantly altered understanding of what the political scientist is doing and why. As a consequence, then, the two points to be dealt with may justifiably be treated as one; to demonstrate that the ideas, attitudes and concerns which dominate the discipline are logically derivable from a particular type of conceptual framework and from no other is at once to present evidence that political scientists endorse such a paradigm.

Some members of the field, I noted, are conscious of the character of the paradigm they employ. "Reality," contends Urban Whitaker, "remains reality whether it is known or not and whether it is approved or not by mere man." Consistent with this view, Whitaker distinguishes between hypotheses, theories and laws by arguing that hypotheses have not been proven to reflect reality, laws have, while theories are only "partially proven beliefs." "This set of definitions," he properly acknowledges, "is hinged on the assumption that there is only one 'truth' . . ."³ In a like manner, Charles S. Hyneman remarks

²T. S. Kuhn notes that whatever the discipline, when investigators use different paradigms, they always "live in different worlds." The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 110, 149.

³Urban Whitaker, "Fact and Theory in the Study of International Relations" (unpublished essay, 1960) p. 2.

that the employment of scientific methodology "imposes upon the student a concern to find out what actually exists and occurs, . . . to seek knowledge about reality [emphasis added] which is the foundation for obtaining further knowledge."⁴ Harold and Margaret Sprout, in their text Foundations of International Relations, comment that "the term real world poses a philosophical issue about which men have argued since the days of Plato, and probably long before." Therefore, they decide, "we do not propose to re-argue this issue. We simply assume that there is a real world, distinct from someone's image thereof, though knowable only through the processes of perception from which are derived concepts and theories about reality."⁵ Indeed, observes still another student of politics, the very word "'theory' denotes an organized set of ideas about reality."⁶

Political scientists have "assumed" the existence of a reality with a single true form, "knowable," in the Sprouts' words, if only appropriate attitudes are held, appropriate skills developed, appropriate methods used.⁷ In this regard, it might be worth while for

⁴Charles S. Hyneman, The Study of Politics (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 28-29.

⁵Sprout and Sprout, Foundations of International Relations, p. 49.

⁶William A. Glaser, "The Types and Uses of Political Theory," Social Research, XXII (1955), p. 275.

⁷See also: William Harbold and Dell Hitchner, "Some Reflections on Method in the Study of Politics," Western Political

the reader to take another look at the citations with which I introduced the first chapter.

From given premises given conclusions logically follow. Hence, having postulated a reality with one "true" and "identifiable" structure, it is to be anticipated that political scientists will be especially interested in certain kinds of questions and issues. What, for example, is the "real" character of political activity? If he is loyal to the nineteenth century paradigm, does it not follow that the student of politics will suppose that patterns are there to be revealed? Will he not be led by the logic of the conceptual framework to agree with David Easton that "in the concrete world of reality the elements of political life have some form of determinate relation," and that, therefore, "the task of research is to discover what these are"?⁸

Moreover, it seems to me (once again adhering to the demands of the nineteenth century paradigm) that we would expect this particular "task" to become rather central to the field. Why? Because our paradigm also informed us that whether or not an investigator has located a "recurrent relationship," a pattern, is to be determined by

Quarterly, II (1958), p. 754. The authors write that "science rests upon the assumption [italics mine] that an observable reality exists; [and] that this reality consists of an organized pattern of relationships . . ."

⁸David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 97.

his colleagues. "Objectivity," you will recall, "has to do with the attitudes and practices that are generally accepted within the profession and that lead different scholars to approximately the same answer to the same question."⁹ Now since this sort of agreement is exceedingly hard to come by, the moment political scientists move beyond the aforementioned basic question and attempt to fit specific events into some sort of broad theoretical framework (a phenomenon the going paradigm does little to account for), we would expect them to spend a great deal of their time and effort simply describing and discussing the "nature" of politics. For to do otherwise, to enter that vast area of disputation and disagreement, is either to challenge the prevailing understanding of objectivity, and hence the prevailing paradigm, or to declare one's colleagues less than objective; and the farther one proceeds into the realm of dissension, the more this statement applies.

The Conservative Nature of Political Science Scholarship

According to the above line of reasoning, we would anticipate a tendency on the part of political scientists to shy away from the more weighty, potentially contentious subjects. They do. This has been pointed out by observers from within the field as well as from without.¹⁰

⁹Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis, p. 50.

¹⁰Understandably, those who make such accusations from without the field are usually less sympathetic, are most caustic in their criticisms. C. Wright Mills' The Sociological Imagination is an excellent case in point. (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1959).

Gabriel A. Almond, for instance, refers to certain "blind spots" disclosed by surveying recent political science publications. Ignored, it was found, are such subjects as the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy, the political factors involved in military security problems and the impact of economic and socio-cultural variables upon international relations. Almond was moved to conclude that

. . . judging by published articles in the general political science journals since the end of the war, . . . the political scientist has primarily played the role of providing the historical and descriptive background on foreign governments and politics, foreign and international institutions, and foreign ideologies.¹¹

So too, we would expect political scientists to lean toward non-controversial understandings of established institutions and non-controversial interpretations of the mechanisms of political change. After all, to take positions strongly at odds with those currently in vogue is not only to question the objectivity of one's colleagues, it is to question as well the clear-sightedness, the reason, in a word the objectivity, of the statesmen who represent those institutions. And who would be so presumptuous? Is it not more likely that one who finds his views far out of accord with everyone else's will begin instead by doubting his own methods, if not his own abilities? Even more important, is it not likely that most political observers will simply assume their colleagues and political leaders are by and large

¹¹Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1950), pp. 154-55.

objective, therefore, by and large correct, when it comes to funda-
mental understandings of institutions, fundamental analyses of political
change mechanisms?

As before, our expectations are met. Few are the political
scientists who can be accused of iconoclasm. They are a cautious
lot. Easton made this point one of the central themes of his book The
Political System. It is his estimation that

Contemporary research shows a strong commitment to the
status quo . . . proposals for reform have for the most part
been confined to minor adjustments in the existing mechanisms,
rather than to the contemplation of the value of more drastic
revisions or to research into the fundamental generalizations
explaining political change.¹²

It would be difficult to present the argument more forcefully. It would
be equally difficult, I think, to find fault with it. Clearly, the major
dissenters of our time on matters political are not political scientists,
however one may feel about that situation. Of principal interest here,
it is the situation most logically compatible with the epistemological
paradigm "assumed" throughout the discipline.

At this point it may be objected that I have begun to confuse
two distinct undertakings; namely, analyses and descriptions of what
"is" and prescriptions concerning what "ought to be." Thus it may be
argued I fail to recognize that while an acceptance of the nineteenth
century paradigm might indeed incline a student of politics to accept
established analyses of what "is" economically, socially and politically,

¹²Easton, pp. 64-82.

it does not follow that he will thereby be more apt to endorse popular ideas about what "ought" to exist. This argument, however, presupposes that "is" and "ought" are naturally separate entities. That they are is, of course, an hypothesis, and one which is being challenged in this treatise. I might add that it is also an hypothesis which is directly contradicted by observation when it comes to economic, social and political phenomena; there are no examples of violent disagreement about what "ought to be" which are not accompanied by equally violent disagreement about what "is"; glaring illustrations are the controversies between Marxists and anti-Marxists, liberals and reactionaries, liberals and radicals, Southern Whites and Negroes, labor and management. Hence, if it can be shown that "is" and "ought" are not at all naturally separate entities, (I will attempt to do so in subsequent chapters), the above argument immediately falls to the ground.

There is no need to suppose political scientists will be conscious conformists and I do not intend to make that assertion.¹³

What I am asserting is that the very logic of the conceptual framework

¹³Hans Morgenthau insists this is frequently the case. He makes much of the "risk" involved in defying established preconceptions in any society, including our own. In his estimation, "the value which a particular group puts upon a certain 'truth' which is not to be questioned determines the degree of risk which the investigator runs who sets out to question the 'truth' nevertheless." Apparently he believes this presence of risk is enough to insure conformity in most instances. See: Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: Phoenix Books, University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 162-63.

encourages conformity of thought. This because having accepted the nineteenth century paradigm the implications of a radical, an extreme, analysis or interpretation are no less than startling. To challenge views which are fundamental to one's society, those concepts which are the "givens" endorsed by politician and political observer alike, is to maintain that everyone else is making erroneous, non-objective, analyses. Whether one attributes the errors of others to stupidity, insanity, carelessness or duplicity, the charge is a serious one to make. It is not that political scientists draw back in fear. It simply never occurs to them that colleagues and politicians, many of whom they know and respect, could be so grossly mistaken.¹⁴ It is conceivable to them that their colleagues might go awry in regard to little things perhaps, but not where fundamentals are concerned.

The Fate of the Rebellious Scholar

We can now extend the logic of our nineteenth century paradigm a bit further. If popular understandings of fundamentals will generally be "assumed" correct in broad detail, it follows that commentators who challenge them can expect to have their own

¹⁴It is interesting (because it is consistent with the point being made), to note that "many of the more controversial political theorists were trained abroad as, for example, Carl J. Friedrich, Herman Finer, Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, William Ebenstein, Hans J. Morgenthau, Hans Kelsen . . ." Many others, I might add, were trained outside the field, e.g., C. Wright Mills. See: Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United States (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), p. 49.

objectivity brought into question. Once again, this is what occurs. An individual who attacks basic assumptions is generally charged, by persons who hold those assumptions, with being misinformed, with suffering from distorted perceptions; and, depending upon the degree to which the assumptions he challenges are basic, he will be regarded as myopic, unintelligent, unscholarly, duped, deceitful, fanatic or some combination of these. Even more commonly, it will be said of him that he has permitted his values to intrude upon his judgment; he has allowed his personal "oughts" to cloud and color the impersonal "is."

Thus we find that when the political philosopher Leo Strauss and his adherents presented a lengthy, and, in my estimation, well-structured argument against the current behavioralist trend in political science, they were met with nothing short of contempt.¹⁵ It was said of them they "scorn qualification," "assert their convictions inflexibly," and express viewpoints which are "irrelevant to the questions that matter." They were dubbed "fanatics" who employ the vocabulary of the fanatic. For, continued the authors of the review being cited here, "it is characteristic of the fanatic to throw all his opponents into one pit, and to ignore real [read true] differences of

¹⁵The publication referred to is Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, Herbert J. Storing, ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962).

quality, action, and intention among them. "

Why is it Strauss and his associates do not possess "that precious element of detachment"? How account for their political irrelevance? They are the victims of "an exaggerated moralism which converts all political issues into moral issues and analyzes political phenomena by means of moral categories."¹⁶ In effect these critics have suggested Strauss et al permitted their values to intrude upon their personal judgment.

The late C. Wright Mills was another contemporary who had a penchant for debunking the "givens" of his society and the scholarly community. Hence we should be prepared to find Mills' objectivity questioned. It was Talcott Parsons, when reviewing The Power Elite, makes the criticism that "there is no pretense of even trying to maintain a scientific neutrality." Mills' understanding of the governmental situation, states Parsons, constitutes nothing other than a "biased view." And "this bias . . . is particularly evident in his tendency to foreshorten social processes and emphasize overwhelmingly shortrun factors." He is inclined, moreover, "to exaggerate the empirical importance of power." Now what we are being told, of course, is that Mills is unobjective. Accordingly, Parsons observes that "as he

¹⁶John H. Schaar and Sheldon S. Wolin, "Review of Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics," The American Political Science Review, LVII (March, 1963), pp. 126, 127, 136, 150.

approaches the climax indicated by the title of his final chapter the tone of indictment becomes shriller and shriller and the atmosphere of objective analysis recedes."

Can it be that Mills, like Strauss, has allowed his values to distort his vision? Parsons does not declare it openly, but he implies as much when he says, "I understand that he [Mills] professes to be a socialist--non-Communist, of course." Of what possible relevance would such an observation be to his review if not to make this suggestion?¹⁷

Edward Shils refers to "Professor Mills' supercharged fantasies about modern society . . ." and in one of his arguments finds "paranoid implications." Although Mills' reasoning is not wholly without continuity (Shils admits it has a certain unity born of passionate involvement), "it is not the unity which it could possess if it were disciplined by a correspondingly intense and persistent rigor of analysis or by painstaking devotion to the truth." Furthermore, "if Professor Mills had more feeling for his fellow-men, he would study them more carefully and not just find illustrations which support his prejudices."

Is it as Parsons has suggested? Were Mills' observations perhaps distorted by his Marxist commitments? Shils appears to be

¹⁷Talcott Parsons, "Review of The Power Elite," World Politics, X (October, 1957), pp. 127, 134, 140, 142.

thinking along these lines when he laments, "Mills, like other critics who at one time or another have come under Marxist influence, is troubled and enraged by any mode of analysis which even remotely suggests a 'harmony of interests.'" Moreover, he adds, "the Marxist view of the world dies very hard in them."¹⁸

When it comes to American Diplomacy, a persistent critic of United States policies as well as the assumptions underlying the more popular, acceptable, analyses of those policies is William Appleman Williams. He has been called--among other things--a "brilliant but perverse historian"¹⁹ while his writings have been variously described as full of "exaggeration and over-emphasis,"²⁰ out of "the mainstream of international relations study,"²¹ (suggesting, of course, that the mainstream is the "correct" stream), and even downright "vulgar, self-serving, imprecise and shallow."²²

¹⁸Edward Shils, "Review of The Sociological Imagination," World Politics, XIII (July, 1961), pp. 603, 607-10, 619-20.

¹⁹Foster Rhea Dulles, "Review of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy," The American Historical Review, LXIV (July, 1959), p. 1022.

²⁰Ibid., p. 1023.

²¹Charles A. McClelland, "Review of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy," The American Political Science Review, LIII (December, 1959), p. 1196.

²²Robert L. Heilbroner, "Review of The Great Evasion," The New York Review of Books, III (January, 1965), p. 21.

Like Mills, Williams does his observing and renders his criticism from an essentially Marxian position. Like Mills, he stands accused of suffering from "distorted" perceptions. After noting Williams' Marxist orientation, Robert L. Heilbroner asks of his work, The Great Evasion, "Is the failure of this book due to the personal failings of its author or does it reflect a flaw inherent in the philosophy behind it?" Then, as if in answer to his own question, he adds that when one employs a Marxist approach "social criticism . . . becomes distorted into social caricature." "Truth," Heilbroner seems to be telling us, is the immediate and unfortunate victim.

Before proceeding, I would like to comment briefly on several points of possible confusion. First of all, I do not wish to leave the impression that Strauss, Mills and Williams have been unarmed innocents under attack, that they have not returned the fire. Indeed, in a way they can be said to have fired first, and on occasion they have used much the same sort of ammunition, condemning the work of their opponents as unscholarly, non-objective, value-laden and so forth. If they have been less vituperative, and in my estimation, Strauss and Williams have been, it must be remembered that their adversaries have the weight of numbers; their views are the majority views. Nothing is surer to convince one of the correctness of his convictions than the support of others; and nothing is more likely to

intimidate, restrain and humble the intellectual insurgent than lack of the same support. It would seem only just, then, if we forgive those who are defending established opinions their seemingly greater condescension.

Secondly, all three of the above "rebels" have their defenders, they are not entirely alone. On occasion they are favorably reviewed.²³ Moreover, even their antagonists at times find some merit in their work. For example, Foster Rhea Dulles, who called Williams "brilliant but perverse," his work exaggerated and over-emphasized, concluded that The Tragedy of American Diplomacy is nevertheless "a highly interesting contribution to today's great foreign policy debate,"²⁴ an evaluation which must, I think, be regarded as something of a laurel.

Finally, it should be emphasized that responses to non-conformists are not nearly so violent, so disdainful or condescending in nature when the ideas they challenge are less than fundamental. In fact, when it comes to assailing a fashionable notion of little import or consequence, the attack may even be welcomed; which brings us to the next logical subject of consideration. If individuals such as

²³See, for example: J. P. Warburg, "Review of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy," Political Science Quarterly, LXXIV (June, 1959), pp. 273-74; and Neal Stanford's review of the same book in the Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 1959, p. 6.

²⁴Dulles, p. 1023.

Strauss, Mills and Williams are sometimes severely criticized, we would suppose that those who present more obnoxious theses, theses which are in still greater conflict with basic "truths," would be dealt with in an even more vitriolic fashion. As the following analysis will show, they are.

Attitudes Toward Racial Bigotry

It is a near "truth" of the American social science community, a "truth" I happen to share, that racism in any form is undesirable. It is also a community near "truth," and one I do not share, that bigotry is somehow irrational; that "any philosophy [which] results in judging a people or an individual by the color of the skin, whether that skin be 'white' or 'black' or 'brown' or 'yellow,' is inappropriate and unrealistic."²⁵ Accordingly, Robert K. Merton asserts that "It is the self-fulfilling prophecy which goes far toward explaining the dynamics of ethnic and racial conflict in America today." This "self-fulfilling prophecy," argues Merton, is the result of an initial "false definition of the situation [which evokes] a new behavior [that] makes the originally false conception come true."²⁶ In this manner,

²⁵Otto Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations, p. 23. Klineberg expresses this view as only his opinion; the conclusion that it represents something akin to a community outlook is my own.

²⁶Robert K. Merton, "A Social Psychological Factor," in Arnold M. Rose, ed., Race Prejudice and Discrimination: Readings in Intergroup Relations in the United States (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 512.

he concludes, "the specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error." Racists are wrong. Theirs is not a "rational" position; it is not "objective." Consequently, when social scientists attempt to locate the origins of such error they will frequently be heard to speak of unrealistic fears, unrelieved feelings of guilt, aggression arising from deprivation, a sense of inferiority, ignorance, and conformist traits which may at times achieve the proportions of "authoritarian" attitudes.²⁷ The "authoritarian personality," understood to be intellectually rigid, dogmatic, and essentially closed to "rational" persuasion, has become a popular concept among social scientists. And the suggestion of course is that a connection exists between this kind of mental inflexibility and racist inclinations.²⁸

I might add that whereas the views of Mills, Strauss and Williams have at least been given some critical consideration by other scholars, racist arguments are frequently subject to the most extreme scorn of all in being simply ignored. It would seem that so far as scholars are concerned, such arguments are often so ludicrous, so far beyond the pale, it is not even worth the time or effort to attempt any confrontation.

²⁷George B. de Huszar, ed., Anatomy of Racial Intolerance (New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1946), esp. pp. 156-60.

²⁸Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., 1960), p. 94.

Understanding the Radical Rightists

Ever since the end of World War II, particularly since the close of the Korean War, the so-called "radical right" in the United States has been gaining popularity at an impressive, if not alarming rate. It is a near "truth" of the American political science community (again, one I share) that the structural changes this element wishes to bring about in our society are undesirable. It is also fast becoming a community "truth" that this disturbing phenomenon can best be interpreted in the manner used to explain the views of Strauss, Mills, Williams and the racists.

In the estimation of Daniel Bell, "what the right wing is fighting . . . is essentially . . . that complex of attitudes that might be defined most simply as the belief in rational assessment . . ." ²⁹ Similarly, Richard Hofstadter finds the far-right characterized by "emotional intensity" as well as "dense and massive irrationality," and finds they are prone to generate "peculiar ideas." ³⁰ Seymour Martin Lipset and Talcott Parsons arrive at the same conclusion. In reference to the rightist movement Parsons speaks of "irrational action," "irrational behavior," "distorted beliefs," and "over-determined

²⁹Daniel Bell, ed., The Radical Right (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., 1964), p. 16.

³⁰Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," in The Radical Right, p. 81.

behavior."³¹ Lipset talks of irrationality and authoritarian attitudes.³² The words "hysteria" and "paranoia" quite frequently enter into scholarly discussions of this movement.³³

Having thus decided "radical right" activities are typified by error and irrationality, political scientists, to date, have not been inclined to make further search for "causes" of those activities. The assumption seems to be that irrationality and error are cause enough, and that it only remains to locate the causes of these latter.

From whence might come irrationality and error of such great proportions? It is Bell's conviction that frustration and fear do much to account for them; frustrations born of shattered hopes and ignorance, apprehensions born of misapprehensions. He tells us:

After twenty years of Democratic power, the right-wing Republicans hoped that the election of Dwight Eisenhower would produce its own utopia: the dismantling of the welfare state, the taming of labor unions, and the "magical" rollback of Communism in Europe. None of this happened . . . Thus eight years of moderation proved more frustrating than twenty years of opposition.³⁴

³¹Talcott Parsons, "Social Strains in America, (1955)," in The Radical Right, p. 217.

³²Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right," in The Radical Right, pp. 307-71.

³³See, for example, Bell, The Radical Right, p. 5; also Richard Hofstadter, "Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited: A Post-script (1962)," in The Radical Right, p. 99.

³⁴Ibid., p. 3.

Elsewhere he adds, "the politics of the radical right is the politics of frustration--the sour impotence of those who find themselves unable to understand, let alone command, the complex mass society that is the polity today."³⁵ Of the fears, the apprehensions, Bell comments: "the radical right, having a diffused sense of fear, needs to find some story or explanation to explain, or justify, that fear."³⁶ Explanations must be "sought," he believes, because the fears are essentially groundless. David Riesman and Nathan Glazer also refer to the unrealistically apprehensive nouveau riche, "the raw-rich Texas millionaire. . . obsessed by fears that 'they' will take his money away."³⁷

Lipset locates still another source of irrationality and error, an overweening concern with status. In answer to the question, why should a fixation on one's status lead to unreason, Lipset replies, "in status conflict there are no clear-cut solutions. Where there are status anxieties, there is little or nothing which a government can do. It is not surprising, therefore, that the political movements which have successfully appealed to status resentments have been irrational in character, and have sought scapegoats which

³⁵Ibid., p. 42.

³⁶Ibid., p. 15.

³⁷David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes, (1955)," in The Radical Right, p. 109.

conveniently serve to symbolize the status threat."³⁸

Hofstadter observes that this unwarranted concern with status may also lead to authoritarianism. "Is it not status aspiration," he asks, "that in good part spurs the pseudo-conservative [Hofstadter's word for the radical rightist] on toward his demand for conformity in a wide variety of spheres of life?"³⁹ "Pseudo-conservatism," he continues, "is among other things a disorder in relation to authority, characterized by an inability to find other modes for human relationship than those of more or less complete domination or submission."⁴⁰

Far-rightists are authoritarians, and authoritarians are noted for mental inflexibility. They submit to the will of others with little or no critical evaluation of that will in contrast to the non-authoritarian who founds his beliefs and actions on reason.⁴¹ An irrational concern

³⁸Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right," p. 309.

³⁹Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," p. 93. It is a notion of growing popularity within the scholarly community that authoritarianism is causally linked with extremes of both left and right. Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, for instance, argue that "the authoritarian predispositions would seem to be more closely linked with the reactionary and radical positions than with an overall ideological continuum from liberalism to conservatism." "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XVII (Summer, 1953), p. 186.

⁴⁰Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," p. 89.

⁴¹Janowitz and Marvick say of him: "In common sense language, the authoritarian is the individual who is concerned with power and toughness and who is prone to resolve conflict in an arbitrary manner. He is seen as having strong and persistent desires that others submit to his outlook. He himself desires to submit to

with status, irrational frustrations and fears, lead to authoritarianism, authoritarianism leads to irrational political observations, irrational political observations to irrational political commitments. The analysis is completed.

In my estimation there is an obvious logic behind the above explanation. You will recall that the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm distinguishes truth--and reason which makes possible the contemplation of truth--from error--and unreason from which that error derives. Clearly the political scientist is to be expected to conclude that the rightist's views, which appear so irrational to him, are just that. The alternatives are to suppose that it is he who is the irrational one, or that both of them are; not appealing alternatives nor ones likely to be chosen.

Moreover, in Chapter One we noted that the nineteenth century paradigm tells us emotion is a major threat to reason. Then what could be more logical than to suspect that radical-right irrationality is of emotional derivation? Would we not expect scholars who view the world through such a paradigm to look first for signs of emotion, for fears, frustrations and anxieties, just as they do? And is it not sound logic to reason this way: fears, frustrations and anxieties lead

other individuals whom he sees as more powerful." He has "a tendency . . . to adopt an uncritical and submissive attitude toward the moral attributes that are idealized by his group." Janowitz and Marvick, "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior," p. 186.

to authoritarianism--authoritarians are mentally rigid, think in simplistic terms, and have difficulties with authority relationships-- radical rightists are obviously mentally rigid, think in simplistic terms, have difficulties with authority relationships, and to top it off are possessed of anxieties and fears--therefore, radical rightists are likely to be authoritarians?

Perhaps one might question the reasoning of the aforementioned scholars on the grounds that it is circular, that their conclusions are not true by discovery but by definition. Thus, we are told radical rightists make erroneous and irrational readings of economic, social and political phenomena because of frustrations, fears, and status anxieties which are themselves based upon erroneous and irrational readings of economic, social and political phenomena. However, such a criticism assumes the validity of the nineteenth century paradigm, it assumes that the form of truth is "out there" to be discovered and in no way created by definition. Since I personally reject the paradigm, I do not intend to make the criticism; as far as I am concerned, the reasoning is excellent.

The Popular Interpretation of Fascism

Without question, the most shocking and abhorrent political event of our time has been fascism, that ugly and seemingly enigmatic movement which in its worst form ran rampant through much of Europe

during the 1920's, 30's and 40's. The uncommon emphasis upon duty and obedience to one's nation and to its leaders; the grotesque glorification of the nation's people; the devotion to battle and brutality. These things astonished and horrified the liberal Western mind and had to be explained.

It is a near "truth" of the American political science community that the attitudes of the German people during the era referred to were irrational. It is a community near "truth" that the program of their leaders was equally irrational. "On any rational grounds," it is reasoned, "such a policy was wholly unrealistic."⁴² Ergo--the policy was based on irrational ground.

How account for the temporary loss of reason by vast populations? For the most part explanations have varied around a central theme. The leaders were either insane--"to many the ideological bases of National Socialism were the product of a handful of unbalanced minds," or power mad--"to others, the Nazi ideology was a mere propaganda tactic, designed to win the support of the masses but by no means the world view of the leaders themselves,"⁴³ or they were misled--"even their higher leaders, who were most obviously

⁴²George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 886.

⁴³George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: The Universal Library, Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), p. 1.

cynical, were self-deceived almost as much as they deceived others . . . Goebels, who was the only national socialist leader with any pretension to unusual intellectual capacity . . . was completely duped by his hero worship for Hitler and by anti-Semitism."⁴⁴

The leaders then were motivated by lunacy and/or cravings for power. But what of the masses? And the educated, what of them? It is clear that many of the propagandists were intellectuals.⁴⁵ Numbers of the finest German minds were caught up in the fascist venture, their hearts filled with passion and commitment. None other than the world renowned existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger, for example, at one point exhorted his students to understand that "the Fuhrer himself, and only he, is the current and future reality of Germany, and his word is your law."⁴⁶ It was Heidegger who said of the movement: "We first understand the glory and greatness of the Hitler revolution when we carry implanted within us this reflection:

⁴⁴Sabine, p. 885.

⁴⁵Daniel Lerner, The Nazi Elite (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1951) (Hoover Institute Studies), p. 26. Mosse observes that "the Nazis found their greatest support among respectable, educated people." Mosse, p. 1. Liberals gave their support too: "The social characteristics of Nazi voters in pre-Hitler Germany and Austria resembled those of the liberals much more than they did those of the conservatives." Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, pp. 129-30.

⁴⁶Martin Heidegger, German Existentialism, trans. by Dagobert D. Runes (New York: The Wisdom Library, Division of the Philosophical Library, 1965), p. 11.

Everything that is great is in the midst of the storm."⁴⁷ How explain such statements from such a man? And the rest of the educational community, what of it? William L. Shirer observes that few professors and instructors lost university posts because they defied National Socialism. In this regard he cites Professors Wilhelm Roepke and Julius Ebbinghaus. Said Roepke, "It was a scene of prostitution that has stained the honorable history of German learning."⁴⁸ And in retrospect Ebbinghaus lamented, "The German universities failed, while there was still time, to oppose publicly with all their power the destruction of knowledge and of the democratic state. They failed to keep the beacon of freedom and right burning during the night of tyranny."⁴⁹ Why?

Then too, there was the clergy. Although friction occurred between various religious groups and the state, most clergymen "went along," some with singular determination and zeal.⁵⁰

What could have so thoroughly corrupted the German mentality that it became capable of this sort of irrationality? It is a popular conception of the American political science community, a near "truth,"

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 20.

⁴⁸William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 251.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 251-2.

⁵⁰Heidegger, pp. 46-7.

that the answer to this last question is "authoritarianism." "In countries like Germany and Japan," the argument goes,

the authoritarian tradition is predominant and democracy is still a very frail plant . . . Some people and some nations are more "dictatorship-prone" than others . . . The very existence of an authoritarian mass movement like fascism depends on the desire of many persons to submit and obey . . . The totalitarian system, whether communist or racist, appeals to people who, for whatever personal reasons, look for the father-child relationship for security in dependence.⁵¹

So much for fascism. It is the strange product of a strange blend: Irrationality and error caused by power mania, insanity, duplicity, and authoritarian inclinations.

Explanations of Communism

The other major political phenomenon of our era has been the so-called communist movement, at times nearly as odious in operation as fascism. Particularly Stalin's Russia, with its slave labor camps, its ruthless elimination of idealistic revolutionary elements (on the grounds that they were out of step with history), the oppressions, the abolition of basic human freedoms and the night-time removal at gunpoint of persons suspected of disloyalty grieved and disgusted Western sensibilities. And like fascist practices, such things had to be explained.

It is a near "truth" of the American political science community that the understandings which contemporary Marxists have of

⁵¹William Ebenstein, Today's Isms, pp. 105-7.

politics are basically irrational and wrong. Such persons, it is said, habitually "over-simplify" political events. "The Soviet explanation of Western colonialism, for example, is based on an exclusively economic interpretation."⁵² Similarly, they propose an economic interpretation of imperialism and war. Yet, "the fact is that the causes of imperialism and colonialism must be seen in terms of a subtle interplay among many factors . . ."⁵³ And "while it can scarcely be denied that economic interests play a significant role in motivating state action . . . most wars result from the interplay of a complex set of forces. They can seldom be attributed to the operation of one factor alone."⁵⁴ In the sub-title of a book Frederick C. Barghoorn has called Russia's view of the United States "a study in distortion."⁵⁵ It is not only the Russian leaders who are being irrational. "Studies of public opinion in Soviet Russia," John G. Stoessinger informs us, "suggest great distortions in the Soviet perception of world politics."⁵⁶ Like statements are made about Communist

⁵²Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, p. 75.

⁵³Ibid., p. 77.

⁵⁴Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, International Politics: Foundations of International Relations (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954), p. 263.

⁵⁵Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950).

⁵⁶Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, p. 398.

theoreticians in other countries. George F. Kennan has spoken of "Asian Communists and indeed of the entire Marxist or Marxist-influenced intelligentsia of the underdeveloped areas" as "wandering willfully, blindly, in defiance of all historical evidence into situations and predicaments in which there is not the slightest historical probability that they will realize their utopian ideals . . ." ⁵⁷ Once more we are confronted with the task of explaining irrationality and error on a vast scale. What is it that prompts Communist leaders to "wander blindly"? Why do they arrive at such erroneous and irrational conclusions? And why do their peoples so often acquiesce?

It is a popular idea among members of the American political science community that the irrationality and error of Communist leaders result in large measure from a commitment to premises which are themselves wrong; ⁵⁸ their vision is said to be distorted by the endorsement of a "false" ideology, one "shot through with errors and contradictions." ⁵⁹ Accordingly, Stoessinger writes that the reason Russian statesmen view the world in distorted fashion is

⁵⁷George F. Kennan, "Comments on Ideology and Reality in the Soviet Union," Ideology and Reality in the Soviet System, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, XCIX (Jan., 1955), p. 30.

⁵⁸If Marxist ideology makes for irrationality and error, it is understandable that the arguments of Mills and Williams have been regarded as suspect.

⁵⁹James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, Government by the People: The Dynamics of American National, State and Local Government (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 26.

that they adhere to an ideology which "colors the lenses" through which they look.⁶⁰ Kennan began his famous "X" article with the statement: "The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances . . ." ⁶¹ And of China, A. Doak Barnett says that "to underrate the importance of ideology as a determinant of Peking's long-range policy, or to argue that ideology is no more than a cloak for Chinese national interests would be a serious mistake. The Chinese Communists," he continues, "are motivated by a revolutionary zeal . . . Ideology greatly influences their conceptions of China's national interests, and the Communist belief in world revolution definitely impels them to project their influence beyond China's borders." ⁶²

Another explanation which has enjoyed popularity with political scientists is that the Soviet leaders are--like their fascist counterparts--power hungry. Soviet power, just as Nazi power, contend John S. Reshetar, Jr. and Gerhart Niemeyer, has "become its own

⁶⁰Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, p. 398.

⁶¹George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), pp. 566-82. See also: Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works (New York: Vintage Books, 1960). Also: Daniel Bell's comment, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality," World Politics, X (April, 1958), pp. 360-1.

⁶²A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 68.

end;" it is "might without service."⁶³ It may be that the very nature of a totalitarian system, they speculate, "causes the rulers to lose the capacity for obeying reason and to act from whims, passions and fear rather than rational judgment."⁶⁴ Barghoorn refers to the U. S. S. R. as a nation controlled and directed by a "new" nationalistic, imperialistic, "totalitarian ruling class." "Both more powerful as a class, and more insecure as individuals, than the elite strata of traditional monarchies or of capitalist democracy, social tensions are probably more acute than in constitutional states."⁶⁵ As a consequence, he believes, "there is a compulsion to direct the aggressions generated by these tensions to out-groups."⁶⁶ What Barghoorn appears to be saying is that the new Communist nationalism is not "the necessary embodiment of Marxism in action," but rather, the power drive of an insecure and fearful elite. Numerous other attempts have been made to account for Communist irrationality and error, but none, I believe, has gained as widespread an endorsement as the two just

⁶³Gerhart Niemeyer and John S. Reshetar, Jr., An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), p. 49.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 16.

⁶⁵Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 182.

⁶⁶Ibid.

listed.⁶⁷

It is my estimation that the reasoning behind the aforementioned analyses of Communist actions is as sound as it was in the other instances, regardless of how much I may personally disagree with any given conclusion. At best, one who endorses the nineteenth century paradigm might complain that before attempting to explain the error of Communist conceptions by references to ideology scholars ought to at least draw a clear distinction between the two; that is, between conception and ideological belief. Otherwise we may be confused. We may think they are telling us Communists entertain erroneous notions (conceptions or ideological beliefs) because they hold erroneous conceptions or ideological beliefs.⁶⁸ Once more, however, as one who

⁶⁷Including the suggestions that Soviet leaders may in part be motivated by homosexual inclinations, Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press Publishers, 1953), p. 403; or that their personalities may have been negatively influenced as a result of their having been swaddled as babies, see Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman, The People of Great Russia (London: The Cresset Press, 1949); also Geoffrey Gorer, "Some Aspects of the Psychology of the People of Great Russia," The American Slavic and Eastern European Review, VIII (October, 1949), pp. 155-60.

⁶⁸Especially in view of the suggestion, frequently made, that Soviet-brand Marxism alters with the situation; in other words, that ideological beliefs may well equal conceptions. See, for instance, Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism, or Charles P. Schleicher, International Relations: Cooperation and Conflict, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 87-88.

does not endorse the nineteenth century paradigm I cannot register the complaint.

The Necessity of Sound Perception

Recently, during a conversation with a colleague, a conversation which centered on the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy to which my associate is opposed, he responded to a statement of mine with the comment: "You're assuming the administration is acting rationally." "Aren't you?" I asked. The answer was an emphatic "No." Which means that for one scholar at least (and I have the feeling he is not alone in his verdict), still another political phenomenon must be added to our list of the irrationally derived.

Consider, then, the number of instances in which faulty perception has been said to be involved in the entertainment of political attitudes repugnant to the scholar investigating them. Would we not expect, in light of these, to find political scientists writing about the importance of accurate vision? Quite frequently they do. Throughout his international relations text Stoessinger lays great stress on the need for clear-sightedness. The final chapter of the book, called "Perception and Reality in World Politics," is, as the title indicates, concerned with little else. At one point Stoessinger argues that "if the Japanese in 1941 had perceived themselves and the United States as they really were, there would have been no Pearl Harbor. It would

have been obvious that Japan could not possibly win a war against the United States." ". . . It was the power of an image," he believes, "that precipitated the Japanese attack."⁶⁹ Otto Klineberg, you may remember, was quoted in Chapter One as having written

A good case might be made for the view that if Hitler had recognized the real qualities of his enemies, instead of being misled by false and inadequate stereotypes, he might have made very different decisions, and the whole course of history might have been affected thereby.⁷⁰

Klineberg, like Stoessinger, emphasizes the problem and the danger of faulty images, over and over again.⁷¹

That the concern of these authors follows logically from the premises of the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm hardly needs to be pointed out. Moreover, given that radical rightists, self-proclaimed Communists, racists, etc., are daily having more political impact and are putting forth arguments which cannot but sound ludicrous to their ears, in the future we would expect political scientists to manifest increasing preoccupation with perception.

General Comments on Ideology, Propaganda and Totalitarianism

In Chapter One we found the prevailing paradigm arguing that viewer and viewed are independent of one another. That which "is,"

⁶⁹Stoessinger, p. 23.

⁷⁰Klineberg, p. 41.

⁷¹Frankel, p. 33; See also: Sprout and Sprout, p. 124.

it told us, "is" whether or not the observer exists, and irrespective of the condition of that existence. Therefore, the logic continued, the "is," the true "facts," are equally independent of whatever desires or objectives the observer may entertain; ("fact" and "value," "is" and "ought" are separated). Too, the paradigm informed us, under certain circumstances some observers may come close to, even achieve, truth, but clearly, not all do so; hence, it is possible to be wrong about what "is," to make an erroneous reading. And finally, it was reasoned that one may be kept from discovering the truth of a particular object or event by some personal value preference which distorts one's perception; one may, in a word, let his "oughts" mix with and contaminate his reading of the "is."

Now ignoring its utopian aspects, we can say of an ideology that it constitutes a reading (albeit an involved one), of economic, social and political externals. Marxist ideology, for instance, includes the contention that politics "is" a matter of class struggle, that wars "are" caused by the imperialist ambitions of capitalist states, and so on. Insofar as he employs the nineteenth century paradigm, then, we would expect the student of politics to assume that like any other reading an ideology may be "false"; it may be a set of beliefs out of keeping with reality. Even more importantly, since all ideologies do have utopian or goal-striving aspects, we would further expect the political scientist to take a rather jaundiced view of ideological interpretations

in general. This, because the "ought" side of the ideology is apt to condition one's view of the "is"; and that, according to the paradigm, is no less than a cardinal sin.

Actually, to claim that political scientists are skeptical of ideological interpretations is probably putting it mildly. It is said of ideologies that "they assume to be built upon intellectual foundations, but frequently their appeal is more to emotions than to minds."⁷² More forcefully, it is said that "the most dominant quality of every ideology is its irrational character. Logic, cool reasoning, and sane judgment have little place in their acceptance or rejection. Rationalization replaces logic, and conviction precludes reasoned judgment."⁷³ It is suggested that "an ideology is a simplifying mechanism, even oversimplifying; it offers to the individual ready-packaged ideas and therefore obviates the necessity for him to work out answers for himself."⁷⁴ In a certain respect one author considers the ideologue more subversive of truth than the liar. "Both are concerned with untruth," he tells us, "but whereas the liar tries to falsify the thought of others while his own private thought is correct, while he himself knows well what the

⁷²Norman Hill, Contemporary World Politics (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 409.

⁷³Francis James Brown, Charles Hodges, Joseph Slabery Roucek, eds., Contemporary World Politics, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1940), p. 570.

⁷⁴Hill, p. 429.

truth is," not so with the ideologue; the "person who falls for an ideology is himself deluded in his private thought . . ." ⁷⁵ As we supposed, some argue that an ideology "approaches social realities from the point of view of an ideal and interprets them consciously or unconsciously to prove the correctness of the analysis and to justify the ideal. The starting point of such reasoning is essentially an unscientific element of thinking--the ideal." ⁷⁶

If ideological interpretations are to be scorned, what are the alternatives? One text offers a suggestion. Its authors write:

Although complete objectivity in studying world affairs seems . . . to represent an almost impossible ideal, there may be certain standards which, if followed, will produce a more complete and accurate picture of world problems than might otherwise be true. This approach might be called the vantage point of critical scholarship. ⁷⁷

And what is the approach of the critical scholar? Judging by their whole approach, which stresses the importance of obtaining a "true" image of world affairs, I suspect the authors may have had in mind

⁷⁵Werner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge; An Essay in Aid of a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 48.

⁷⁶Brown, Hodges, Roucek, p. 569. I think it highly consistent with the above view of ideology to speak of the distorted perceptions of Marxist statesmen, and to suggest that C. Wright Mills and William A. Williams let their ideological commitments turn them from "truth's" path.

⁷⁷Elton Atwater, William Butz, Kent Forster, Neal Riemer, World Affairs: Problems and Prospects (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1958), p. 54.

something akin to the nineteenth century paradigm as I detailed it in Chapter One.

For many political scientists propaganda, no less than ideology, involves attitudes and practices which range from questionable to damnable. In keeping with the nineteenth century conceptual framework, there is a tendency to distinguish between education and propaganda by suggesting that the first has to do with the inculcation of truth (or what to the most competent judges appears to be truth), and its single aim is to enlighten minds and extend horizons; the educator is without ulterior motives. Furthermore, education, while admittedly "an attempt to influence and control thinking and conduct," is nevertheless done "in such a manner that the persons who think and act are stimulated to seek to understand for themselves why they do what they do."⁷⁸ Finally, in education there is a conscious endeavor to provide all the relevant facts, to give the audience the fullest picture upon which to base its judgment.

Not so with propaganda. Despite the bewildering variety of definitions political scientists have offered for that concept, there is a fair amount of agreement among them that the propagandist is one seeking to further some interest. Unlike the educator, he is generally seen as goal-oriented; he wants to convert people in the service of an

⁷⁸F. C. Bartlett, Political Propaganda (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 6.

objective, not inform them in the interest of knowledge. On matters political, propaganda is often termed "a conscious attempt to produce political action or inaction."⁷⁹ Scholars suggest that the propagandist, very likely because of his strong value involvement, is not overly particular about his methods. "Distorted facts, misrepresentations, irrational appeals to prejudice and emotion," are commonly described as the "tricks and devices of the propagandist."⁸⁰

"In most cases," state Robert Strausz-Hupe and Stefan T.

Possony,

a propagandistic presentation of a problem will resemble far more closely the plea of a skillful lawyer than the cool analysis of a scientist whose sole intention is to clarify assumptions, to ascertain facts, multiple causes and effects, and to weigh accurately the importance of each factor.⁸¹

"Lies and falsehoods," Strausz-Hupe and Possony inform us, are a "frequent characteristic of propaganda." Even when the propagandist is being truthful, they add, "he will rarely speak the whole truth." C. C. Rodee, T. J. Anderson, and C. Q. Christol refer to

⁷⁹Robert Strausz-Hupe, Stefan T. Possony, International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 353. See also Lennox A. Mills, Charles H. McLaughlin, World Politics in Transition (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956), pp. 114-15; and the discussion of definitions of propaganda in L. John Martin, International Propaganda (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 10-11.

⁸⁰Carlton Clymer Rodee, Totton James Anderson, Carl Quimby Christol, Introduction to Political Science (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1957), p. 427.

⁸¹Rodee, et al., p. 444.

this last practice as "distortion by selection."⁸² "In this instance," they observe, "all the propagandist's materials may be based on facts. He has, however, selected only those facts which present the picture he wishes to exhibit." A related practice mentioned by these authors is one they call "slanting." Here, "all the information may be presented, but the comment, discussion, or opinion accompanying the facts may have emphasized only one side or phase of the problem."⁸³ As a result of such "slanting," the authors contend, there would doubtlessly be a "tendency for the subject to ignore, or treat as secondary, very pertinent information which would offer an entirely different perspective of the news." Lastly, the propagandist may choose to place insufficient emphasis on the facts, or he may "exaggerate the meaning of the facts in an interpretation of their significance."

As for the effectiveness of propaganda, it has no theoretical limitations. It never works out that way, and no one expects it to, but according to the logic of the nineteenth century paradigm, "it is conceivable that one persuasive person could, through the use of mass media, bend the world's population to his will."⁸⁴

⁸²Ibid., p. 444.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Dorwin Cartwright, "Some Principles of Mass Persuasion," in Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. by Daniel Katz, et al. (New York: The Dryden Press, 1954), p. 382.

Regarding totalitarian systems, it is obvious that in their modern form they are based on fairly widespread popular support. The mass approval given the Nazi movement in Germany has already been discussed. Stalin's Russia is another notable example. In view of the harsh and restrictive nature of these regimes, the political scientist is naturally asked to explain the willingness of so many to support them. Various answers are given; in connection with Germany we spoke of the "authoritarian personality" hypothesis. Another explanation commonly offered, equally consistent with the demands of the nineteenth century framework, is the suggestion that the totalitarian dictator "rules by force but he appeals for popular approval to mass plebiscites; he denies to his populace the right to limit his program, yet by propaganda and demagogic appeal he tries to convert the nation to his view . . ." ⁸⁵ In other words, the totalitarian is depicted as something of a specialist in propaganda. Raymond Aron, reflecting on the Russian people's acceptance of their government's policies observes,

It is easier to persuade or stupefy men when they are submitted exclusively to one propaganda line. A system of interpretation, however stupid and absurd, ends by leaving its mark on men's minds when it is applied every day, every hour, every minute,

⁸⁵H. Arthur Steiner, Principles and Problems of International Relations (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), p. 45.

to the innumerable events that occur in the four corners of the earth.⁸⁶

In like manner, both the Russian and Chinese leaders are sometimes described as experts at selling Marxist-Leninist ideology abroad. In general, the argument usually runs this way:

People everywhere have grievances against their governments and the institutional environment in which they live. People are human, and the political-economic system in no country is perfect. Soviet propoganda exploits the grievances in a very effective manner. Particularly is this true in the less industrialized and politically unstable countries of the world.⁸⁷

In concluding this chapter, I would like to emphasize that, save for the ones I called "community views," many political scientists would disagree with any one of the theses discussed; on occasion, vigorously disagree. And even the "community truths" would naturally be decried by some. My only concern, as I said at the outset, has been to take the more popular outlooks and understandings and demonstrate that they are logically compatible with the epistemological paradigm of nineteenth century natural science. Most of the less popular views

⁸⁶Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1954), pp. 234-35.

⁸⁷Margaret Ball and Hugh B. Kullough, International Relations (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956), p. 556. Stoessinger even asserts that "ideology as a source of power is largely a monopoly of totalitarianism. A democracy may have goals or ideals but not an ideology." Stoessinger, p. 27.

are no less compatible. There are just too many of them to consider, and I feel little would be gained from making the attempt.

Throughout this chapter I have sought to demonstrate the extent to which modern political science assumes the appropriateness of the nineteenth century conceptual framework. The tendency to agree about fundamental issues, the inclination to attack as unscholarly and non-objective those who do not, the arguments that the Russians, Chinese, Nazis, radical-rightists, as well as Mills, Williams and Strauss are guilty of permitting their values to hinder their reading of the facts (with the implication that this is a bad practice), the contention that the propagandist emphasizes values while the educator accents fact, the suggestion that ideological commitments distort facts by straining them through a value screen, all of these are, I insist, compelling evidence for the notion that political scientists postulate a natural distinction between fact and value; and that they think in terms of discoverable "truths" external to the observer. Here, at least, they take for granted the correctness of the paradigm in question.

III. THE PREVAILING PARADIGM: MORE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE

It is the function of science to understand and interpret the world, not to change it.¹

--Heinz Eulau

The two methods of approach--the inclination to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what should be, and the inclination to deduce what should be from what was and is--determine opposite attitudes towards every political problem. "It is the eternal dispute," as Albert Sorel puts it, "between those who imagine the world to suit their policy, and those who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world."²

--E. H. Carr

Politics as "Offensive"

Let me return to an idea introduced early in the preceding chapter. There it was reasoned that if a political scientist endorses the nineteenth century paradigm--which argues there is only one set of "truths" about any object or event--he will be inclined to assume that, wherever fundamental issues are concerned, the statesmen who guide his nation are essentially correct in their understandings and

¹Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 9.

²E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1956), p. 37.

analyses. Given the paradigm in question, I suggested, the alternative would require a mental sturdiness, self-confidence, even plain conceit of no mean dimensions. Now when it comes to a general understanding of the nature of political activity, I believe the same observation applies. Students of politics are well aware there is both a defensive and an offensive element to the game; that is, people go after political power both to preserve and enhance their interests. However, to the politician and, therefore, to the political scientist as well, the major portion of the bull work and the brain work connected with politics has to do with the latter, with offense.

But there is another and perhaps more important reason why political scientists tend to view politics in this way. The nineteenth century paradigm tells us facts are distinct from values, that the former have to do with what is, and the latter with what one wants to be. In addition, it argues the objective viewer will be adept at distinguishing the two, he will have a facility for recognizing facts which is at once to say he will have a facility for recognizing values. In other words, for the "objective," or "reasonable" man values are essentially conscious phenomena, his goals consciously held goals. It is the less-than-reasonable man who is said to have his values lying below the level of awareness; the radical rightist, for instance, who believes he seeks freedom, but in "truth" desires status. Since the conscious objectives of people engaged in political activity largely

have to do with enhancing or promoting interests, it is reasonable and consistent with the nineteenth century epistemological framework for the student of politics to conclude that politics is principally an offensive undertaking. When discussing the implications for political science of the twentieth century physics paradigm, I will argue the most important values are always assumed; that indeed, they are taken for granted precisely because they are of paramount importance. I will argue too, that as with all assumptions, they seldom enter our awareness; rather we act out of an endorsement of them much as we live and breathe.

The student of politics, then, usually tells us men aim for political power in order to achieve and acquire. "Why do people participate in politics," the authors of American Democracy in Theory and Practice ask. For these reasons, they answer: "economic gain," "social adjustment," "the need to understand," "relief of psychic tensions," "the quest for power," and "the need for self-esteem."³ No mention is made of a desire to defend what they have economically and socially. "People seek political influence not necessarily for its own sake," says Robert A. Dahl, "but because control over the government helps them to achieve one or more of their goals."⁴ Lewis A.

³Robert K. Carr, Marvin H. Bernstein, Walter F. Murphy, American Democracy in Theory and Practice (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), pp. 279-83.

⁴Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 16.

Froman, Jr. writes that "politics is concerned with (1) the decision-making process involved in the distribution of payoffs, and (2) what kinds of people receive what kinds of payoffs . . ."⁵ To Harold Lasswell, the first of five questions which are "pertinent to every political situation" is, "what goal values are to be sought?"⁶ In publication after political science publication we find this same idea expressed. "Politics may be defined as the art and practice of achieving group ends against the opposition of other groups";⁷ "politics is said to be a struggle in which individuals or classes or parties or nations strive to promote their interests through influencing or controlling group action."⁸ Promote interests, that is the key concept. Defend, to be sure, but far more importantly, promote.

Do not misunderstand me, I believe it quite necessary to study the offensive aspects of political endeavor. However, when they are concentrated on almost to the exclusion of defensive features, one winds up with an understanding of politics which, I am convinced,

⁵Lewis A. Froman, Jr., People and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 16.

⁶Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (Cleveland: Meridian Books, the World Publishing Co., 1963), p. 187.

⁷Quincy Wright, Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1954), p. 116.

⁸Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1966), p. 7.

ill accords with experience. But more of that later.

This notion, that politics is largely offensive, or change oriented, is reflected in much that is written about the subject. One sees it in Lipset's suggestion that radicalism is primarily the result of economic deprivation coupled with "the exposure to the possibility of a better way of life."⁹ One finds it in the observation, popular among political scientists, that "in all the underdeveloped countries a 'revolution of rising expectations' has taken place."¹⁰ The idea here is that the peoples of underdeveloped nations have been made more aware of their deprived state by radio, television, foreign contacts, et cetera, and now they grow restive and impatient to share the wealth. One finds it again in Dahl's contention that the apolitical are that way because they put "a low valuation on the rewards to be gained from political involvement relative to the rewards expected from other kinds of human activity," or because they believe there is little likelihood they can change things, or because they feel the outcome will be acceptable anyway.¹¹

It is a view of politics as "offensive" which lies behind much

⁹Lipset, Political Man, pp. 47-48.

¹⁰See Donald Brandon, American Foreign Policy: Beyond Utopianism and Realism (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1966), p. 200.

¹¹Dahl, pp. 60-63.

of the comment and criticism aimed at the U. S. foreign aid program. By many it seems to be taken for granted that the single intent of the aid is to promote change, to elevate economies, alter social and political structures and so forth. "The chief purpose of American economic assistance abroad at the present time and for some years back," the argument runs, "has been to facilitate the economic development of underdeveloped areas."¹² Finally, one usually finds it expressed in discussions of war and revolution. Political scientists are prone to view collective violence as the result of a desire for gain. Though some, even most of the participants may be fighting a defensive engagement, the assumption seems to be that usually at least one group or nation involved is out to gain something over and above what it began with. Hence, as there are said to be "revolutions of rising expectations," so too, there are said to be wars of aggrandizement, fights over the spoils of past encounters, and over "power" pure and simple.¹³ We are presented with a picture of man as radical and

¹²Bernard C. Cohen, "New Dimensions in American Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy in American Government (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 11. See also: Thomas R. Adam, Elements of Government (New York: Random House, 1960). Adam quotes President Eisenhower to the effect that "our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burden." p. 435.

¹³Other "offensive" causes commonly given include a desire for political hegemony over an area and attempts to extend some religion, culture, or territorial boundary. See the list of causes presented by Charles Hodges in The Background of International Relations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1931), p. 555.

capricious, willing on occasion to risk everything, even his life, in the hope of securing something more. Reinhold Niebuhr appears to have put the idea in the strongest terms possible when he said of war: "The man in the street, with his lust for power and prestige thwarted by his own limitations and the necessities of social life, projects his ego upon his nation and indulges his anarchic lusts vicariously."¹⁴

It is this conception of man as other than conservative which leads to the conclusion that wealthier, more productive nations have an advantage in time of war because of the ability of their people to "belt tighten." The hypothesis is that a "fat" people can and will forego some of its luxuries during a crisis, turning butter into guns, items of pleasure into instruments of war.¹⁵ Consequently, they are said to have a decided edge on countries whose populations live closer to the subsistence level, those countries which have little or no peacetime "fat" to be transformed into wartime muscle.

While I am on the subject of war, I might add that according to the nineteenth century conceptual framework, emotion is injurious to reason; to no small extent the two are portrayed as opposing forces. Therefore, to suggest, as some observers do, that war is more the

¹⁴Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 93.

¹⁵See the discussion in Van Dyke, International Politics, pp. 183-84.

product of emotion than reason is to remain consistent with the paradigm. Sometimes it is merely proposed reason takes a back seat once the battle has begun. Other authors contend that in time of war reason succumbs completely. Geoffrey Bourne takes the latter position when he states, "Reason has no hand in initiating war; emotion is entirely responsible for this. To make men willing to accept mass murder as a hallowed mission, the emotions must be violently stimulated."¹⁶ Although consistent with the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm, the above outlook does not follow from it automatically, and is not supported by many scholars. Quincy Wright, for example, argues: "The contrast of reason to war is another of those simple alternatives which seeks to limit choice to policies neither of which is wholly desirable."¹⁷

On Economic, Social and Political Change

It is an easy matter to demonstrate that certain assumptions about the nature of change, popular among political scientists, are logically compatible with the nineteenth century paradigm. Objects and events, you will remember, were said to populate our universe; objects and events with single "true" forms. These forms were

¹⁶Geoffrey Bourne, War, Politics and Emotion (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1941), p. 49.

¹⁷Quincy Wright, p. 204.

further said to be "caused" by other objects and events which, preceding or accompanying the ones in question, somehow gave them rise. The paradigm encourages an understanding of the universe, then, in which time exists as an absolute.¹⁸ Events take place, things come into being and pass away, through time, while time itself is a constant. It is as a straight line, one end of it moving back into the dim past, farther back than the mind can fathom, and the other extending on into the future. Now it is consistent with such an understanding of time to argue that "the rate at which institutions change is highly variable,"¹⁹ to suggest "there are occasions in the history of a community when the rate of change is for awhile accelerated, and adjustments are attempted or accomplished with rapidity and a sense of urgency."²⁰ On the other hand, if time is not held to be a constant, such statements, when made without further clarification, are meaningless. The foregoing view is also consistent with the prevailing paradigm in that it presupposes there are "true" and discoverable economic, social and political forms which can be witnessed to alter at varying rates of speed.

As the nineteenth century paradigm permits change to be "really" fast or "really" slow, so too, it allows for the idea that

¹⁸In short, there is a decided conflict between an Einsteinian understanding of time and space and the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm.

¹⁹G. Lowell Field, Government in Modern Society (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1951), p. 367.

²⁰Leslie Lipson, The Great Issues of Politics (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 441.

change can be "truly" radical or only moderate in nature. The word "revolution" is often used to describe extreme and pervasive alterations. Leslie Lipson employs it in this manner. By way of illustration, he points to the Russian revolution of 1917 as "one of the most penetrating and intensive overhauls of a social order of which history has record."²¹ It is this same understanding of change as potentially radical which leads Alfred De Grazia, "speculat[ing] on the fate of the world under the Communist type of leadership," to conjecture: "The class structure of previously existing societies would be demolished within several years of the day of victory." "In its place," he writes, "a new ruling element composed almost entirely of persons of exclusively materialist cast, uneducated or, if educated, apostates of culture, will govern ruthlessly in the name of the People." Finally, De Grazia concludes, "their authentic policies will be expropriation of all forms of wealth. In a country such as the U. S. A. or France, persons with over \$5,000 of assets would probably lose on the average half of their possessions." And "those who own the more would lose the more."²²

A third notion about change which accords well with the

²¹Ibid., p. 441.

²²Alfred De Grazia, Politics and Government (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 298-99.

nineteenth century paradigm is the belief that it can take place in one part of a society (or in one part of the world) without necessarily occurring in another. The paradigm stipulates that some things are causally connected, but not all things are. Consequently, it stands to reason one aspect of a community may be radically transfigured yet have little, possibly no, causal influence upon its other parts. A marked alteration in a nation's economic structure, for instance, need not be accompanied by comparable changes in its social or political institutions, modifications in foreign policy need not be matched by parallel transformations domestically. That students of politics customarily make such an assumption strikes me as rather obvious. Thus, while most are quick to admit the impossibility of maintaining the status quo in the international arena, one often comes across the suggestion that a primary national objective, or "interest," is to "preserve our institutions."²³ To one who viewed change holistically the preservation of any institution in a world of flux and variation would be presumed inconceivable. Gabriel Almond's observation is worth reviewing here. Almond, we noted, found an almost total lack of studies dealing with the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics or with the connection between economic and

²³See Charles Burton Marshall, U. S. Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1952, quoted in Martin C. Needler, Understanding Foreign Policy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), p. 10.

socio-cultural factors and international relations. In part, I propose, the lack results from an assumption that such things are not always profoundly related.

Also reconcilable with the prevailing paradigm are the various equilibrium theories which have been propounded. A basic premise seems to be that the parts which go to make up a society have "real" form, and will be in harmony or equilibrium if all goes well. An analogy is sometimes drawn between the human body with its organs and a community with its respective parts. As harmony or equilibrium is possible, so too is the absence of harmony, or "unstable equilibrium."²⁴ If I read Talcott Parsons and George Liska correctly, both equilibrium and "unstable equilibrium" are seen as conditions which exist independent of the observer, much as the forms of objects and events were said to do. Hence, it would be possible to make a wrong analysis, to conclude a society was in equilibrium, for example, when in "truth" it was not.

Description and Prescription in Political Science

The paradigm separates fact and value. One can describe without prescribing it informs us, or conversely, one can postulate

²⁴See Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1964), p. 289. Also George Liska, International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957).

an objective without concern for or comment about what presently exists. With this assumption in mind, then, it is fit for Hyneman to declare: "Description I understand to be a report of what actually exists and occurs." "The preoccupation I label normative doctrine and proposals for social action is another special case of bringing empirical data and ideas together. I put under this head writing that is heavily impressed by the author's personal preference or conviction."²⁵ Likewise, it is fair for Avery Leiserson to write "program-oriented policy research . . . is sharply differentiated from that which is aimed at the discovery of empirically based principles or uniformities. . . I am not arguing that either type of research is better or worse. I am saying that one type is directed toward the achievement of personal or group ends, while the other is directed toward the systematization of knowledge about politics and government."²⁶

If students of politics take it for granted that prescription and description are totally different kinds of activities, we would expect to find them (again, we do find them) debating whether or not they, as political scientists, ought to prescribe. Harry Ekstein, reporting on a conference held to consider the relationship between

²⁵Hyneman, pp. 28-29.

²⁶Avery Leiserson, "Problems of Methodology in Political Research," Political Science Quarterly, LXVIII (1953), p. 561. See also: Inkeles, pp. 102-103.

political theory and political investigation, relates: "Most of the disagreements which arose during the discussions of the conference arose from certain fundamentally different ideas about the 'end' of the study of politics."²⁷ Those of a behaviorist bent, he notes, thought in terms of "transform[ing] the field of political studies into a genuine scientific discipline." Others accented the need for "moral reflection" for the consideration of political goals. Eulau has already been cited as having asserted "it is the function of science to understand and interpret the world, not to change it."²⁸ Leaning in the other direction are scholars such as David Easton and his followers who plead the necessity of value theory. The question at issue is not whether the political scientist should concern himself with values, but rather, whether he should do so as a scientist. It seems evident that those who are discussing and debating the matter have assumed the validity of that part of the nineteenth century paradigm which claims it is possible to describe without prescribing. And, to repeat the point of interest here, having made that assumption, their debate is admittedly meaningful.

There is another approach which, in certain respects,

²⁷Harry Ekstein, "Political Theory and the Study of Politics: A Report of a Conference," American Political Science Review, L (June 1956), p. 476.

²⁸Op. Cit., p. 9.

constitutes an alternative to the above courses of action. Called "ends-means analysis," it purports to allow political scientists to reflect on both things at once (that is, on normative elements and issues as well as the purely descriptive), while seemingly maintaining an air of detachment which it is argued may be impossible if one concentrates only on the normative. Instead of becoming an advocate for some pet objective, the scholar merely proclaims "if this is your end, then you are best advised to use that means"; he may even preface his remark with, "of course, I cannot tell you what your end should be." In following such a procedure the political scientist remains true to the prevailing paradigm, for to talk of ends is to talk of values, while to speak of means is but to refer to facts.²⁹

Teaching Political Science

Certain ideas about the teaching of political science are especially compatible with the nineteenth century paradigm. Plainly, one who assumes the correctness of that framework might be expected to say with William A. Robson, "The proper attitude of the teacher should surely be . . . to distinguish so far as possible between the occasion when he is expressing personal value judgments from those

²⁹See Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis, pp. 154-55.

when he is filling a more objective role."³⁰ So too, we would hardly be surprised to hear the nineteenth century paradigm advocate argue, "The principle functions of a professor of political science are . . . the same as those of the teacher of any academic subject: to provide a store of accumulated knowledge and wisdom, to teach the younger generation to add to and reinterpret knowledge."³¹

Any and all of the following observations made by political scientists accord equally well with the paradigm:

Prejudiced exhortations carried into the classroom become indoctrination. And indoctrination is not good teaching; indeed it is not teaching at all. The sorcerer's apprentices may enlarge offhand remarks to the exclusion of the central truth.³²

Efforts should be made to develop political science in a stable, balanced manner, and not allow sudden enthusiasms for a particular aspect or method to lead to the neglect of other aspects or the distortion of the subject as a whole.³³

Once we get away from the straight path of depersonalized research there is the danger of propaganda, the danger of cheap feelings glibly expressed, and these are from no point of view worthy of academic encouragement or

³⁰William A. Robson, The University Teaching of Political Science, UNESCO, April 1954, p. 43.

³¹Ibid., p. 89.

³²Raymond Moley, "The Academic Man in Politics," Columbia University Forum, Vol. VI (Fall, 1963), p. 7. Quoted in Robert H. Connery, ed., Teaching Political Science: A Challenge to Higher Education (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1965), pp. 14-16.

³³Robson, p. 28.

recognition. But surely as at present we ought to be able to see through and reject shoddy analysis, simulated passion, or unreal vision.³⁴

Faculty members should not exploit their students for political ends or "work up" feelings which have not arisen spontaneously among the students.³⁵

Lastly, we might anticipate the argument that a primary objective of the American political scientist ought to be "to make the people of the United States the best-informed citizenry in the world in the field of politics."³⁶ In this connection, I detect an inclination on the part of political scientists to assume that all economic, social, and primarily political problems can be solved through education. Education is to be used to motivate the apolitical, enlighten the segregationist, temper the positions of right and left extremists, engender a more progressive U. S. foreign policy, and alleviate, if not eliminate, our pressing domestic economic and social difficulties; to no small extent it is seen by many contemporary political scientists as something of a

³⁴Edgar H. Brookes, "Through British Eyes," in Teaching Political Science, p. 75.

³⁵Ibid., p. 86.

³⁶William Anderson, "In Ancient Greece," in Teaching Political Science, p. 119. According to Robson, "The goals for political science report of the American Political Science Association found that training for intelligent citizenship is the predominant interest and emphasis among political scientists in the United States." Robson, p. 41.

panacea. "Time and education are the basic requirements for a resolution of world economic or psychological problems," Alfred De Grazia maintains.³⁷ "Time enables education to occur; time means forestalling the disasters of inflationary populations, forestalling military or semi-military aggressiveness, forestalling the use of ultimate weapons." And with sufficient time, he seems to be saying, education can handle all of these matters.

The following questions, issues and outlooks either emanate from the nineteenth century paradigm alone, or would be dealt with in an entirely different manner given the rejection of that framework.

The proper unit of study. What should the investigator look at, groups or individuals? Or should he perhaps investigate both? (The answers which he gives to this question are a distinct indication that when he asks it the political scientist believes he is inquiring as to the "true" sources, or causal origins of political activity.) If he is strongly behavioralist in orientation he will probably reason: "the basic matter of politics and government is people."³⁸ "Political institutions are never more or less different from the patterns of behavior of the people who create them or the regularities of their actions. If this be so, institutions can and must be analyzed in terms

³⁷De Grazia, p. 303.

³⁸Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney, Politics and Voters (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1963), p. 3.

of the behavior of their molecular units, the individuals whose relations to each other and behavior towards each other are more or less rigidly structured."³⁹ If instead, he is a non-behavioralist or only a weak supporter of that approach he may view politics as a group phenomenon, insisting "the chief social values cherished by individuals in modern society are realized through groups."⁴⁰ When it comes to international politics the same kind of question must be asked; namely, is the appropriate unit of study the nation or interest groups within the nation? At present, most political scientists would answer "the nation," but every now and again someone puts forth a thesis which argues the dominant importance of particular elements.

Political activities. Should a political scientist play an active role in party politics? More particularly, should he hold office? Those who say no to these questions contend such involvements lead to partisan attitudes, and are thus inimical to objective study. Those who say yes insist any possible threat to objectivity is more than compensated for by the new perspective and sources of information which active involvement provides, both of which will enhance objectivity.⁴¹

³⁹Eulau, p. 15.

⁴⁰Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," American Political Science Review, XLIV (June, 1952), p. 376.

⁴¹See Hyneman's discussion of this matter in The Study of Politics, Chapter One.

Self-fulfilling prophecy. The suggestion is occasionally made that a "false" analysis of an economic or social situation--if cogently structured and persuasively presented--may win large numbers of adherents who, simply by acting as though it were "true," can render it so. Michael Curtis puts the hypothesis this way:

The preoccupations, ideas and prophecies of the political writer affect behavior in a way that the work of the natural scientist does not. The chemist's personal view of smoking does not affect the correlation between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. But history shows many political prophecies to have been self-fulfilling--the bandwagon movement once a candidate is thought likely to succeed--or self-denying.⁴²

And there is a moral implied by this reasoning: a student of economic and social events has to be particularly cautious, particularly "responsible" when it comes to investigating and reporting. Such an hypothesis could only follow from the prevailing paradigm. It presupposes a separation between experience and thoughts about experience, and it takes for granted an understanding of "error" which the twentieth century physics paradigm does not allow.

The autonomy of thought and action. If there is no necessary connection between thought and experience, then none need be postulated between thought and action. I consider this last view--the idea that thought and action are independent of one another--to be a near "truth" of the American political science community. Here the

⁴²Michael Curtis, ed., The Nature of Politics (New York: Avon Book Division, The Hearst Corp., 1964), p. xxii.

hypothesis is that one can alter his theories without changing his behavior, or conversely, that one may begin to act in a different manner yet make no concomitant alteration in his thoughts. Eulau was taking precisely this position when he spoke of understanding and interpreting the world without changing it. As with the idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy, the hypothesis in question here can only be derived from the nineteenth century epistemological framework.

Particularly when it comes to foreign policy, the masses may not know what is in their own best interests. Probably the best expression of this outlook is found in Walter Lippman's The Public Philosophy.⁴³ Briefly stated, the notion is that "the people are generally poorly informed and, even if information is available to them, their judgment is often wrong."⁴⁴ Again, we are being presented with an argument which assumes there are a "true" set of facts to be poorly informed about, and to erroneously interpret.

Concern over the "objectivity" of graduate students. One of the criteria by which political science graduate students are sometimes evaluated is their ability to be "objective." As a student and as a faculty member, I have witnessed (with misgivings) the inclination of educators to employ this standard. Moreover, the word "objective"

⁴³Walter Lippman, The Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., Atlantic Monthly Press, 1955).

⁴⁴Frankel, International Relations, p. 45.

is given all of the nineteenth century paradigm meanings. Thus it is asked if the student is attuned to "reality," if his descriptions reflect the "facts" of a situation, and if he is able to keep personal aspirations and objectives from coloring his analyses and theoretical formulations.

Preoccupation with definitions. Few are the political scientists who have not at one time or another lamented the lack of a standardized vocabulary for their discipline. Even the most commonly used words are defined and redefined in so many ways that communication among members of the field is never easy and often impossible. "Communism, democracy, freedom, security, aggression, justice and many other political terms not only mean different things to different people, but also to most people what is connoted is vague and imprecise."⁴⁵ Then too, it is argued, words used by the political scientist often evoke strong emotions. The Sprouts refer to a classroom incident in which "the emotional connotation of communism was sufficient to block further rational thinking on the subject."⁴⁶

Now it is consistent with the prevailing paradigm to suggest, as some writers have, that the problem might be solved if only students of politics would give it more attention; if, for example, they would concentrate on making their definitions clear and precise, and

⁴⁵Sprout and Sprout, p. 23.

⁴⁶Ibid.

if they would avoid emotion-laden terms. Of interest to us are the assumptions underlying that suggestion. They include: the notion that a precise definition is one which accurately details an external phenomenon; the implication that the emotions which certain terms evoke are triggered by the words alone, or by the words and error, but not by experienced "facts"; and the view that an emotion-free vocabulary could be constructed and still leave political scientists something to talk about--which is either to argue political scientists largely share their values, or that it is possible to describe without prescribing; that, in other words, fact and value are separate.

While we are on the subject of definition there is another comment which might be worth making. The heart of the nineteenth century paradigm was said to be that "truths" the "real" forms of objects and events, exist "out there." Consequently, it stands to reason "nothing can be shown to be true or false about the real world of politics (or economics) simply by definition."⁴⁷ At least not according to the logic of the going conceptual framework.

Summary Comments and Conclusion

In this chapter and the previous one I have tried to make it clear that political scientists have for the most part assumed the

⁴⁷Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 8.

validity of the conceptual framework of nineteenth century natural science. To be sure, not every political scientist is aware of, or concerned about, epistemology or scientific method. However, I think it safe to say that when those who are speak of scholarship or science they usually have in mind the kinds of things I have mentioned; and even the non-theoretical investigator will be found to adhere to the prevailing paradigm the greater part of the time.

Clearly, it is assumed by most students of politics that there is such a thing as the "truth" of any economic, social or political event; thus it is argued that some persons, e. g. , Nazis, have misread the truth in times past, and that others, for example Marxists, continue to do so. It is assumed that the facts of an event are distinct from the observer's values. Hence, it is concluded that a scientist (including the political scientist) can be value neutral in his investigation, and that the scholarly investigator will concern himself principally with facts rather than values, or at any rate will not confuse the two. "We have tried," assert Harold and Margaret Sprout in the beginning of their text, "to make the book as non-polemical and non-policy-oriented as possible."⁴⁸ "My study," says Inis L. Claude, Jr. in Power and International Relations, "represents a sincere attempt to construct a dispassionate critical analysis unmarked by the bias of

⁴⁸Sprout and Sprout, p. 16.

commitment."⁴⁹ And Lipset informs the reader in the introduction to Political Man "I endeavor to deal as objectively as I can with the conditions of democratic politics, comparatively as well as in America."⁵⁰ Such comments are fairly typical.

It is assumed that strong emotion is likely to cloud one's perceptions. I recall hearing a professor of political science advise a former Hungarian "freedom fighter" not to write a term paper on Russia's role in the Hungarian revolt because he was too emotionally involved and would not be apt to present an objective account. Similarly, I have heard scholars who profess opposition to the Johnson administration's Vietnam policies excuse themselves from active participation in protest movements on the grounds that they wished to maintain a detached and objective stance. One colleague expressed concern for the objectivity of those whose strong commitment one way or the other was open and obvious. I suspect the idea that involvement in "causes" may be injurious to objectivity is rather widely held among students of politics.

When it comes to practicing their profession, it was said that political scientists are wont to regard as objective those understandings most widely endorsed by their associates, while ideas which run

⁴⁹Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 10.

⁵⁰Lipset, p. xxxvi.

counter to those in vogue are frequently attacked as "irrational," "non-objective," the result of emotional involvement or ideological bias. In turn, these very accusations are themselves premised upon the assumption that there is such a thing as the "rational" or "objective" view, and that no one-to-one relationship exists between ideas and experience.

Such assumptions as the above, then, are clearly drawn from the nineteenth century paradigm, and their validity depends upon its correctness. In the following chapter and in subsequent chapters that paradigm will be brought into question. I began by saying that the paradigm was a conceptual whole, that its parts are logically consistent with one another, and therefore a threat to one premise is a threat to all. But it is not simply one or a few of the basic premises which are now coming under attack. Each of them are.

In my estimation the arguments of the attackers are telling; they insist the measuring instrument is intimately tied to the measured, the observer bound inseparably with the observed. They contend there are no "true" as opposed to "false" readings of reality, that there are no "natural" similarities, no "natural" laws or "natural" causes. And they assert that every statement of fact is at once a statement of value.

Perhaps political scientists will be able to meet the assault and maintain the old paradigm intact, although I personally do not believe it. However, this much seems sure. In view of the

increasing frequency of the challenges to that conceptual framework, and considering the cogency of those challenges, political scientists cannot long continue to ignore them. If they would hold on to the nineteenth century paradigm they must turn to the preparation of their defense, and soon.

IV. THE PREVAILING PARADIGM: INCONSISTENCIES,
INADEQUACIES AND ANOMALIES

The acid of science which has eaten away so many ancient images now is seen to turn on the image of science itself. The white-coated high priest of truth: austere, objective, operational, realistic, validating, is degraded to the status of the servant of a sub-culture, trapped in the fortress of its own defended public image, and straining the grains of truth through its own value system.¹

--Kenneth E. Boulding

The Observer and the Observed

Slowly but surely and one by one the premises of the prevailing paradigm--that paradigm long entertained by scientists and layman alike--have come to be disputed. The arguments proceed in the following manner.

It is apparently just not so that the "facts," the objects and events which the layman contemplates and the scholar studies, have a structure which is in any way independent of them as observers. In this world of ours the viewer and the viewed, the measured and the instrument of measurement, are increasingly being recognized as inseparable. Einsteinian theory, for example, argues that the length

¹Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 171.

of an object will always vary if measured by observers who are in motion relative to one another.² Yet, under the circumstances, each reading will be a correct one. That the nature of an observation is dependent upon the nature of the observing instrument is an assertion which can be defended merely by noting that a micrometer and a yardstick give different reports; or that a camera does not "see" or "relate" the same thing as a tape recorder. The point being made is that the "fact" of an object will vary as the observational device varies.

Nor, it appears, can the viewer and the viewed be divorced when it comes to describing events.³ Again it was Einstein who noted that when one instrument records two events as having taken place simultaneously, a second, in motion relative to the first, will tell us they happened at different times. For today's atomic physicist such ties between the observed and the observing mechanism can seldom be ignored. The natural scientist of days past could afford to do so; but the modern physicist finds it impossible to speak of the behavior of sub-atomic particles as though this behavior were somehow "independent

²Morris Cohen, p. 236. Or see Russell Fox, Max Garbuny, and Robert Hooke, The Science of Science: Methods of Interpreting Physical Phenomena (New York: Walker and Co., 1963), p. 17.

³We would expect this, for as we will see later whether one views a piece of time-space as an object or an event is also determined in part by one's relationships with that piece of time-space, one's objectives, etc.

of the means of observation."⁴

What difference does it all make? Just this. If it is the case that the structure of the aforementioned kinds of facts will be determined in part by the structure of the device which observes them, does this not hold true as well for any and all the facts men may speak of? In the words of P. W. Bridgman, "the instrument of knowledge par excellence is the brain."⁵ Then is it not likely, Bridgman wonders, that the things one brain recognizes as true or factual will, by a markedly different brain, be held to be false? And in such a situation, would not both brains be right?

Too, an immediate and unyielding tie is now beginning to be recognized between the things said to exist "out there," the "facts," and the theories we entertain about them. Of Daltonian and Newtonian theoretical formulations T. S. Kuhn comments,

[these] theories, of course, do "fit the facts," but only by transforming previously accessible information into facts that, for the preceding paradigm, had not existed at all. [italics added.] And that means that theories do not evolve piecemeal to fit facts that were there all the time. Rather, they emerge together with the facts they fit from a revolutionary reformulation of the preceding scientific tradition, a tradition within which the knowledge-mediated relationship between the

⁴Neils Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New York: Science Editions, Inc., 1961), p. 25.

⁵P. W. Bridgman, "The Nature of Physical Knowledge," in L. W. Friedrich, ed., The Nature of Physical Knowledge (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1960), p. 22.

scientist and nature was not quite the same.⁶

Likewise, the philosopher Angus Sinclair writes

Facts exist only in the situations which each man experiences as the outcome of holding his attitudes or theories or following his ways of selecting and grouping in attention. In that from which he makes his selection there are neither facts nor no facts. In most cases of this kind we mostly follow much the same ways of selecting and grouping (as is shown by our being able to discuss the exceptions where we do not) and we therefore fall into the illusion that we are all dealing with one fact or set of facts which is independent and common to us all. But any other intelligence which did not follow ways more or less like those we follow would not experience horses or fossils at all, and references to an allegedly independently existing fact that the former are descended from the latter would be meaningless to it. That is to say, it is the theories or attitudes or ways of selecting and grouping in attention that are basic, and the facts are derivative.⁷

Finally, if Einstein found that similar instruments would report different lengths for objects and different times for the occurrence of events depending upon their relationships with those objects and events, can we then ignore relationships? Can we ignore the relationships, that is, between the knower and that which is known? In respect to relationships, Sinclair tells us

When a man asserts that there really is a tree, and that it was and is and will be a single, unitary entity whatever I think about it (although perhaps allowing that my way of thinking determines to some extent whether I experience a single

⁶ Kuhn, . . . p. 140.

⁷ W. Angus Sinclair, The Conditions of Knowing: An Essay Towards a Theory of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951), p. 93.

unitary pipe) then he is in effect asserting that all persons similarly situated [emphasis mine] do in fact make the same selections and groupings in attention as he does.⁸

Neils Bohr suggests "the general concept of relativity expressed the essential dependence of any phenomenon on the frame of reference used for its coordination in space and time."⁹

In light of the above comments we must ask this question: can we ever state that something is a fact without considerable further qualification? Or is it possible that the best we can do is to claim W is the fact given X type of measuring instrument, holding Y assumptions or theories, and having Z kinds of relationships with the thing being viewed?

Evidence from Psychology and Semantics

In attempting to answer this last question we might look at the findings of the famed child psychologist Jean Piaget. Piaget has found the universe of a child is significantly different from that of an adult. Numerous words and concepts which children use in common with adults do not mean the same thing to them as they do to their elders.¹⁰ Their "associations" are not the same. Nor do they differ

⁸Sinclair, p. 79.

⁹Bohr, p. 7.

¹⁰Jean Piaget, The Child's Conception of the World (New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Cox, 1963), p. 30.

in a random manner. Piaget is convinced children pass through definite stages during each of which they share a reality that in many of its aspects is unlike the reality of other stages.

Thus it appears that in growing up the child does not so much learn to see truth or reality as he learns to see a particular kind of reality. He accomplishes this by becoming the same sort of measuring instrument as his parents, physically as well as intellectually. It is no wonder Piaget's work leads him to observe that

In psychology as in physics there are no pure "facts," if by "facts" are meant phenomena presented nakedly to the mind by nature itself, independent respectively of hypotheses by means of which the mind examines them, of principles governing the interpretation of experience, and of the systematic framework of existing judgments into which the observer pigeon-holes every new observation.¹¹

Further evidence for the view that the objects and events of our universe do not possess a form which is independent of the observer is furnished by Benjamin Lee Whorf's exhaustive studies of language. In Whorf's own words,

the background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade . . . We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it

¹¹Ibid., p. 23.

in this way--an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language.¹²

To illustrate, our sense of "time" is not shared by the Hopi Indian who has no understand of, or language to represent, an orderly progression of time from past, to present, and on into the future; and who does not make our kind of separation between time and space.¹³ Whorf was quick to note that the implications of his findings are

very significant for modern science for it means that no individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free . . . From this fact proceeds what I have called the "linguistic relativity principle," which means, in informal terms, that users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world.¹⁴

In the eyes of one observer, Professor Robert Livingston, anthropological and linguistic investigations of the sort carried out by Whorf, Edward Sapir and others

demonstrate conclusively that culture, and especially language, not only affects one's world view but also affects the very processes by which one thinks and the logic one assumes for the operation of all processes in the universe.¹⁵

¹²Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality (Boston: The M. I. T. Press, 1964), pp. 212-21.

¹³Ibid., pp. 57-64.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 215-21.

¹⁵Robert Livingston, "Perception and Commitment," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XIX (Feb., 1963), pp. 14-18.

Livingston goes on to insist that neurophysiological studies conducted in the past decade have clearly shown that "the sensory data on which our perceptions necessarily depend are contaminated during the earliest input stages by our past experiences, expectations and purposes."¹⁶

"Contaminated" is perhaps a poor word choice; "altered" might have been better. As measuring instruments, we are apparently being altered from moment to moment, however slightly. Thus our measurements, (our realities), are seen to change; again, however slightly. But there appears to be no reason to suppose that any particular measuring instrument gets a "truer" reading of the facts. It simply gets a different one.

Categories and Causes

The nineteenth century paradigm is built upon the hypothesis that our universe consists of objects and events with "real" and discoverable forms, forms which are independent of the observing instrument, including the human. This hypothesis, I believe we can now justifiably conclude, seems to be without empirical support and therefore can be discarded.

Once we have denied that facts (realities) have single concrete forms, if we are to be consistent we must go on to deny the existence of "natural" categories or classes. This too is now being done.

¹⁶Ibid.

According to Whorf, things will appear similar or dissimilar depending, again, on our linguistic (and therefore our cultural) backgrounds. He consistently found that statements which seem to have nothing in common in one language (that is, they refer to dissimilar entities) may seem very much alike to the speaker of another tongue. Whorf illustrates with the sentences "I pull the branch aside," and "I have an extra toe on my foot." To the speaker of English, he observes, they are hardly alike. But to the Shawnee, on the other hand, the two phenomena are "intrinsically" similar. For him the first sentence means "I pull it (something like branch of tree) more open or apart where it forks." And the second sentence would be taken as meaning "I have an extra toe forking out like a branch from a normal toe."¹⁷ The suggestion? There are no "natural" categories.

The philosopher of science E. A. Burttt agrees with this type of reasoning, saying that when it comes to ordering things external to us "many different kinds of order are discernible." Moreover, he adds, the sort of order we find will depend on the sort we seek. What determines the kind of order observers will seek? According to Burttt, "the further ends which, consciously or unconsciously, they want their explanations to serve."¹⁸ Which is to say one orders according

¹⁷Whorf, pp. 233-35.

¹⁸E. A. Burttt, "The Value Presuppositions of Science," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XIII (March, 1957), p. 100.

to one's values. The implication of his argument is that we do not simply discover "natural" orderings. Our role is not strictly a passive one.

Max Planck makes the point even more explicitly when he maintains

any scientific treatment of a given material demands the introduction [italics added] of a certain order into the material dealt with . . . Order, however, demands classification . . . It is important at this point to state that there is no one definite principle available a priori and enabling a classification for every purpose to be made . . .¹⁹

No classification will suit every "purpose," or again, "One orders according to one's values." To use a homely illustration, most people would agree a wool coat and a leather coat are more alike than the wool coat and a wool drape. A moth would not. And we must ask ourselves: given the kind of measuring instrument he is, given his particular set of values, is the moth wrong in his decision? Either no classification is natural, or one is as natural as the next. If we decide the former, the concept "natural category" is descriptive of nothing; if the latter, it is redundant. It is enough to say "category," and less likely to confuse.

There are other ways to make the point that to say there are no "natural" forms is to say there are no "natural" categories or

¹⁹Max Planck, The New Science (Greenwich Editions, Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), pp. 237-38.

classifications. One categorizes or classifies a piece of time-space (object or event) by noting its facets, by identifying its form. If that form is not "natural," then the categorization can hardly be declared "natural." Or, to reverse this line of reasoning, to identify an object or event--to discern its form--is simultaneously to categorize it.

Thus I describe a piece of time-space now before my eyes as "green," putting it in the category of "things that are green." It has four legs; now I place it in the category of "four-legged green things." It is used to sit upon, here I categorize it among "four-legged green things used to sit upon," and so on until I call it a chair, again putting it in a familiar category. To identify and describe, then is at once to categorize, and vice versa. So much for the second premise of the nineteenth century paradigm which holds that there are in existence "natural" categories, containing things whose likenesses or similarities are in no manner dependent upon the observer.

To suggest that facts have no one true, or truer, form is to suggest there are no natural categories. Yes, and to do these two things is to suggest we can no longer speak of "real" causes. How can we if there are no concrete facts or naturally similar entities to be caused? Hence our old understanding of cause has itself come under attack. In case this point is not entirely clear I will repeat what was said in chapter one. There it was argued the existence of real classes presupposes the existence of laws. This because we only know objects

and events through their relationships to other objects and events. We call things alike which have like relationships with other things. And duplications of relationships between objects and events are laws. Finally, lawful relationships between objects and events are causal sequences.²⁰ Therefore, to say things are not "naturally" alike is to say similar relationships between them are not "natural," and hence that the laws or causal sequences are not "natural."

On what basis, then, do we decide to call some objects and events the causes of others? As far as Burtt is concerned (and I fully agree), statements of causality are as value directed as statements about individual facts or about categories. Any object or event, he comments, is causally connected with an infinite number of additional objects and events, if by cause one means those variables which are necessary to the existence of the thing in question. Consequently,

any interpretation of the causal relation that is historically adopted by any group of scientific or philosophical thinkers is selected from alternative interpretations because it is in line with some dominant interest of the thinkers who select it--because it furthers some ulterior aims which they wish to achieve. This means that scientists, among other people, cannot help choosing what sort of causal order they shall look

²⁰Obviously not all lawful relationships are held to be causal sequences. However, every causal sequence is a lawful relationship. The basis upon which man decides what he will label cause will be discussed further, in this chapter and in subsequent ones.

for, and cannot help doing so in terms of the ends they hope to see realized through the knowledge thus gained.²¹

How about the causal statement "Henry got tuberculosis from tubercle bacilli"? A pure description? Not by a long shot. Listen to the tubercle bacillus saying "Henry got tuberculosis because his heart was beating." Yes, we might argue, his heart was admittedly a necessary cause, but it was hardly sufficient. "On the contrary," retorts the bacillus, "I and my fellows are necessary in such matters, but it is always the heart beat which is sufficient. I have yet to see an individual contract tuberculosis without it. Therefore I repeat 'Henry got tuberculosis from a beating heart.'"

The simple point is that underlying the statement "Henry got tuberculosis from the tubercle bacillus" are a pattern of shared values. They include a desire to allow human hearts to beat, and an "I don't give a hang" attitude about the fate of tubercle bacilli. And to share the fact is to share the values. There would be no "science" of tuberculosis if tubercle bacilli had equal time.

²¹Burt, op. cit. Although I would place the same emphasis on values that Burt does, when I detail the twentieth century paradigm I will argue that to have particular relationships with pieces of time and space (objects and events) is to experience particular facts, embrace particular values, and give particular meanings to words. That is, I will contend that such relationships, experienced facts, word meanings, values and the like constitute a whole package, a change in one presupposing a change in the rest.

Order and Objectivity

Having said the foregoing, we are forced to conclude that intentionally or otherwise critics of the prevailing paradigm are attacking the assumption of an orderly universe. They are not arguing no order can exist. Rather they are claiming that where one observing instrument may look out and see order a second, being a different measuring instrument and having different relationships with the measured, may just as accurately discern chaos. For we humans the planets move in an orderly, lawful manner. But to a creature that used one light wave every billion years the heavenly bodies would be seen to move in a random, haphazard fashion. It would be a vision of turmoil and anarchic pandemonium. And what is more, given the measuring instrument in question, it would be a vision every bit as correct as our own. To postulate a certain kind of order is simultaneously to postulate a certain kind of observer, having a certain kind of relationship with the observed.

Now as long as realities, facts, are held to have specific discoverable forms it is meaningful to refer to those who comprehend or seem to comprehend their structures as being more "objective" than those who do not. But what becomes of the objective-subjective dichotomy when a single reality is denied? What changes are now wrought in the "ideal" scientist's, the "ideal" scholar's character? Clearly at

this point the two categories, objective and subjective, can no longer be viewed as in opposition. In any instance, the "objective" view will be neither more nor less than the one inter-subjectively agreed upon.

"It is a theory that there is a subjective and an objective realm or order and these can be distinguished," so speaks Sinclair. "This theory," he observes, "has been so generally accepted in our culture that men seldom notice that it is a theory, and that it ought to be treated as such, and inquired into, and if necessary abandoned." He then concludes, "I believe that it has to be abandoned, as a consequence or concomitant of the general changes in epistemological attitude now taking place in our culture."²² I believe so too. As I understand it, the logic of the argument being presented in this chapter leaves me no alternative.

In making the assertion that objectivity is simply inter-subjective agreement, are we not in harmony with the individuals we criticize? After all, the latter also spoke of objectivity as being born of inter-subjective accord. No, we are far from agreeing. We may be using the same words, but we mean vastly different things by them. What defenders of the prevailing paradigm mean is this: if a group of trained observers can achieve inter-subjective agreement regarding the nature of a fact or truth, they are more apt to be right, to have an objective view, than if they cannot agree. Therefore, at any given time

²²Sinclair, p. 101.

we are well advised to assume that the objective view is the one shared inter-subjectively by qualified investigators. There is always the possibility that it may not be so. Each individual, according to this understanding, can maximize his objectivity by minimizing his prejudice and bias; he can do so by seeking truth rather than one or another goal.

On the other hand, according to the view being defended here, objectivity is not sought through inter-subjective agreement, it is inter-subjective agreement; the word has no other meaning. The reading which will be considered objective is ever and always that which the larger number of qualified observers agree upon. And when we say that on occasion the majority may conclude it was in error, that they sometimes take up as objective a view they formerly scoffed at, we are only observing that they may inter-subjectively change their collective mind. But the objective view itself remains as it was, the one blessed with inter-subjective accord.

It is easy to understand why we must take this position. After we have said there are as many "correct" or "true" ways to describe reality as there are different measuring instruments, having different relationships with the measured, we have destroyed any distinction between subjective and objective other than the one just mentioned. And to speak of decreasing bias or prejudice must become, in our eyes, totally without meaning.

Values

First opponents of the prevailing paradigm relinquished the belief in "an external nature or reality to be known by science." Then, having done so, they could no longer suppose "that the success or failure of science is to be measured by the degree to which it gives us knowledge about external nature or reality."²³ Hence, the next question they had to ask themselves was "how do we measure the success or failure of science?" And the answer came back, "we decide according to our goals, according to our values."

Since describing and/or classifying things in one way leads to conclusions, suggests to one courses of action (and precludes others) which will be radically different from those another description and/or classification would promote, every description can be said to have its value side, to be value laden. This is so whether the description refers to facts or to causes, and whether one is conscious or unconscious of his value choices. Recall the values which were observed to be a part of the causal description of Henry's tuberculosis. When values are held in common, as those were, we forget their existence. But when we begin to speak in abstract terms about the nature of scholarly investigation we ought, the present line of reasoning suggests,

²³Paul F. Schmidt, "Some Merits and Misinterpretations of Scientific Method," The Scientific Monthly, LXXXII (Jan., 1956), p. 22.

to remember. Not doing so, engaging in a

zealous endeavor to create a "value free" science--which seems so essential a requirement of objective scientific method--has meant simply that the values dominating our thinking have retired to the arena of our underlying suppositions, where they can maintain themselves against critical appraisal by being so completely taken for granted that no one's questioning attention is focused upon them.²⁴

Regardless of how we express all of the above, the meaning is obvious: the fact-value distinction has been brought under the gun.

"What," the skeptics ask in launching their attack on this particular dichotomy, "is meant by a fact?" Is it synonymous with a "correct" description of something external? But there can be as many correct descriptions of externals as there can be dissimilar measuring instruments having dissimilar relationships with the things described. Does fact refer to a right ordering of things out there? Think of what Planck had to say about the "introduction" of order according to the ends sought.

And what, it is next inquired, is meant by "value"? Does it have to do with judgment? But every description is itself a judgment. To judge anything one must employ a "standard." A standard may exist physically (we could, for example, use a car as a standard and judge the car-ness of other objects by comparing them to our standard), or it may merely be an internalized standard, a mental construct,

²⁴Burt, p. 99.

(which is what we usually employ in classifying things as cars or not cars).²⁵ Standards, then, are always employed in the process of judging. So too, when one describes the characteristics of something he does so by comparing it to a standard or standards. That is, to use the same illustration, one describes an object as a car or not-car by comparing it to a mental standard of some kind. J. Bronowski was no doubt thinking along these lines when he recently authored an excellent fictional dialogue in which he has the scientist say

I don't know what a description is. I know what a judgment is; at least, I know when I make a judgment. But I don't know how to make a description--a scientific description, a pure, precise, mechanical description; a description period, with no judgment in it.²⁶

To describe is to judge. Yes, and let us clear this matter up, it is also to order. To categorize or classify, to judge, to describe and to order must now be seen as essentially one and the same process. That is why the use of a standard is common to all. When we describe an object as a car or a leaf we are at the same time judging it and putting it in the category or order "cars" or "leaves." And it is our values, Burt has said, that determines what orderings we will accept.

Believers in the dominant paradigm were observed to speak

²⁵See: Russell Fox, et al., p. 28.

²⁶J. Bronowski, "The Abacus and the Rose," The Nation, CXCVIII (January 4, 1964), p. 7.

of values in conjunction with "ought," "normative," or "prescriptive" statements and to talk of facts in connection with "descriptive" statements, with statements of an "is" variety. Does this mean, then, that an observer is said to deal in values when he prefaces his remarks with such as "I want," "I prescribe," "I suggest," but to deal in facts as long as he sticks with "I find," "there are," or "the fact is"? No indeed, the advocates of the going view of science and scholarly investigation appear to "judge" analyses and descriptions given by others as value-laden when they do not happen to coincide with their own analyses and descriptions. And this is at best a questionable practice. Regarding this issue, Jerome Frank has remarked of the observer

If his facts are too discrepant from those of other persons, they may consider him insane or excessively anti-social and put him in an asylum or jail or hang him. If enough other men agree with him, then we call his selection "objective"--as "objective" as anything human can be.²⁷

Knowledge and Reason

The third major assumption which was made about the character of the scientific scholar was that he would love knowledge. Now that there are no longer concrete facts, or laws or causes to have knowledge of this assumption becomes as porous as the others. What is it we are to love, the critic inquires? Knowledge, reply the defenders of the

²⁷Jerome Frank, Fate and Freedom (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), pp. 174-78 and 363.

prevailing paradigm. And not just because of what you can do with it, but principally because it is worthy of love, as are all things good and beautiful. An answer which, I would think, ought to bewilder the critic; to find the advocate of science, of all people, speaking as though knowledge had an "inherent" aesthetic appeal. For is this not the very same person who has long been insisting beauty and goodness (being values) are in the eye of the beholder? Truly a strange state of affairs.

Even more disturbing, the advocate frequently neglects to define this thing which is to be loved. If asked to do so he talks of facts, and laws, and truths, and realities, of all the things said to have no single form. Warily one can only repeat once more that what the facts, the truths, the realities look like will depend upon what the measuring instrument looks like, and upon the nature of its relationship with the thing being measured; "you can only find that which your method and your instruments are capable of finding."²⁸ Every instrument, every method, every relationship will provide knowledge. Its form will simply vary as instrument, method and relationship vary. If, when it comes to a selection of methods or instruments, goals and values are always the determining factor as some have argued, then, the questions "what knowledge" and "knowledge for what" become inseparable.

²⁸Titus, p. 96.

Only one assumption about the character of the scholarly observer remains to be examined; namely, that he will be dedicated to the use of "reason." If the previous criticisms of the prevailing paradigm have merit--if reality has no single form--if there are no "natural" categories--no concrete laws nor causal sequences which exist totally independent of the observer--if one description is as objective as another in any absolute sense--if fact is not different in kind from value and all readings of a situation are equally deserving of the label "knowledge"--then, what can it possibly mean to be "reasonable"? This time when he asks for a definition the critic will probably be told that reason is rationality; to be reasonable is merely to be rational. But rationality is now being made a synonym for reason and in the last analysis one can only be made to know what something is if he can be shown what it is not.²⁹ If he insists upon being told what reason and

²⁹This is a simple point, but one which is frequently missed or misunderstood. Often we are inclined to think we define objects and events merely by likening them to other objects and events. Actually each time we make such a comparison we are simultaneously distinguishing the thing being defined from other things. For example, if we wished to define a door for someone ignorant of its nature, we might say it is "wood," not only likening it to other wooden objects, but, more importantly, distinguishing it from all objects which are not wood. We might continue that it is shaped like the top of a table. Here in likening it to a table we distinguish it still further, this time from wooden objects with various other shapes. When all is said and done, if we are to make clear that it is not exactly the same as any of the objects we have compared it with, we must either show or tell how it differs. In a word, we state what it is by showing what it is not.

rationality are not, the word emotion will doubtlessly be brought in. Referring once more to Chapter One, the advocate of the going view usually argues that to be swayed by emotion is to be less than purely reasonable; to allow one's actions to be guided by emotion is to be governed somehow by subjective rather than objective personality components.

The primary difficulty with this particular argument is that it presupposes the two attributes, reason and emotion, are somehow physically differentiated in man; man is seen as having a segmented personality.³⁰ In light of modern psychological findings, the view is a hard one to maintain.

Interestingly, the implication contained in the dichotomy between reason and emotion is that the wholly reasonable man will be devoid of emotion, if nothing else, a physical impossibility. Indeed, one sometimes hears it suggested that man can never achieve complete rationality because he is unable to shed himself of his emotions. Yet all of the events in which men participate, from wars to weddings, are accompanied by emotion; and which of us feels that its presence detracts somehow from his own rationality? Not only does emotion play a key part in man's doings, but the strength of the emotion men feel

³⁰For an argument against this view of man, see: William Kapp, Toward a Science of Man in Society (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 153.

is observed to be in direct proportion to the importance they attribute to the affair. Thus wars and weddings are highly emotional events, riding buses and mailing letters are not. To say, then, that emotion is injurious to reason is to say that reason plays but a minor role in the affairs of men, and almost no role at all when it comes to history-making events.

Finally, when one presses an advocate of the prevailing paradigm to give current illustrations of emotion-based behavior he will point, almost invariably, to activities he does not himself find logical. And one is left to ponder whether he ever meant anything else by the concept.

Turning now to the techniques, practices and sub-assumptions the prevailing paradigm suggests, it was contended that a good investigator will:

(a) Control Emotions. If this admonition is intended to mean a "scholar" will not "care" about the outcome of his analyses and investigations, we must observe that if he did not care he would not have conducted them in the first place. And if he did not care in a particular manner, that is, if he did not embrace the especial values and goals he does he would have chosen other matters to investigate, or he would have used different tools to investigate them, or have employed different standards for judging and interpreting. If to control emotion means to remain

calm and unruffled we can say that when their personal facts--and therefore their personal values--are being attacked few men do so; particularly if the attacked values relate to things they consider of critical importance, for example, economic, social and political positions.³¹ Lastly, to argue that emotions should be controlled because they will corrupt logic or reason, or hide the "truth" makes absolutely no sense within the framework of the criticisms being outlined in this chapter.

Next, it was said that the scholar is well advised to:

(b) Strive for methodological precision. He will pursue "certainty, exactness, universality and system." Why will he do so? Because he desires knowledge, "certain knowledge." But all knowledge is equally certain, we must protest. It is if we are to adhere to the terms of our critique.

In line with the emphasis placed on methodological precision it was premised one must:

(c) Make definitions clear and concise. Here I quoted Lastrucci who suggested a scientist defines things "operationally" or "objectively"; to be more explicit, "in terms of specific operations, behavioral processes or effects," or "in terms of empirically verifiable and standardized referents," such as scales or yardsticks.

³¹The command to minimize emotions carries with it the rather alarming suggestion that one should not care about anything, or that if one does care, he will thereupon become less objective.

Unfortunately Lastrucci's argument misses the point. Whether one defines "operationally" or "objectively" the goal is the same and so is the method of achieving it. The goal is agreement and the method verification; verification of operations on the one hand and of the readings on measuring devices on the other. But alas, aim and method are themselves more a part of one another than Lastrucci recognizes. To verify anything means to get others to agree to one's observations. However, investigators appear to agree on the nature, and more importantly on the meaning of operations, behavioral processes, dial readings and the like, only to the extent that they share common relationships with the objects and events being thus defined (and hence hold common values). When a community of physical scientists are found to share a relationship with the gauge on a tank they are found to share as well a set of relationships with the tank and its contents. If they did not, if they were unable to agree upon the meaning of a gauge reading of say 200 or 300, they would have no science. And collectively they would not continue to employ that particular measuring device. So too, for a group of political scientists to agree a scale reading is 50 or 70 indicates nothing unless they also agree upon the meaning of those figures. If they agree about the former it tells us they share a relationship with the scale. If they agree about the latter it tells us they share a relationship with the social, economic or political

phenomena the scale happens to refer to. Political scientists, it should be obvious, seldom find themselves in this last position. Moreover, as with natural scientists, if they do not share a set of relationships with things the scale refers to they will hardly continue to use it as a group; which is exactly the fate suffered by most instruments in political science.

The problem remains. To have precise definitions is to have agreement; but agreement apparently neither precedes nor follows the sharing of relationships, it is simply a part of them. Precise definitions are indicative of science to be sure. They tell us one exists. But there appears to be no magic formula by which we can make dissimilar measuring devices (here observers) having dissimilar relationships with the things they are measuring (experiencing different realities) and consequently endorsing dissimilar values, somehow mean the same things by the same words. In fact, going by past experience, we can rest assured they will not.

As for the argument that one ought to:

(d) Employ instruments in the observational process, in order to minimize the danger of biased observation, this proposal too misses the point, and for the same basic reason. It follows from everything previously said in criticism of the going view that any instrument, any observer, will give an equally unbiased observation. It will be unbiased in that a like measuring instrument having like relationships

with the measured would offer like measurements. Thus to be biased now means to be biased away from some other observer. It means disagreement, and nothing more. And as we have just noted, it is not simply a matter of using instruments and thereby preventing disagreement. In the words of Lewis White Beck, the instruments employed by the natural scientist are but

extensions or projections of the questions he asks. With other questions there would be other instruments and other data. The choice of his instruments is not ultimately determined by the object, but by the kind of answers he wants.³²

To state it plainly, the natural scientist selects those instruments which are most likely to solve particular problems or answer particular burning questions. Hence, for physical scientists to agree they must first agree that a given problem ought to be solved, or that a given question is burning. "In this respect," Beck concludes, the natural scientist "is exactly like the social scientist." Except, we might add, that social scientists do not agree when it comes to locating problems to be solved or questions to be answered; even more importantly, they do not agree on the urgency of a solution. As a result, they also disagree about the appropriateness of one and another's favorite instruments.

Moving on to the next issue, if reality has no one "true" form, if in an absolute sense all views are equally objective, what do we mean

³²Beck, p. 389.

by the injunction:

(e) Be a trained observer? If the investigator is not being trained to see "the" truth, what is he being trained for? He is being trained, it seems, to see a "particular" truth. Is it not clear, asks Kuhn, that the aim of all scientific text books is "pedagogic and persuasive"?³³ The biology student is not taught to believe a cell "may" divide, but that it does. He is not told there "may" be such a thing as a leucocyte, but that there is. In political science, Dwight Waldo observes, students "receive verbal, visual, and aural evidence of, and often accept as their own, quite different preferences on such matters as federalism or pluralism, depending upon the instructor who faces them."³⁴

I might add, however much American political scientists may disagree, on fundamental issues they do so only within limits. Few will be found to speak from a conviction that fascism or communism, for instance, is the best of all possible systems. No, in my estimation, they differ within rather narrow limits, and in doing so they put forth what John Kenneth Galbraith has referred to as the "conventional wisdom." "In general," Galbraith shrewdly observes, "the articulation of the conventional wisdom is a prerogative of academic, public, or

³³Kuhn, p. 1.

³⁴Dwight Waldo, "Values in the Political Science Curriculum," in Approaches to the Study of Politics, ed. by Roland Young (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 98.

business position."³⁵ The most important role education plays is strictly a conservative one. We code the heads of our youth so that they may be measuring instruments similar to us, so that they may hold our beliefs and our aspirations. There is nothing necessarily repulsive about the practice. An uncoded head is also an empty one.

If training does not prepare one to see "the" truth, but instead conditions one to see the truth of the moment, to accept prevailing paradigms, then we would expect the creation of new paradigms to be the work of people not themselves committed to the old. In Kuhn's eyes, this is precisely what occurs. Viewing the world through established conceptual frameworks or paradigms scientists develop specialized skills and esoteric vocabularies. Argues Kuhn, this "professionalization leads on the one hand, to an immense restriction of the scientist's vision and to a considerable resistance to paradigm change."³⁶ Thus it is, he continues, that when a science makes major strides, when it comes up with startling new discoveries, they are almost always the work of young members of the field, or at any rate those who are new additions. Because they are not committed to the old understanding of how things are they can busy themselves in constructing paradigms

³⁵John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York: The New American Library, 1958), p. 20.

³⁶Kuhn, p. 64.

which will alter that understanding.³⁷

Another sub-assumption was said to be the notion that at any particular time we can:

(f) Assume the objective view is most likely to be what the body of adequately trained (competent) observers say it is. I suppose enough has already been said in criticism of the objective-subjective dichotomy, and I will not belabor the point here. I do think it worth while to add, however, that this principle can now be seen to be a very conservative one. It is ideally suited to defending the "conventional wisdom." This because it says he who measures from a set of relationships not shared by his colleagues will be summarily dismissed as unobjective, enabling those colleagues to protect their collective truth as well as the values of which it is a part, and with an easy conscience. Numerous authors have commented upon the phenomenon. One who spoke from personal experience was Ernst Mach. Mach observed that

no one disturbs his fellow-men with a new view unpunished . . . To presume to revolutionize the current way of thinking with regard to any question, is no pleasant task, and above all not an easy one. They who have advanced new views know best what serious difficulties stand in their way. With honest and praiseworthy zeal, men set to work in search of everything that does not suit them. They seek to discover whether they cannot explain the facts better, or as well, or approximately as well by the traditional views.³⁸

³⁷Ibid., pp. 89-90.

³⁸Ernst Mach, Popular Scientific Lectures (La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1943), p. 297.

The obstacle is an even bigger one than Mach recognized. It appears that as long as they enjoy their old relationships with that which is being explained the group can justifiably dismiss a new view as illogical. For it is the logic of relationships they do not share. It is the truth of a reality not yet their own.

According to the old paradigm every fact has a distinct form. Therefore, it was argued, the scientist must of necessity:

(g) Be an empiricist. What can we say of this postulate now? If we insist every measuring device gives a reading which is correct given the sort of measuring instrument it is and the relationships it has with the measured, are we not saying at one and the same time that all measurements are empirically based?

No doubt the reader attributes the falling of leaves to gravity. For the sake of making a point, I will see it as the work of *Attractus*, god of all attraction. In the beginning, I hold, his spirit was made to pervade all things, causing them to desire to draw together, to become one. You can empirically defend your position? So can I! Gravity, you say, accounts for the paths of heavenly bodies as well as those of objects on earth. Well so does *Attractus*. And what is more, I maintain *Attractus* is responsible for the drawing together of man and woman in love relationships; it is he that makes people to seek the company of others; he causes fish to move in schools, and birds to fly with one another in great numbers. Empirically gravity can account for

so little, and Attractus so much. I cannot point to Attractus, you mock? To be sure, but where is your gravity?

The moral? I will repeat it. All explanations, all beliefs, are tied to observation. Indeed, what else could an explanation explain? Similarly, all explanations have their component of faith. The latter is to be found in the acceptance of a standard for judging. Your standard in the foregoing instance went something like this: If _____ and _____ and _____, then gravity. Mine, on the other hand, ended with the name Attractus. Our standards were different. The blanks did not contain the same variables. But one was as tied to observation as the next.

No, it is not simply the use of empiricism which makes an investigation scientific. If by empiricism one means a continual re-checking of one's conclusions against observation, Sir Arthur Eddington has even gone so far as to consider it of minor importance. To Eddington it is the theoretical assumptions (what I referred to here as standards) which are crucial. He states

It is the essence of acceptance of a theory that we agree to obliterate the distinction between knowledge derived from it and knowledge derived from actual observation . . . I am not denying the importance of actual observation as a source of knowledge; but as a constituent of scientific knowledge it is almost negligible.³⁹

³⁹ Arthur Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939), pp. 11-12.

So much for empiricism. Its practice was said to require the scientist to:

(h) Study general, not unique phenomena. What, then, becomes of this demand? It suffers much the same fate as the last requirement. I believe we can dismiss it as another needless suggestion. If an investigator wishes to "explain," "understand," or "predict" general phenomena he must, almost of necessity, base his explanation, prediction or understanding upon the observation of general phenomena. Moreover, he will. One does not speak of the nature of eggs by looking at a single egg, nor of wind storms on the basis of a single experience. Does it ever happen that someone commits such a cardinal sin? I suppose so. But I can recall no instances of it offhand. In the world of the scholar one individual does not accuse another of having studied the unique, but rather of having based his arguments on an insufficient number of observations. The difference here is a big one. The latter is all too often simply another way of saying he finds himself in disagreement with the other's conclusion and can think of no sounder reason why. Now an investigator can never examine all instances of a phenomenon. At some point he must have done with looking. And for those who find the measurement he offers does not express their private reality, that it is not logical for them, the point at which he terminated his observations will almost always be too soon.

It seems to me that cautioning an investigator to be empirical,

or to study general phenomena is analogous to hanging signs in factories which say THINK. It is never that employees do not think, it is what they think about. It is not a problem of observers failing to observe, it is what they observe and the way in which they observe it. And it is not a problem of investigators failing to study general phenomena, but one of their failing to draw similar conclusions from their studies. Such problems have to do with differences in viewers, in viewer-viewed relationships and in values, something which the advocate of the prevailing paradigm has thus far failed to comprehend.

Because the difficulty is of the latter sort, the observer who believes he can win his colleagues over by making an exhaustive number of observations will complete his investigations only to find himself vilified for having looked at many cases which were not "really" examples of the phenomenon. That is, he will be said to have made improper classifications. Or it will be suggested he has allowed his desires to intrude, or that his explanations are too simplistic. Whatever the justification for dismissing his efforts, it boils down to this. His reality is different from that of his opponents.

If pleas for empiricism and the study of general phenomena are unnecessary, what can we say of the suggestion that the scholar should:

(i) Employ "models"? Models were described as "hypothetical situations." A model, it was observed, "is something which all cases in a

category are similar to, but none are identical with." An ideal gas was called a model. Economic man is a widely recognized model. Now let me add a few more. "Tree," I maintain, is a model. "River" is a model. Even "Henry," I insist, is a model.

There is a tree outside my window, but it is not "tree." It is not the model. If it were there could be no trees, for it can never be duplicated in every last detail. "Tree" is a hypothetical situation. It is something which all cases in a category are similar to, yet none are identical with. So it is with "river." And if that is "Henry" I am looking at right at this moment, in less time than it takes to tell you about it Henry will have disappeared. Cell changes will have taken place, facial expressions altered. Before very long every cell in that body will be replaced. Yet I will continue to call it Henry. Why? Because "Henry" is a model which the object I am looking at approximates moment after moment, day after day, week after week. I call these approximations Henry much as the psychiatrist will point to examples of "schizophrenic man." But "Henry" is a model nonetheless. A model, according to defenders of the prevailing paradigm, is a "hypothetical situation." Frankly, when it comes to descriptive statements, I know of no other kind.

Models, the argument ran, enable us to cut through the complexities "out there." I agree. Without their use we could neither speak of food, nor water, nor any other necessities of life. And life

would not be possible.⁴⁰ We must generalize or perish. Still, I wonder if it is really necessary to argue for the use of models if one cannot do without them.

It is possible to make the same sort of comment about the notion that a scientific investigator will seek to:

(j) Isolate systems. If facts have no one true form and there are no natural categories, if things are not inherently distinct from one another, then to locate an object or event may be to isolate it, but it is to isolate it conceptually. Once more referring to Jerome Frank, I would remind you that

a fact is a purposive human act; that the fact picks out some features of human experience and omits others, because the picking out and the omission in some way serve human purposes, practical or otherwise. A fact reflects or results from a human motive or interest or purpose in dealing with experience. "Pure observation" or "pure description" of experience does not occur. Looking and reporting are always motivated. Observation is selective, interpretive.⁴¹

Individual facts, in other words, are not "naturally" isolated. This is equally true, of course, of systems of facts. In effect, then, one cuts out a piece, or pieces of time and space from their surroundings and makes believe they are, by their very nature, distinct.

Moreover, and again this is the heart of the matter, when observers

⁴⁰Kenneth Boulding makes this point well in The Image, op. cit.

⁴¹Frank, p. 360.

have similar relationships with the areas of time and space they are cutting up they seem to do their cutting in a similar manner. Thus one chemist's relationships with that piece of time and space he calls a vial of iodine are essentially the same as his colleague's. One chemist sees the iodine as notably different, (different in kind) from other elements and compounds. His associates agree. But it is important to keep in mind the apparent basis of their agreement. They agree, it appears, because in respect to that vial of matter they are what we might call a single measuring instrument, with a single set of relationships. One chemist's reality is the same as another's in such a situation.

When it comes to political, economic or social questions, however, one investigator does not at all share the relationships and the realities of most others. Consequently, the way in which a given observer cuts up time and space seems indefensible to the next; the things one refers to as isolated variables are to another inextricable parts of a complex whole at best. The point? In the last analysis isolation (the act of separating pieces of time and space from their surroundings) is a conceptual practice; one which we engage in as naturally as we breathe. And it is about as sensible to urge scholars to do the one as to do the other.

According to the prevailing paradigm, after the facts have been located the investigator will turn to the question of how they got there. In other words, after describing what "is" he will attempt to

explain how it came to be. And when it comes to deciding which of two or more explanations he should favor the scholar, it was said, will:

(k) Practice theoretical parsimony. Parsimony, Bierstedt suggested, "has to do with simplicity." From among alternative theories, all of them equally adequate to explain a given phenomenon, the good scholar was said to select the least complex. In such a manner did Copernicus win out over Ptolemy.

Political scientists, I will later argue, have been reluctant to give this particular principle their whole-hearted embrace. I will try in a subsequent chapter to make it clear just why that is. For the moment, however, let me simply comment upon the principle itself. What I have to say is this: when the followers of Copernicus dubbed his theoretical formulations as having greater simplicity than the Ptolemaic they spoke for themselves; they did not necessarily speak for the followers of Ptolemy. To say it was less complex for the latter group is to fail to note that in order to relinquish their old views and take up the new they would have had to alter countless relationships with their universe, relationships of many varieties, social, economic, political, religious, and so forth. For such were the ramifications of the new theory. To those tied to Ptolemaic conceptualizations these ramifications must often have appeared as parts of Copernican theory.⁴²

⁴²What I am suggesting is that they would no doubt disagree over what the theory "was," over its very nature. That people not sharing relationships with phenomena, but declaring adherence to a common theory, interpret that theory differently is hardly open to

If so, the views of the upstart Copernicus would indeed seem infinitely more cumbersome.

Once more the moral: if facts have no one distinct form and natural categories do not exist the universe turns into a single entity, and when it comes to cutting it up degrees of complexity must be as variable as factual forms; another point which seems to elude proponents of the prevailing paradigm.

The final sub-assumption referred to in the first chapter was spoken of as akin to the one just discussed. According to it the scholar ought to:

(1) Attempt only the confirmation or refutation of easily understood hypotheses, (and) remain skeptical. Confirming or refuting easily understood hypotheses, I noted, is generally interpreted to mean that an hypothesis should be "impartially (scientifically) tested" instead of "proved by appropriately selected data and reasoning." And remaining skeptical was said to mean a scientist will never commit himself to the idea that he has discovered a truth which can under no circumstances be disproven. The ideal scientist will be humble as well as tolerant.

Turning to our "key" principle for the last time: if facts have no one true form and there are no natural categories, then to pick out a fact or to categorize it is to do so on the basis of a pre-existing

challenge. An ideal contemporary illustration is the multiple interpretations given to Marxism.

conceptual framework. It is to do just what Lundberg said scientists ought not to do. I think Kuhn has stated the idea well. He describes the research process as "a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education."⁴³ "Normal science," he elaborates, "is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like." In brief, scientists undertake to prove the correctness of their paradigms with "appropriately selected data and reasoning." This should come as no surprise. Every scholar knows he must decide how things are before he can even begin to select data. In order to decide what is relevant he must first have a standard for judging relevance. Not to employ such standards, not to make use of paradigms, would be to turn out studies having the order of a clothes hamper. I will confess that in my own estimation some scholars come close to doing just that. But even these never quite make it; if only because it is impossible.

As for being humble and tolerant every man to his own conclusions. As for myself I would suggest scientists have demonstrated over and over again they are not one whit less than human when it comes to such characteristics.

One of the most devastating attacks upon the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm has been made by Thomas Kuhn in

⁴³Kuhn, p. 5.

the essay already cited. Kuhn's work is worth treating at some length here. He begins by contending that underlying any statement, "scientific" or otherwise, there are always certain unexamined assumptions. Not only are these assumptions (paradigms) requisite to description, but, Kuhn argues, they seem to be necessary to perception itself.⁴⁴ Pieces of time-space (things), are never, can never, merely be seen. They are always seen as something, as this or that entity. And this according to Kuhn, requires prior assumptions. There exists no line between theoretical suppositions and paradigm assumptions. When the former are so taken for granted that members of a community of observers do not bother to note their existence they have then become transformed into the latter. A paradigm, then, is a theory held with assurity. As such, it represents what Kuhn was quoted as calling a "conceptual box."⁴⁵ Science, he then goes on to maintain, exists when these boxes, or more commonly a significant number of them, are shared by the members of a scholarly community.⁴⁶ What do

⁴⁴Kuhn does not make clear whether he considers a single assumption to be a paradigm, or whether a paradigm is always a group of assumptions logically connected. I have used it in the latter sense. Perhaps the issue is unimportant. I cannot conceive of an assumption which exists in isolation. All of the assumptions we make appear related to many others, and to alter one is to alter the rest. Regarding the use of paradigms in perception, see pp. 52-65, 84-85, 110, 127-28, particularly p. 112. Kuhn proposes that without paradigms there would be what William James called "a bloomin' buzzin' confusion."

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 160-61.

scientists do with "perceptual boxes"? They engage, we noted, in a concerted attempt to force nature into them.⁴⁷ Here Kuhn counters the idea that the scientific scholar is one who goes out in a detached manner to determine what "is." Not so, he insists; the scientist begins with the assumption that he knows what "is," and need only seek corroborating evidence.⁴⁸ He expends most of his efforts in building a case for the paradigm he personally endorses.

The prevailing epistemological paradigm describes the ideal scientific scholar as one who tests his theories by holding them up against the facts. If the facts do not support them the theories are promptly discarded. Again Kuhn takes exception. Since the key theoretical assumptions underlying any investigation (the paradigm or paradigms) are taken for granted, one can hardly test them against the facts in some conscious manner. Are they really taken for granted? Kuhn writes: "though many scientists talk easily and well about the particular individual hypotheses that underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are little better than laymen at characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems and methods."⁴⁹ Unaware of their theoretical assumptions, then,

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 5, 24.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 47.

they can hardly give them an "impartial" test. But Kuhn goes still further in denying the above conception of the scholar. The paradigm cannot be tested by holding it up against the facts, he argues, because the very form of the facts is itself determined by the form of the paradigm to be tested. To alter one is simultaneously to change the other.⁵⁰ "Fact and theory," he tells us, are "not categorically separable, except perhaps within a single tradition of normal-scientific research."⁵¹ In other words, investigators who make the same basic assumptions, who share a paradigm, may speak of separating fact and theory, but without a shared paradigm they have no right to do so. Fact and theory, discovery and invention, such things blend into one another in Kuhn's estimation, they are in no way "categorically and permanently distinct."⁵²

Again on this matter of testing theory with fact and dismissing theories which do not accord with the facts, Kuhn insists no theory ever accords with all of the facts with which it can be confronted.⁵³ Every theory has its counterinstances. To scientists viewing the world within a paradigm (or rather, through a paradigm), these counter instances are simply seen as problems to be solved, as puzzles;

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 7, 15, 53, 66, 79.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 7.

⁵²Ibid., p. 66.

⁵³Ibid., p. 18

"every problem that normal science sees as a puzzle can be seen, from another viewpoint, as a counterinstance and thus as a source of crisis."⁵⁴

The object of normal science, Kuhn affirms, "is to solve a puzzle for whose very existence the validity of the paradigm must be assumed.

Failure to achieve a solution discredits only the scientist and not the theory."⁵⁵ (emphasis added). When for an individual enough unanswered questions have come to be seen as counterinstances, as anomalies, he is then ready to shift his allegiance to a new paradigm.

Kuhn sees absolutely no hope for the investigator who, personally endorsing one paradigm, hopes to test an offered alternative by comparing it to the facts. His personal facts are not the facts which flow from that alternative. Moreover, to "understand," indeed, to "see" those alternative facts, he must first embrace the paradigm of which they form a part.⁵⁶ Of Lavoisier and the "discovery" of oxygen, Kuhn reflects, "the fact that a major paradigm revision was needed to see what Lavoisier saw must be the principal reason why Priestly was, to the end of his long life, unable to see it."⁵⁷ Until

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 79.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 80.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 53.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 56.

the scientist has learned to see nature in a different way--the new fact is not quite a scientific fact at all."⁵⁸

Moreover, Kuhn points out, "there are seldom many areas in which a scientific theory, particularly if it is cast in a predominantly mathematical form, can be directly compared with nature. No more than three such areas are even yet accessible to Einstein's general theory of relativity."⁵⁹ After a theory has been accepted, then, says Kuhn, instruments are designed and built to prove the theory's worth. Such "pieces of special apparatus," he states, "illustrate the immense effort and ingenuity that have been required to bring nature and theory into closer and closer agreement."⁶⁰ "Before he could construct his equipment and make measurements with it, Coloumb had to employ electrical theory to determine how his equipment should be built."⁶¹

The prevailing paradigm spoke of scholars using theoretical parsimony when they decide which of conflicting theories are the soundest. "The new theory is said to be 'neater,' 'more suitable,' or 'simpler' than the old." Concerning this issue, Kuhn remarks,

Probably such arguments are less effective in the sciences than in mathematics. The early versions of most new paradigms are crude. By the time their full aesthetic appeal can

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 53.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 26.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 27.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 33.

be developed, most of the community has been persuaded by other means . . . Ordinarily, it is only much later, after the new paradigm has been developed, accepted, and exploited that apparently decisive arguments--the Foucault pendulum to demonstrate the rotation of the earth or the Fizeau experiment to show that light moves faster in air than in water--are developed . . . Usually the opponents of a new paradigm can legitimately claim that even in the areas of crisis it is little superior to its traditional rival.

In addition, the defenders of traditional theory and procedure can almost always point to problems that its new rival has not solved but that for their point of view are no problems at all.

In short, if a new candidate for paradigm had to be judged from the start by hardheaded people who examined only relative problem-solving ability, the sciences would experience very few major revolutions . . . The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must often do so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving. He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind can only be made on faith.⁶²

The ideal scholar, the scientific scholar, will not be dogmatic, according to the nineteenth century paradigm. He will maintain an "open mind." Kuhn is telling us the very opposite. He will see what his paradigm permits him to see, nothing more. He will attempt to force nature into his theoretical boxes. What he is not looking for he will not "see." In becoming a competent investigator he must of necessity immerse himself in a particular paradigm; he must make it his own. Yet this "professionalization leads . . . to an immense restriction of the scientist's vision and to a considerable resistance to paradigm change."⁶³ Science is not open minded, Kuhn

⁶²Ibid., pp. 154-57.

⁶³Ibid., p. 64.

argues, on the contrary, it is singularly dogmatic and close minded. And since "there is no such thing as research in the absence of any paradigm," it cannot be otherwise.

A good scientific training teaches one to be open minded, asserts the prevailing paradigm. Scientific training, counters Kuhn, "is a narrow and rigid education, probably more so than any other except perhaps in orthodox theology."⁶⁴ "Science students accept theories on the authority of teacher and text, not because of evidence."

Scientists look for new theories and are tolerant of those offered by others the nineteenth century paradigm informed us. Scientists do not "normally aim to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those invented by others," protests Kuhn. "Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none."⁶⁵

A scientific scholar will keep his values out of his theoretical formulations, we were told. Kuhn disagrees. He insists that when one relinquishes a given paradigm and takes up another he not only makes a shift in fact and theory, but changes his mind as well about what is a problem, what are the standards by which solutions will be judged and what solutions are legitimate. In short, to change paradigms

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 1, 80, 165.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 24, 35-36, 52.

is to be concerned about different things, it is to alter one's values. Thus "when the transition [from one paradigm to another] is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the field, its methods, and its goals."⁶⁶ (My emphasis.) Scientists, to repeat the point, hold in common not only facts but objectives. It is "just because he is working only for an audience of colleagues, an audience that shares his own values and beliefs, [that] the scientist can take a single set of standards for granted."⁶⁷

The prevailing paradigm envisioned "reasonable" men discussing and debating the relative merits of their respective theories; it saw them "proving" the worth of their formulations. This too, according to Kuhn, does not take place. He notes that

when paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense . . . whatever its force, the status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle. The premises and values shared by the two parties to a debate over paradigms are not sufficiently extensive for that.⁶⁸

Each group uses its own facts to defend its own theories. And since neither a given group's facts nor its theories exist precisely as they

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 23, 84-85, 102, 108-9.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 163.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 93.

do for endorsers of an opposing paradigm, such bodies of unlike observers inevitably fail to communicate. "To the extent . . . that two scientific schools disagree about what is a problem and what a solution, they will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms." "Which problem is it more significant to have solved? Like the issue of competing standards, that question of values can be answered only in terms of criteria that lie outside of normal science altogether." "The proponents of competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross purposes. Neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other needs to make its case." Hence, "the competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs."⁶⁹

Communication is made doubly difficult because to employ different paradigms is also to use words in different ways. This too is unavoidable.

Copernicans who denied its traditional title 'planet' to the sun were not only learning what 'planet' meant or what the sun was. Instead, they were changing the meaning of 'planet' so that it could continue to make useful distinctions in a world where all the celestial bodies, not just the sun, were seen differently from the way they had been seen before.

Clearly, since things are different when paradigms are shifted, since experiences are not the same, any word used to describe and detail

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 108-9, 147.

those experiences cannot but have an altered meaning.⁷⁰

In effect, Kuhn is contending that proponents of conflicting paradigms do not contemplate the same reality.

In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution [in paradigms] scientists are responding to a different world . . . What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards.⁷¹

Kuhn is debunking the notion of "true" forms which the scientist may hope to contemplate. He writes: "We may . . . have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth." "Does it really help," he asks, "to imagine that there is some one full, objective, true account of nature and that the proper measure of scientific achievement is the extent to which it brings us closer to that ultimate goal? If we can learn to substitute evolution-from-what-we-know for evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know, a number of vexing problems may vanish in the process."⁷² Once more, the stress on the role of values.

What Kuhn is doing in his treatise is tying up the observer and the observed. A given viewer, having certain experiences and

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 127-28. Kuhn remarks "there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts." p. 45.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 110.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 69-70.

employing a particular paradigm, experiences certain truths. A different viewer, with different experiences, et cetera, will likewise experience different truths. What were anomalies within one framework become tautologies within another, "statements of situations that could not conceivably have been otherwise."⁷³ In changing paradigms a scientist is not said to view things differently. That would suggest that the things are things independent of the viewer, that they have some autonomous form. "Scientists do not see something as something else," Kuhn argues, "instead, they simply see it." "The scientist does not preserve the gestalt subject's freedom to switch back and forth between ways of seeing."⁷⁴

If we accept the above, it is no longer meaningful to speak of an observer being in error, in the sense that the nineteenth century paradigm employed that term. Kuhn makes this point as well. "Consider," he asks, "the men who called Copernicus mad because he proclaimed that the earth moved. They were not either wrong or quite wrong. Part of what they meant by 'earth' was fixed position." So too, "the laymen who scoffed at Einstein's general theory of relativity because space could not be 'curved'--it was not that sort of thing--were not simply wrong or mistaken . . . What had previously

⁷³Ibid., p. 78.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 85.

been meant by space was necessarily flat, homogeneous, isotropic, and unaffected by the presence of matter." Neither proof nor error are at issue in such matters, Kuhn insists, "the transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced."⁷⁵

To continue our review of Kuhn's essay, he reflects that the popular conception of scientific knowledge holds it to be cumulative; scientists go on learning more and more about what "is", about the "truth." Kuhn, on the other hand, insists that in the long run knowledge is not cumulative at all. The major strides in knowledge entail paradigm change which in turn involves an altered world view, facts, sub-theories, goals, standards, et cetera. Consequently, such changes constitute what he contends are "revolutionary" alterations, rather than evolutionary modifications. Why revolutionary? Because like political revolutions, Kuhn answers, new paradigms aim to change "institutions in ways that those institutions themselves prohibit."⁷⁶

In that such proposed changes contradict the values and the experienced realities of other members of the scholarly community they will, as we noted, move to reject them. Since to be scientific, or scholarly means to endorse their own basic assumptions or

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 148, 150.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 92.

paradigms, the new view will often be hailed as unscientific, as against scholarship. "Those who rejected Newtonianism proclaimed that its reliance upon innate forces would return science to the Dark Ages." In such instances, the new views being tendered appear to work counter to "progress" itself. "At the start a new candidate for paradigm may have few supporters, and on occasions the supporters' motives may be suspect."⁷⁷

Kuhn was quoted as arguing that new theories were usually less aesthetically pleasing, less simplistic than the old. He also maintains they frequently do no better in answering the questions which have provoked a "crisis" in the field. (Kuhn believes paradigm change is always accompanied by epistemological crisis.) In fact, he writes,

Copernicus' theory was not more accurate than Ptolemy's and did not lead directly to any improvement in the calendar. Or again, the wave theory of light was not, for some years after it was first announced, even as successful as its corpuscular rival in resolving the polarization effects that were a principal cause of the optical crisis.⁷⁸

If knowledge is cumulative, we would suppose that major additions to knowledge are made by persons steeped in the facts and theories of a field, those who have the greatest quantities of information concerning the problems and processes as understood by the scholarly community involved. Yet, Kuhn observes that "almost

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 79, 80, 102, 158, 161-62.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 153.

always the men who achieve . . . fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they change." Given Kuhn's personal understanding of theory, fact, truth, knowledge, and the like, we would, of course, expect just such a result. After all, the young and the new to a field are persons whose "practice has committed them less deeply than most of their contemporaries to the world view and rules determined by the old paradigm." ⁷⁹

The prevailing paradigm would lead us to expect a willingness on the part of scholars, particularly the "objective" ones, to alter their theoretical assumptions or paradigms without great difficulty. Kuhn's thesis does not lead to such an expectation. Indeed, it suggests the reverse. And the reverse, according to Kuhn, is usually the case. Quite often, he notes, outstanding scientists do not make the change to a new paradigm, they simply die off. He observes too that persons who have created new paradigms have frequently understood this sort of reaction was to be expected. He quotes Darwin and Planck here. Said Darwin in his famous work, "Although I am fully convinced of the truth of the views given in this volume . . . I by no means expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with a multitude of facts all viewed, during a course of years, from a point

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 89-90, 143.

of view directly opposite to mine." And Planck lamented, as a result of personal experience, "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."⁸⁰

With a paradigm revolution over and a given world view victorious the victors celebrate the "progress" that has occurred. Fortunately for them, "they are in an excellent position to make certain that future members of their community will see past history in the same way." "Partly by selection and partly by distortion, the scientists of earlier ages are implicitly represented as having worked upon the same set of fixed problems and in accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in scientific theory and method has made seem scientific." "No wonder," Kuhn reflects, "that textbooks and the historical tradition they imply have to be rewritten after each scientific revolution." His analysis, Kuhn acknowledges, may in places "suggest that the member of a mature scientific community is, like the typical character of Orwell's 1984, the victim of a history rewritten by the powers that be." But that suggestion, he concludes "is not altogether inappropriate."⁸¹

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 24, 56, 78, 149-50.

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 165, 137, 166.

Finally, the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm encourages the conclusion that a "science" exists to the degree that a community of scholars has "precise" and "accurate" knowledge regarding what "is." The further implication is that they are less emotionally involved in their findings, less dominated by their values, less dogmatic, have greater detachment, and apparently greater "objectivity"; to no small extent their scientific status results from such characteristics. In addition, they are seen to make "progress" when members of other disciplines do not. Therefore, in so far as one respects and admires "truth," tolerance, "objectivity," detachment, and progress, physical scientists are more worthy of our respect and admiration than their counterparts in other areas of investigation. Not so with Kuhn's conception. Here scientists are scientists simply because they share paradigms, overriding sets of values, beliefs, theories and the like. And because they act to reinforce one another's convictions, they may even be more dogmatic, less tolerant and "open-minded" than members of fields in which few paradigms are held in common. As for "progress," merely to say a discipline is "progressive," that it moves "forward," presupposes the community of scholars involved is largely agreed upon which is the "forward" direction; it presupposes, that is, relative unanimity as to values or objectives. Arguments over whether a field is a science "will cease to be of concern not when a definition is found, but when the groups that now

doubt their own status achieve consensus about their past and present accomplishments." ⁸²

Other Inadequacies and Anomalies

It is a premise of the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm that a scholar can be value-free in his investigations. To some persons the very words "scientific analysis" seem to connote "impartial" inquiry. That this position is untenable can be demonstrated merely by observing that a scholar only becomes a "scientist" when his community recognizes him as such; and he only acquires his community's recognition in so far as his efforts are directed toward the realization of values dear to it. At the very least, "scientific" status demands the value implications of a scholar's work not be in opposition to the community's own.

"But," the reader might disagree, "scientific findings often conflict with community values, look at the import of Darwin's work, or that of Copernicus." The experiences of these two men and their adherents, however, simply make the point. To persons whose values were attacked by evolutionary doctrine, or by the idea that the earth goes round the sun, Darwin and Copernicus were not scientists but charlatans, the product of their labors not scholarship, but quackery. Indeed, I believe we are fully justified in defining a scientist as "one

⁸²Ibid., pp. 160-62.

whose scholarly endeavors are dedicated to the fulfillment of community objectives." Empiricism, (and the prevailing paradigm accents empiricism), permits no other conclusion.

The prevailing paradigm does not tell us why it is that on some occasions people can readily agree to use a common set of standards for judging, classifying and describing, while at other times the most lengthy and elaborate arguments fail to produce anything resembling unanimity. Realizing that classifications are always value-oriented helps make tautological what was problematic. More will be said about this matter later. We need, for example, to explain why values are sometimes shared, sometimes not.

The nineteenth century paradigm cautioned us to beware of false-prophets, bad theorists who would lead us from the path of "truth." Let us, then, empirically test the basis of this fear. Let us inquire as to the names of a few false-prophets. By current notions of the "truth," who in the past presented us with gross error? Well, we might mention the name of Herodotus. He came up with numerous nonsensical ideas. Herodotus believed, for instance, that the Nile flooded every year because of peculiar activities of the Sun-god, which he described in detail.⁸³ Or there was Plato. He urged a belief that the world we experience is but an "unreal" representation of the "true" world, that of ideas. In the *Timaeus* he argues the presence of "soul" in all things, accounting for order, knowledge, law and the

⁸³See Russell Kahl, Studies in Explanation (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).

like, and put there in the beginning by the Creator. Unquestionably, these views, along with a great deal else that Plato espoused, have to be declared "false" by contemporary standards. And of course we must not neglect to mention Ptolemy; little of his theorizing is now considered correct. So too with Newton. We will have to include him. Newton contended inertia was a property intrinsic to matter.⁸⁴ It was independent of a body's environment. The opposing view is now held to be the "truth." Newton also believed in absolute space and absolute motion, wholly erroneous conceptions by today's understanding. He argued a corpuscular theory of light, and saw mass as always conserved, rather than "convertible with energy" as Einstein contemplated it. Such a small amount of Newtonian theory remains intact. And to think Pope was once moved to write:

Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night:
God said, Let Newton be! and all was light.⁸⁵

We might go on adding to the list of false-prophets almost indefinitely; most of yesterday's intellectual heroes would have to be included. Moreover, few of today's geniuses rest secure in their positions. If Velikovsky comes to be accepted, Darwin will be understood to have had little to say worth listening to, and we will return

⁸⁴See: D. W. Sciama, The Unity of the Universe (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., 1961), pp. 84-95. Also: Kuhn, pp. 100-101.

⁸⁵Sciama, p. 163.

to cataclysmic theses of the sort that preceded him.⁸⁶ And if Dewey Larson has his way a unified theory of the universe will henceforth be taken as "true" of a kind that will render much of Einstein's work erroneous.⁸⁷

"Men like Plato and Newton are not false-prophets," you will protest? "They are the monumental intelligences of yesterday?" To be sure. But they are the other too, and one would be hard put to argue otherwise. It is always much easier to locate today's false-prophets. One need only look to those he disagrees with.

It might be suggested that such a one as Newton is more worthy of forgiveness than are contemporary "false-prophets." He did, after all, the best that the overall knowledge and technical sophistication of his time permitted. However, this is decidedly not the case. On the question of absolute space, for example, Newton was opposed in his own day by Leibnitz, who presented a relativistic understanding.⁸⁸ In so doing, Leibnitz came much closer to today's truth. Yet Newton prevailed.

⁸⁶For an understanding of Velikovsky's thesis, read: Immanuel Velikovsky, Worlds in Collision (New York: Delta Books, Dell Publishing Co., 1965). Also: Earth in Upheaval (New York: Delta Books, Dell Publishing Co., 1965).

⁸⁷See in particular Dewey B. Larson, New Light on Space and Time (Portland, Ore.: North Pacific Publishing Co., 1965).

⁸⁸Kuhn, p. 72.

The foregoing raises a couple of interesting related questions. Does the offering of a totally "wrong" reading of a situation (as interpreted by the scholarly community), indicate incompetence on the part of the offerer? Is it a sign of poor scholarship? If so, most of the scholars we pay tribute to in our history texts were, by current standards, unscholarly incompetents. Must a theory predict well to be considered the work of a scholar? Again, if the answer is yes most theories of years past attest to the mediocrity of their formulators. Finally, if Kuhn is right, if all paradigms lead to equally correct conclusions, as those paradigms are proposed and as they are understood by those who propose them, on what basis do scholars condemn the work of others as wrong and unworthy, and can we justify their continuing to do so?

Another assumption of the nineteenth century paradigm which does not fare well when put to empirical test is the notion that fact and value are separate. I can think of no instance in which value positions have been in conflict without the "facts" being disputed simultaneously. It is easier to illustrate this in the social sciences where disputes are more common, however, the point can be made for the physical sciences as well. An excellent illustration is the clear value conflict between Edward Teller and Linus Pauling, and the concomitant disagreement over the "facts" of radiation, nuclear and thermonuclear testing.

At the end of Chapter One I mentioned that it is consistent with the prevailing paradigm to view creativity as an individual product. By now, however, it may have occurred to the reader that if there is no single truth of an object or event, if there can be as many factual descriptions as there are kinds of measuring instruments and types of relationships between measurers and measured, then creativity must be seen not as the product of an individual but of a community. An idea, an hypothesis, a theory, is creative and insightful only when people say so. Copernicus was a genius only when and to the degree that he was recognized as such by others. And he was given recognition only when and as his colleagues became similar measuring instruments enjoying similar relationships with the things they were observing.

If I were to state the theme of the foregoing attack on the prevailing paradigm in a single sentence, I think I would say it simply argues there is no such animal as scientific or scholarly method. Or to say the same thing, the scientific method is a method employed by all of us. Persons quick to point out the anomalies in the going view have said as much, and precisely. "Science is not a special activity," J. Bronowski has declared, "it is a type of all human activity."⁸⁹ Just so, adds Henry Margenau, "the method of science

⁸⁹J. Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 113. James B. Conant states flatly that "there is no such thing as the scientific method." Science and Common Sense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 45.

is nothing more than an elaboration of procedures of common sense. Even the simple instances of gaining knowledge are examples of the scientific process . . . "90 Then what is science, and what knowledge? Such questions remain to be answered. For some readers, whose personal realities are of a kind to make them receptive to the arguments in this chapter, an answer to these questions may be forming itself in their minds. For others there is no doubt mostly confusion. It is my hope and my intention that subsequent chapters will prove enlightening to both groups. In the meanwhile I would like to risk adding to the confusion by taking another look at political science and the political scientist in view of what has just been said.

⁹⁰Margenau, p. 17.

V. PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: UNANSWERED
 QUESTIONS OR ANOMALIES?

Different human purposes, confronting the same experience, result in different facts. A hammer is not the same fact to a carpenter, a poet, a physicist, and a murderer. A piece of land is not the same fact to a farmer as to an oil geologist or to a soldier in battle. Salt water is one kind of fact to a shipwrecked sailor and another to a chemist. What men are "up to" affects their facts. Facts are valuations of experience which alter with variations in men's interests.¹

--Jerome Frank

Kuhn observed that when paradigms are in conflict, what appear to be unanswered questions when looked at through the old paradigm come to be seen as anomalies by those who do their viewing through the new. Not only are they anomalies, they are predictable anomalies; they are the expected state of affairs. So it is in this case. The reader may be inclined to argue the things I refer to as anomalies and inconsistencies are not such at all, but are simply the unsolved problems, the unanswered questions of the discipline. When viewed from a relativistic position, however, they are seen to be problems inherent in the nineteenth century paradigm; problems which no longer exist when a relativistic framework is employed.

¹ Frank, p. 134.

Beginning with the pettiest of difficulties and moving to those of grander scale, political scientists spend a great deal more time stressing the need for scientific methodology than do their counterparts in the physical sciences. They continually talk of the importance of objectivity and value-neutrality. We might, then, expect them to do well.² Yet they do not develop a "science," and despite their concern they are continually accusing one another of producing value-laden and non-objective readings. On occasion it is suggested that political science is a young discipline and time is required to build a "science" in the strict sense of the word. However, as Bert F. Hoselitz observes, this is a specious argument.

The beginnings of astronomy as a unified body of science go back to the sixteenth century, the beginnings of mechanics as an exact integrated science to the seventeenth. History, economics, and politics as unified disciplines are only a very little younger.³

²In response to the above, a colleague, E. Lane Davis of the State University of Iowa, remarked, "It is not just the exhortation that is worth noting but the unusual, one might almost say neurotic attention which is given to these matters in comparison to the natural scientists."

³Hoselitz, p. 7. Lewis White Beck has written: "When we think of the social sciences as only the 'poor relations' of the natural sciences, we forget that an insight into the order of society was prior to that into nature. Every primitive people sees nature by an analogy with its social organization. Science began when laws, like those given by governments and tribunals, were projected into nature. The great Greek philosophers approached nature with the anticipation that it would conform to simple principles, some aspects of their society providing them a model for the interpretation of nature." See Beck, p. 387.

Had we made progress at the same rate as astronomy or mechanics, we would have achieved "scientific" status at least a century ago.

Although American students of politics have found it relatively easy to reach accord on a few particular issues (e. g. Marx was a false prophet, the Nazis authoritarians), they have had very little success when it comes to agreeing on even the most basic of general subjects such as the nature of democracy and totalitarianism, the relationship between a successful revolutionary leader and his adherents, or again, the difference between propaganda and education, between liberty and license.⁴ Here too, one might simply argue these issues constitute

⁴Totalitarian leaders are sometimes depicted as all-powerful Machiavellians who rule with combination of mailed fist and lies. Under a totalitarian government, says H. Arthur Steiner, "the only limitation upon the power of the state is the intuition of its self-chosen leader. The policy of the totalitarian state vacillates with the whims of its leader . . ." pp. 5, 45. We also find the idea expressed that "dictator candidates attempting, after their rise to power, to swim against the accepted social current of their time, were usually unsuccessful. They occupied, so to speak, a wrong place; that is, they represented a type of dictatorship not then in demand . . . like everyone else, dictators have to follow prevailing trends." George W. F. Hallgarten, Why Dictators? (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954), p. 13. Revolutionaries are sometimes portrayed as charismatic individuals who manipulate the "fears and hopes" of a mass, and with over-simplified schemas, lead them willy-nilly into paths of risk and radicality. See Burns and Peltason, pp. 28-30; also Ball and Kullough, p. 556. Of revolutionaries it is also said: "The outbreak of most revolutions has surprised the revolutionist groups and parties no less than all others, and there exists hardly a revolution whose outbreak could be blamed on their activities. It usually was the other way around: revolution broke out and liberated, as it were, the professional revolutionists from wherever they happened to be--from jail, or from the coffee house, or from the library." Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), p. 263.

problems of the discipline, problems which will eventually be solved. It is my contention, however, that such words will continue to have vague and even conflicting meanings so long as scholars neglect to give them operational definitions, and that they will do the latter so long as they continue to think of descriptive words as referring to independent "facts," rather than to kinds of experiences (to experienced "facts"). For one who thinks in absolute terms, it is apparently considered unnecessary to build operational definitions. Since democracy, liberty, propaganda, etc., have concrete forms, it is only important to be able to point to instances of each. A relativistic epistemology, requiring as it does the use of strict operational definitions, would promptly lead political scientists to conclude that what is "really" education for one man is "really" propaganda for another, that what constitutes "free speech" for one is to a second "a call of fire in a crowded theatre," that one individual's liberty is another's license, and so forth. The next step (see Chapter Ten of this essay) would be to ask under what common circumstances (if any) men label information disseminated propaganda, and when education; when they are found to speak of a Government's acts as "in the interest of liberty," and when they will conclude said acts "encourage license." It is with questions of this sort, I believe, that a fruitful political inquiry must begin.

As political scientists are unclear about the nature of democracy, freedom and the totalitarian state, so too they are unclear

about the facets of extant communism. How does one recognize a communist state? Is a nation to be considered communist because its leaders declare it that? Although this seems to be the general practice, if the answer is yes, then by the same logic Stroessner's Paraguay becomes a democracy. Or is a country communist because its statesmen pay tribute to Marx and Lenin, study their writings, and insist their governments are patterned after their teachings? If yes, then quite a number of Latin American states whose constitutions are clear emulations of our own, and whose statesmen diligently read and quote the writing of our nation's foremost spokesmen, must be taken as democratic. Is it that communist nations can be identified by their economic and social structures, classless in orientation? But political scientists themselves are found to observe that "the range of income, for example, as between the highest paid member of Communist society and the average worker or peasant is at least as great as in any society under private enterprise."⁵ Others go even further, arguing "the distribution of rewards in the Soviet Union is much more unequal than it is in most other industrialized nations."⁶ Indeed, if communism were to be measured by the number of welfare-state measures in existence and the scope of their application, Israel would certainly be

⁵George W. Cronyn, A Primer on Communism, ed. by Howard Oiseth (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1961), p. 54.

⁶Lipset, p. xxiii.

declared more communist than the Soviet Union. Yet we do not consider Israel a communist state. And if communism is government ownership and control, few states have been as communist as the Dominican Republic under Trujillo. Perhaps it is that communist states are those which are working hard to create a classless society as Joseph Cropsey has written.⁷ But we must ask how we are to know that the USSR is working toward a classless state.⁸ Again, are we to take the word of individual spokesmen? Then once more we must conclude many a Latin American dictator is engaged in building democracy. Moreover, our general inclination is not to take the words of Soviet or Chinese statesmen at face value; then why should we do so here? There is no apparent basis for it. If we empirically test the underlying assumption: namely, that statesmen do actively build societies which conform with the lines initially set out in their ideologies, we find self-proclaimed Christians have not built Christian worlds, democrats have not built democracies along the lines defined by the ancients (instead they have been content to call existing structures democratic), and communists do not appear to be building the classless society. "Since the 1930's there has been an ever-widening gap" in the Soviet Union "between the

⁷Joseph Cropsey, "The Moral Basis of International Action," in America Armed, ed. by Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1963), pp. 84-85.

⁸Stoessinger tells us we are nearer to a classless society in the West. See p. 208.

highest and lowest paid workers, and between their incomes and that of the bureaucracy."⁹ And whereas Marx argues in the Manifesto that one of the first things the proletariat will do upon taking power in advanced nations is to abolish inheritance rights, the USSR has recently reintroduced them.¹⁰ Actually, as classical theorists often observed, societies have seemed to go through various stages, from democracies, to aristocracies, to despotic structures and so on. Democracies have not simply become progressively more democratic. Thus, over the long run, it would appear there is greater empirical evidence for assuming that despots build democracies and democrats despotism.

Once more I propose the vagueness and confusion will continue until scholars cease to ask is country "X" or individual "Y" "communist"--as though communism were an entity with "real" form independent of man--and begin to ask instead: "to what kinds of life experiences do "X" and "Y" apply the word "communism"; what sort of life experiences do we apply the term to, and why?" (See the discussion in Chapter Ten.)

To sum the argument up to this point, I believe we are justified in contending that thinking in terms of the nineteenth century

⁹Cronyn, p. 55. Political scientists, it seems, argue both that communism does not exist and then, in using that term to refer to various governments of the world, that it does.

¹⁰Arthur P. Mendel, ed., Essential Works of Marxism (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 32.

paradigm understanding of "science" has not served political scientists well. They have not developed a "science," and they have been unable to settle even the most fundamental issues, such as what they mean by the key concepts and words they employ.

We might also argue the reverse. Political scientists do not appear to have served the paradigm any better than it has served them. Thus, given their reluctance to claim possession of "truths," one is inclined to question the confidence with which they frequently declare the analyses of people like Mills, Williams and Strauss "false." To confidently dismiss an argument or theory as nonobjective and wrong implies that one has a fairly healthy idea about what is objective and right. (This practice ill accords with the nineteenth century paradigm.)

A related anomaly is that although political scientists are hesitant to declare they have "truth," they do not show any particular interest in broad-gauge theory, as we might anticipate. There appear to be fewer job opportunities for those whose specialty is political theory than for those specialized in international relations or comparative government; and political scientists themselves rate the latter fields more important.¹¹

¹¹See Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp. 53-59. Also see R. B. Macpherson, "World Trends in Political Science Research," American Political Science Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), p. 432.

On the other hand, though relatively uninterested in broad-gauge theory, political scientists manifest an overweening concern with narrow-gauge theory a la the nineteenth century paradigm. Kuhn suggests one indication of paradigm crisis is a markedly increased expenditure of effort and energy to make the old framework continue working; for instance, the creation of epicycles by upholders of the Ptolemaic universe. It may be that the numerous behavioral explanations being turned out by political science scholars will one day be regarded as the epicycles of our field.¹²

Then there is the anomaly which stems from the observation (one Hans Morgenthau continually makes), that much of contemporary political science is founded on the assumption man is inherently "rational."¹³ Given the assumption, it appears somewhat contradictory to explain so many varied and profound political phenomena as the products of "irrationality." Illustrations of the latter, we noted, include fascist movements, Marxist movements, the politics of racial bigotry everywhere, activities of the radical-right and, I might add, even a considerable portion of current American domestic and foreign policy. Or to put this whole argument more forcefully: like

¹²I am indebted for this insight to Professor E. Lane Davis of the State University of Iowa.

¹³Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, pp. 1-47.

all ideas, the notion that "rationality" has concrete form (is an absolute) and the view that man is inherently rational, are only hypotheses--nineteenth century paradigm hypotheses. And they are hypotheses so effectively countered by the political scientist's own reckoning that one wonders by what logic we should consider maintaining them.

To continue with the argument political scientists fail to abide by their paradigm, we find them maintaining "science is the process of systematizing observation and thought, and of formulating propositions the truth of which is tested by their capacity to predict and control." We witness them concluding "political science as a pure science, therefore should seek to devise formulae to predict how political conflicts are likely to turn out."¹⁴ Now the price of bad theory is inevitably failure when it comes to acting; not to predict right is not to control. But a glance at the history of physical science will make it clear that theories are most seriously questioned when actions based upon them go amiss. Yet, we frequently witness students of politics dismissing Marxist theory with clear conscience, despite the fact that regarding many issues it has predicted far better than anything the West has come up with, e.g. the course of events in underdeveloped areas.

Moreover, political scientists have seemed reluctant to judge

¹⁴Wright, p. 117.

Marxist theory according to the success reaped by nations employing it, and that is the principal way in which it should be judged. Vernon V. Aspaturian recently made this argument. He suggests:

Marxism-Leninism is a theory of social reality and hence, a theory of power, its origins, manifestations, forms, calculations, deterrence, and manipulation, and it is a very powerful and effective theory. Its effectiveness as a guide to action does not rest upon its being "scientific," for it can only be relative in this regard, not absolute, and the only valid measurement of its effectiveness as a theory of analysis and action is to compare it with the effectiveness of corresponding analytic systems employed by Western decision-makers.¹⁵

The foregoing is not intended as a plea for Western political scientists and statesmen to employ Marxist formulations. Indeed, I will subsequently do the opposite. I merely wish to note the rather summary dismissal of dubious theory by those who quite often give rather whole-hearted endorsement to far more questionable hypotheses.

Political scientists pay tribute to a paradigm which insists scholars only reject theories after analyzing them thoroughly--having tested them against the facts and found them wanting. Yet, a great number of these same political scientists dismiss dialectical materialism with but the vaguest idea of what it is about. For that matter, I personally know several anti-Marxist Ph.D's in political science who can do little more in the way of discussing the subject than to speak

¹⁵Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Challenge of Soviet Foreign Policy," in The Revolution in World Politics, ed. by Morton A. Kaplan (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962), pp. 219-21.

of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Nor is this observation meant to demean the scholarship of political scientists. I am challenging only the popular understanding of what the good scholar does and why.

Because the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm supposes the universe to abide by simple laws, it argues for theoretical parsimony; the very simplicity of an hypothesis is to be considered no mean recommendation.¹⁶ Yet surprisingly, as well as inconsistently, among political scientists to label a theory simplistic is usually to criticize it, and this rather severely. Where once one could discredit an hypothesis merely by calling it a "devil theory," the words "over-simplistic," and "single-cause explanation" now have a similar result. It is an extremely popular form of attack. Daniel Bell employs it against the radical right.¹⁷ Hans Morgenthau uses it to depreciate economic interpretations of Imperialism, as does John G. Stoessinger.¹⁸ Ironically, Stoessinger also uses it to discredit Morgenthau, saying his assumption that "the central and universal goal of foreign policy" is power, "is a brilliant exposition of a single-factor analysis. But like all such efforts it is a tour de

¹⁶See Bierstedt, The Social Order, p. 21.

¹⁷Bell, The Radical Right, p. 9.

¹⁸Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf Publishing Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 49-50. Also Stoessinger, p. 75.

force which simply does not stand up under critical scrutiny."¹⁹

At the same time, one does not find a sound justification of the thesis that simplistic schemas are rightfully suspect. One does hear it said that economic, social and political phenomena are more "complex" than the physical; the argument seems to be that there are more causal variables involved in such events than any simplistic thesis could possibly account for.²⁰ But here we promptly confront a major anomaly. To refer to E. A. Burtt once more, any physical object or event can readily be shown to be causally connected with an infinite number of other objects and events.²¹ Henry's tuberculosis was said to be caused by tubercule bacilli. Yet his heartbeat, I noted, was just as much a cause, if by cause one means the variable or variables which had to precede or accompany the one in question in order for it to occur or exist just as it does. To the tubercule bacilli and the heartbeat we might now add gravity, the sun's rays, Henry's employer who transferred him to an unhealthy climate, Henry's parents who gave him existence, and so on ad infinitum. Nor can we argue the bacilli seem a more powerful factor. What could be more causally powerful in this case than gravity or the rays

¹⁹Stoessinger, p. 29.

²⁰See Curtis, p. xxii; also Lipset, p. 90.

²¹Burtt, p. 123.

of the sun? As for distinguishing between necessary and sufficient causes, I have already considered and rejected that particular basis for designating importance. Now if one could go on for a lifetime distinguishing variables causally related to Henry's illness, or any other physical phenomenon for that matter, of what sense is it to propose social phenomena are more complex? And what is to be meant by complexity?

It goes without saying that in order to decry an explanation as over-simplistic one must first assume the correctness of the nineteenth century paradigm. To argue important variables have been omitted is to take for granted variables have "real" existence independent of the viewer. Just as obviously, the epistemology inherent in the arguments of Kuhn, Sinclair, et al, does not allow for such a criticism. In any absolute sense, it is equally correct to say the universe is comprised of two, ten, a million, or an infinite number of variables. One cannot simply ask if a phenomenon is simple or complex. Rather the question has to be phrased in the following manner: "given this or that specific set of objectives, how complex or how simple must the phenomenon at issue be considered?" An interesting related question is "under what conditions or circumstances do observers hold phenomena, questions, or problems to be complex, and under what circumstances do they regard them as simple? Much will be said in answer to that last query in a succeeding chapter.

Another argument commonly presented against single-factor analysis is that the categories employed are not "mutually exclusive." Here again, Stoessinger takes Morgenthau to task, contending "national interest" and "moral principle" are not distinct as Morgenthau supposes, but are, on the contrary, interdependent.²² While I believe a closer reading of Morgenthau would show him to be fully aware of this, it is a very easy matter to demonstrate that the argument itself is specious. The biologist speaks of heredity on the one hand and environment on the other, though even a gene or a DNA molecule has an environment which if altered would in turn change its own nature.²³ We talk of water as a category distinct from oxygen, yet water--to be water--must contain the latter. And as students of politics we refer to economic, as distinguished from social, as distinguished from political questions and issues, knowing full well that politics has to do with economic and social matters, that social questions have economic and political ramifications, that the categories, in short, are in no way mutually exclusive.

²²Stoessinger, p. 30.

²³In this connection, the psychologist D. O. Hebb suggests that to ask how much a given human attribute is due to heredity and how much to environment is like asking to what extent the width of a field determines its area and to what extent its length does so. The answer, he points out, can only be that in an absolute sense both are 100 per cent responsible. D. O. Hebb, A Textbook of Psychology (London and Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1958), pp. 128-29.

The suggestion that the classifications used in a given simplistic thesis are "too abstract"--for instance, the concept class in class analysis--is but the same argument in different guise. Again, nothing could be more abstract than the concept power, or community, or nation, and not a few firmly established labels in physical science, such as gravity or sub-atomic particle are not only abstract but metaphysical to boot.²⁴

Finally, if the label "over-simplistic" is to be tagged on to every explanation of political phenomena which leaves out countless numbers of causally related variables, no explanation can be excepted. Admittedly, some explanations of some phenomena do include more variables than others, but contrasted with the number they all omit, distinctions between them appear hardly worth making. Moreover, while they tend to decry simplistic schemas, those explanations of events most widely endorsed among political scientists in general are notably simplistic, studies of the radical-right, for instance, and of the fascist movements in Germany and Japan. And this too is anomalous. Conversely, if the appellation "simplistic" is meant to imply that a theory has few ramifications, one wonders how it could possibly be applied to economic interpretations of imperialism as

²⁴While the concept nation is an abstraction, one can readily point to its components, to people, territory, etc., but not so with the sub-atomic particle or gravity; these last concepts are as mystical as "soul" or "spirit."

outlined by Hobson, or more particularly, Lenin.

It seems to me one of the major difficulties confronting the political scientist who would employ the nineteenth century paradigm in his work is that when treated as hypotheses many of its premises are directly refuted by his experience. (Is this why he picks and chooses among them?) Perhaps the foremost of these is the assumption that fact and value are separate.

Anomalies Associated With Separating Fact and Value

Until fairly recently, it was not uncommon to find students of politics suggesting that a competent and careful investigator might hope to keep his values out of his work entirely.²⁵ As Easton observes, however, this view now seems to be losing ground. The position is a difficult one to defend.²⁶

After all, values are found to play a rather decisive role when it comes to determining what a political scientist investigates and what he presents in the classroom. Such things as the torture and assassination of political enemies, or the violent overthrow of governments are highly common political events, more common, I

²⁵ e.g. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How and George E. G. Catlin, The Science and Method of Politics (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner Publishers, Ltd., 1927). For others, see Easton's listing, The Political System, p. 224.

²⁶ Easton, pp. 223-27.

suspect, than democratic elections. Yet, while scholars do consider these phenomena they do not make exhaustive studies of either. The reason why is obvious. Their own values as well as those of the community do not encourage, on the contrary, they discourage, such a course. That member of a political science department who wished to conduct a seminar on the most effective revolutionary methods and techniques would have a difficult time convincing his colleagues of the worth of his choice. He would have an equally difficult time publishing any articles he might write on the subject, and at many institutions of higher learning whether or not one obtains tenure depends in great part on how many books and articles he gets into print. Were the political scientist to argue in favor of substituting his course for the one generally offered in American Government he would feel the full weight of his society's values.

It is reasoning of the above sort which has led Easton and others to grant that values are quite important when it comes to dictating which facts an investigator will look at. What they have not been willing to concede is that what the facts look like, their very form, is just as dependent upon the values of the observer. The idea is preserved that the accuracy of a descriptive statement depends upon its correspondence with some external reality. Given this distinction between "is" and "ought," then, some of the following observations become mild inconsistencies, while others are nothing short of

paradoxical.

To begin then, paradigm assumptions aside, experience informs us arguments over values are invariably arguments over the facts and vice versa. This is so in the physical sciences as well as the social. The disputes between Edward Teller and Linus Pauling over the effects of radiation have already been mentioned.

So too, one who takes unorthodox positions--one who makes markedly different readings of the facts than do his colleagues--can expect to have his motives (values) questioned. Among political scientists we found this to be the case with Mills, Williams and Strauss. These writers have likewise raised the issue of their opponents' intentions.

More importantly, if fact and value are "naturally" distinct entities we would expect that when it came to economic, social and political matters the facts would support our particular values only on occasion. On cold war issues, as between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, we would anticipate factual support for our preferences roughly fifty per cent of the time. Yet we contemplate no instance in which the facts do not uphold our own expressed values, and this overwhelmingly, whether it be a question of communism, fascism, racism or whatever. Neither do our adversaries. We note that no arguments are recognized as sound--as supported by the facts--which are strongly counter to a community's

aims and interests, to its values. If fact and value are indeed "naturally" independent, such a finding must be considered nothing other than inconceivable. It is most aptly described as miraculous.

He may insist that fact and value are free of one another, but like the layman, the political scientist would be hard pressed to indicate "objective" persons who take value positions on crucial economic, social and political matters which happen to be antithetical to his own.

Moreover, communist, fascist and racist methods and practices are indisputably value choices, they have to do with preferred ways of doing things. If fact and value are separate, of what importance is it to an actor--of what concern--that the facts uphold his personal likings? If informed that the facts do not accord with his values, the fascist or racist might justifiably respond "so what?" For if we mean to suggest those values best bolstered by the facts are of greater "worth" (a value decision)--if we mean to make factual backing an argument in their behalf--we are saying that for us at least fact and value are not at all separable. We are seen to deny our initial premise. Actually, merely to suggest the facts are more supportive of some values than others is to postulate a tie between them.

Just as some of the paradigm premises conflict with the political scientists' experience, so too, not a few of the conclusions such premises point him toward are equally at odds with the world

of his experience. For instance, a logical connection was drawn between nineteenth century paradigm assumptions and the belief that education is a prime weapon--according to DeGrazia the prime weapon--in the arsenal of democracy. This view too has commanding weaknesses. By and large, the main spokesmen for recent major economic, social and political movements, those we did not like as well as those we did, have not lacked in formal education. This was so, I observed, in Nazi Germany; it was also the case in Soviet Russia.

Of the World War I settlement which many scholars now agree laid the base for the rise of fascist Germany and World War II, Norman Angell has noted that although some educated persons did write and speak against it, "the educated class showed no larger proportion of such than the 'uneducated': the universities, the clubs, the churches were no more immune from the contagion of unreason than any average trade union or Odd Fellow's Society." And "if that be true," he asks, contending "no one with knowledge of the ground would deny it--of what avail was the learning in this particular trouble?"²⁷

If those who stress the efficacy of "political education" mean by that term the promotion of their personal "enlightened" viewpoints

²⁷Norman Angell, The Public Mind (London: N. Douglas Publishing Co., Ltd., 1926), p. 38.

(I have not even raised the matter of how we can hope to "educate" if we don't know the "truth"), they must respond to the many studies which consistently show "people seek information congenial to prior attitudes";²⁸ that in keeping with this, they "interpret the same information differently";²⁹ that "the categories employed by a person in characterizing stimulus situations tend to protect him from unwanted changes in his cognitive structure."³⁰ "Communication research points up the fact that it is difficult in general for a communication to reach people who are not already in favor of the view it presents . . . they prefer not to face the implications of ideas opposed to their own . . . what they do is to evade the issue psychologically by simply not understanding the message."³¹ In view of Kuhn's thesis, we might add that they misunderstand the message from the sender's point of view, not from their own, and that to receive it in the form he intended is first to accept the set of underlying assumptions of which it

²⁸Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail," in Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. by Daniel Katz, et al., p. 526.

²⁹Ibid., p. 528.

³⁰Dorwin Cartwright, "Some Principles of Mass Persuasion," ibid., p. 385.

³¹Eunice Cooper and Marie Jahoda, "The Evasion of Propaganda: How Prejudiced People Respond to Anti-Prejudice Propaganda," The Journal of Psychology, XXIII (January, 1947), pp. 20-21.

is a part. Here, no evasion occurs.³²

A final pertinent observation which can be made respecting the "power" of education is that every political scientist knows--whatever his personal persuasions--that he can expect to have notable impact upon only a relatively small segment of his class. A graduate student in biology can lecture a roomful of students and they will all leave saying "yea." Nor does he have to speak some final "truth." Biologists of yesterday had this same success in pushing ideas which are now considered wholly in error. No political scientist that I know of is blessed with such a force. They take the podium each day knowing full well that a few will respond with "yea," a few "nay," and the great number with a skeptical "it may be so." And professors of politics least prone to this experience are widely regarded by students as persons who belabor the obvious.

It has struck me as both inconsistent and paradoxical, then, when on several occasions I have heard colleagues claim they tempered their arguments when presenting them to highly unsympathetic groups. (In each of these instances, the speakers were liberals and the audiences rightist oriented.) Thus, the educating word, of dubious impact when it comes to effecting change, is blunted as though it were

³²Evidently many political scientists are prone to think this one-to-one tie between experience and thought does not hold for the "rational" observer; that is, for themselves. This idea too, is consistent with the nineteenth century paradigm.

overpowerful when used upon those considered to be most in need of education. The rationale underlying this approach, of course, again derives from the nineteenth century paradigm. It is supposed that there is a "natural" logic to the positions being espoused, and that if an individual is made to accept a few minor premises he will be inclined to extend the reasoning to incorporate other, more important ones, on his own. On the other hand, it is assumed, if the arguments are not watered down the hearer may "close his mind" at the outset. That this view is wholly incompatible with a relativistic understanding of knowledge will be demonstrated when the implications of the twentieth century paradigm are discussed.

I spoke previously of opposition between the belief that education is a potent political weapon and the finding that individuals are highly resistant to ideas which conflict radically with ones they already hold. The same contradiction can be said to exist between this last observation and the notion that people can be effectively propagandized, that they can be made to accept readings of situations markedly out of keeping with their experience.

Emphasizing Offensive Aspects of Politics

As understood by subscribers to the nineteenth century paradigm, we noted, politics has "something" to do with defense and "much" to do with offense. Political activists are believed to be concerned

in a minor way with maintaining, and in a major way with altering, various aspects of the status quo. Given this particular paradigm derived conclusion, I propose that all of the following observations have to be taken as anomalous.

To begin with, in view of the foregoing premise, we would expect the most economically and socially deprived individuals to be at least as political as the "haves." And, considering that when contrasted with the latter they have infinitely more to gain, we might even anticipate their being more political. Yet we find just the reverse.³³ Economic and social derelicts--in the U. S., inhabitants of Michael Harrington's "Other America"--are at once the apolitical. With everything to profit, but little to protect, they usually fail to cast their ballots, and rarely enter into involved political activities such as working for a party or candidate, or getting out the vote on election day. Moreover, the higher up the economic and social ladder one looks, the more political activity he will be apt to discern. A man with a job is more apt to vote than a man on relief. One who not only works but owns a little property is likelier to work for a party than is an employed person living a rather hand-to-mouth existence. A few steps higher on the economic and social ladder we find persons

³³Political scientists have long noted and lamented this particular fact. See E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960).

not only engaging in party work but donating considerable sums of their own money to the "cause." Higher still we encounter individuals either running for office or personally encouraging others to do so. Exceptions notwithstanding, we are fully justified in declaring a strong correlation exists between economic and social wealth or power and political activity, such that, by and large, the more one has of the first, the more he will involve himself in the latter. And this, I contend is inconsistent with an understanding of politics as chiefly offensive.

To act offensively, to aim for changed conditions--whether the actor be a nation or an individual--requires plotting and planning; and the more offensive, the more far-reaching the objectives, the more elaborate the programs of action must be. On the other hand, if the prime objective is simply to maintain some existing situation one will be inclined to forego planning. Policies will only be restructured as the situation is itself restructured by factors and conditions outside of one's control. To be concise: offensive behavior necessitates planning, while defensive behavior demands only the ability to react in a homeostatic manner. In keeping with the idea that politics is principally offensive, then, we would expect an examination of American foreign policy formulation to reveal a penchant for long-range planning. Here too, when we look we discover the opposite. Among career service officers we meet "skepticism about the value of planning"; we encounter "an inadequate organization for planning, both in the

National Security Council and in the departments having foreign policy interests"; we find that bodies such as the National Security Council and the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department concentrate on short-range planning which borders on reaction.³⁴ We find, in a word, an anomaly.

If foreign aid were granted with offensive intent, as political scientists are disposed to suggest, we would again anticipate organization and design; we would foresee its being coordinated and controlled by a central agency with a highly trained staff; we would contemplate financial commitments to recipient countries of several years duration in the least; and we would expect to find machinery for determining if the aid given was well and wisely used. Instead, we find "overlapping agency jurisdictions and unclear objectives."³⁵ We discover short-term (one year) financing.

We observe that our biggest current aid venture, the Alliance for Progress, while ostensibly aimed at bringing Latin America into the twentieth century economically and socially, "is based mostly on loans and not grants," and we note that "Latin America loses more

³⁴Franklin A. Lindsay, "Program Planning: The Missing Element," in Foreign Policy in American Government, ed. by Bernard C. Cohen, pp. 130-32.

³⁵These comments were taken from President Kennedy's Message to Congress on the issue of foreign aid, March 22, 1961; reprinted in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., Why Foreign Aid? (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), pp. 1-9.

money on the unfair exchange than it gets or can ever hope to get from the Alliance." This last point is an important one. The quotations are from John Gerassi's controversial book The Great Fear in Latin America.³⁶ With extensive documentation, Gerassi argues the United States has not "granted" large sums of money to Latin America despite our tendency to encourage that impression. He proposes if we sincerely desired to alleviate the economic problems of that hemisphere partly at our own expense we would back the countries concerned in their quest for stabilized world-market prices for their produce. This we have been unwilling to do. Furthermore, Gerassi insists, given the deteriorating economic situation in Latin America, the present level of aid is a must, else revolutions would soon take place and we would most certainly suffer severe expropriation. Gerassi, then, views our foreign aid program as defensive in intent, aimed at preserving our existing investments. "I suggest we have only one goal," he concludes, "the defense of our interests." (Italics mine) "Few politicians or statesmen ever put it so bluntly, but all act according to it once in power."³⁷

As for machinery designed to assess whether aid is used as it was intended, inquiry discloses a foreign aid program which Fred

³⁶John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America (New York: Collier Books, Inc., 1965), p. 28.

³⁷Ibid., p. 406.

Cook has described as "shrouded in secrecy." Observes Cook,

The State Department has been permitted to stamp "Secret" or "Confidential" on most Comptroller General's reports and even a Congressman or a Senator, faced with this designation, runs the risk of being accused of violating our espionage laws if he names a specific school or hospital for which millions of dollars have been appropriated and which still has not been built.³⁸

A final, and perhaps the best, illustration of the seemingly defensive character of politics is the American legislative committee system as it operates on the national level. Beginning with the very election of a Congressman, no congressional aspirant, suffice it to say, will gain the backing of a party unless he has a built-in empathy with and affection for the interests with which that party group is closely aligned. And without such backing, financial and otherwise, a political hopeful does not stand a tinker's chance of being elected to Congress.

This means that generally speaking a Congressman from an eastern industrial area will think like a labor leader when labor questions are involved, while a representative from Iowa will view the problems of agriculture like a farmer. Furthermore, it means that the Congressman will be equipped to take the "right" postures without undertaking an evaluation of the sentiment at home. He can

³⁸Fred J. Cook, "The Billion-Dollar Mystery," The Nation, CC (April 12, 1965), p. 28.

truly "vote his own conscience."³⁹ "If his position happens to coincide with that of the organized groups in his district, it is not simply because he is controlled by them. It is because he is one of them."⁴⁰

When it comes to committee placement, the freshman congressman, or the rather rare representative who seeks to change committee assignments, sends his request to the dean of his state party delegation.⁴¹ In each case, the gentleman who enjoys that position knows well how to give proper representation to the foremost interests in his state. He knows too, how to select congressmen with the requisite political values to sit on the committees which guard those interests. Naturally, this method of doling out committee assignments is a virtual guarantee that the standing committees will be interest non-partisan.

The upshot of the above is that the various committees serve as ideal weapons of deterrence against those who would harm the interests they represent. Each year approximately 13,000 bills are introduced into the House of Representatives, and are referred to the appropriate committees (the appropriate committee being the one representing those interests which would be most negatively affected

³⁹James M. Burns, Congress on Trial (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 10.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, LV (June, 1961), p. 346.

were the bill in question to pass). Of the 13,000 plus bills introduced, "90 per cent die in committees other than the Rules Committee."⁴²

What has been said of the form and function of committees applies to subcommittees as well. A key to the why of subcommittee existence is the fact that specific interests are subsumed under the more general area interests of full committees. And once more, as Charles O. Jones has observed in respect to subcommittees of the House Committee on Agriculture, "members who have little interest in the proceedings are expected either to remain silent during hearings or not attend."⁴³

As for functional committees, in certain respects they relate to the specific interest committees as the latter relate to their subunits. Representatives of predominantly wheat growing regions will be wheat-conscious in particular and are likely to seek appointment to that commodity's subcommittee. But in a broader sense, they, like the members of all farm product subcommittees, are agriculture-conscious. Hence the utility of an agricultural committee. In a similar manner agriculture, along with other specific interest-oriented committees, has a still broader concern for the economic

⁴²Willard F. Williamson S. J., "House Rules Committee: An Appraisal," Social Order, XII (February, 1962), p. 55.

⁴³Charles O. Jones, "Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agricultural Committee," American Political Science Review, LV (June, 1961), p. 361.

welfare of the nation; for its ability to maintain itself against catastrophe inflicted by external or internal agencies. What hurts agriculture is likely to injure wheat, and what hurts the nation is likely to injure agriculture.

In structure and in function, then, the committee system is both cautious and conservative. It is not constructed in a manner permitting interest elements to rush forth into conflict with one another, risking present fortunes in the hope of some greater gain. On the contrary, in its every aspect it is built first to protect and preserve the going interest structure, and the more dominant the interest, the more protection offered. Then, but only then, will the system tolerate mild encroachments on the domains of the weaker elements.

As I have pointed out, one of the things the political scientist is engaged in doing in the above situation is testing an hypothesis--in this instance, the hypothesis that political activity is largely offensive. As a result, when looking tells him otherwise, we would expect the political investigator to discard his hypothesis. Instead, he is frequently heard to declare the variables do not behave correctly.

Thus, when political scientists witness the poor neglecting to vote, foreign policy planners failing to plan with long-run intent, foreign aid programs stressing military hardware and loans, and appearing to lack coherent organization and purpose, they are quite often moved to conclude that the actors involved are deficient in

"rationality" and "logic." Hence, they are apt to speak of "educating the poor" and "enlightening the statesman." They may well view the problem as one of pointing out to apolitical individuals the kinds of action "really" consistent with their objectives--to politicians, the "reasonable" means to their declared ends.⁴⁴

When viewed from a nineteenth century paradigm position, this particular reaction seems a confused mixture of consistency and inconsistency. That paradigm informed us order (in this case, rational structure) exists "out there." The observer discovers order (rational structure), he does not impose or create it. When the student of politics fails to discover it, therefore, he may be justified in supposing none exists, that he is contemplating a disordered or irrational phenomenon.

On the other hand, the very raison de etre of the political "investigator," the political "scientist," is the supposition that there is order to be investigated, that something exists to be scientized. Indeed, it is a premise of the nineteenth century paradigm that all objects and events are part of some orderly or lawful process, and the political "scientist" is distinguished from the layman by his seeming promise to discern that order. In a very real sense, then,

⁴⁴A recent report found that "training for intelligent citizenship is the predominant interest and emphasis among political scientists in the United States." Robson, p. 41.

when he throws up his hands and declares his variables "irrational" or "unreasonable" the student of politics acknowledges his own defeat and his own irrelevance; after all, anyone could do that much. Special training is hardly required. If this is not entirely clear, think for a moment what our response might be if we heard a biologist say of the variables he was analyzing, "they are illogical and unreasonable." It puts one in mind of a carpenter who blames his tools. At any rate, it is a strange kind of science.

If viewed from the relativistic perspective implicit in Chapter Four, the conclusion that certain activities are "correctly" described as illogical or irrational is meaningless. There it was argued all order or rational structure derives from the viewer-viewed relationship. The observer was seen to impose order as well as discover it. Individuals were described as cutting up time and space the way they do, categorizing as they do (distinguishing certain kinds of order), because they relate to the world in a particular way, experience it in a particular way, and want to do specific things with those experiences (entertain certain goals). Looked at in this way, when an observer argues a phenomenon is irrational or disordered, it does not simply tell us something about a piece of external world, it says something as well about the way he experiences it, about his relationships with it. In addition, it reveals much about his goal structure, a theme we will return to later.

A relativistic framework also prompts this kind of comment: If a theory or paradigm cannot make meaningful (if it cannot "order" and make "rational") what we experience today, it holds no promise of predicting what we will experience tomorrow, and is useless, therefore, as a basis for guiding our actions.

Lastly, there are very real potential conflicts between some nineteenth century paradigm premises and liberal democratic values; e. g., between the belief, popular among political scientists, that ideas should meet and conflict in the market-place and the opinion that "false-prophets" ought to be guarded against. I say potential conflict because whether or not it exists depends upon how false-prophets are to be guarded against. If they are simply to be met with opposing arguments of great cogency, no conflict is present. However, if in any way they are to be denied access to communications media (speaker's platforms, scholarly journals, and so on), if they are to be discriminated against when it comes to obtaining university seats, or if they are to be restrained in their dealings with students, then the conflict is real indeed.

Whether and to what extent such as Marxists and radical-rightists have difficulty obtaining academic positions or presenting their views--as they wish to present them--in "respectable," "scholarly" journals, can only be speculated about. However, I suspect they confront greater obstacles in this regard than is

generally supposed.

(While wholly acceptable for the nineteenth century paradigm advocate, for the relativist it is inconsistent to urge debate and then to work against it by dismissing those one does not agree with as non-objective, unscholarly or irrational. From a relativistic vantage point the use of such adjectives constitutes nothing other than name-calling. To counter an argument by labeling its author unscholarly or non-objective is no different from countering it by calling him stupid or dumb.⁴⁵ To one who does not endorse the nineteenth century paradigm, the practice [as we noted, sometimes engaged in by political scientists] becomes highly questionable scholarship. One wonders what we might think of a physicist or an astronomer who rejected an offered explanation or theory by arguing that its promoter was non-objective, irrational, or misread the situation.)

⁴⁵Kurt London had this to say about an international conference of Sovietologists meeting in Athens in 1962 to discuss "The Non-Aligned Afro-Asian Countries in a Divided World": "Forums of this sort, it must be understood, can be successful only if the principles established in the first four international conferences are carried forward. One of these principles is the steadfast rejection of Communist participation. This issue was raised in Athens by an African delegate who considered the exclusion of Communist representation deplorable. The writer, having polled organizations and individuals who have encountered Soviet delegates across the conference table, and himself keenly aware of the importance of free discussion, explained that Communist participation would not permit an objective procedure." (emphasis added) Kurt London, ed., New Nations in a Divided World: The International Relations of the Afro Asian States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishing Co., 1963), p. xi.

On Talking Past One Another

One of Kuhn's more insightful observations is that when paradigms are in conflict communication tends to break down. Members of opposing camps proceed to give the same words different meanings. In a very real sense they can be said to speak different languages. As a result, they fail to deal with each other's arguments. Continuing to reason within their respective logic systems (paradigms), adhering to their individual vocabularies, they succeed in reconvincing themselves of their own wisdom and insight. They strengthen their own commitments. But with their intellectual protagonists they exchange not a word.

If it is as Kuhn suggests, if the very act of perceiving requires the use of paradigms, can it be that political conflicts often involve paradigm clashes, with adherents of each framework speaking a language the very logic of which will lead them to conclude they are right, their opponents wrong? I believe the answer to that question is an emphatic and easily demonstrated "yes!" Because a great deal more will be said about this issue later, for the present I will only aim at establishing the point. Two illustrations of broken communication will be given.

First, there is the radical-right contention that former president Dwight D. Eisenhower is a "conscious communist." This particular conclusion is drawn from a definition which brings liberal

welfare measures under the heading of "communism," as Daniel Bell has himself observed.⁴⁶ Bell quotes Dan Smoot who declared, "I equate the growth of the welfare state . . . with Socialism and Socialism with Communism." Now semantically there is nothing wrong with this. That it is man who assigns the meaning words possess is not, at least to my knowledge, a seriously disputed proposition.⁴⁷ If liberal welfare programs are labeled "communist," (and they are), if Eisenhower is witnessed espousing and promoting said programs (and he has been), it follows that he can justifiably be considered, indeed, logically he must be considered, a "conscious communist." And viewed thusly, it is not an answer to the charge simply to label it a symptom of irrationality or paranoia. As we noted, however, liberal observers are frequently inclined to do just that.

The second illustration has to do with the conclusion, popular among Southern whites, that Negroes are inferior to Caucasians. We find social scientists (outside of the South) busily refuting this sentiment with evidence that Negroes and whites from similar cultural settings will obtain roughly similar scores on intelligence tests. Or, it is insisted that both races were drawn from the same evolutionary

⁴⁶Bell, The Radical Right, pp. 14-16.

⁴⁷See the discussion by Van Dyke, Political Science, A Philosophical Analysis, pp. 67-70.

stockpile.⁴⁸ Yet anyone who has spent time in the South knows such arguments have nothing whatsoever to do with the standard employed by white Southerners for judging equality and inferiority. Their standard reads very much like this: if an individual has dark skin, if he has a broad, flat nose, coarse hair and thicker than average lips, then he is biologically inferior. And given this kind of standard, Southern whites are found to reason well, while liberals who present the above arguments are heard to talk only to themselves.

At this point it may be protested the radical-rightist and the racist are not being dismissed for the way they define, but for the way they categorize. It is wrong, the reader may suggest, to throw liberals in the same box with Marxists, just as it is wrong to differentiate between one individual and another on the basis of skin pigmentation and facial characteristics. This very criticism, however, is based upon an hypothesis which we found to be under heavy attack: namely, that there are "natural" categories and classes, which exist independent of any and all observers. Once we deny the worth of that premise, liberals, conservatives, radicals and other opposing groups, are heard to speak a great deal, but to communicate little.

Additional consequential questions (consequential by my

⁴⁸See Chapter II, "Race Beliefs and Facts," in Arnold Rose, The Negro in America (A condensation of Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma) (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

estimation) which either have not been answered by political scientists (many of them because they have not been asked), or which have been answered so vaguely or variously that when it comes to acting upon them, no answer would profit us equally well, include the following:

We are unable to say with confidence why it is "political ideas flourish in the soil of social conflict and change." This is so of ideas regarded as among man's most penetrating and "objective" insights, as well as those considered to be his most "irrational." Given nineteenth century paradigm assumptions, one might expect the reverse for "objective" readings. In times of tranquillity men are less emotionally aroused, and certainly they have more opportunity for unhurried, "impartial" study. In respect to the influence of emotion upon reason, I suggest it is something of an anomaly that if asked to name the three most "objectively creative" political statements in American history, the student of politics would find they came into existence at a time of great emotional upheaval, the products of unusually feeling and affected minds.

We cannot account for the observation that political scientists, despite their training in such matters, are seldom heralds of marked political change. The good prognosticator, a Marx or a Churchill, usually comes to be recognized as a specialist in political analysis after the fact. (Though in slightly different guise, this is the same phenomenon Kuhn spoke of when he observed that major contributions

to a field of inquiry are generally made by novices.)

To date, it was noted, we have not explained why contemporary American political scientists are prone to view economic, social and political events as complex, why they have a fragmentary understanding of society, while in countries such as China and Cuba observers usually incline towards simplistic analyses. So too, there is the question of why our forefathers sometimes endorsed simple explanations, or why all countries, including the United States, invariably use them in time of war. Again, we have not accounted for the preference some states exhibit for economic interpretations of political phenomena (i. e., Russia, China, and the underdeveloped areas in general), nor the distaste other countries (for example, the U. S.) manifest for the same explanations.

Political science has told us little about when to expect to find political freedom being enhanced in a nation, and when restricted, save to speak in a vague and rather self-laudatory manner about the length of time required to develop democratic institutions and habits; a view belied by the apparent willingness of Americans to persecute the individual, to deny him political freedom, under certain circumstances.⁴⁹

Political scientists have not said why a backward nation may

⁴⁹See Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955).

suddenly tire of gradual, pacific methods and turn to violent means, except to use teleological explanations, sometimes speaking of the persuasive influence of charismatic leaders--a view belied by studies between leader and led--or of an impatience to fulfill "rising expectations," an understanding contradicted by immediate experiences, as we will subsequently observe. They have not said why a "have" nation may suddenly opt for war, or why an element within a nation may decide upon revolution, except to provide so many possible answers that none is preferable.

Finally, we have failed to explain why it is that a Marx or an Adam Smith (as in physical science a Newton) is, almost of a sudden, hailed as a genius by considerable numbers. The absolutist can hardly suggest they were espousing "truths," since each of these individuals is now held by the Western world to have dealt more in error than in accuracy. Charisma hardly accounts for it; none of the three was noted for that characteristic. As for a lively writing style, none of them would have captured a prize here, either, and Marx wrote in a singularly arid fashion. The question, like so many others, remains to be given a meaningful answer.

Up to this point I have conveyed the impression that students of politics have been unaware of the flaws in the paradigm they support, and of the contradictory, the anomalous positions it prompts them to countenance. The impression was not unintentional, since for the

most part I believe they have been ignorant of such things. However, there are exceptions and it is to these last that I wish to turn now; to those who have not only recognized some of the imperfections but have gone on to propose repair and replacement.

VI. THE BEHAVIORIST-BEHAVIORALIST ORIENTATION

We shall presently find that certain metaphysical questions of "existence," "reality," "subjectivity," and "tangibility" can take their place with the question of how many angels can stand on the point of a needle and other profound issues that agitated learned men of other ages.¹

--George A. Lundberg

Behaviorist Assumptions

Like the adherents of any school of thought, those party to the behaviorist-behavioralist orientation have not been able to decide precisely what that orientation is. On occasion understandings vary rather widely. Austin Ranney notes "some have seen 'political behavior' as merely the study of voting, while others have regarded it as any and all efforts to emphasize the 'science' in 'political science.'"² In this particular instance, however, the lack of accord does not seem to bother anyone very much. The problem is usually solved or avoided, depending upon how one happens to feel about it, by simply pointing to instances of the thing; that is, political scientists introduce

¹George A. Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their Implications for Sociology," in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. by Maurice Natanson (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 57.

²See Austin Ranney, ed., Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. ix-x.

students to the behaviorist-behavioralist orientation by having them read articles and books written by persons generally understood to be behavioralists.³ Or students may be required to take a methods seminar from an instructor claiming to be of the "behavioral persuasion."

Unfortunately, such a course cannot be followed here. First of all, though concerned with what behaviorist-behavioralists do, I am even more concerned with their rationalizations for doing it, with their underlying assumptions or paradigm if you will. Moreover, because I intend to disagree with the orientation, I will have to attempt a description of it and accept that to do so is to encourage dissent. Hopefully my characterization will not conflict radically with the image of the behaviorist-behavioralist "persuasion" held by most social science scholars.

To simplify matters, hereafter I will refer to the orientation in question as behaviorist. Elsewhere I noted political scientists often distinguish behaviorism from behavioralism, contending that the former does not take conscious data into consideration. However, not all students of politics make this distinction and it is not an important one for my present purpose. As long as it is understood that when I use the term I mean it to include those who are concerned with conscious phenomena, behaviorism will suffice.

³This is the way Ranney gets around trying to define behavioralism. See ibid.

Behaviorists are most indebted for their basic assumptions to that philosophical school known as positivism, or more precisely, logical positivism.⁴ The positivist approach came into vogue sometime around the turn of the century as a growing number of philosophers began to complain about the gap between their philosophical formulations and experienced "reality." Taking their cue from the natural sciences, logical positivists argued "philosophy ought to be scientific," and that "statements about reality can be valid only on the basis of experience."⁵ They wanted to avoid what seemed to them the loose, imprecise, even downright vague theories and doctrines of their predecessors.

From the outset, some students of politics were impressed. They viewed the new move as a matter of returning to political "reality" as it appealed to the senses, much as the positivists did. To their minds "prevalent abstractions seemed artificial and contrived."⁶ They would have agreed with Arthur Goldberg's recent observation that

⁴Jay A. Sigler, "Politics and the Philosophy of Science," The Western Political Quarterly, XV (June, 1962), pp. 314-19.

⁵Victor Kraft, The Vienna Circle: The Origin of Neo-Positivism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953), pp. 15-16.

⁶Henry S. Kariel, "Political Science in the United States: Reflections on One of its Trends," Political Studies, IV (June, 1956), pp. 113-15.

the complex theoretical structures of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Harrington, Hobbes, Hegel, and Marx attest to no lack of imaginative abilities. What have been lacking have been the casting of theory into universal, empirically, falsifiable form, and the provision of criteria of falsification.⁷

As derived from logical positivism, then, behaviorism involves the playing down of political and social "philosophy" and the stressing of political and social "science." Key assumptions, seldom explained, are that "science" means knowledge rather than opinion;⁸ that science is therefore good and desirable;⁹ and that it is principally a method, one used with great profit by students of natural phenomena.¹⁰ What I have spoken of as an epistemological paradigm to be looked through and unconsciously acted upon, persons of a behaviorist orientation generally refer to as a method to be looked at and consciously

⁷Arthur S. Goldberg, "Political Science as a Science," in Politics and Social Life, ed. by Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), pp. 34-35.

⁸See Harbold and Hitchner, pp. 754-55.

⁹See Samuel J. Eldersveld, et al., "Research in Political Behavior," American Political Science Review, XLIV (Dec., 1952), p. 1005; Ekstein, "Political Theory and the Study of Politics," p. 476; Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 111; Evron Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach on Traditional Political Science," in Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, pp. 2-3.

¹⁰Sigler, p. 315; Harbold and Hitchner, p. 754; Kirkpatrick, pp. 14, 26-27.

employed.¹¹

Since I intend to argue that as they are practiced logical positivism and behaviorism constitute a full endorsement of the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm, it will be necessary to make the following points abundantly clear. Logical positivists have not insisted "reality" exists, or that it has a "true" form. What they have insisted is that the very questions, "Is there a reality?", "Does it have a 'true' form?", "Is there even such a thing as 'truth'?", are metaphysical and hence meaningless. In order for a question to be worthy of a scientist's concern, they assert, it must be answerable, either by empirical test, or by way of demonstrating that the answer follows in a logical manner from premises already established. This has been the intellectual position of logical positivism, and it has been strongly backed by behaviorists.¹²

¹¹On the notion that science is a method, see Sidney Ulmer, "Scientific Method and the Judicial Process," The American Behavioral Scientist, VII (Dec., 1963), p. 21; also Sidney Ulmer, ed., Introductory Readings in Political Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1961), p. 3; Crane Brinton, et al., "The Application of Scientific Method to the Study of Human Behavior," The American Scholar, XXI (Spring, 1952), pp. 208-25; George A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1961), p. 2.

¹²Kraft writes that for the logical positivist "to be real means empirically: to fit into the spatio-temporal system of the intersubjectively observable. Whether this system itself is nothing but a conceptual construction or whether it represents an absolute reality subsisting by itself, this question cannot even be formulated. It is the problem of the 'transcendent ideality or reality' of space

On the other hand, behaviorists have not seemed quite so reluctant as the positivists to personally commit themselves on the issues of "reality" or "truth." A minority incline toward the view that "reality" has no one "true" form, that the very structure of the facts are dependent upon the observer-observed relationship. The foremost advocate of this position would no doubt be George Lundberg. Regarding such matters Lundberg has advocated relativism. "Existence" and "reality," he has maintained, are "always relative to some responding organism." "These words," he elaborated, "designate nothing absolute or final of the type usually implied by such words as 'truth' and 'fact.'" Lundberg contrasted his own view with the more popular notion that an investigator's findings must "square with some 'objective reality' (represented only by certain words) which is declared to 'exist' independently of anybody's observations or corroboration."¹³ In *International Relations*, Charles A. McClelland has taken a similar position.¹⁴

and time--a metaphysical problem." While Kraft repudiates the relativistic understanding of a few positivists which leads them to deny "true" forms independent of any observer, he insists the whole question is metaphysical, "going wholly beyond the domain of the scientifically knowable." pp. 180-82.

¹³Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their Implications for Sociology," pp. 41-42, 47-64.

¹⁴The clearest exposition of McClelland's views on this subject are contained in an unpublished paper entitled "Some Comments on Whitaker's Explorations." The paper was written in 1960 in connection with the San Francisco State College International Studies project.

By far the greater number of behaviorists appear to be convinced "reality" does indeed have an independent form.¹⁵ Thus Heinz Eulau tells us that "by knowledge" he means "a set of verified statements about reality"; a reality to which "perception may or may not correspond."¹⁶ And scholars who comment on the behaviorist orientation do not seem to evoke criticism when they suggest "science rests upon the assumption that an observable reality exists,"¹⁷ or that the aim of behaviorism is to "provide unsentimental reports of 'what is really happening.'"¹⁸

¹⁵See also Ulmer's observation that behaviorism involves the "belief that laws of human behavior exist and are subject to discovery." Readings in Political Behavior, p. 2. One of the major themes of this essay, of course, is that the greater number of political scientists, whatever their philosophical bent, assume the existence of "true" forms to be "discovered." Naturally, some scholars would disagree with me here. Aron Gurwitsch, for instance, comes to the opposite conclusion. He makes the blanket assertion that today the student of politics is "taught that the truth of an opinion consists in its functional and utilitarian values." "We are told," he continues, "to speak of the truth of an opinion only in consideration of the consequences produced by the very fact of trusting this opinion. It is not that an opinion is true: an opinion only becomes true to the extent to which it produces satisfaction and meets the deep need of mankind for compensation." "On Contemporary Nihilism," The Review of Politics, XII (April, 1945), pp. 173-74.

¹⁶Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, pp. 9, 120.

¹⁷Harbold and Hitchner, p. 754.

¹⁸Kariel, p. 115.

A disagreement as fundamental as this one might be expected to impede if not prevent agreement on any other issues. It probably would if it were not that nearly all concerned--those who believe "reality" has independent form, those who do not, and those who are unsure--concur with the logical positivist proposition that the whole question is metaphysical and therefore unimportant. Lundberg, for example, decides "all assertions about the ultimate 'reality,' 'nature,' 'essence,' or 'being' of 'things,' or 'objects,' are . . . unverifiable hypotheses, and hence outside the sphere of science."¹⁹ So too, Avery Leiserson conjectures that "the preponderant weight of distinguished thought on the subject warns of the slight gains to be derived from reading or talking about method in general, or from evaluating the belief-postulates of conflicting logical or philosophical schools."²⁰ And Eulau concludes that "whatever philosophical views different scientists may hold about man and the reality of man, they need not interfere with their work in the laboratory or in the field. For there," he states, "the validity of theoretical propositions about human behavior, from whatever philosophical position derived, is a

¹⁹Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their Implications for Sociology," pp. 41-42.

²⁰Leiserson, "Problems of Methodology in Political Research," pp. 558-84. Quoted in Jean M. Driscoll and Charles S. Hyneman, "Methodology for Political Scientists; Perspectives for Study," American Political Science Review, XLIX (March, 1953), p. 194.

matter of inter-subjective agreement . . ."²¹ Respecting Leiserson's statement, probably the best evidence for the view that behaviorists do not now consider the issue in question an important one is that one rarely finds them writing about it. Political science, it is thus assumed, can "dispense with metaphysics, moral speculation and philosophical dialectics."²²

As outlined in the first chapter, the nineteenth century paradigm says the "true" forms are "out there," free of all observers. If one is "objective" he may hope to discern said forms. Because no one can ever be sure his personal readings are the "objective" ones (the brightest of minds have been seen to err badly), it was suggested scholars seek the corroboration of their colleagues when making analyses. While not a "fool-proof" scheme (whole communities of scholars have been known to err, also badly), it seems the best available alternative, the one most promising of success. Now, the logical positivist and the behaviorist are heard to say that whether or not "true" forms exist, the aforementioned remains wise counsel. According to Lundberg, who does not believe in "true" external forms, there is only one criterion for "objectivity,

²¹Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 134.

²²See the comment by Kariel, pp. 116-17.

corroboration by qualified observers."²³ For him the "objective" view is that which is held inter-subjectively by properly trained investigators. Eulau, who does believe in "true" external forms, agrees. The methodological problem, he proposes, is one of deciding "just what degree of inter-subjective agreement among informants or observers should be accepted as constituting sufficient evidence for making inferential statements about reality."²⁴

Behaviorist Practices

How does an investigator go about obtaining the corroboration of his associates? First of all, by being as rigorous, as precise and exacting as he can be both in his theorizing and in his analyses. "The behavioral sciences," Sidney Ulmer reports, "stress the value of developing and utilizing more precise techniques for observing, classifying and measuring data."²⁵ In Samuel J. Eldersveld and Morris Janowitz's words, behaviorism "tries to develop rigorous research

²³Lundberg, Schrag, and Larsen, p. 34; also Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their Implications for Sociology," pp. 43, 62.

²⁴Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 120. See also Karl W. Deutsch, "The Place of Behavioral Sciences in Graduate Training in International Relations," Behavioral Science, III (July, 1958), pp. 279-80.

²⁵Ulmer, Readings in Political Behavior, p. 3.

design and to apply precise methods of analysis to political behavior problems."²⁶ "This twofold aspiration," according to Jaques Chapsal, "for precision of the data (and for their measurement, when they are measurable, and sometimes when they are not) and for a more rigorous theoretical formulation, certainly seems to characterize the political scientists who rally under the banner of 'political behavior.'"²⁷

In explaining what it means to be rigorous, thorough and precise, behaviorists usually begin by declaring that exacting operational definitions are a must. Political scientists "do not accumulate, communicate, and cooperate sufficiently," they contend, "because we have no common language . . ."²⁸ "All of the variables," J. David Singer recommends, "need to be defined as precisely and operationally as possible in order that they may be measured in terms of their frequency, direction, or intensity."²⁹ After all, the goal of the

²⁶Samuel J. Eldersveld, Morris Janowitz, and Heinz Eulau, Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1946). Quoted in Eulau, A Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences, p. 90.

²⁷Ranney, Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, p. vi.

²⁸See Ekstein, "Political Theory and the Study of Politics," p. 477.

²⁹J. David Singer, "The Relevance of the Behavioral Sciences to the Study of International Relations," Behavioral Science, VI (Oct., 1961), p. 328.

behaviorist is "science," and as de Grazia notes, "every science must use words precisely and constantly in equivalent senses."³⁰

Every now and then someone of a behaviorist inclination will be heard to say that the investigator "cannot get entangled in problems of definition if he hopes to come up with a piece of research."³¹

Robert Dahl, for instance, agrees with David Easton that "striving for rigorously operational definitions may kill science at infancy."³²

But I believe we are justified in not taking such statements very seriously. Right from the beginning, the chief rationale for a logical positivist-behaviorist approach has been that it is a necessary alternative to the loose theorizing and hypothesizing of the traditionalists. To have a "science" is to have precise hypotheses and theories.³³

Since hypotheses and theories are put forth in verbal symbols (are expressed in words), if they are to be precisely stated it is imperative that words be given a common meaning; it is imperative that

³⁰ Alfred de Grazia, "The Hatred of New Social Science," The American Behavioral Scientist, V (Oct., 1961), p. 6.

³¹ Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 6.

³² Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Politics: New and Old," World Politics, III (April, 1955), p. 483.

³³ C. B. Macpherson refers to the stress placed on "detailed and precise formulation of concepts and hypotheses" by American behaviorally oriented political scientists. "World Trends in Political Research," p. 434.

definitions themselves be precise. Indeed, we could put it more forcefully and say that to have precisely stated hypotheses is to have common word meanings (shared definitions). If we discard the goal of precise operational definitions we discard the goal of precisely stated hypotheses and theories, and thereupon we discard the reason for taking up behaviorism in the first place. So precise definitions are necessary to the behaviorist persuasion.³⁴

The idea that "research in political behavior must place primary emphasis upon empirical methods," is likewise consistent with other behaviorist contentions.³⁵ To begin with, if our words (our definitions) are always to be tied to experience (operationally defined), and if our hypotheses are only series of words, we have said, in effect, that our hypotheses are also to be tied to experience (that they are to be empirically verified). Moreover, if "facts" are not to be looked upon as external "truths," if "corroborated reports are the basic 'facts' of science and knowledge" ("fact" and "corroborated report" being made synonymous),³⁶ then empiricism becomes a must, for corroboration means empirical corroboration.

Behaviorists, then, understandably give a slightly different

³⁴Bone and Ranney, p. 4.

³⁵David Truman, quoted in Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science," American Political Science Review, LV (Dec., 1961), pp. 763-72.

³⁶Lundberg et al., Sociology, p. 34.

meaning to the word empiricism. It has always had to do with observation and re-observation, but the behaviorist places an increased emphasis upon the latter. While "in many ways ancient empiricism is identical with modern empiricism . . . it was the empiricists of antiquity who were the first idolators of books." "It is in books," they claimed, "that the empirical knowledge of previous generations is stored up. Further verification of results that were once put down and generally agreed upon thus became superfluous." Many "restricted experimental proof to the occasional confirmation of a speculative theory, or they might choose to resort to an experiment in order to refute an opponent."³⁷ Da Vinci, the reader will recall, simply spoke of sciences whose "origin or middle or end" comes "through one of the five senses."³⁸ More recently, John Locke, generally considered a major promoter of empiricism, still viewed it principally as a counter to the concept of "innate ideas," "universal principles in the mind of man discoverable by a priori reasoning."³⁹ With nineteenth century natural science, however, re-observation--

³⁷Ludwig Edelstein, "Recent Trends in the Interpretation of Ancient Science," in Roots of Scientific Thought, ed. by Philip P. Wiener and Aaron Noland (New York: Basic Books, 1957), pp. 93-94.

³⁸See pages 20-21 this essay.

³⁹Lee Cameron McDonald, Western Political Theory; The Modern Age (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), p. 125.

the re-tying of ideas to experience--gained in importance. Currently the behaviorist gives it an especial emphasis.⁴⁰ As I noted, it is understandable that he does so. For many of our predecessors, "facts," or "truths," were best found through experience. But to the behaviorist qua scientist, the "fact" or "truth" is the experience, it is never anything more than the inter-subjectively verified observation. It is for this reason that behaviorists tend to insist upon "concepts that can be tested by successive researches."⁴¹ (italics mine)

If political science concepts are to be ones which "can be tested by successive researches," it follows also that behaviorists cannot pay much heed to the politics of bygone eras. There is no way to empirically contact the past. Scholars who chronicled events of history as they happened did not use modern techniques for measuring and quantifying data. Anyway, political behaviorists concentrate on the data of consciousness and, as Eulau puts it, "dead men do not talk."⁴² Political behaviorists, then, find it necessary to research the here and now, with, of course, an eye on the

⁴⁰As does the logical positivist, since he too "prescribes that a statement is to be taken as meaningful only if it is capable of empirical verification, and its meaning is the mode of its verification." Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, p. 36.

⁴¹Eldersveld et al., "Research in Political Behavior," p. 1006.

⁴²Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, pp. 127-28.

future.⁴³

From this point on the behaviorist, when he writes and when he speaks, cannot be readily distinguished from the conscious advocate of the old paradigm. He makes the same sharp distinction between fact and value.⁴⁴ He appears to give the same sort of meaning to the word "value." H. N. Peters tells us "value will be operationally defined as a symbolic utterance or act expressing choice or preference."⁴⁵ Finally, because he aims at making political investigation a science, and because he reasons "a value judgment implies a choice, and it's choice which science cannot make,"⁴⁶ the behaviorist usually argues that "how men ought to act . . . is not a concern of political behavior research,"⁴⁷ much as the advocate of the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm contended "valuing" was not a scientific endeavor.

To say that he strives to keep his value preferences out of

⁴³Ibid.; Eldersveld et al. say that while historical knowledge is important, "as a matter of convenience and in the interest of completeness of data, research in current and immediately observable political behavior is necessarily emphasized." "Research in Political Behavior," p. 1005.

⁴⁴So does the logical positivist. See Kraft, The Vienna Circle, pp. 182-87.

⁴⁵H. N. Peters, "Toward a Behavioral Theory of Value," ETC., XII (Spring, 1955), p. 172.

⁴⁶Joseph Wood Krutch; see Brinton et al., p. 214.

⁴⁷Eldersveld et al., "Research in Political Behavior," p. 1004.

his analyses is to say that he aims at collecting his evidence "in an impersonal and objective way."⁴⁸ He wishes to free himself from bias, to cultivate in himself an attitude of disinterest and detachment. All of the aforementioned were objectives of the nineteenth century paradigm advocate. (All of them are also objectives sought by the positivist. Concerning positivism, Richard von Mises says of it that it "implies a lack of prejudice, superstition, obstinacy, blind trust in authority, mystical thinking [and] fanaticism."⁴⁹)

The behaviorist hopes to find inter-subjectively verifiable regularities.⁵⁰ His highest ambition in this regard is to locate inter-subjectively verified laws,⁵¹ although he concedes such laws, like those of the physicist, need not be absolutely invariable; it is enough if they can tell us what is "highly probable."⁵² Aware that inter-subjectively agreed upon measurements and readings necessitate

⁴⁸Bernard Berelson, The Behavioral Sciences Today (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 3.

⁴⁹Richard Von Mises, Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 1.

⁵⁰See David Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism' in Political Science," in The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science. A symposium by the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Oct., 1962, p. 7.

⁵¹See Ulmer, Introductory Readings in Political Behavior, pp. 2-3.

⁵²Ibid., p. 3. See also Singer, "The Relevance of the Behavioral Sciences to the Study of International Relations," p. 326.

inter-subjectively agreed upon standards for judging, measuring, categorizing and the like, the behaviorist is likewise found to argue the need for shared models.⁵³ Lastly, he tells us it is necessary to avoid error. Eulau is of the belief that adequate training in "self-observation" will make it less likely an observation will be a wrong one.⁵⁴

Attitudes and Techniques Peculiar to Behaviorism

In reviewing the following attitudes and practices (which seem to me peculiar to the behaviorist orientation), I will do no more than briefly describe them and note the explanations generally given by behaviorists for holding such attitudes, or for undertaking such practices. I will not try to relate them to the logical positivist-behaviorist epistemological position discussed in the beginning of this chapter, primarily because I cannot discern any logical connection. Indeed, most of these attitudes and practices appear to be an admission on the part of the behaviorist that all along he has believed in a reality made up of objects and events with "true" forms to be discovered.

The behaviorist insists that in the last analysis it is people who make politics; therefore, he elects to study individuals. Looking at individuals, he concludes that political phenomena are invariably

⁵³Ekstein, "Political Theory and the Study of Politics," p. 477.

⁵⁴Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 115.

complex.⁵⁵ Often, no further explanation is given for that judgment than the observation that politics has to do with human behavior, and human behavior is obviously a complex thing. What I have said should not be taken to indicate the behaviorist's main interest is in individual actors. On the contrary, Eulau states, "most behavioral researches are not concerned with the individual political actor as such." Nevertheless, he goes on to explain, "the political behaviorist concentrates on the behavior of individuals whose interactions and transactions make up collective behavior, even if he is concerned with describing and explaining the actions of groups, organizations, or other large collectivities."⁵⁶ This because "groups, organizations or nations have no independent status apart from the conduct of the individuals who are related by behaving towards each other in certain ways." Thus, when the behaviorist talks of locating uniformities he will usually mean uniformities of human behavior.

Since he holds that the individual is the proper unit of investigation, the behaviorist usually favors an interdisciplinary approach to the study of politics. He believes there should be a ready exchange of information and ideas between the political scientist and the

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 113.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 13-15. See also Bone and Ranney, p. 3; Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science," p. 19.

sociologist, psychologist and anthropologist. This way, he reasons, it will be possible to select "from what is known about man those of his behavioral characteristics investigated by different behavioral sciences that seem to be especially relevant to the solution of political problems."⁵⁷

If one supposes he must begin by "understanding" the individual and only gradually work up to an "understanding" of the group, community or nation, it is to be expected that he will be reluctant (a behaviorist might say humble-minded) when it comes to theorizing about those larger entities early in the game. I believe this aptly describes the behaviorist position. Eulau advises that "an empirical discipline is built by the slow, modest, and piecemeal cumulation of relevant theories and data."⁵⁸ "A science of politics," according to Eulau, "is built from the bottom up by asking simple questions that can, in principle, be answered."⁵⁹ In the field of international relations the behaviorist Harold Guetzkow suggests

The most useful theories will have to be, at first, small conceptual systems dealing with a restricted range of phenomena . . . It would be fruitful to limit at first the predictions to

⁵⁷Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 20. See also Eldersveld et al., "Research in Political Behavior," p. 1005.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

minor international occurrences, rather than risking an attempt to forecast important global events.⁶⁰

A final observation worth mentioning is that the behaviorist appears to consider his orientation potentially radical. Stephen K. Bailey proposes that "a systematic description of the way in which our state legislatures actually function, for example, might so clash with present stereotypes and value expectations held by the public at large as to stimulate a widespread movement for change." "The institutionally detached scholar," argues Bailey, one "who simply reports and theorizes on what he sees, especially if he can prove it, can unintentionally undermine an entire culture."⁶¹

Behaviorism Reconsidered--A Critique

In reviewing the criticisms which the behaviorist orientation is open to, I will again start with what I consider to be the least important points and issues. In each instance I shall briefly state the behaviorist position and then give the counter argument. It will be noted that some of the most telling arguments against that

⁶⁰Harold Guetzkow, quoted in Charles McClelland, "The Function of Theory in International Relations," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV (Sept., 1960), p. 309. Quotation taken from Guetzkow, "Long Range Research in International Relations," American Perspective, IV (1950), pp. 421-27. See also V.O. Key, Jr., "The State of the Discipline," American Political Science Review, LII (Dec., 1958), p. 965.

⁶¹Bailey, "New Research Frontiers of Interest to Legislators and Administrators," pp. 3-4.

orientation are made from a relativistic frame of reference.

The behaviorist insists his aim is the creation of a "science" of politics, patterned along the lines of physical science. Toward this end he stresses "empirical investigation and generalization," while empirical investigation he understands to mean that which involves checking ideas against experience again and again. Yet, A. S. Eddington and Kuhn have contended this sort of empiricism plays almost no role at all when it comes to investigation in the physical sciences. Eddington said that although he would not deny "the importance of actual observation as a source of knowledge,"⁶² "as a constituent of scientific knowledge it is almost negligible." And Kuhn argued "there are seldom many areas in which a scientific theory, particularly if it is cast in a predominantly mathematical form, can be directly compared with nature."⁶³ As for trying to "create" a science, I am not familiar with any writing which even implies that the physical sciences resulted from a conscious effort to laboriously build them. On the contrary, investigators of physical phenomena seem to have gone about their business, conducting their investigations in the manner they believed most appropriate, and scientific status was awarded them by a grateful community at the point when their work

⁶²Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science, pp. 11-12.

⁶³Kuhn, p. 26.

seemed to foster objectives (enhance values) it held dear.⁶⁴ As we might expect, political scientists of the behaviorist orientation are accused of producing studies which matter to few persons besides themselves. If the student of politics would be a community leader, assert William Harbold and Dell Hitchner, "he must be so because he reflects more perfectly than the average the problems and ideals of the community. He will then be capable of being a spokesman for it, clarifying its problems and proposing solutions that will make sense to its members." "It is on the shoals of irrelevance and unacceptability," they propose, "that the suggestions of political science have frequently been wrecked in the past."⁶⁵

More commonly, those who think in terms of methodically "building" a science are accused of belaboring the obvious and the trivial. The authors of Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics do a first-rate job of making this particular argument.⁶⁶ Reviewing various voting studies, Walter Berns observes that one set of authors (Angus Campbell, Gerald Burin, and Warren Miller) say

⁶⁴In this connection, C. B. Macpherson has said of the behaviorist orientation, "it is necessary not only that political science should be done but also that it should manifestly appear to be done. . . ." Macpherson, "World Trends in Political Research," p. 433.

⁶⁵Harbold and Hitchner, p. 764.

⁶⁶Storing, ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics. See also Mills, The Sociological Imagination.

they wish to discover why there was a heavy increase in the vote in 1952 and why the Republicans profited most.⁶⁷ "We learn," writes Berns, "that the Republican success in 1952 was due in large part to the 'switching of a large number of former Democratic supporters to Eisenhower.'" "Why did one of every four Truman supporters of 1948 vote for Eisenhower in 1952," Berns queries. "' . . . a strongly positive orientation toward Eisenhower is left as clearly related to the switch,'" the authors tell us.⁶⁸ Of the book Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign,⁶⁹ Berns comments that an important finding concerning pre-election voter attitudes (important by the authors' own estimation) is that "'those who talk with compatible persons remain most firm in their prior convictions; those who cannot recall any discussion of politics in their groups are unstable generally, often receding into nonvoting or neutrality; and those in contact with opposition preferences show it by their heavy

⁶⁷ Angus Campbell, Gerald Burin, and Warren Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954)

⁶⁸ Walter Berns, "Voting Studies," in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, p. 13.

⁶⁹ Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954)

rate of defection to that opposition."⁷⁰ Berns notes the authors of this last study further inform the reader: "The loss of a 'magnetic leader' and his replacement by a 'less impressive man' may also result in voting changes," and people choose one candidate over another "because they agree with his stand on the issues or because they are attracted by his personal qualities or both."⁷¹ "What armchair speculator would write the following," Berns asks: "'This is an important consideration: the more reading and listening people do on campaign matters, the more likely they are to come to recognize the positions candidates take on major issues."⁷² (The statement is taken from Voting.)

Behaviorists have responded to the charge of dealing in trivia in several ways. First, they acknowledge there is some merit in it. For example, Jaques Chapsal agrees that "the results of studies they [behaviorists] have conducted with exemplary methodology may sometimes be trivial; their hypotheses . . . sometimes very banal . . . All this is quite true and regrettable," he concedes, "and should be severely criticized."⁷³

⁷⁰Berns, p. 16.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 33.

⁷²Ibid., p. 37.

⁷³Chapsal, Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, p. vi; See also Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science," p. 25.

Heinz Eulau, on the other hand, argues "from the standpoint of empirical research, " a question can be justly called trivial "only if it does not yield answers that 'significantly' add to knowledge."⁷⁴ By knowledge, Eulau says he means "a set of verified statements about reality." Again he reminds the reader that a science is built from the "bottom up, by the slow, modest, and piecemeal cumulation of relevant theories and data." And Alfred de Grazia has this to say: "to abolish triviality would be to abolish science as we know it, for the history of science abounds in instances of the trivial becoming the important either immediately or in the long run." "Furthermore," de Grazia concludes, "society does not necessarily favor the important over the trivial, for the important tends to be controversial."⁷⁵

By way of commenting on the rationalizations for dealing in trivia offered by Eulau and de Grazia, of Eulau we might ask if on domestic issues he would include as knowledge all of the many Birchite readings, along with those of racial bigots, Trotskyites, and the like. For that matter, if all that is required for a reading to become knowledge is that it be inter-subjectively verified, on many domestic and nearly all international questions we must now include the Chinese knowledge, that of the Russians, the Indians, and so forth.

⁷⁴Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, pp. 8-9.

⁷⁵de Grazia, "The Hatred of New Social Science," pp. 8-10.

Yet if we do, and this appears to be what Eulau's suggestion would lead to, what could we possibly conclude from so many varied and conflicting pieces of knowledge? How could we possibly act upon our knowledge? That is, how could we hope to get a sense of the appropriate response from it, not to mention a sense of direction?

If instead, Eulau meant to include as knowledge only those readings which are verified by other members of the behaviorally oriented American political science community, we must again pose the question "Why?" If Eulau's answer is that such readings are, or are more likely to be, in accord with the "true" state of affairs, we have a right to cry foul. For while he has personally declared a belief in "true" forms external to the observer, he nevertheless endorsed (and behaviorism is premised upon) the logical positivist position that the whole issue of "true" forms is metaphysical and cannot be treated by the scientist. Therefore, he cannot now be permitted to commit himself on the matter simply in order to support a challenged proposition. Finally, if Eulau wished to indicate that verified readings of the behaviorist are more worthy of being labeled knowledge because they are consistent with some set of community goals, we need only remind him these readings were called trivial in the first place because, as Harbold and Hitchner noted, they are not found to be relevant to the overall goal structure of the community. That is why members of the community have largely ignored them. That is why

they have not bestowed the title "scientist" upon Eulau and his colleagues.

As for the idea that sciences are built from the "bottom up," this notion too is in direct opposition to Kuhn's analysis. Kuhn, it will be recalled, has argued a broad paradigm (a large scale conceptual box) is taken up, looked through, and then all the little bits and pieces, the ramifications, are filled in by those party to the framework. First comes the paradigm, he insists, then come the facts which justify its acceptance.

One aspect of the "bottom to the top" thesis was the notion that political scientists must study individuals in order to learn about the group, community or nation. While doubtlessly good advice, we should keep in mind that any whole is always found to act in a manner not directly predictable by examining and adding the actions of its parts. The various qualities and characteristics of gases, for instance, cannot be learned by a study of individual molecules, nor, I would add, can nations be known simply by looking at individuals. Moreover, because parts and wholes behave differently, concentrating on the former in an endeavor to comprehend the latter may sometimes mislead more than instruct, unless we are very careful to maintain the distinction between the two throughout our analyses. To illustrate: an hypothesis about the way elites act is in no way discredited by our discovering that individual members of elite communities do not always respond as predicted, anymore than the

law which states molecular action will increase if a quantity of gas molecules is heated is discredited when we note that at any given point in time some molecules are moving more slowly, while others have apparently ceased motion altogether.⁷⁶ Hypotheses about wholes, whether elites, nations or gas molecules, can only be tested by looking at wholes. Naturally, in each of these cases what is so for the whole must be so for a majority of the parts. By fixating on the individual, behaviorists often give the impression they will accept no statement about the group, community or nation which does not hold for the individual actor. If that is their position, they have most certainly not taken their cue here from the natural sciences.

De Grazia's defense of trivial studies warrants little comment. Agreed that in science the trivial has quite often become important, but the scholars who made such studies hardly considered them trivial when they made them, and neither the scholarly community nor the community at large gave them unstinted support in terms of money, research facilities and recognition as long as they continued to be regarded as trivial. Most often it gave no support at all. It was only as a view came to be seen as important indeed that the community turned to assist it. If de Grazia means to argue that some support

⁷⁶For an article which misses this simple point, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Political Attitudes of Wealth," The Journal of Politics, VII (Aug., 1945), pp. 213-25.

ought to be given the trivial just in case, he has my backing. But if he wishes to suggest that the principal orientation of the political science community should be toward a consideration of the trivial, I wholeheartedly dissent. Nor can I agree with his statement that "society does not necessarily favor the important over the trivial, for the important tends to be controversial." It is precisely the controversial political questions that society most wants to have discussed. And it is because the political science community frequently hesitates to discuss them that it has failed to gain the notice of the society it hopes to one day counsel.

Another criticism made of the behaviorist orientation is that concern with building a "scientific" language has encouraged the creation of a vocabulary so esoteric in nature non-behaviorists frequently cannot understand what their behaviorist colleagues are talking about; behaviorists are accused of speaking "jargon."

On their part, behaviorists have not been inclined to deny the charge. De Grazia grants it is a sound one, and "regrettable." Still, he explains, it is "partly inevitable."⁷⁷ The emphasis which any science places on verbal precision virtually insures that its language will seem jargonese to the uninitiated.

Probably the most pertinent comment to be made here is

⁷⁷De Grazia, "The Hatred of New Social Science," pp. 6-7.

that the jargon of the behaviorist does not have the same immediate utility as that of the physical scientist. The latter can translate crucial passages in his language, crucial by the standards of the general community, into words which can be understood, and more important advantageously acted upon, by that community. The jargon of the physical scientist, then, acts to enhance community goals and objectives. Among other things, the biologist's jargon works to prolong human life, as the chemist's helps produce synthetic materials which make life more comfortable. But what community values are the behaviorist's jargon intended to realize? "Jargon for what?" is the question always asked of a science. Physical scientists are able to answer that question, political behaviorists are not, save to speak of their own value complexes.

The reader who wishes to leave values out of the matter is once more reminded that fields of inquiry are viewed as "science-like" depending upon how well they promote community goals, and investigations are not regarded as science when to pay them heed is to work against human interests. I am assuming, of course, that it is the general community which decides when a science exists. If, instead, we leave it up to the community of scholars involved in an area of inquiry to decide when they have a science, behaviorism has already gone far toward that objective and astrology has reached it.

When it comes to deciding what is an acceptable answer to any question asked, what is an "accurate" reading of a situation, what is an appropriate research tool, even, according to some scholars, what is to be considered a problem, we noted the behaviorist urges a reliance upon inter-subjective accord. I have only two observations to make here. First, considering the hostility encountered when behaviorism was first proposed, it is conceivable that had political scientists used the above criterion to estimate its worth, behaviorism might have been rejected by the very method of evaluating it now recommends for use. The second, and more consequential point has to do with one of the implications of the stand. Recognizing that in times past whole communities of scholars have come to be accused of perpetuating "error," have been found guilty of fighting "truth" and "progress," in taking the position that only methods and analyses which gain the inter-subjective approval of the scholarly community are to be viewed as "objective" and acceptable, behaviorists manifest a wholly unwarranted confidence that it could not happen again. Ironically, their very approach may insure that it does.

A "scientist" always looks upon his variables as "natural" and as part of some "order." Seeking to discover order, he takes it for granted order is there. Thus, he is not heard to describe a process as lacking any regularity though he may confess he has not yet located it. So too, assuming an orderly process, he does not admonish

his variables to behave differently, nor villify them when he does not personally like the way they act. In the political sphere, therefore, the "scientific" assumption, as Lundberg has noted, must be that wars and revolutions, and we can add radical rightism, are as "natural" as physical events.⁷⁸ Here too, offering an hypothesis never provides a justification for ignoring the "scientific" commandment to explain rather than calumniate or condemn.

We are justified, then, in asking behaviorists just what they intend to convey by the word "irrational" and its various synonyms, especially since such terms play so important a part in their explanations of political phenomena. If by labeling attitudes or actions "irrational" behaviorists mean to indicate the individuals involved ought to have thought or behaved differently, that their attitudes and actions were somehow "inappropriate," they are being unscientific indeed.⁷⁹ Assuming such variables to be as "natural" as any others, that they might have thought or acted differently under the given circumstances must be supposed inconceivable. In this sense, their attitudes and actions **were** the only appropriate ones. If, instead,

⁷⁸Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their Implications for Sociology," p. 39.

⁷⁹At a seminar convened to discuss "The Application of Scientific Method to the Study of Human Behavior," Hiram Haydn called attention to the inconsistency of scholars trying to find the "rationality" of social phenomena yet producing numerous studies which explain in terms of "irrationality." Brinton et al., p. 210.

"irrational" is simply being used to define attitudes and actions which he personally finds silly, stupid or repugnant, the behaviorist can be accused of rendering value judgments, something he said he sought to avoid.

Finally, if the word is meant to describe attitudes and actions believed to be inappropriate to a realization of the objectives or goals of the actors in a situation, we must ask the behaviorist these additional questions: How does he know what the actors' values are, or were? Considering that many groups brought under investigation-- such as the arch conservatives--are found to use words in an esoteric manner when describing, would we not expect them to do so when it comes to stating their objectives? At the least, it can hardly be assumed that their goals are what they appear to say they are, that they mean by their words what we mean when we use them. In addition, if a group is believed to be confused about the facts, it might be supposed that it will be similarly confused about its values. At any rate, if we cannot take its word concerning the one we would seem well advised not to do so concerning the other. Recalling that the behaviorist informs us readings of conditions and events are acceptable only when they can be empirically validated, we have a right to inquire as to his empirical support for the view that communities of conservatives, non-voters, or whatever, endorse the values, seek the objectives, he supposes them to, particularly if their

activities argue otherwise.

When it comes to offering explanations of the attitudes and actions of many groups, behaviorists can often justly be accused of giving restatements of the problem as partial answers. This was the point Berns was making when he noted the 1952 Eisenhower vote was called the result of a democratic switch-over, the latter due to a "strong positive orientation" toward Eisenhower. Explaining political actions by reference to irrationality or misunderstanding constitutes the same sort of answer.

On the other hand, many behaviorist empirical explanations are so cumbersome and involved as to be of dubious value; i. e. , political preferences are deemed the result of family influences, cultural factors, education, personality characteristics, income level, sex differences, etc.⁸⁰ Moreover, I am unaware of any justification for this practice. If we tried to provide a full casual explanation for the political preferences of a given individual or group at a specific point in time there is no end to the variables we might

⁸⁰For example, see Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," The American Political Science Review, LII (March, 1958), pp. 27-45; Herbert McClosky and Harold E. Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty," The American Political Science Review, LIII (Sept., 1959), p . 757-76; Almond, "The Political Attitudes of Wealth," pp. 213-25; Fred I. Greenstein, "Sex-Related Political Differences in Childhood," The Journal of Politics, XXIII (May, 1961), pp. 353-71; Oscar Glantz, "Protestant and Catholic Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Area," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIII (Spring, 1959), pp. 73-82.

include, the heartbeats of the individuals, the nourishment taken to keep them alive, the sun's rays, gravity, and so on ad infinitum. Behaviorists, like other scholars, have not attempted to include all variables causally related to the phenomena they try to explain, and I doubt if anyone would seriously suggest they do so. The point is, however, they do not appear to have any clear idea of the basis on which they include some variables in their lists of causes and exclude others. Were they to inquire into this matter, behaviorists would soon discover that what they call the cause of any political event or situation is in great part determined (just as the physical scientist's lists of causes are determined) by the particular values and objectives they have respecting the things they are investigating.

Because he maintains even relatively unimportant political phenomena are extremely complex, the behaviorist is usually hesitant to investigate the major issues of our time, issues such as the East-West confrontation or the revolutions occurring in underdeveloped areas of the world. This hesitation is also due to a belief that as yet he does not possess the tools and methods requisite to an attack upon problems of this magnitude. Two critical comments are worth making here. The one has been made in such a telling fashion by Edward C. Uliassi that I will simply quote the heart of his argument. Respecting the neglect of "great issues" in the social sciences, Uliassi remarks,

What seems to have been occurring is the substitution of one mode of imprecision, currently fashionable, for another, currently unfashionable. The imprecision of interpretive, multivariate, historical analysis of complex processes and problems has yielded to the currently more acceptable mode of imprecision: the imprecision of artificially-simplified studies whose narrow empirical character makes them only partially relevant to the actual social situation being studied. The case is analogous to that of looking under a street lamp for a coin lost in a forest--because the light is better there.⁸¹

The other point to be made is this: Just because behaviorists are reluctant to advertise their positions on the "great issues" does not mean they have none. Were the scholar engaged in a diligent study of voting preferences in some New England township to believe with a radical rightist that our nation is about to be taken over by an intolerably vicious communism, and that both political parties are equally guilty of aiding, even encouraging the process, it seems a safe bet he would promptly discontinue his investigation. Or again, if he were of a sudden convinced our present political system is hopelessly and incurably fascistic, and that leftist revolution is the only solution, he would doubtlessly abandon this particular analysis. That the specific investigations any political science scholar engages in are dependent upon his understanding of over-all domestic and international political situations can be empirically demonstrated with no difficulty whatsoever. Rarely, if ever, do we find scholars with

⁸¹ Edward C. Uliassi, "An Editorial Note," Studies in Public Communication, III (Summer, 1961), pp. vii-ix.

the values of a C. Wright Mills or a William A. Williams undertaking small-town voting studies. Just as rarely do we witness scholars who do engage in such studies holding the values of a C. Wright Mills or a William A. Williams. In other words, gross changes in our understandings of major events would prompt gross changes in what we study, and the way we study it. Similarly, minor alterations in the one would beget minor alterations in the other.

Behaviorists do have positions on the "great issues." Nor have I ever found them especially reluctant to express these in private conversation, or to decry the positions of others as "wrong," thereby suggesting they have a good idea of the "right" ones. I suppose a behaviorist might argue his positions on major issues are of the nature of opinion, while as a scholar he seeks fact. But to this we must respond that he gives them credence enough to base his actions upon them, which, as a scientist who believes he can never dogmatically declare he has "fact" or "truth," is the most he can permit himself anyway. Moreover, opinion becomes fact not because the individual scholar is more confident of his readings, but because others agree that they are sound. Hence, given a world of conflicting interests and objectives, it is inconceivable that any given reading will or could come to be hailed "fact" in the foreseeable future. I might add that if the behaviorist is honest with himself I suspect he will concede he is as confident of his readings on some "great issues"

as he is about many of the lesser matters. However, the important thing to remember is that the "great issues" are there, and the scholar acts in respect to them, he cannot do otherwise, and to act is to act on the basis of some sort of understanding. It is not presumptuous of us to speak on these matters when we have so little to go by, the presumption is to act in respect to them, but it is a presumption we cannot escape. To express our presumptions in words, to acknowledge them, does not seem to me an unscholarly thing to do. Quite the contrary, I would think.

Behaviorists are fond of teleological explanations, more so than traditionalists ever were. They have a penchant for explaining things in terms of desires, purposes, motives and lust. And insofar as they have expressed a wish to be scientific, we are right to question them about this practice, for the established sciences have systematically labored to free themselves from teleological explanation. Angus Sinclair refers to a seemingly "irreversible trend" within all areas of investigation, presently "scientific" or otherwise, to replace them with explanations of a causal variety.⁸² "In the physical sciences," Sinclair observes, "this replacement is now a completed achievement; in the biological sciences it is not perhaps entirely an achievement but it is an aim." Even in areas such as

⁸² Sinclair, The Condition of Knowing, pp. 43-46.

psychology where some would deny it is an aim, he notes that scholars "never replace a satisfactory causal explanation by a teleological one, other conditions remaining the same, but frequently replace an otherwise satisfactory teleological explanation by a casual one."

Now it is possible to defend the use of teleological explanation.⁸³ It is even possible to argue they do not differ in any significant way from non-teleological ones, a motive can be viewed in the way any other cause is, as a precedent which predictably leads to whatever it is one is attempting to explain. However, this sort of reasoning skirts the heart of the matter. There is a very good reason why scientists in all fields are witnessed to substitute explanations which emphasize non-mental, more directly observable factors, for ones which explain in terms of motives and purposes. Science, as we have already observed, is goal-oriented, it seeks answers which will make it possible to manipulate toward some desired end. It goes without saying that motives and purposes are among the most difficult of variables to pin down, and in many instances when they are seemingly located, manipulation of them appears the longest, most obstacle-ridden course to the desired goal. A psychologist treating a sadistic child, for example, might be convinced that the youth honestly believes the animals he mistreats are "bad" and ought to be

⁸³For a defense of the use of the teleological explanation, see Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, pp. 363-67.

punished. But he would be likely to conclude that calling this motive the "cause" of his sadism would be a far less effective way to prevent sadism in children than would locating and manipulating the formulative influences which give rise to such motives in the first place.

Whether or not we label motives causes rather than some other group of variables we might cut out depends, then, upon the structure of our own goal-complexes as investigators. In this connection, it would be interesting and revealing to make a study of the societal value changes which accompanied the demise of teleological explanation in physical science.⁸⁴ It is not a question of whether motives are causally related to political phenomena, but whether giving them primacy in our causal statements (or any place at all) is the procedure most in keeping with our personal objectives. In order to decide this, of course, we must agree to talk about objectives, and behaviorists are notably reticent to engage in that kind of conversation.

Behaviorism--An Endorsement of the
Nineteenth Century Paradigm

In a certain sense, all of the criticisms given thus far are

⁸⁴T. S. Kuhn has pointed to the changes in experience and value which accompanied the decline of a belief in the Ptolemaic universe and the acceptance of the Copernican view. See The Copernican Revolution (New York: Random House, 1957), especially Chapter 4, entitled "Recasting the Tradition."

extraneous to the contention that the behaviorist orientation is an unsound one. For if it can be shown--as I believe it can--that this whole intellectual edifice is premised upon untenable root assumptions, there is no need to proceed further with the attempt to discredit it. As the following arguments will demonstrate, the behaviorist orientation (and for that matter, its theoretical progenitor logical positivism) constitutes nothing other than an implicit endorsement of the paradigm of nineteenth century natural science, and therefore suffers all of its weaknesses and inadequacies.

Let me begin by recalling the quotation from Lundberg with which I began this chapter. Lundberg's thesis was that the debate about whether or not a single "true" and discoverable form to reality exists could take its place "with the question of how many angels can stand on the point of a needle and other profound issues that agitated men of other ages." The idea Lundberg wished to convey is that all such matters are unanswerable, essentially uninteresting, and hence, the scientist cannot and should not adopt any position at all regarding them. But I wonder what we would believe of a community of scholars who, after affecting this posture concerning angels and pins, then went on to assure one another "if we all stand here, if we all agree to use these standards for measuring, if we agree to employ this vocabulary, then, we can agree that such and such a number of angels do indeed dance on the head of a pin." I am fairly certain of

what we would not believe. We would not believe such scholars considered the issue uninteresting or that they took no position respecting it, particularly if they continued to do just what they had always done, concerning themselves with the same old sub-issues and using the same old vocabulary while going about their business. Yet this is precisely what behaviorists have done.

Instead of taking the word of behaviorists that they make no commitment on the question of "truth" and "reality," it is a simple matter to empirically check and see if they do. For the purpose at hand, let us suppose rather than avoiding as metaphysical the issue of "true" external forms, behaviorists were to commit themselves to a position of belief; that is, let us assume they were to consciously identify with the nineteenth century paradigm. As students of economic, social and political phenomena who now assert "truth" is out there to be discovered, how might we expect them to go about discovering it? I propose we would expect them to proceed in the following manner.

Because political scientists never find themselves in full accord when it comes to analyzing and describing economic, social and political phenomena, we would anticipate a decision to tentatively label "objective" or "true" those analyses and descriptions they were most inter-subjectively agreed upon. We would expect them to make the customary distinction between what "is" (facts), and what one

wants to be (values), and to insist the latter are of little concern to the scientist qua truth-finding scientist. Moreover, as facts would be viewed as independent of what one wants to be, so too, they would be seen as independent of what one thinks will be (of one's predictions). Thus, we would expect to hear it argued that it is possible to describe without predicting.

We would foresee a belief in "error," an erroneous description or analysis obviously being one which was incompatible with the "true" state of affairs. Understandably, error would be something to be avoided. In addition to "true" facts, we would anticipate a desire to locate the "true" connections between them (causes and laws). And, since the facts would be seen as having "real" form and "real" complexity, we would anticipate references to improper categorizations, to false analogies and to simple and complex phenomena without further qualification, such as a reference to goals.

In addition, having assumed the inter-subjectively united behaviorist community was that segment of the total population most likely to be in touch with political "reality," with the "objective situation," (Not an unreasonable assumption under the circumstances, since they spend far more time investigating such matters than does the rest of the society), it would be reasonable to talk of giving graduate students the same kind of indoctrination and training in order to render them equally "objective." We would expect, then,

to hear suggestions being made along this line.

In order that scholars could communicate more readily, we would also be prepared to hear pleas for definitional precision, and for the precise formulation of hypotheses. Finally, we would expect to find it believed that fields of inquiry which enjoy greater "scientific" status do so by virtue of their coming nearer to discerning "truth," that science "turns opinion into fact," revealing verities in the process. As a result we might anticipate a desire to have a "science," to do what the "scientists" do, and an inclination to see science principally as a frame of mind (objective), and a series of techniques and methods. In a word, we would contemplate an understanding and an approach which look exactly like the ones now put forth by the behaviorist community. The nineteenth century paradigm advocate said "maybe our view is not 'true,' therefore we should hold it lightly, inter-subjectively test it," and so on. The behaviorist says "maybe there is no 'truth,'" which he translates "maybe our view is not 'true,' therefore we should hold it lightly, inter-subjectively test it, etc." Frankly, I see no meaningful distinctions between the two arguments when it comes to acting upon them. A rose is a rose by whatever name we may call it, or whether we call it at all.

The nineteenth century paradigm advocate, then, believed "reality" had "true" form; the behaviorist only pretends it does. As we will find in Chapters Nine and Ten, were he to believe (or

pretend to believe) it does not, he would begin to do markedly different things, put forth markedly different arguments, and in many instances, arrive at radically different conclusions. I will very briefly mention a few of them here.⁸⁵ The non-relativistic reader is forewarned that they may at first glance appear somewhat preposterous, even ludicrous. However, he is assured they will be shown to logically derive from a relativistic paradigm in the appropriate place (Chapters Nine and Ten).

In the first place, the relativistic behaviorist would at least reconsider his enthusiasm for a "science" of economic, social and political phenomena.⁸⁶ He would understand a science comes into being in a very special kind of situation. The scientific situation is of this sort: The community of scholars (the scientists) share a set of experiences (fact-value combinations) with the pieces of time-space they as scientists investigate. In addition, an overriding set of these particular experiences (fact-value combinations) are shared

⁸⁵Throughout this critique I am judging and evaluating the behaviorist not by what he says but by what he does. I think this practice warranted; Eulau himself has pleaded that "in seeking, clarifying, or refining our definitions of politics, we turn to what men do as they behave politically and why they do it. Definitions unrelated to the behavior of man, in politics as in any other area of human activity, have no content." Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 5.

⁸⁶I am assuming a science will be said to exist when the population at large declares it to, otherwise, as I previously noted, if we leave it up to the scholars themselves to decide astrology must be considered a science.

by the community at large, such that this community accepts their (the scientists) word (statements of fact and cause) essentially at face value, taking it for granted that to do so will move them toward a fulfillment of the values involved.⁸⁷ The scientific situation is also one in which peoples' experiences with the pieces of time-space the science refers to are relatively stable through time. The way we experience coal, or steel, or various germs is more or less the way our predecessors experienced them, and essentially the way they will be experienced by the next generation, and the next. A science of economic, social, political matters, therefore, would be indicative of a politically aristocratic society (the scientific community sharing some, but not all of their fact-value combinations with the masses, and their word being accepted automatically by the latter because doing so would mean moving toward the fulfillment of the values involved.) Since sciences exist when our relationships with the things they refer to are relatively stable, a science of economic, social

⁸⁷ Sometimes a point can best be made by an extreme illustration. Of the tie between the categories and language we agree to employ and our experiences (fact-value combinations), imagine a West Irian headhunter trying to realize his particular goals with the categories and language of an Einstein.

It is worthwhile noting that the general community's decision to accept the word of a scientific community is based on successful past experience. Thus, the community might conceivably change its mind. Were biologists to give information which worked against life and health more than it enhanced it, the community would soon cease to regard biologists as scientists.

and political questions would also be indicative of a society in which these kinds of relationships were basically static in nature.⁸⁸

A relativist would not bother to urge the creation of a common vocabulary (though he might desire one). This because he would understand each of us hangs words directly on our experiences, and that consequently we only share word meanings to the extent we share experiences, never, of course, completely sharing either one. To argue for a common language is to argue for common experience (fact-value combinations), and in the economic, social, political sphere this will never be brought about simply by proselytizing for it.

In this connection, I might point out we never define for ourselves, only for others, precisely because we tie word meanings to experiences and always know what we mean when we use any words. Moreover, when people share experiences (fact-value combinations) with the pieces of time-space (objects and events) they are talking about they will also share word meanings and therefore communicate with ease. One radical rightist never has to ask another what he means by the word "freedom." They both tie it to a shared

⁸⁸ Another assumption underlying this whole argument is that an area of inquiry is not considered "scientific" because it comes up with readings which are in some sense more "certain." Physics, for instance, was regarded a science when it held many ideas now considered "false," and these "false" ideas (i. e. Newtonian constructs) had as much to do with gaining it recognition as a science as the ones which are still considered "true."

experience and "know" what they mean when they employ it. It is the liberal who complains the word is vague and imprecise and can be used in so many ways it might be better not to use it at all. In a like manner, the liberal communicates readily with a fellow liberal when he speaks of "extremism," while radicals of right and left contend that word has all the characteristics the liberal attributes to "freedom."⁸⁹

One who employed a relativistic understanding would not speak of erroneous descriptions, since he would predicate his work upon the assumption that all descriptions are--in any absolute sense--equally valid.⁹⁰ He would reason that to cut up time-space in one way, to use certain categorizations, and to give specific meanings to the words which apply to those categorizations, is to make possible particular patterns of activity, particular responses, while precluding others. Hence, he would conclude all men do, and must, evaluate

⁸⁹The logic of the argument being presented would lead us to predict that if a segment of a society begins to have economic, social and political experiences which differ significantly from the remainder of the society they will find it necessary to develop their own language to represent that experience. Examples, of course, are the bolsheviks in the U. S. S. R. and the radical rightists in the United States.

⁹⁰Whether or not words such as "error," "objectivity," "bias," etc. would continue to be used by investigators utilizing a relativistic epistemology is open to debate. I have talked with several scholars who concur with my basic arguments yet insist they would be, though with radically new meanings. I am of the opinion they would not be, for reasons to be enumerated in subsequent chapters.

and value as they experience, and that fact and value, consequently, are not at all separate in the way it has been supposed they were. There are many more implications of grounding our investigations upon a relativistic epistemology as we shall subsequently see; suffice it to say, it is not at all an unimportant matter which epistemology one endorses, or makes believe he endorses.

George H. Sabine has remarked of the philosophical radicalism of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that it "claimed to be empirical but it made little effort to check its premises by observation."⁹¹ Much the same criticism can be made of twentieth century behaviorism.

Behaviorists have consistently argued for precision of definition and hypothesis, never, it seems, bothering to observe the circumstances under which men can agree to employ the same words for the same purposes, use the same standards for categorizing and for judging etc., and to similarly note the circumstances in which they cannot. Had they done so, they would have found that when men agree to employ common standards and a common language it is because they also share experiences with the variables to which the standards and the language refer. For example, any time men have not used the liberal categories which lead to the view

⁹¹Sabine, A History of Political Theory, p. 669.

that all men are essentially the same, they have not shared the related liberal values. The attitude of the Nazi toward the Jew, the Southern white toward the Negro, and the World War II American toward the Japanese are cases in point.⁹² In other words, an empirical check would reveal that "precision" is a wholly relative concept. A micrometer is a precise instrument to the tool-maker interested in measuring a piece of stock. But it would be about the most imprecise of instruments to a Plains Indian bent on judging the height of a horse. To find the same instrument, or hypothesis, or reading, precise is to put it to the same use, it is to relate in the same manner to the things the instrument, hypothesis or reading deal with. And to relate in the same way, to share experiences, is at once to share the same fact-value combinations.

The behaviorist contends fact and value are independent of one another. Yet an empirical checking of this assumption discloses that whenever facts are in conflict, value complexes are in conflict. Interestingly, the value dispute between the behaviorist and his opponents is itself very often immediately obvious. Walter Berns

⁹² Another illustration which comes readily to mind is the Nazi inclination to define race in a way that made it virtually synonymous with culture, thus enabling them to "logically" refer to the Jewish race, and to value-judge it "inferior." Hitler even spoke of as races the "Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Ruthenians, Serba, and Croats," as well as the Jews. Mein Kampf, trans. by Ralph Manheim (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1964), p. 123.

gives an illustration of this when he says of the book Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign,

Whereas the classical democratic theorists might have despaired at the picture of the democratic voter drawn by modern social science, the authors of Voting find nothing incompatible between the American electorate and a revised and reasonable understanding of the qualities needed to constitute a healthy democracy. Disinterestedness, even apathy, are valuable if not carried to extremes; heterogeneity permits a balance between progress (defined merely as movement or change) and conservatism . . . [Berns notes] there is nothing "scientific" about the way they arrive at this changed (and lowered) conception of political health, yet it is on the basis of it that they draw this decisive conclusion.⁹³

So too, when C. W. Wahl tells us the "dissenter and the individualist" must be distinguished from the revolutionary because the former "manifests a quality which is of great good to mankind, " while in his estimation the latter does not, he is making a clear value judgment.⁹⁴ It is a value judgment, moreover, which would not gain the agreement of radicals of extreme left and right in our society and, for that matter, would not have been supported by the founders of our nation whom we continue to hold in such reverence. I suspect Wahl, like most people, would not take the position that under no circumstances should a people ever revolt. Consequently, he is only

⁹³Berns, "Voting Studies," pp. 46-47.

⁹⁴C. W. Wahl, "The Relation Between Primary and Secondary Identifications: Psychiatry and the Group Sciences," in American Voting Behavior, ed. by Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 277-78.

saying of the revolutionaries he had in mind when he made his statement "they rebel over the wrong things," and that happens to be another value judgment on his part. Whatever the behaviorist may wish, it is manifestly impossible to declare a nation, a system, or an individual to be democratic, irrational, progressive, or anything else, without employing some standard to judge these things, and the choice of a standard for evaluating is ever a matter of value. Values are involved in a major way when it comes to deciding what is a problem, and which problem is more important than another. Values play a part in determining what we will hypothesize about and the way in which we formulate our hypotheses. Having hypothesized, values determine when the hypothesis is to be considered "sufficiently" supported, when it is "proven" enough, etc., etc.

David Easton has been quoted as saying that "reason's role in discussions of political values is bound to be limited."⁹⁵ Again the argument: fact and value are separate, facts can be reasoned over, while values cannot. Yet take an empirical look! Where are these "political value" issues which cannot be discussed? What do they have to do with? I cannot think of a single major (or minor) issue which scholars have declared to be beyond discussion because

⁹⁵ Quoted in R. C. Pratt, "A Note on David Easton's Approach to Political Philosophy," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XX (Aug., 1954), p. 374.

it has to do with value preferences.

Finally, looking reveals that whenever facts are debated by scholars they are prone to bring up the subject of values by accusing one another of trying to build a case to support preformed biases rather than sticking to the facts. The review comments about Williams and Mills will be recalled in this connection. Another first-rate illustration is the recent controversy between the American Behavioral Scientist and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists over the publications of Emanuel Velikovsky.⁹⁶ Each journal charged the other with distorting data, and with omitting important findings in order to defend the conclusion of its liking. Now, it would seem to me that if empirical analysis tells us scholars continually accuse persons whose facts they dispute of letting their values interfere, if they are only inclined to see as "value free" readings they also consider "factually sound," we have good reason to question the hypothesis that fact and value are "naturally" distinct in the first place. Where, we might ask of the behaviorist, is the empirical evidence for supposing they are?

Behaviorists would be hard pressed to give an empirical

⁹⁶See "Notes on 'Scientific' Reporting--How the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Reports on the Velikovsky Case," American Behavioral Scientist, VIII (Oct., 1964), pp. 14-17.

defense of their understanding of scientific inquiry. Where is the evidence for the supposition that scientists hold their theories and hypotheses lightly, testing them against fact and discarding them when there is grave conflict between the two? To quote a former student, one almost never finds political scientists admitting to basic errors in approach or judgment about political matters. At best, one finds them "reformulating their analyses in the light of new information."⁹⁷

One seldom finds political scientists meeting the arguments of scholars they disagree with in a head-on manner; one seldom finds this sort of debate taking place in the physical sciences.⁹⁸ Where, then, is the empirical evidence which has led to the assumption that it is a vital ingredient of the scientific process?

In March, 1961, the American Behavioral Scientist reported the results of one empirical testing of the understanding of science

⁹⁷I am obligated for this observation to Kenneth Mortimer, a graduate student in sociology at San Francisco State College.

⁹⁸I was unable to locate a single review of the Herbert J. Storing book which dealt in even a quasi-systematic way with the points scored against the behaviorist metaphysic. Andrew Hacker wrote a letter to the American Political Science Review in which he acknowledged that the authors of the essays contained in this volume did a first-class job of showing the metaphysical and epistemological weaknesses in the behaviorist position. However, he continued, behaviorists are not philosophers, and their work should be judged according to its own merit, a comment which strongly suggests that Professor Hacker is perhaps no philosopher either. American Political Science Review, LVII (June, 1963), p. 431.

behaviorists appear to endorse. Interviews were conducted with fifty-seven researchers from six departments of science in a major Mid-western university. According to the ABS,

. . . less than half the researchers believed in freedom of research in a classical sense; only one-third in impartiality; and only one-fifth in suspending judgment, in the absence of bias, in free diffusion of information, or in group loyalty. [Whereas in] the classical concept of science, the producer of knowledge is viewed as completely neutral in his concern for how the knowledge is applied, only one-third of those interviewed took such a position.⁹⁹

Only twelve out of the fifty-seven declared they evaluate facts "impersonally and impartially" and more than half emphasized loyalty to the group over loyalty to the public. Lastly, ABS reports, researchers who did uphold the "classical myths" were no more productive or motivated than those who did not. In fact, there was a very slight difference in the opposite direction.¹⁰⁰ I have already argued physical scientists do not act according to the classical view. If, in addition, they do not even purport to do so, from whence comes the behaviorist understanding?

Behaviorists who assert their orientation is potentially radical would do well if they stated more clearly what they mean by such a declaration and then gave it an empirical check. Regarding

⁹⁹"Scientists vs. the Ideology of Science," The American Behavioral Scientist, IV (March, 1961), p. 35.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

the radicality of scientific findings in general we might note individuals and groups adversely (radically) affected by new "findings" have not regarded them as "scientific," have often not even graced them with the label "finding." As for radical behaviorism, it is important to remember that radicalism in the economic, social, political sphere has to do with drastic structural change in immediate terms. It is on the basis of this definition that we speak of radicals of right and left. With that definition in mind, then, I am unable to conceive of behaviorism as it is currently practiced producing a radical investigation. That behaviorist findings are frequently employed by successive governmental administrations appears mute testimony to its status-quo direction. Nor can I imagine how one who had the radical objectives of a Robert Welch, Stokely Carmichael, Gus Hall, or even the mildly radical goals of a C. W. Mills, might profitably employ the categories and vocabularies of a Robert A. Dahl or a Richard Snyder. That they do not attempt to do so again suggests the behaviorist orientation is generally conservative. The reader might also reflect it is a simple matter to think of studies which implicitly argue for radical change of a left or right direction, and ask himself which investigations, if not the behaviorist, implicitly urge a recreation of the status-quo. It seems to me behaviorists have themselves granted their status-quo inclination when they inform

us theirs is a "long-run" approach.¹⁰¹

Other assumptions behaviorists might put to empirical test include the notion that sciences are consciously and methodically "built" or "created," that the building is done in a "bottom to the top" manner, that phenomena are "naturally" complex or simple, that the physical sciences deal with phenomena which are less complex than the social, that physical science is empirical in the sense behaviorists have supposed it to be, and lastly, that the behaviorist does not act out an endorsement of the nineteenth century epistemological position.

Summary and Conclusion

Whereas the behaviorist has supposed there is such a thing as a position of neutrality from which one can carry out "objective" investigation, the foregoing critique argues against that supposition. In Kuhn's words, it informs us "there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts."¹⁰² It instructs that "whether we like it or not, human behavior (or even animal

¹⁰¹Eulau also proposes some of the questions on "top," the macroscopic questions, may not be answerable by the methods of science. The suggestion appears to be that even with gradual building we may never get there. This is another attitude which would hardly prompt a "radical" approach to the "great issues" of our time. See Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 9.

¹⁰²Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 125.

behavior) indicates direction."¹⁰³ The very investigative behavior of the behaviorist, his utilization of particular assumptions, methods and techniques, is not without creative impact. In doing what he does, he builds as well as analyzes the world.

In part, the behaviorist, like the logical positivist, has not understood the above because he interprets the relativistic findings of physics, psychology, anthropology and linguistics to suggest there may be no "true" form to reality. Having done so, he is able to regard the whole issue as interesting but unimportant and highly esoteric in nature. Thus too, he has been able to maintain the prevailing paradigm intact and continue about his business.

If he were to interpret such findings as many linguists, anthropologists, psychologists and physicists themselves do, as arguing reality has a theoretically infinite number of "true" forms, he would feel compelled to make significant alterations in his paradigm. He might even decide it was necessary to discard it and begin the construction of a new one.

It is my conviction that if they are ever to make any order of the variables they confront, political scientists in general will have to do the latter. They will have to grasp the idea that when it comes to economic, social and political questions there are countless human

¹⁰³Louis O. Kattsoff, "Social Science and Purposive Behavior," The Scientific Monthly, LXXVI (Jan., 1953), p. 24.

measuring instruments having almost as many kinds of relationships with the objects and events they are viewing, and consequently experiencing as many "true" realities. To date, political scientists have tended to leave it to their colleagues in the natural sciences to make this observation.

My analysis of the present and my suggestions for the future [James B. Conant once commented] will be viewed in quite different lights by a communist, a left-wing member of the British Labor Party, an orthodox New Dealer (if any be still extant), a follower of John T. Flynn, or a political agnostic. Indeed the whole history of science in the last three hundred years may be read differently by people of differing political views.¹⁰⁴

For an investigator to imply or suggest that one set of economic, social or political facts is "truer" or "more factual" in some concrete sense is to miss this point. It is to continue abiding by what J. Bronowski calls an "atomic construction" which "supposes, like the atomic science of the last century, that there lies below our experience a set of facts which are more exact than experience; which are indeed exact."¹⁰⁵

In any absolute sense, then, one economic, social or political measurement is as "factual" as another. It is not simply a question of "what are the facts," but of "which facts are relevant?" And to answer the last question one must decide upon the goals to be

¹⁰⁴Conant, Science and Common Sense, p. 297.

¹⁰⁵Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science, p. 125.

aimed for. When facts are collected ends must be considered. "Data collection is like garbage collection: before you collect it you should have in mind what you are going to do with it."¹⁰⁶

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the behaviorist's approach is this: if every reading is factual given the particular viewer-viewed relationships it springs from, and if the social scientist insists on accepting only those readings which are made most frequently by his colleagues (those which represent the predominant viewer-viewed relationships), the objectives underlying the science that results will also be those shared by the greater number of investigators.

It is not difficult to see how such a science will be defensive of the status-quo, an observation I have already made regarding behaviorism. Reasoning along this line, Reinhard Bendix once asked "must we pay for the greater empiricism of modern social science with unconscious and uncritical subordination of intellectual endeavor to the social and political forces of our time?"¹⁰⁷ Behaviorism apparently answers in the affirmative. Behaviorists insist upon verified problems, verified facts, verified theories. By so doing they select only those problems, facts and theories which reflect the reality

¹⁰⁶Fox, Garbuny, and Hooke, p. 51.

¹⁰⁷Reinhard Bendix, Social Science and the Distrust of Reason (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California, 1951), p. 41.

of the middle-class academic, itself but one of an infinite number of realities. Thus have behaviorists chosen to be irrelevant to the powerful economic, social and political forces of our day.

There was once a beauty to the paradigm behaviorists employ.

It argued:

If there is a single "true" or "real" form to that which is external--
 If under certain conditions men can discern that single "real" form--
 If we call one who does so "objective" while he does so--
 Then, the "categories" seen by this "objective" viewer must alone be "real"--
 Then too, the constant relationships between like entities which the objective viewer detects must be the only "real" ones--
 If we choose to call these constant relationships laws--
 Then, laws themselves are "real"
 If any real entity A under real circumstance B, leads to real entity C--
 If when A's and B's are alike (are "really" A's and B's) C's are also always found to be alike--
 Then, we can say the evidence argues every effect has a cause or causes, and that these causes are "real"--
 If all of the above is so--
 Then, the universe must be orderly--
 If we wish to know the "real" facts, laws and causes--
 Then we should train observers to be "objective"--
 Then we should teach them to distinguish between the "real" facts and ones they may want to exist--
 If we call an understanding of "real" facts, laws and causes "Knowledge"--
 Then this knowledge will itself be "real"--
 And so on with the rest of the paradigm.

But now the behaviorist is heard to argue:

If there is no single true form to reality--
 If under certain conditions observers can nevertheless discern that nonexistent form--
 If we call one who does so objective while he does so--
 Etc., etc.

From where I stand, behaviorism not only encourages irrelevant investigation, it has all the appearances of bad logic as well.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸"From where I stand" was emphasized because, as we will later observe, from where the behaviorist stands given his experiences--his fact-value complexes--the behaviorist logic is impressively tight.

VII. EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE NATURAL LAW THEORIST

Only a great fool would call the new political science diabolic: it has no attributes peculiar to fallen angels. It is not even Machiavellian, for Machiavelli's teaching was graceful, subtle, and colorful. Nor is it Neroian. Nevertheless one may say of it that it fiddles while Rome burns. It is excused by two facts: it does not know that it fiddles, and it does not know that Rome burns.¹

--Leo Strauss

The Case for a Natural Law Approach

Like the nineteenth century paradigm advocate (hereafter when I refer to those who support the nineteenth century paradigm, I mean to include the positivist) the natural law theorist begins with the assumption "natural" categories exist and that objects and events "naturally" fall into this or that category, whether man recognizes it or not. However, he does not stop there. Rather, he goes on to make the additional observation that experience consistently tells us the forms of objects and events are never "perfectly determinate, fixed and complete," but are, on the contrary, "indeterminate, dynamic, and tendential. They are never simply what they are, but also on the way to something that they now are not." In short, "the

¹Leo Strauss, "An Epilogue," in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, p. 327.

world is dynamic and in flux."² What this means, of course, is that things do not remain permanently in one category, but are seen to move on to some other. A sapling is seen to move, however haltingly, toward the category "tree," as a calf inclines toward "cow," and a child toward the category "adult."

To the natural law theorist, the importance of this last observation is that if an object or event is never simply what it is at the moment, if it is always in a tendential state, then these tendencies must be just as "real" or "natural" as any of the various categories. Indeed, we can go even further and note the categories sapling and tree, or child and adult, are linked to one another. A sapling is, among other things, something tending towards "tree," its very sapling-ness depends upon that tendency, as a child is something tending towards "adult."

Consequently, the "truth" or "accuracy" of the statement "this is a child," is found to be inseparably connected to the "truth" or "accuracy" of the statement, "this is something tending towards adult," as the "truth" of the statement "this is a sapling" is immediately dependent upon the "truth" of the statement "this is something tending towards tree." To the extent the "truth" of one statement is impaired, so too, is that of the other. That is, to the precise degree this object

²John Daniel Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 74-75.

is not "tending towards adult," it is not "child," and vice versa. It is now possible to grasp the natural law thinker's meaning when he writes: "each individual entity is marked by an essential structure which it shares in common with other members of the species," and "this structure determines certain basic existential tendencies that are also common to the species."³ To say men fall into a common category, then, is to claim they share characteristics and tendencies.

Having found category (fact) and tendency to be part of one another--having observed that a fact includes its existential promise--and that to recognize the true fact of an object is at once to recognize its "natural" tendencies, whereas to misread the fact is simultaneously to misread the tendencies--the natural law theorist deems it fair to conclude there is something about the very nature of the facts which can be called prescriptive, and that he is therefore justified in labeling such prescriptions "true values." In brief, he makes the decision "natural" tendencies are also "best" tendencies.

Thus, it is natural "tendencies" the natural law theorist has in mind when he speaks of natural laws or natural values. "It is good for an entity to exist in a condition of active realization," asserts John Daniel Wild, while "if its basic tendencies are hampered and frustrated, it exists in an evil condition."⁴ It is this same kind of

³Ibid., pp. 132-33.

⁴Ibid.

reasoning which enables Heinrich Rommen to argue that although "reality is independent of its being thought of or noticed by the finite intellect," nevertheless, "being and oughtness must in the final analysis coincide."⁵

At this point, it occurs to the natural law advocate that if it is the case a fact includes its existential promise (its tendency), it must also be the case that a statement of fact includes a statement of promise. In other words, he reasons, it must be so that a description always contains a prescription in some implicit manner. Once again, experience convinces him he has speculated correctly.

"One's opinion regarding the character of the 'Is'" writes Leo Strauss, "settles one's opinion regarding the character of the 'Ought.'"⁶ With a rap at the positivist, Strauss illustrates the point.

. . . if a man is of the opinion that as a matter of fact all desires are of equal dignity since we know of no factual consideration which would entitle us to assign different dignities to different desires, he cannot but be of the opinion--unless he is prepared to become guilty of gross arbitrariness--that all desires ought to be treated as equal within the limits of the possible, and this opinion is what is meant by permissive egalitarianism.⁷

I consider this argument to be particularly compelling, a

⁵Heinrich Rommen, The Natural Law (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), pp. 163, 172.

⁶Strauss, p. 325.

⁷Ibid., pp. 325-26.

"fact" of nearly every observers' experience, be he positivist, relativist, natural law enthusiast or whatever. A central theme of this essay is that a political scientist who assumes the validity of the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm--who believes the universe and his knowledge of it is as that framework suggests--will conclude he as a scholar ought to do things in a most specific manner. So too, a political scientist who decided our political system is hopelessly corrupt and cannot be "worked through" would hardly be expected to lecture his students on how to achieve objectives via the existing two party system. And to magnify the idea by carrying it into the realm of the absurd, the individual whose reasoning convinced him the world is going to end at midnight tomorrow is not likely to feel he ought to be concerned with how best to celebrate New Year's Eve three weeks from now.

Natural law thinkers might remind their positivistic opponents that if the latter did not themselves intuitively believe the descriptions one accepts will determine the kinds of prescriptions he endorses, they would not show the concern they do for presenting "objective" viewpoints, or for guarding against false prophets. Political scientists in the United States, it was noted, consider their principle job to be one of educating and informing the public. Is it not an underlying assumption that an informed and educated citizenry will act with greater political wisdom, that in a word, what the public believes is

shapes its ideas of what it Ought to do about it? "Time and education," de Grazia told us, are all that is needed for a "resolution" of the world's economic and psychological problems. How could this be unless it is supposed the "Oughts" and acts of the educated will differ from those of the uneducated, and in a specific direction?

When the positivist protests that nonetheless there is a decided difference between the statement "this is a chair, and that is a tree," and the contention "this is a good chair, and that a bad tree," the natural law proponent again has a ready answer. Not so, he responds. When we speak of a "good" chair we only mean it is very much a chair. To say something is a very bad chair is only to say it is very "unchairlike."⁸ The words "good" and "bad," then, are merely being used to indicate degrees of "chairlikeness," and the "decided difference" disappears.

Now, if every descriptive statement has its implicit value aspects, it follows there can be no such thing as an "impartial" vocabulary. Hence, we find the natural law theorist contending: "Neuter discourse is a false idol"; "just as no action is really indifferent, so no utterance is without its responsibility"; to define is to assume

⁸Felix E. Oppenheim presents this argument against the natural law position, and Harry V. Jaffa presents the rebuttal. See "The Natural Law Thesis: Affirmation or Denial?", The American Political Science Review, LI (March, 1957), pp. 48, 59-60.

perspective; that is the method of definition."⁹ Clearly, he elaborates, "different ways of saying a thing denote different interests in saying it, or to take this in reverse as we do when we become conscious users of language, different interests in a matter will dictate different patterns of expression."¹⁰

Explicating the natural law epistemology still further, to argue the above kind of connection between what one thinks "Is" and what one thinks "Ought" to be, is to postulate a bond between thought and action. Ergo: "Man is not a self-contained spectator," affirms Eric Voegelin, "he is an actor, playing a part in the drama of being and, through the brute fact of his existence, committed to play it without knowing what it is."¹¹ In the view of the natural law theorist, therefore, there can be no ivory tower analysis; there can be no standing outside and merely observing until one feels confident he has the correct "facts," or entering into the play with half a heart. "Participation in being . . . is not a partial involvement of man," argues Voegelin, "he is engaged with the whole of his existence for participation is existence itself. There is no vantage point outside

⁹Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 24, 108.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 115-16.

¹¹Eric Voegelin, Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. 1.

existence from which its meaning can be viewed and a course of action charted according to a plan, nor is there a blessed island to which man can withdraw in order to recapture his self."¹²

Consistent with the logic of his conceptual framework, the natural law proponent sees the ideal educator as one who first locates true facts and values and then urges their acceptance. Citing Aristotle as his witness, Clive Staples Lewis remarks "the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought."¹³ Because he believes "language is not a purely passive instrument," but that "all speech . . . is a form of eros in the proper interpretation of the word,"¹⁴ he dismisses the suggestion that contemporary American political scientists can or do refrain from promoting values. Strauss discovers "more than a mysterious pre-established harmony between the new political science [his name for positivism] and a particular version of democracy." "The alleged value-free analysis of political phenomena," he argues, "is controlled by an unavowed commitment built into [my emphasis] the new political science to that version of liberal democracy." Strauss makes it abundantly clear the version being fostered is not his own. "The new political science," he

¹²Ibid.

¹³Clive Staples Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 26.

¹⁴Weaver, pp. 115-16.

declares, "becomes ever less able to see democracy or to hold a mirror to democracy, it ever more reflects the most dangerous proclivities of democracy. It even strengthens those proclivities."¹⁵

In saying this last, Strauss touches upon a problem which understandably worries many natural law theorists, but which, just as understandably, hardly seems to exist for scholars employing a positivistic paradigm. According to the natural law scholar, if all descriptions are implicitly prescriptive it logically follows that to the extent one's own descriptions do not appear prescriptive they must simply prescribe existing values; they must advocate a recreation of the status quo.¹⁶ Touching upon this matter in an address to the American Philosophical Society, Arthur Murphy proposed social scientists have become so accustomed "to the naturalistic fallacy in its sociological form, to the identification of the moral ought with the is of group approval or aversion, that we hardly understand what else than socially dominant opinion (in our own group, of course) moral authority might be."¹⁷

¹⁵ Strauss, p. 326.

¹⁶ See Dwight Waldo, "Values in the Political Science Curriculum," in Approaches to the Study of Politics, pp. 98-107.

¹⁷ Arthur Murphy, "The Common Good," Proceeding and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XXIV (Sept., 1951), pp. 3-18; quoted in Wayne A. R. Leys, "Ethics, Social Science, and Conflict of Interest," The American Behavioral Scientist, V (Nov., 1961), p. 6.

His conviction that political scientists adhere to what Murphy termed "socially dominant opinion" is what prompted Strauss to accuse them of pushing a "particular version of liberal democracy." The thing which troubles Strauss and other natural law enthusiasts most about positivism is this: it occurs to them that if political scientists continue to insist upon value-free investigation, and if value-free investigation is never value-free, but simply involves a silent endorsement of prevailing values, then, no matter what kind of values our society happens to fix upon, the work of political scientists will implicitly foster them with equal vigor and enthusiasm; at least, it is suggested, it will never oppose them. Positivism, then, is believed to lead to a position of "whatever is is right." Observes Wild, "when the individual finds himself in conflict with society, he is sure to be wrong. There is no universal standard to which an appeal can be made from the judgments of a corrupt community."¹⁸

In view of what has been said so far, it is hardly surprising to find natural law theorists asserting the very nature of a social science based on positivism is of a kind to encourage anti-liberal institutions. Several blame the rise of fascism in Italy and Nazi Germany on the positivistic presuppositions which even then had come to dominate Western social science thought. John H. Hallowell

¹⁸Wild, p. 70.

argues that when the liberal German scholar declared all values to be of equal absolute worth--thereby placing democracy on a moral plane with authoritarianism--he at once deprived himself of any argument with which to defend his liberal values. Fascism was but the natural outgrowth of the dominant philosophy, he proposes: "by regarding value judgments as expressions simply of subjective, individual preference or choice, positivism fosters intellectual anarchy and nihilism, [and] it is just such a milieu that breeds fascism."¹⁹

Hallowell also tells us that having readied the ground for anti-liberalism, positivism ill-equipped the liberal German scholar for fighting it when it arose.

. . . professed liberals had neither the standards nor the will to declare this despotism wrong. They could accept it only as a fact--a positive fact. The will to resist was lost--destroyed by themselves. There was, as a matter of fact, no armed resistance, no great uprising against the Nazis, because the "liberals" saw nothing to fight about. They had no ideas, no values, for which to fight; they had no doctrine, no way of life, to defend.²⁰

According to Hallowell, because their only philosophy was that as scholars they could promote no philosophy, their work constituted an

¹⁹ John H. Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1943), pp. 18-20. Regarding the connection between fascism and positivism, see also Rene de Visme Williamson, "The Challenge of Political Relativism," The Journal of Politics, IX (May, 1947), p. 149.

²⁰ Hallowell, p. 108.

explicit acceptance and an implicit endorsement of the Hitler regime in all of its most brutal manifestations. As one might expect, and as the quotation opening this chapter suggests, the sort of criticisms made of the liberal in Nazi Germany are sometimes leveled at his American counterpart in our own troubled present. "He fiddles while Rome burns," says Leo Strauss, "unaware either that he fiddles, or that Rome is burning."

Given the supposition "true" values exist and can be discovered, the natural law theorist confronts two final difficulties; namely, how does one go about finding value "truth"? And, having found it, how does he recognize it for what it is? To the first question, Wild informs us Plato provided a clear answer. "The only pathway, we are told, lies through the arduous exercise of the individual intellect in a Socratic questioning, examining, and sifting of the relevant evidence. Then, the truth may be seen or it may not be."²¹ As for how one is to know the truth is true, if and when he sees it, to the properly trained mind, insists the natural law advocate, its nature will simply be self-evident. There neither is nor can be any proof of such matters.²²

The Positivist-Natural Law Debate

If "debate" requires a communication of ideas, that word is

²¹Wild, p. 13.

²²"If nothing is self-evident," argues Clive Staples Lewis, "nothing can be proved." Lewis, p. 53.

for the most part inappropriate to describe the dialogue which has gone on between the positivist and the natural law theorist. While members of the two camps have talked a great deal, they seem to have communicated little. In many respects their dialogue constitutes a first-rate illustration of Thomas Kuhn's observation that individuals employing different paradigms will experience different worlds, speak different languages, and end by "talking past" one another.

The positivist, we noted, views the world through nineteenth century paradigm assumptions, and therefore premises fact and value are separate. He means by this that what is "out there"--the facts--are independent of what he would like to have exist "out there"--his preferences or values. Following the logic of his assumption, he concludes there is such a thing as a "detached," value-neutral, position from which one could and should conduct analyses and render judgments. To be able to maintain an air of detachment, he reasons, is in the very nature of sound scholarship. The good educator he describes as one who reveals "facts" but does not push values; a sharp line is drawn between proselytizer and educator, and between propaganda and education. Concerned with definitions, he urges the creation of a value-free vocabulary. Finally, he proposes political scientists concentrate on discovering "factual" truth, however much its discovery might hurt, however much it might appear destructive of their personal values. In this connection, he urges nothing be taken

as "self-evident," recommends the maintenance of an "open mind," and warns against blind, unexamined ideational commitments (dogmatism), especially on metaphysical issues.

The natural law theorist, on the other hand, begins with the assumption fact and value are inseparable. In saying this, he does not mean to argue they cannot be distinguished by the observer. According to Wild, "those who have responsibly defended this theory have never asserted that value and existence were the same. What has been asserted is that they are distinct, but inseparable."²³ And Strauss avers, "the notion of a law of nature is based on the distinction, and not on the confusion, between the nature of a being and the perfection or the end of that being."²⁴ When he contends fact and value are inseparable, the natural law theorist wishes to indicate only two things. First, he means the present "factual" state of an object (what it is in the here and now) cannot be divorced from a certain possible future condition or state (its existential promise), which he therefore chooses to call "natural" value. Secondly, he intends his statement to signify (a) an individual must act, (b) his actions are always based on some understanding of what the facts are, and (c) his choices of behavior, the values he acts out, will vary depending upon what he happens

²³Wild, p. 99.

²⁴Leo Strauss, "Critical Note: Locke's Doctrine of Natural Law," The American Political Science Review, LII (June, 1958), p. 491.

to accept as fact. Consequently, he deduces there can be no detached, value-free position, no air of impartiality. Forced by the nature of things to speak in behalf of some value-fact complex, the good educator, he decides, is one who pushes the "correct" or "natural" one. Since for him all statements of fact are goal-oriented, the natural law thinker does not make the positivists' distinction between propaganda and education. In his estimation, to propagandize in behalf of "true" values is education of the highest sort.²⁵ Lastly, the natural law theorist contends true values are recognized intuitively. There is no way to prove their validity. One simply accepts them on faith, and this in a rather closed-minded and dogmatic manner. To quote Lewis: "An open mind, in questions that are not ultimate, is useful. But an open mind about the ultimate foundations either of Theoretical or of Practical Reason is idiocy. If a man's mind is open on these things, let his mouth at least be shut. He can say nothing to the purpose."²⁶

One thing could scarcely be more obvious. The debate between positivism and natural law is epistemological, philosophical and metaphysical; it is not an argument about particular facts, but about the paradigms from which those facts derive. Yet, thus far it has not been carried out on the paradigm level. Instead, members of the

²⁵Robert Horwitz does an interesting portrayal of Harold D. Lasswell as a "master propagandist" for values he, Horwitz, does not happen to subscribe to. "Lasswell: Master Propagandist," in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, pp. 227-304.

²⁶Lewis, p. 60.

two camps have merely beaten each other over the head with their respective conceptual frameworks.²⁷ Perhaps in doing so they have reassured themselves of their own propriety and wisdom, but they have done little about communicating that wisdom, and virtually nothing in the way of re-examining its foundations, of asking themselves if they are really so wise after all. Those of a positivistic orientation have been most guilty in this respect. In my estimation, natural law theorists have been somewhat more inclined to take up epistemological and philosophical issues. A first rate example is the Herbert J. Storing edition, Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, frequently referred to in this chapter. The authors in question did indeed argue at the appropriate level. I have already mentioned Andrew Hacker's letter to the American Political Science Review in which he granted Storing and his colleagues had done an excellent job of demonstrating the philosophical and epistemological flaws in the positivist framework.²⁸ Those who reviewed the Storing book, however, did not

²⁷Felix Oppenheim says of the representatives of both positions, "Instead of arguing for their respective theories and against those of their antagonists, they knock down straw men." Ironically, Oppenheim then goes on to accuse natural law theorists of "jumping over the unbridgeable gap which separates the realm of the 'is' from that of the 'ought,'" a charge they are not open to unless it is first established the two areas are separate in the way positivists have supposed. This, we saw, the natural law advocate vehemently denies. See Oppenheim, pp. 47-48.

²⁸See n. 98, Ch. 6, p. 272, this essay.

respond in kind.

Review comments include these evasions: "The authors assert their convictions inflexibly"; "the lack of political relevance stems from an exaggerated moralism which converts all political issues into moral issues and analyzes political phenomena by means of moral categories"; "our concern, quite simply, is for . . . that precious element of detachment--which only a philistine would deride as ethical neutrality."²⁹

As criticisms, the worth of the foregoing comments in that respect is wholly dependent upon the validity of the very set of assumptions Storing et al. were challenging. Ironically, from a natural law point of view it is even possible to consider them compliments. One can imagine the natural law theorist responding in this fashion:

"Assert our convictions inflexibly?" "If our convictions are representative of 'true' values, and we think they are, inflexibility is a most commendable characteristic." "Engage in an exaggerated moralism which converts all political issues into moral issues and analyzes political phenomena by means of moral categories?" "But we have contended all political issues are moral issues, and that all political analyses are made by means of moral categories, your own as well as ours." The only important question is, whose analyses

²⁹Schaar and Wolin, pp. 126, 136, 150.

reflect the 'correct' moral categories?" You are concerned about that "precious element of detachment--which only a philistine would deride as ethical neutrality?" "But we have insisted there is no such animal, detachment is a myth, and calling us philistines or other names will do nothing to alter the fact."

When testing the natural law thesis by pushing it upon positivistic students and colleagues, I found certain criticisms were made again and again. Here too, an inadequate understanding of the position often seemed indicated; however, several were such common complaints I think it worth while dealing with them now. Each of the criticisms, it will be noted, can be readily countered without stepping outside of the natural law framework.

To begin with, it was argued the very lack of agreement about values among peoples of various cultures is ample demonstration of their relative nature. At least two responses can be made to this criticism. First, to quote Strauss once more, "precisely if natural right is rational, its discovery presupposes the cultivation of reason, and therefore natural right will not be known universally: one ought not even to expect any real knowledge among savages."³⁰ And second, if a lack of universal agreement is to be considered proof of the relative nature of values, we must then make the same

³⁰Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 9.

kind of conclusion concerning facts, for the latter are found to be just as universally disputed. Yet, their existence is strangely taken for granted. In the words of one natural law thinker: "The curious thing about value non-cognitivism . . . is that its total skepticism concerning the objectivity of 'values' is matched by an equally complete credulity concerning 'facts.'"³¹

Several persons contended it is nevertheless easier to obtain agreement about "facts" than about "values," and therefore the scholar ought to concentrate on the former in the interest of progress. Such an assertion, I insist, has absolutely no basis in our experience. Admittedly, positivistic political scientists tend to agree about many of the major economic, social and political facts of our time. But, as the natural law theorist knows only too well, they are similarly agreed about values. Watch them! Is it not obvious that they usually find the same ideologies appealing, and the same political activities repugnant? One can observe of many positivistic political scientists that at election time they even tend to agree upon a common candidate. And when they meet in the halls of the academy, they ask about the health of one another's families; they do not wrangle in the manner of persons bent on the realization of radically different, not to mention mutually exclusive, goals. On the other hand, whenever the facts are

³¹ See Harry V. Jaffa, "Reply to Oppenheim," The American Political Science Review, LI (March, 1957), pp. 57-58.

disputed, as between the Marxist and the liberal, the liberal and the radical rightist, or the natural law theorist and the positivist, one invariably finds an equally vigorous conflict of values. The natural law theorist would predict this, of course, since he has argued questions of fact are at once questions of value.

This last point, that questions of fact always involve questions of value, was also disputed. Since it seemed to help if I illustrated the natural law position, I will do so here. Confronted with the question: "Is individual X an authoritarian personality?" the positivist would prepare to answer by drawing up a scale for measuring authoritarianism. In doing this, he would very likely seek the assurance of his colleagues that it was an appropriate scale. That done, he would apply the scale to X and give his answer. Confidently he might add: "In answering your question I have dealt neither in values nor metaphysics." "I have not been concerned with whether authoritarianism is an absolute, nor with the question 'Is it good or bad to be authoritarian?'"

The natural law theorist, on the contrary, would argue something like this: "Not only does your 'fact' fail to be value-free, it is the very opposite, it is value-derivative. For clearly the fact of X's authoritarianism or non-authoritarianism depended upon your measuring instrument or standard, and what you agreed to use as a standard just as clearly depended upon your values." This is what Strauss has called

rendering "invisible value judgments"; it involves bringing values in through the "back door." Strauss remarks: "When social scientists distinguish between democratic and authoritarian habits or types of human being, what they call 'authoritarian' is in all cases known to me a caricature of everything of which they, as good democrats of a certain kind, disapprove."³²

The natural law theorist would also be likely to ask the positivist why he had bothered to make the remark about not concerning himself with whether authoritarianism was good or bad. "Are only statements which include explicit references to good or bad, likes or dislikes, to be considered value-laden?" he might query. "If so, how explain that on virtually every occasion when you have complained my values influenced my analyses I was speaking, like you, not of what I thought good or bad, liked or did not like, but of what I honestly believed to be so." "What I understood you to mean by your accusations was that my statements indicated preference in an implicit manner." "I grant it, and insist that so, my friend, do yours, as I have emphatically demonstrated."³³

Two criticisms were frequently made of the contention that "natural" tendencies ought to be considered "best" or "more valuable."

³²Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 21-22.

³³For one of the better demonstrations, see Walter Berns, "The Behavioral Sciences and the Study of Political Things: The Case of Christian Bay's The Structure of Freedom," The American Political Science Review, LV (Sept., 1961), pp. 204-24.

A few persons did not wish to allow the existence of "natural" tendencies, although they insisted upon the need to assume the existence of "natural" categories (and hence, naturally similar characteristics). In this case, it was only necessary to point out again that to the extent two things share characteristics (are members of the same category), they invariably share tendencies. Some persons apparently have difficulty understanding the argument that there is no point at which category leaves off and tendency begins, that they are parts of one another. Perhaps the natural law theorist is justified in complaining persons with a positivist bent tend to contemplate a world of static forms and categories, and to ignore the world of process and flux, which is, after all, the world of our experience; one might say, the "empirical" world.³⁴ Instead, theirs seems to be a universe in which things go from category to category sans any transitional stage; or, if there is one, it is deemed somehow less real.

The other, and more common criticism, one which I must admit surprised me, went as follows: "Just because a tendency is 'natural' is no basis for arguing it is ipso facto to be considered of greater value. Having said the 'natural' tendency of a sapling is to become tree, it does not automatically follow that it is 'better' or 'best' for it to do so." Now, this would be a sound argument except

³⁴See Wild, p. 84.

for one thing. The positivistically based argument against fascism, communism, racial bigotry, and radical rightism in its entirety was noted to be established upon the premise that value choices which do not reflect the "facts" of the matter (the "real" categories), are ipso facto bad value choices. Now the argument is presented that though categories and tendencies are equally "real," blend in to one another, depend upon one another for existence, it is the case that values based upon "real" categories are of greater intrinsic worth, while those based upon "real" tendencies are not. When he makes this sort of argument, we are warranted in borrowing Strauss' phrase and accusing the positivist of "gross arbitrariness."

Given his paradigm assumptions, the natural law theorist has quite properly maintained that once one surrenders the concept of "natural" values, as the pro-positivist insists on doing, it is impossible to criticize the actions of another group or nation, save in a wholly arbitrary manner. It is possible to say no more than "I do not like what you do."³⁵ When viewed from the natural law angle, criticism of the kind currently tendered by the contemporary American political scientist of positivist convictions is seen to be wholly inconsistent with his own underlying epistemology.

³⁵ See Wild, pp. 48-49; also Williamson, pp. 147-77; also Leo R. Ward, "The Natural Law Rebound," The Review of Politics, XXI (Jan., 1959), p. 127.

A final criticism of the natural law position was that it is dubious scholarship to accept, not to mention promote, "truths" which cannot be demonstrated to be "true," which are defended in the last analysis as "self-evident."³⁶ (The reference is to the "self-evident" nature of "true" values of which the natural law advocate speaks.)

The answer to this criticism which natural law epistemology provides is that dubious scholarship though it may be, it is the only kind of scholarship. It is always a relatively simple matter to demonstrate the "truth" of a given fact (or for that matter, value) once agreement is reached on the appropriate standard to be used in judging. But it is quite impossible to demonstrate in some logical way that a particular standard is the correct one to employ. To refer to a previous illustration, one can readily demonstrate an individual or a nation is or is not authoritarian, once the question of an authoritarianism scale is settled. But although it is the case the nature of the scale selected will determine the nature of the answer one gets, the appropriateness of any specific scale will be seen as "self-evident" or it will not be seen at all.³⁷

Once this last is understood, it becomes plain the natural law theorist and the positivist are not advocating such different

³⁶Oppenheim gives the same criticism. See p. 43.

³⁷This is essentially the point Kuhn was making. See pp. 156-72.

approaches to the discovery of "truth" after all. The positivist utilizes certain standards to judge political questions, the appropriate nature of which he must, of necessity, assume to be "self-evident." Employing said standards, he obtains collections of "facts," and then proceeds to argue values are "good" values only to the degree they accord with his "facts." In this way, his values, no less than the natural law theorists, are defended as having "self-evident" worth.

The natural law proponent might also point out that when Strauss argues we should not expect savages to have "any real knowledge" of "true" values, he is hardly in opposition to the positivist. The latter has emphasized the importance of a certain kind of education if political "facts" are to be recognized. He does not look to the savage. And since he accepts no values which do not square with the "facts" derived from that education, if it be accepted "fact" and "value" are tied, in rejecting the savage's "facts" as unworthy he rejects his values as well.

Natural Law Evaluated--Assets and Liabilities

If they did nothing else, natural law theorists would nonetheless serve a worthwhile function just by probing and prodding some of the epistemological and philosophical premises upon which their more positivistic colleagues hope to erect a science. Insofar as they

consistently give rise to understandings in direct conflict with our experience, several of these premises are nothing short of amazing. The contention that fact and value are independent entities is probably the best example of this. It prompts Felix Oppenheim, in the article previously cited, to draw the following rather unexpected conclusion: The positivist position of value noncognitivism, he states, "while denying that intrinsic value-judgments have cognitive status, leaves everyone logically free to subscribe to any set of political and ethical norms."³⁸ Certainly, this is the precise thing value noncognitivism, as practiced, has not done, as we know full well when we reflect on what has been said of fascists, communists, racists, U. S. radical rightists, in fact far too often of any group whose economic, social and political values were strongly at odds with those of the liberal political science community.

By dichotomizing fact and value and concluding it is possible to peddle facts without simultaneously peddling values, I am convinced many political scientists have come to hold views of their field, of education, and of themselves as educators which similarly fly in the face of experience. A popular notion among positivistic political scientists being that they should not be involved in fostering any set of economic, social or political values, I believe they also incline to the assumption they do not engage in such practices. They seemingly

³⁸Oppenheim, p. 51.

fail to make the simple observation that the standards (measuring instruments) which they employ in order to judge things political permit of a most restricted type of conclusion. They forget it is not just a fluke that they neglect to take up the instruments for judging democracy or despotism which the self-proclaimed fascist or communist might utilize. Such standards would give notably different readings, ones out of accord with the particular values the scholar is busily engaged in promoting.

It is interesting to note that the picture of education which results when fact and value are separated in this way is at odds with the one generally given by persons who approach the subject from a philosophical vantage point. For example, the noted student of education Werner Jaeger offered this definitional comment: "Education," he proposed,

is the process by which a community preserves and transmits its physical and intellectual character . . . Education, as practiced by man, is inspired by the same creative and directive vital force which impels every natural species to maintain and preserve its own type; . . . Therefore, education in any human community (be it a family, a social class, a profession, or some wider complex such as a race or a state) is the direct expression of its active awareness of a standard . . . And since the basis of education is a general consciousness of the values which govern life, its history is affected by changes in the values current within the community.³⁹

And former Commissioner of Education, Francis Keppel, was

³⁹Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. by Gilbert Highet : (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 2-3.

sufficiently impressed by what Jaeger had to say that in a recent book he defined education by quoting the above passage directly.⁴⁰

In my estimation natural law theorists provide a real service, then, just by reminding the political science community of its value involvement, however unpleasant some may find the reminder. Another of their important services, and a closely related one, has to do with curbing the development and promulgation by political scientists of an extremely narrow set of political views and values. By drawing a hard line between fact and value and by ignoring as a metaphysical interest the creative ties between the standards they use in making political measurements and the resulting measurements themselves, political scientists could quite conceivably end by becoming the dogmatists they stand in such horror of. For if fact and value are tied in the way the natural law proponent contends, to the extent political scientists are in radical disagreement over values concerning any given political phenomenon, we would expect them to similarly dispute the facts. Consequently, if while arguing for complete freedom of choice when it comes to values, political scientists act to suppress as "non-objective," "irrational" or whatever individuals who radically contradict their personal readings of the facts, they will without question develop a community dogma which encompasses both fact and value.

⁴⁰Francis Keppel, The Necessary Revolution in American Education (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 1-2.

That natural law theorists are justified in fearing such an eventuality is adequately demonstrated, I think, by many of the responses to their own publications as well as to those of scholars such as C. Wright Mills and William A. Williams. It is my personal conviction that we have already traveled too far in the direction of developing a community dogma. There is, of course, an inevitable conflict between the demand which all societies impose that educational institutions promote certain sacred values and the desire on the part of intellectuals to have maximum latitude of inquiry. Natural law theorists likewise appear to be aware of this conflict in a way in which positivists do not.

I believe thanks are due the natural law thinker for continually calling attention to the manner in which individual scholars cannot be other than dogmatic. I refer here both to the observation that every expressed "fact" ultimately flows from certain assumptions and standards which are themselves embraced as having "self-evident" virtue and value, and to the observation that the very vocabularies and methods we employ in our investigations warp and condition our findings. I suppose a chief reason for this awareness is that, as we noted, much criticism of their work has been based on assumptions which natural law theorists flatly reject and put forth in a vocabulary they do not use.⁴¹

⁴¹Whatever the reason, one frequently comes across comments like this one by Hallowell: "To understand the thought of any man, it is essential to know with what 'freely invented' concepts he starts, to

At the same time, on the occasions when they have tried to engage critics in discussion of basic assumptions they have had little success.

Strauss insists a positivistic political science "rests on a dogmatic atheism."⁴² Though I do not necessarily share his chagrin, I would not challenge his contention. I think it would be as difficult a feat to employ the theories and the language of contemporary behaviorism and yet conclude some political event under consideration was the work of God as it would be, using the same tools, to wind up agreeing with the readings of a quasi-Marxist theoretician living on Mainland China. Like Kuhn, Strauss is demonstrating that via our selection of assumption and word, in a most decided fashion we build the answers we seek into our very analyses.

Lastly, I consider it to the credit of natural law theorists that they have decried in loud voice the superficiality and the triviality of much contemporary political science. They have been critical of its narrow vision and parochial interpretation, and they have reproached the positivistic investigator for his reluctance to commit himself to a conclusion, even those modest conclusions to which his

know the point of view from which he observes and interprets life about him. It is necessary to know his premises as well as the conclusions he draws from these. The things which he presupposes, which he may regard as self-evident, are as important to an understanding of his thought as are the ideas which he expresses and his manner of expression. Implicit assumptions, in other words, are as important as explicit assertions." Hallowell, p. 2.

⁴² Strauss, "An Epilogue," p. 322.

modest analyses clearly point. All too often, complains Richard Weaver, the political scientist prefaces his final statements with "It may not be improbable in view of these findings," or "On the basis of available evidence, it is not unreasonable to suppose," or again, "The present survey would seem to indicate." Contends Weaver, "All these rhetorical contortions are forms of needless hedging." "These scholars," he notes,

move to a tune of "induction never ends," and their scholarship often turns into a pedantic empiricism. They seem to be waiting for the fact that will bring with it the revelation. But that fact will never arrive; experience does not tell us what we are experiencing, and at some point they are going to have to give names to their findings--even at the expense of becoming dialecticians.⁴³

I would only add Amen! It is one thing to concede you are fallible, to grant your conclusions may all be regarded as nonsense tomorrow, even by yourself. It is quite another to act as though merely admitting one's opinions, openly and honestly, is less than scholarly conduct.

Turning now to the short-comings of natural law theory, to my mind they are probably as numerous, certainly they are as serious, as its virtues. First of all, while I find the epistemology logically sound, when natural law theorists apply it in an effort to explain why things have happened or are happening in some particular way, I am seldom impressed with the results. Hallowell's contention that positivism was responsible for German fascism is a case in point.

⁴³Weaver, pp. 193-95.

The essence of Hallowell's argument was that a positivistic philosophy fostered moral relativism, thereby encouraging ethical nihilism, thereby preparing the ground for the rise of fascism. Then, because they believed all values to be of equal intrinsic worth, positivistic scholars did not have sufficient moral dedication to actively resist the Hitler regime. Assumptions implicit in his explanation are: that positivism encourages moral nihilism (the belief there is no "objective" basis for one's moral positions); moral relativists will be more tolerant of brutal activities of others than will moral absolutists and, that relativists will be less apt to respond to a call to physically involve themselves in defense of a moral principle than will absolutists.

Blatantly contradictory to Hallowell's thesis, however, are all of the following observations: Positivists--European or American--have not been moral nihilists; they have, we found, insisted their moral options are "objectively" rooted in "fact." Moral absolutists, like moral relativists, have abided and abetted brutality of all varieties; I need only mention the numerous religious wars the world has known, the enthusiasm with which many devout persons, including church figures, endorsed European fascism, and as every political scientist well knows, individuals who view current political movements in Russia and China as sufficiently intolerable to warrant brutal U. S. remedial initiatives have more often than not backed

their arguments with reference to values they hold to be absolute. As for moral relativists being reluctant to answer a call to defend moral principles, what of the enthusiastic response of U. S. positivists during World War II? And what of the determination of the Russian people in behalf of what they considered a high moral cause during the same war? Moral relativism was by then well established among Soviet politicians as well as scholars. For that matter, what of the Nazis? Themselves moral relativists according to Hallowell's own reckoning, they fought for what they held to be a profoundly moral objective. Unless one is to believe they lied even to one another, their correspondence reveals a sincere belief that the preservation of that which they considered German, was the most worthy of moral aims. Granting Hallowell may have persuasive answers to all of the foregoing counters, he does not present them in his thesis and it suffers as a result. And the argument is weakened still further when we reflect that far simpler, in my estimation more convincing, explanations can be given for the liberal German scholar's refusal to take up arms against the Nazis. George L. Mosse has offered one; he comments:

Faculty attitudes can easily be explained; they are not very mysterious and should be apparent to all, even today. Academicians rarely oppose the regime in power; in Germany they were directly connected with it, and consequently tended to support the status quo.⁴⁴

Respecting the broader question "Why do academicians rarely oppose

⁴⁴Mosse, p. 202.

the regime in power?", Hallowell's reflections provide neither answers nor guidance.

So too, when Strauss seeks to account for the existing political atmosphere in the U. S.--one which he apparently considers both dangerous and critical--he makes reference to the over-equalitarian nature of the democracy implicitly fostered by a positivistic political science.⁴⁵ What I find to be serious flaws in this explanation will be clearly stated in Chapter Ten.

Natural law theorists complained investigators of a positivistic orientation continually stress the importance of real "facts," yet, except for the trivial, steadfastly refuse to point to any; they never commit themselves. In my opinion a fair comment, I believe it can be said with equal fairness that while natural law theorists constantly emphasize the significance of real "values," outside of the wholly general, few natural law theorists move to enumerate them.⁴⁶ Their lists of sample values concerning human nature generally include nothing more than such objectives as "self-preservation,"

⁴⁵For Strauss' comments about the perilous nature of the present, as well as the pitfalls of liberal style democracy, the reader is referred to his "Epilogue," pp. 307-27.

⁴⁶Typically, we are told no more than "That is good which advances man's nature; that is bad which keeps him from realizing it," or that we must locate "universal pattern(s) of action, applicable to all men everywhere, required by human nature itself for its completion." See Lon Fuller, "American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century," Journal of Legal Education, VI (1953-54), pp. 472-73; also Wild, p. 64.

"self-propagation," etc.⁴⁷

Whenever they attempt to square this reluctance to describe what is naturally "good" for man with their enthusiastic willingness to inform us as to what is "bad" for him in the here and now, natural law theorists try to push the same weak logic employed by the positivist in order to explain how it is he cannot tell us what the facts are, but nevertheless knows who it is that misreads them. Lon Fuller has offered this specious bit of reasoning:

If a working companion asks me for a hammer, or the nearest thing to it available to me, I know at once, without knowing precisely what operation he is undertaking, that many tools will be useless to him. I do not pass him a screwdriver or a length of rope. I can, in short, know the bad on the basis of very imperfect notions of what would be good to perfection. So I believe it is with social rules and institutions. We can, for example, know what is plainly unjust without committing ourselves to declare with finality what perfect justice would be like.⁴⁸

I will leave it to the reader to judge if Fuller's argument would not possess greater logical appeal if it read something like this:

If a working companion asks me for a hammer, or the nearest thing to it available to me, I know at once, without knowing precisely what operation he is undertaking, that many tools will probably be useless to him. I am not apt to pass him a screwdriver. Still less would I be likely to pass him a length of rope. I can, in short, have a fairly good notion of what

⁴⁷See, for example, Robert M. Hutchins, "Natural Law and Jurisprudence," in Natural Law and Modern Society, ed. by John Cogley, et al. (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1963), p. 33.

⁴⁸Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 12.

would be bad, since I have a fairly good notion of what would be good to perfection. Naturally I cannot know what would be truly imperfect, since I do not know what would be truly ideal. So I believe it is with social rules and institutions. We can, for example, only know what is plainly unjust, to the degree that we feel able to declare with finality what perfect justice would be like.

While tracing their assumptions and methods back to the great classical logicians, natural law thinkers sometimes practice a strange, embarrassingly strange, form of logic in their work.

There is another interesting parallel here between positivist and natural law theorist. Those of a positivistic bent sometimes proclaim truth beautiful, then tell us we can never be sure we have it, leaving us to ponder how they can presume to know it to be so attractive. Natural law theorists likewise pronounce upon the merits of true value, yet, on occasion we find them saying while man's symbols may reflect such truth, "none is completely true insofar as the truth about being is essentially beyond human reach."⁴⁹ (This criticism applies principally to those natural law theorists who claim the laws derive ultimately from God.)

To natural law theorists who hold God to be the well-spring of true values--and they seem to be the majority⁵⁰--it must appear

⁴⁹Voeglin, Order and History, p. 7.

⁵⁰Harvey Wheeler writes: "Usually natural law has been invested with religious content. However, there need not be any religious obligation attached to natural law." I might add that of the most vocal proponents of a natural law position today, the majority, without question, view such laws as God-given. See Harvey Wheeler, "Natural Law and Human Culture," in Natural Law and Modern Society, p. 199.

the height of pretension to suggest man choose his own values, to, as it were, "play God" in respect to objectives. But this view itself indicates what seems to me a flaw in the natural law position, for man cannot do otherwise. Those who argue the absolute nature of values have never been able to agree upon what they are or what they direct in any given situation; that is why they have hesitated to label them. Consequently, each individual, convinced though he may be that values are natural and absolute, must decide for himself whose interpretation he will accept; that is, he must decide for himself what his values will be, he must "play God." It is not possible to deprive man of responsibility for the values he holds, however much we may all sometimes wish it were.

Scholars with positivistic leanings have been taxed by natural law enthusiasts with being committed to a preservation of the status quo. This charge too, can be just as properly leveled at the accusers themselves. While social change has sometimes been rationalized with reference to natural human rights, the French Revolution and our own are prime examples,⁵¹ more commonly, those who have insisted upon the immutability of the laws were desirous of maintaining the going socio-economic structure; they identified

⁵¹For the argument that natural law advocates have often been radicals, see Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1965)

natural law with existing positive laws.⁵² Robert Gordis, himself a natural law theorist, speaks of the conservative bias in natural law as "undeniable."⁵³

On their part, natural law theorists were able to finger the dynamics by which a positivistic social science invariably endorses status quo values. Positivism is concerned with "facts" (existing categories), not tendencies. Since it refuses to grant the worth of any values at odds with these existing categories, it will, of necessity, derive its Ought from its Is.

The dynamics of natural law conservatism are rather similar. While natural law theorists view the world as process and flux, in their estimation the "true" laws never change; "human nature" never changes.⁵⁴ Therefore, we find a tendency to look at what man is and has been, and simply label that "natural." Its conservative coloration also results, I believe, from the religious conviction of many natural law proponents that man has "fallen," never to really get back on his feet again. "Human history," states Russell Kirk, "is an account of men running as fast as they can, like Alice and the

⁵²See Brendan F. Brown, ed., The Natural Law Reader (New York: Oceana Publications, 1960), pp. 3-4.

⁵³Gordis, "Natural Law and Religion," pp. 248-50.

⁵⁴Russell Kirk proposes "human nature, by definition, is unchangeable." Beyond the Dreams of Avarice (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956), p. 24.

White Queen, in order to stay where they are."⁵⁵ Hallowell has argued that when one ceases to believe values are absolute he loses his interest in defending them. What, we might now ask, does it do to incentive to believe that at best, by running one's fastest, he can stay precisely where he is?

While the above imperfections are important enough, there remains another which, to my way of thinking, overshadows all the rest. The imperfection I refer to has several facets, but all of them obtain from a single source, that part of the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm which says "real" forms are out there to be discovered, and the anti-democratic conclusions which flow therefrom.

To explain: because it is assumed the facts have but one "real" or "true" form, it is quickly reasoned that only persons with a certain education and enlightenment can be fact-finders, and only values which accord with the facts are sound or acceptable. Now, such assumptions, as Henry Kariel well notes, are "at variance with those of liberal democracy."⁵⁶ At the same time, other features of the paradigm tend to have a dampening effect on this anti-democratic aspect. Since a given group of scholars may be in error respecting the facts, we found they were cautioned to move against those who held opposing views with great hesitation and restraint. Because fact

⁵⁵Kirk, p. 178.

⁵⁶Kariel, p. 113.

and value were said to be separated, we saw it was not possible to decry the values of others in a completely open manner, more subtle procedures had to be used, etc.

There are, I feel, implications of many natural law positions which, if acted upon, could swing the pendulum back the other way. Unlike the positivist, the natural law theorist openly commits himself to the assumptions there are discoverable "truths," not only factual truths, but value truths as well. Therefore, he too believes in the need for sound perception and for reason and rationality, and he stands in the same fear of false prophets.⁵⁷ However, because he emphasizes the primacy of value-truth, and because he insists value-truth is revealed only to persons who involve themselves in a very particular sort of life and education--"philosophers and philosopher-kings, freed through disciplined thinking from the blind illusions of the senses"⁵⁸--the natural law thinker appears more inclined than the positivist to draw aristocratic, anti-democratic conclusions. Russell Kirk informs us: "The notion that the 'ordinary citizen,' without any assistance, knows at once what is good or bad for him is a concept more unreal than 'economic man.'"⁵⁹ Similar arguments are

⁵⁷See Hallowell, pp. 5, 36-7; Storing et al., p. 311; Kirk, p. 123.

⁵⁸Rommen, The Natural Law, p. 15.

⁵⁹Kirk, p. 114.

found in the writing of Leo Strauss. Natural law thinkers also seem less hesitant to argue the need for censure. And perhaps it is only my imagination, but when reading Strauss' complaints about the thought conformity positivism demands, the dogmatism it nurtures, I am always troubled by the suspicion that what he may be concerned about most is not the demand for conformity itself, but rather, that he believes scholars are being asked to conform to the "wrong" assumptions, they are being asked to endorse a "false" dogma. Strauss never does make it clear whether he is issuing the cry for a greater range of expression, or only a plea for scholars to recognize natural law theorists as the "true" prophets of our age.

Endorsing the bulk of the nineteenth century paradigm, natural law theory falls heir to many other weaknesses suffered by positivism, such as the concentration on teleological explanation, and the inability to offer anything in the way of sound prediction. It has, however, one last redeeming characteristic. Because it links fact and value, it leads to the same understanding of the epistemological alternatives men have open to them on the matter of "reality" that a relativistic epistemology does. Harry V. Jaffa states the options in his reply to Oppenheim. "What Oppenheim calls 'intrinsic value-judgments' and what he calls 'empirical knowledge' are both, in principle, cognitions of an objective reality, or neither are."⁶⁰(my

⁶⁰Jaffa, p. 58; see also Lewis, pp. 62-63.

italics). With that we will move to look in a more systematic way at some of the arguments which have been presented in behalf of the notion "neither are," and at various meanings of such a contention.

Before doing so, however, in view of everything said in this chapter, I would like to make a few additions to our running list of unanswered questions. Given that a natural law epistemology cannot readily be bested with positivistic argument, why is it, then, so widely ignored? And if positivism has nothing more to recommend it than we have encountered thus far, how account for its great popularity, especially in the United States? Why has enthusiasm for natural law assumptions waxed and waned over the years? When the natural law-positivist debate is so clearly epistemological, why do scholars in both camps so seldom talk about epistemology? Why do they ignore one another's definitions, often failing even to observe they are speaking different languages? Moreover, if different vocabularies invariably lead to different world views in this manner, can it be that definitions are not arbitrary after all? Finally, if there are no natural values, how is it scholars in every nation so frequently come to like value conclusions? Certainly in the United States there are no open demands for value conformity. And on the matter of conformity, is there a certain amount of it demanded of its scholars by any society? If so, what are its limits? How are they fixed? And how imposed?

VIII. QUASI-RELATIVISTIC EPISTEMOLOGIES:

PRAGMATISM AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE¹

Every concept represents a sort of taboo against other possible sources of meaning--simplifying and unifying the manifoldness of life for the sake of action.²

--Karl Mannheim

The world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Like the kingdom of heaven, it suffers human violence willingly. Man engenders truth upon it.³

--William James

Founded on many common premises and observations, the pragmatism of William James, F. S. C. Schiller, and John Dewey arrives at conclusions one author terms "startlingly akin to" and another "identical with" those of Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge.⁴ As philosophies, both reflect recognition of the profound

¹Numerous and frequently disparate theories have at one time or another been subsumed under the label "Sociology of Knowledge." My comments in this chapter, however, refer only to that body of propositions and ideas put forth by Mannheim.

²Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. by Louis Wirth and Edward A. Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963), p. 22.

³William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907), p. 257.

⁴Louis Wirth in Ideology and Utopia, p. xviii; see also Jacques J. Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, trans. by John F. Locke (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951), pp. 9-10.

inadequacies of the nineteenth century epistemological paradigm, and both lean toward a relativistic alternative. Kuhn said the process of destroying one thought-system is simultaneously the process of building another. In that case, given the goal of a tightly reasoned substitute for the old conceptual framework, neither the American pragmatists nor Mannheim went far enough in their rebellion. Nevertheless, as I will try to demonstrate in this chapter, the efforts of the above four individuals and their followers was a giant step in the right direction. Although the work of the pragmatists preceded that of Mannheim, in several important respects the latter's theorizing is less relativistic, and therefore, for our purposes less progressive. For this reason I have chosen to review the sociology of knowledge first.

Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge

In sound relativistic fashion Mannheim argued there is no justification for treating economic-social-political "experiences," "thoughts," "word-meanings," and "actions," as separate and distinct things. They are, he insisted, but inter-related parts of a whole process, and to alter one is unavoidably to change all of the others. Thus, he began by proposing "the specific character and life-situation of the subject influence his opinions, perceptions and interpretations." There is an immediate tie between thought and experience, a "correspondence between a given social situation and

a given perspective, point of view, or apperception mass,"⁵ so that to ask about a man's economic, social and political thoughts is at once to inquire about his economic, social and political experiences.⁶

Mannheim next proposed man's social thoughts reflect not individual, but group, or community, experiences. He reasoned since each of us hangs our words directly on our experiences, it follows communication, which clearly requires the sharing of word-meanings, must also necessitate the sharing of experiences. Economic-social-political "knowing," then, is "fundamentally collective knowing . . . presuppos[ing] a community of knowing which grows out of a community of experiencing prepared for in the subconscious. Mannheim held, "In every concept, in every concrete meaning, there is contained a crystallization of the experiences of a certain group." "Knowledge is from the very beginning a co-operative process of group life, in which everyone unfolds his knowledge within the framework of a common fate, a common activity, and the overcoming of common difficulties."⁷ According to this view, there can be no purely individual or private thought about economic-social-political issues; "strictly speaking," said Mannheim, "it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks."⁸

⁵Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 58.

⁶Ibid., p. 56.

⁷Ibid., pp. 21-22, 29, 31.

⁸Ibid., p. 3.

Having contended particular social vocabularies are reflective of particular social experiences, Mannheim went on to observe that groups are continually engaged in conflict over economic-social-political matters. Consequently, to claim a group's word-meanings will vary according to its experiences is to claim its vocabulary will vary according to its position in the conflict (conflict being its experience); or, in a word, a group's vocabulary will vary according to its "interests."⁹ In his preface to Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, Louis Wirth explains this part of the thesis as follows:

Since every assertion of a "fact" about the social world touches the interests of some individual or group, one cannot even call attention to the existence of certain "facts" without courting the objections of those whose very raison d'etre in society rests upon a divergent interpretation of the "factual" situation.

. . . truth is not merely a matter of a simple correspondence between thought and existence, but is tinged with the investigator's interest in his subject matter, his standpoint, his evaluations, in short, the definition of his object of attention.¹⁰

In Mannheim's estimation, then, it is the nature of economic-social-political thoughts and vocabularies to be "interest-laden." The very "mental productions of a social group correspond to its position because, in its struggle to obtain or retain economic and political power, the group, consciously or unconsciously, utilizes its cognitive

⁹ Mannheim states: "Behind every theory there are collective forces expressive of group-purposes, power and interests." Ibid., p. 124.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. xv-xviii.

productions, whether it be to express its desires, or as a direct means of combat in the pursuit of its collective objectives."¹¹

From what has been said it should be apparent that when it comes to economic, social or political issues the sociology of knowledge makes no provision whatever for a "detached" observer, as that creature is generally characterized. Rather, every observer is held to do his viewing from some particular vantage point. "The observer himself," states Mannheim, "does not stand outside the realm of the irrational, but is a participant in the conflict of forces. This participation inevitably binds him to a partisan view through his evaluations and interests."¹² Moreover, as we noted, a viewer's perspective, his opinions and arguments, never reflect his personal interests alone, else he will fail to communicate. Communication requires that his thoughts and language reflect and represent community experiences, community aims.¹³ Social analysis and interpretation is always done in behalf of some social interest group or class, and the vying among groups or classes to make their world-views prevail is simply part and parcel of that interest conflict. In Paul Keckskemeti's words: "Which

¹¹Maquet, p. 35.

¹²Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 116-17.

¹³Mannheim, of course, made no such distinction between "experiencing" and "aiming," since he insisted experience itself has direction. He spoke, for example, of "not purpose in addition to perception but purpose in perception." Ibid., p. 295.

philosophy is to be the dominant one of a society is one of the chief objects of the social struggle within that society. Theoretical discussions may be conceived of as incidents of the general struggle for power."¹⁴ Mannheim himself comments: "The variation in the meaning of words and the multiple connotations of every concept reflect polarities of mutually antagonistic schemes of life implicit in these nuances of meaning."¹⁵

Now up to this point Mannheim's philosophy is notably relativistic. He has argued word-meanings are based on experience; experience, perception, purpose and action are all part of a single process; one can never remove himself from the process, and so on. The reader might well expect to find him also proposing "truth" varies directly with experience, that in an absolute sense all descriptive statements are equally "true," and, that it is consequently not possible to ever speak of an observer's being "right" or "wrong" in his analyses. But Mannheim drew quite different conclusions. He took special pains to demonstrate his thesis, which he labeled "relationism," is as different from relativism as it is from an absolutist position of the nineteenth century paradigm variety. The way in which he went about this is of particular interest here.

¹⁴Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. by Paul Keckskemeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 25.

¹⁵Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 83.

"Relationism" and "Truth"

First of all, Mannheim reflected, at any given time we will find "mutually opposing views and theories are not infinite in number."¹⁶ Secondly, such partial viewpoints always emerge "out of the same social and historical current."¹⁷ We might say they provide glimpses of the social conflict (of the current) from various interest-angles. For Mannheim, then, the social and historical current in its entirety constituted "reality," and just as a view of the whole current would be a more complete "truth," so too, any one of the partial views was considered by him to be a piece of the "truth," a "partial truth."

It is crucial to a knowledge of Mannheim's thesis to understand that he further believed the social-historical current does not simply flow, but proceeds in a dialectical manner, stage (Mannheim called them "epochs") following upon stage.¹⁸ Thus, "truth" about the social-historical current has to do with discerning one of the stages or epochs, in particular the one which is in the ascendant. It is also important to know Mannheim held any epoch-"truth" (which he referred to as the "spirit" or "Weltanschauung" of a period) is itself reflective of epoch-interests, much as the particular views dominating an epoch

¹⁶Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 151.

¹⁸See Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 91-92, 151, 152; also Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 125; also Maquet, pp. 66-67.

always reflect particular interests. Naturally, since history is in process, one epoch replacing another, even these epoch-interests and their corresponding "truths," or spirits, are temporary in nature, in time fated to be superseded by some more progressive complex of interests and understandings.¹⁹ To illustrate: the feudal interests and the Weltanschauung they generated, characterized in part by a religious explanation of the universe, were dialectically replaced by industrial interests and "the forms of thought characteristic of industrial society."²⁰

An interesting and unique feature of Mannheim's philosophy is that it provides for two quite distinct kinds of "truth." There is the "truth" of any given partial view; members of a group or community never achieve complete agreement when it comes to making social analyses; consequently, Mannheim reasoned, it must be the case some persons come closer to comprehending the interest-laden "truth" of their group than do others. In other words, it is possible to be "wrong"

¹⁹Mannheim contemplated a "continuously revised and renewed synthesis of the existing particular viewpoints," and suggested "a demand for an absolute, permanent synthesis would, as far as we are concerned, mean a relapse into the static world view of intellectualism." Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 151. This idea of a continually revamped synthesis is consistent with Mannheim's notion that experience and thought alter together, for if economic-social experiences change through time, and they clearly do, thought must alter as often and as drastically.

²⁰See Ibid., pp. 12, 36, 96.

(Mannheim would have said "less right") about the "perspective truth" of one's community. And, of course, it is always possible to be in error about the "true" historical-social stage, or epoch, the world-community happens to be in.

Depending upon whether one hopes to acquire a "perspective truth," or instead seeks to gain the "truth" about an entire epoch, Mannheim's theory suggests varying patterns of action to the scholar. If one aims for the former, he is advised to first identify and then take up the economic and social experiences (interests) as well as the categories, concepts and word-meanings of the community whose "truth" he wishes to uncover. If, on the other hand, the goal is to glean the "truth" of an historical epoch (of the economic-social current)--an objective Mannheim considered the only one worthy of a scholar's efforts--one must behave quite differently. Gaining the latter will require distinguishing all of the various perspective, or partial, "truths" and their accompanying vocabularies. It will necessitate locating the social bases of each.²¹ And it will include showing the connections between all of the various partial "truths"; that is, the scholar will demonstrate how they are all parts of a social whole; he

²¹Mannheim considered his thoughts concerning the interest-oriented nature of political vocabularies and opinions an improvement on the ideas of Karl Marx. Marx had pointed to the interests underlying the conceptions of one group, his opponents. But as Maquet observes, "the sociology of knowledge will grant no privilege of this type and will endeavor to determine the perspective of any mental production, its own included." Maquet, p. 23.

will construct, to use Mannheim's term, a "synthesis." Accordingly, a synthesis will by its very nature be markedly different from any of the existing dominant political views. "All points of view in politics," Mannheim argued, "are but partial points of view because historical totality is always too comprehensive to be grasped by any one of the individual points of view which emerge out of it."²²

Lastly in connection with discovering an epoch "truth," or Weltanschauung, the scholar must work to divorce himself from close commitment to any of the existing partial "truths," which means his personal economic-social interests must not be intimately bound up with those of a particular group, community or class. The ideal synthesizer will be detached from all special interests, and hence from their respective world-views.

Mannheim was convinced the intellectual community was ideally suited to provide this kind of personality.²³ Unlike workers and entrepreneurs, he insisted, intellectuals are not married to a single set of class interests. He was not suddenly abandoning his conviction detachment is impossible.²⁴ Contrary to what some scholars have supposed, he did not contend the intellectual community "is

²²Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 151.

²³See in particular Ibid., pp. 153-62.

²⁴Maquet, for one, accuses him of this. See Maquet, pp. 82-83; see also Gwynne Nettler, "A Test for the Sociology of Knowledge," American Sociological Review, X (June, 1945), p. 394.

suspended in a vacuum into which social interests do not penetrate"; quite the opposite, he maintained "it subsumes in itself all those interests with which social life is permeated." Like everyone else, the intellectual synthesizer will have his economic-social interest involvements. Only in his case the ties will not be to one particular interest element, rather he will be involved with a "complex" of interests such that a synthetic view will be his natural perspective. The intellectual "more or less takes a part in the mass of mutually conflicting tendencies." And it is precisely because he does, thought Mannheim, that he confronts a "wider area of choice and a corresponding need for total orientation and synthesis."²⁵

Certain features of Mannheim's thesis are worth giving special emphasis. To begin with, every social "truth" accessible to man--even those relating to epochs--are in the last analysis viewed as partial.²⁶ Thus, in the same way the individual perspectives existing during a stage are said to constitute pieces of the broader epoch "truth," the latter is itself said to be one of numerous segments of some yet-to-be-discovered, more all-encompassing, therefore "truer" synthesis.

²⁵Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 157, 161.

²⁶"It may well be," states Mannheim, "that our intellectualism will repeatedly stimulate in us the longing for a point of view beyond time and history--for a 'consciousness as such' out of which there arise insights independent of particular perspectives, and capable of formulation into general laws which are eternally valid. But this objective cannot be attained without doing violence to the subject matter." Ibid., p. 171.

Of succeeding and ostensibly conflicting epoch "truths" Mannheim proposed they "do not contradict each other in their interpretations, but encircle the same materially identical given historical content from different standpoints and at different depths of penetration."²⁷ As a result, one of the best ways to judge the "truth" of a synthesis is to note whether it is "more comprehensive, broader in scope than the preceding ones--systematically mastering the elements handed down from the past, together with new elements, from a higher viewpoint, rather than merely preserving and reproducing them."²⁸ As for the "problem of what is ultimate truth," to the sociologist of knowledge that is a matter he "need not be concerned with."²⁹

Secondly, to see things in any definite way, to make a particular analysis or reading, whether that analysis constitutes an epoch "truth" or only one of the perspective views which go to make it up, it is necessary to: (a) have a very specific set of experiences, (b) utilize a specific vocabulary, and, since experience has direction, (c) promote specific interests. Keckskemeti writes:

The subject who knows history is the subject who participates in history as an active being, sharing in the dominant social aspirations of his epoch. There is an "inner link" between "aspiration" and knowledge . . . To be out of touch with the

²⁷Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 105-106.

²⁸Ibid., p. 118.

²⁹Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 84.

basic trend is to miss the truth; identification with the basic trend will guarantee true knowledge.³⁰

The synthesizer, no less than the non-synthesizer, is bound to a given world-view, born of given experiences and interests. The perspective views which he weaves into his synthesis do not look the same to him as to those who hold them to be "truth."³¹ "Only one who loves or hates," Mannheim tells us, "gets to see in the loved or hated object certain characteristics which are invisible to others who are merely spectators."³² As we saw, however, this one-to-one tie between experience and viewpoint does not mean all viewpoints are equally "true." Whereas exponents of partial views are prone to look upon one another's readings as irrational, are unable to order them or give them coherence, the synthesizer relates them all to an existential whole. He rationalizes them. It is this synthetic quality of his analysis which informs us it inclines toward "truth." In Mannheim's estimation,

³⁰Keckskemeti in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 14, 15, 18.

³¹"Every fact and event in an historical period is only explicable in terms of meaning, and meaning in its turn always refers to another meaning. Thus the conception of the unity and interdependence of meaning in a period always underlies the interpretation of that period. Secondly, this interdependent system of meanings varies both in all its parts and in its totality from one historical period to another." "What is needed, therefore, is a continual readiness to recognize that every point of view is particular to a certain definite situation, and to find out through analysis of what this particularity consists." Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 68-69, 89-90.

³²Ibid., p. 169.

the problem of finding "truth" is not how to "arrive at a non-perspectivistic picture, but how, by juxtaposing the various points of view, each perspective may be recognized as such and thereby a new level of objectivity obtained."³³

A final, less notable, aspect of the sociology of knowledge is that like the absolutist's epistemology it permits a whole group or community to be out of touch with social "truth."³⁴ If a community's interests and experiences are ones the historical-social current has turned against, it will fight the current and challenge "truth."

Implications for Political Science

It is my personal conviction--one I believe I can substantiate--that the most far-reaching implications of the sociology of knowledge stem from its quasi-relativistic complexion. It is Mannheim's relativism which makes his argument a challenge (and a radical one at that) to the nineteenth century paradigm based thought now dominating political science inquiry.³⁵ By way of illustration, if taken seriously

³³Ibid., pp. 296-97.

³⁴Moreover, it is possible for the community to be wrong not merely about specifics, but rather to be wrong in its "total outlook." See Ibid., pp. 62, 70.

³⁵As to the "radicality" of Mannheim's thesis, Gunter W. Remmling writes: "Mannheim's resolute research led him into an intellectual frontier which Louis Wirth has well designated as an area of 'dangerous thought.'" "Revision of an Intellectual Portrait," Social Forces, XL (Oct., 1961), p. 23.

by scholars, the relativistic tie drawn between viewer and viewed, word-meaning and experience, would prompt all of the following:

(a) An interest in operational meanings. The sociology of knowledge urges a concern for the way words are operationally defined by opposing political factions, especially key terms, like democracy, communism, propaganda, dictator, etc. To date political scientists have not bothered themselves about such things. However, as I will note in Chapter Ten, many of these concepts can be demonstrated to have very distinct operational meanings, the discovery of which would necessitate re-thinking much that has been said about contemporary political conflicts, and for that matter, about political activity in general.

(b) The conviction there can be no "ivory-tower" political investigation. Since this point has already been covered in some detail, I will not belabor it now. Suffice it to say Mannheim's thesis is relativistic enough to require the conclusion that it is not only interpretation which is goal-oriented, but the act of perception itself.³⁶ For Mannheim "objectivity" does not have to do with detachment, but with fostering those synthetic social values destined to dominate.

(c) The conclusion that "assumed," or "implicit," goals are always the crucial ones. It is the very essence of Mannheim's theory that a group's language, categories, and so forth, are said to reflect the economic-social interests which members of the group hold in common;

³⁶See n. 13, p. 327.

and as he viewed it, the process involved is entirely an unconscious one. Once more the reader's attention is called to the interest-orientation of perception itself. As Wirth well notes, according to the sociology of knowledge, (according to its relativistic assumptions about the viewer-viewed relationship) "The most important thing . . . that we can know about a man is what he takes for granted, and the most elemental and important facts about a society are those that are seldom debated and generally regarded as settled."³⁷

(d) A rethinking of the connection between prescription and description.

In keeping with Mannheim's schema, all readings and analyses are equally prescriptive in the "implicit" sense; hence, it is saying nothing to suggest an observer's descriptions have been biased or warped by his values. At the same time, it is still possible to distinguish between description and prescription by calling all statements which proclaim "there is," or "there are," descriptive, and those which declare in the manner of "I wish there were," or "I would like there to be," prescriptive. But this is quite a different approach than has heretofore been followed.

(e) The conclusion values are to be judged by what people do and not by what they say. Because the important social objectives of a group are those which they defend with their very definitions and categories, it is not the words themselves which are to be considered important,

³⁷Wirth in Ideology and Utopia, pp. xxii-iii.

but the action-meanings ascribed them. Such meanings, as we noted, can only be found by looking at what people do when they use particular words, by seeking out their operational definitions.³⁸ The inclination of most individuals, and I do not think political scientists have been a consistent exception here, is to judge a person's or a community's values now by its words, now by its actions, depending upon which happens to best suit the judge's liking. A Castro may be considered the builder of a classless communist state not because Cuba is one, but because he seemingly wants to make it that, while a Hitler, however much he clamors for a state in which humanitarian attitudes dominate, is judged by his immediate actions and written down as the brutalizer of millions.

(f) A rethinking of the nature of propaganda and ideology. The sociology of knowledge does not permit the usual distinctions to be drawn between propaganda and education. If propaganda is a "conscious attempt to produce political action or inaction," according to Mannheim every political observation is equally propagandistic. The same conclusion must be arrived at if propaganda is defined as having to do with "one sided" presentations. Even Mannheim's synthetic views are one sided insofar as they reflect the dominant interests of a particular epoch as

³⁸Mannheim was also interested in the changes which occur in vocabularies, understandings and aims during time of war. See Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 246-47.

opposed to others, and accordingly, lose their "truth" as those interests come to be subordinated by a more progressive complex. In the same way, if ideological thought is thought which has a prescriptive component, all thought is equally ideological.

Understandably, Mannheim did not view the educational process as one of imparting unbiased opinion, or "truth." "Education," he wrote, "has for its aim not merely to supply a certain amount of knowledge but also to modify the nature of the pupil."³⁹

(g) A search for the "rationality" of opposing positions, such as those of Marxists, fascists, and racial bigots. As previously suggested, Mannheim's thesis would not allow an investigator to blythely dismiss the radical right thesis or any other analysis as "illogical" or "irrational." Instead, it argues for rooting out the vocabularies of such factions, noting the ties between their vocabularies and their experienced interests, and then, of course, developing a synthesis.

(h) The conclusion that behavioristic political observations are status quo oriented.⁴⁰ In Mannheim's schema perception, conception, action

³⁹Karl Mannheim and W. A. C. Stewart, An Introduction to the Sociology of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 15.

⁴⁰To my knowledge Mannheim never explicitly drew this conclusion himself. However, he does state that the "intellectualistic conception of science, underlying positivism, is itself rooted in a definite Weltanschauung, and has progressed in close connection with definite political interests." And elsewhere he observes, "Conservative mentality as such has no predisposition toward theorizing . . . They tend, under such conditions of existence, to regard the

are all part of a process. To see things in a given way is part of acting in a given way, a way which promotes some interests over others. But it is never possible to see or act in a non-prescriptive, non-directive manner. Thus, Mannheim's thesis leads to the following understanding of a logical positivist-behaviorist approach. If it is the case that a positivist's vocabulary (concepts, categories, and word-meanings) reflect his present experience, and if he calls such a reflection the only acceptable "truth," it follows he is presupposing the recreation of that present experience at least for the duration of his reading and report. Since it is as difficult (requires the expenditure of as much human energy) to recreate one's present experience as to change it, the positivist position is as goal oriented as any other. Moreover, to the degree the position in question is the dominant economic-social outlook of our community, it presupposes the recreation (the immediate recreation) of the community's economic-social experiences; or, to repeat my initial comment, it becomes a status quo understanding.

If Mannheim's notion of an "assumed" prescriptive aspect of

environment as part of a natural world-order which, consequently, presents no problems. Conservative mentality as such has no utopia." Ideology and Utopia, pp. 166-67, 229. Still further, he noted that the view of an educator as a revealer of impartial, unbiased, information, rather than as one who presents information in behalf of certain goals, is an outlook common to relatively static societies; ones which are generally content with the existing state of things. See Mannheim and Stewart, An Introduction to the Sociology of Education, p. 33. See also Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 87-88, 200.

every view is not clear, the reader might try the following. Imagine, for the moment, that there is a "value-free" set of categories, concepts and word-meanings with which one is able to analyze economic-social-political phenomena without simultaneously prescribing. Now imagine further that of a sudden every member of society decides to employ this vocabulary in making all of their personal readings. We would then have an economic-social-political structure which was wholly independent of anyone's willing or doing, a structure which no one had anything to do with giving rise to by virtue of their having aims and interests.

Merits and Demerits of Mannheim's Philosophy

On the plus side, Mannheim's framework makes possible the ordering, or rationalizing, of many economic-social-political phenomena that have so far gone unordered (have been regarded as essentially "irrational"). To illustrate: the rewriting of history accompanying the Russian and Chinese revolutions, for that matter, the rewriting of British-American history which accompanied our own, would be expected activities to one who viewed the world through Mannheim's paradigm. Thought and experience are part of one another his thesis told us; therefore, change in one will always be attended by as drastic a change in the other. One is led to suppose the very act of experiencing radical social change will involve an equally

radical restructuring of ideas.⁴¹ In like manner, it will be recalled, Kuhn spoke of the rewriting of history done by proponents of a new paradigm in physical science. For Mannheim, as for Kuhn, "fact" and "value" are merged in experience. As a result, when one's experience alters, "facts" and "evaluations" are invariably transformed.

In a previous chapter I discussed the inclination of political scientists (who by their own reckoning generally speak for the politically moderate or middle position) to dismiss as irrational and illogical the thought of radical-right and radical-left in the contemporary world. Using different definitions and concepts, it was observed, right, left and middle spend much of their time "talking past" each other. Here again, I believe, an endorsement of Mannheim's framework would be revealing. One who used it would be encouraged to distinguish the different word-meanings (vocabularies) being employed by the disputing factions, to locate, if possible, conflicting interests which these vocabularies would be assumed to reflect, and to attempt some kind of synthesis. In just such situations, Mannheim argued:

The sociology of knowledge seeks to overcome the "talking past one another" of the various antagonists by taking as its explicit theme of investigation the uncovering of the sources of the partial disagreements which would never come to the attention of the disputants because of their preoccupation with the

⁴¹Mannheim proposes that "the dominant modes of thought are supplanted by new categories when the social basis of the group, of which these thought-forms are characteristic, disintegrates or is transformed under the impact of social change." Ideology and Utopia, pp. 82-83.

subject-matter that is the immediate issue of the debate.⁴²

On this same subject, Mannheim's schema would also suggest the growing ideological division in the United States during the past decade mirrors a deepening division of economic and social interests, and that the refusal of the participants to treat each other's concepts and categories with respect is but one aspect of this interest conflict.⁴³

As the above comments indicate, a principal virtue of Mannheim's paradigm is that its use could hardly fail to have a generally positive influence on the mood of political science scholarship. Because investigators would be encouraged to learn their opponents languages, as well as to look for the logic of their arguments, it is likely that the name-calling so often indulged in would be diminished. I refer, of course, to the habit of labelling opposing positions "irrational," "non-objective," "illogical," and the like.

Interestingly, whereas contemporary political scientists have tended to emphasize the inherent rationality of man and then dismiss as irrational most of the significant social movements of our time, Mannheim did just the reverse. After stressing the non-rational basis of all social thought, he went on to pursue the logic of various ideational systems. One looks in vain to find Mannheim rejecting some

⁴²Ibid., p. 281.

⁴³In this connection, see the comments by Wirth, Ideology and Utopia, pp. xxiii-xxv, and by Mannheim, Ibid., pp. 6, 32-33, 64-65, 103.

social idea as lacking in logic or rationality. Not that there is anything very mysterious about this finding. Having taken the position that there can be any number of rationalities, that rationality is in no sense an absolute, we would expect the foregoing.

Political scientists were noted to have difficulty deciding exactly how influential a part "individuals" are able to play in determining the course of history. Mannheim's position on this issue squares well with the sort of communications studies referred to earlier. According to the sociology of knowledge, since ideas reflect experiences, any individual's proposals will be given heed only insofar as they agree with the experiences of those he aims to influence. The logical conclusion is drawn that "the individual cannot by himself tear asunder the historical-social situation. Only when the utopian conception of the individual seizes upon currents already present in society and gives expression to them . . . only then can the existing order be challenged by the striving for another order of existence." In the same way, "social classes become effective in transforming historical reality only when their aspirations are embodied in utopias appropriate to the changing situation."⁴⁴

One final tribute should be paid to the sociology of knowledge. It is sufficiently relativistic to account for its own creation. Mannheim noted if word-meanings are bound to experience, it follows that during

⁴⁴Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 269, 207.

a time of a society's disintegration (Mannheim's own), when economic-social experiences are being rent this way and that, conflicting vocabularies must inevitably spring up. Finding they are no longer able to communicate, men will begin to wonder why. When they look, they will discover the relative nature of word-meanings, and hence, of economic-social knowledge in general. ⁴⁵

In reviewing criticisms of the sociology of knowledge it soon becomes evident Mannheim's detractors seldom did him the service of understanding his thesis before assailing it. Maquet, for instance, derides the notion social experiences are always tied to social ideas in a one-to-one manner as Mannheim has suggested. According to Maquet, the "social conceptions" of one class in a society are frequently accepted by all other classes. He offers India as a case in point, contending the Brahmin world-view is endorsed by every caste in that country. ⁴⁶ Mannheim would have simply denied this is so. They may use the same concepts and words, he would doubtlessly have argued, but they do not at all mean the same things by them; therefore they do not share world-views. In proposing a tie between experience and idea, Mannheim referred specifically to Max Weber's study of religion which he believed to have "clearly shown . . . how often the

⁴⁵See Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 6, 64-65; see also Wirth, Ibid., pp. xxiii-xxv; see also Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 3-6.

⁴⁶Maquet, pp. 45-46.

same religion is variously experienced by peasants, artisans, merchants, nobles, and intellectuals." If "they experienced a common religion," he states, "according to their different contexts of life, they interpreted it in a different way."⁴⁷ I imagine this particular argument of Mannheim's would be relatively easy to test, and I further imagine a test would uphold his position. That word-meanings alter directly with experience seems rather obvious if we but reflect a moment. The word "marriage" has a different meaning to a twelve-year-old than it does for one of eighteen. If at twenty-one the girl marries, the word takes on still other connotations. Its meaning varies again with the first child, and with the first divorce. I can recall hearing a logical-positivist argue against the view that word and experience are bound in this way by proposing there are words in our vocabularies which refer to things we have never experienced. The illustration he used was "centaur." However, it seems to me the word "centaur" has a set of meanings which are indeed tied to certain experiences we have had, with books, for example, and with story-telling grandmothers. And if on the morrow we chanced to see a "centaur" gamboling across the lawn, that word would henceforth have significantly altered meaning. Certainly for those of us who witnessed the incident it would no longer have to do with a "mythical animal," found only in books and in the imagination. In this connection, I might also note the esoteric

⁴⁷Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 7-8.

vocabulary of any scientific community is part and parcel of its esoteric experiences; and anyone who has taught at the university level is apt to have made the discovery that, all other things being equal, non-English speaking students from say Tokyo or Moscow have a decided advantage over those from countries such as Korea or Iran. For the former, learning English is largely a matter of learning synonyms for words already spoken--words which relate to familiar experiences. For the Korean student, on the other hand, there appear to be countless numbers of words which cannot acquire the appropriate meanings until he has first become acquainted with the experiences we fix them upon. Again, one finds English-speaking students learn with greatest ease the languages of people having similar cultures.

Similarly, Mannheim has been accused of holding positions on the matter of "truth's" existence which he quite painstakingly denied were his. One writer charges him with upholding "a chaotic kind of relativism, in which there are as many truths as there are perspectives of observers."⁴⁸ Now, while the writer in question may fail to see a distinction between Mannheim's position and the extreme relativistic one he refers to, Mannheim himself most certainly did. To be sure, he denied the worth of an absolutist view which holds "truth" to exist independently of the observer. However, he was just as vehement in

⁴⁸Frank E. Hartung, "Problems of the Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy of Science, XIX (Jan., 1952), p. 20.

his denial of the relativistic notion that there was never "truth," but only the "truth" of one or another experience, all views being equal in their "truth" content. He was convinced history has a real and discoverable pattern. This pattern, as we noted, could only be contemplated by observers having the appropriate experiences; in his estimation the observer does not view "truth" from without; rather, he exists in "truth" contemplating it from within as it unfolds. But "truth" there is, and observations may reflect it to a greater or lesser degree; some views, that is, are "truer" than others. Unquestionably, Mannheim has given the word "truth" a vastly different meaning than the nineteenth century paradigm advocate gave it. Since every reading of an economic-social-political issue is born of particular experiences, none of them are wholly "wrong"; they are only less "true," which is to say they are less reflective of the historical pattern working itself out.⁴⁹

Perhaps the most unique aspect of Mannheim's understanding of "truth" is that an idea is made "true" by its subsequent success as a reflection of the experiences of the community of man during an epoch. This brings us to a criticism of the sociology of knowledge which does seem just; namely, it is both fatalistic and anti-democratic in outline.

It seems to me Mannheim's philosophy is hardly less deterministic than one based soundly on the nineteenth century

⁴⁹See T. B. Bottomore, "Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge," The British Journal of Sociology, VII (March, 1956), pp. 52-58.

epistemological paradigm.⁵⁰ Perhaps the main difference here is that whereas Mannheim was cognizant of his fatalism, scholars endorsing nineteenth century paradigm assumptions have never seemed to experience great difficulty ignoring their own. At any rate, freedom in the Mannheimian sense "is not a freedom from the jurisdiction of causal laws but merely from ignorance of them."⁵¹ One can do little or nothing about changing the social course of history, that is set; at best it is only possible to gain some understanding of what the course is, and thereupon act in accordance with it. The anti-democratic features of Mannheim's thesis derive not only from this belief in a "true" current, but from his conviction that certain well-placed individuals (the intellectuals) are better equipped to discern the current. Such historically-blessed persons play the same role in Mannheim's framework that the philosopher kings do for the natural law theorists, or the "objective investigators" for the nineteenth century paradigm advocate.

Kuhn proposed it is not possible to demonstrate the soundness of a paradigm to those who do not have the proper experiences. A mere show of factual support will not work, because the "facts" are themselves born of the paradigm. Nor is logical argumentation the answer,

⁵⁰ See the comments by F. S. C. Northrop in Maquet, p. xii; see also Benjamin Schwartz, "The Socio-Historic Approach," World Politics, VIII (Oct., 1955), p. 134; see also Harry H. Bash, "Determinism and Avoidability in Sociohistorical Analysis," Ethics, LXXIV (April, 1964), p. 198.

⁵¹ Bash, p. 198.

since without prior agreement as to the "facts" there can be no agreed upon logic. Mannheim is making essentially the same argument. To quote Keckskemeti,

[if the sociology of knowledge is correct] is it not pointless to discuss the theory on its merits? If your consciousness happens to be subject to the same determining influences as mine (I being the proponent of the theory) you will agree with me; if it happens to be differently conditioned, you will disagree. But it would be a sheer waste of time to put forward arguments for or against the theory.⁵²

Perhaps Keckskemeti goes farther than Mannheim would have. It would never seem to be a waste of time to argue for a paradigm, since it may be the person one attempts to persuade shares a few experiences from which the thesis springs, and will consequently find some value in it. However, he is quite right that if Mannheim is supposed correct, it must be concluded neither argument nor evidence will convert one who has inappropriate experiences.

Recently, my mind full of Mannheimian arguments, I attended a lecture by J. Bronowski which triggered an extremely interesting as well as pertinent train of thought.⁵³ Listening to Bronowski it suddenly

⁵²Keckskemeti in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 27-28.

⁵³The occasion was a guest lecture by Bronowski held at San Francisco State College, April 4, 1967. The essence of Bronowski's argument was that physical scientists exhibit more tolerance than do social investigators. He suggested they have learned by past experience that error is as necessary a part of the scientific enterprise as truth, since if error were to be treated as unscholarly no one would risk new thought, and new thought is crucial. Physical scientists, he proposed, are aware great strides in the past have been made by those who risked new thought with little or nothing to go by. Darwin was "way

occurred to me both Kuhn and Mannheim are noting a "radical" thesis is by definition poorly documented and illogically supported, and that unless this is understood it is possible for scholars representing a prevailing outlook to suppress alternative theses with clear conscience. The question confronting scholars in any area of investigation--a physical science no less than a social--is not "How tolerant are you of thought which is radical?", but rather, "How tolerant are you of radical, poorly-documented, illogically-argued thought?" For to say the first is at once to say the others.

When I pointed this out to colleagues, several protested they could think of radical theses which were nevertheless well-documented and tightly argued. However, in each instance they engaged in an unfair bit of switching standards; they referred to arguments which were radical by someone else's reckoning (in most cases society's) and well-documented, well-reasoned, by their own. When I required a single standard to be maintained, when, for example, I asked about positions in radical opposition to their own which they nonetheless considered tightly reasoned and substantially documented, they did not do so well. I think it clear that to the degree we come to consider a reading well-reasoned and well-documented it ceases being in radical opposition to ours. More will be said about this issue in Chapter Ten.

out on a limb" until Mendel came to his rescue. While Bronowski did not convince me of the physical scientist's greater tolerance, his presentation did provoke some interesting thoughts.

Just as I am convinced the value of Mannheim's thesis stems primarily from its relativistic set, so too, I believe its major drawbacks result from his failure to carry the logic of relativism far enough. Unlike the nineteenth century paradigm advocate, he did not hold economic-social "truth" to be independent of all observers. Yet unlike the relativist, he nevertheless proposed it was more independent of some than of others--those who had the wrong (anti-historical) experiences and interests.

Like the good relativist, Mannheim argued economic-social words have precisely the meanings men give them in tying them to their experiences. At the same time, he hesitated to arrive at a like conclusion regarding terms such as "knowledge," "truth," "error," and "cause." On occasion he came close to doing so, but he was never very systematic about it. He never seemed to view relativism as a logically tight epistemology. As a consequence, he was sometimes cowed with absolutist arguments of an extremely superficial nature. The best example of this is his reaction to the classic absolutist argument against relativism which states "if 'truth' is relative, then the idea that it is must itself be relative, and consequently cannot be considered 'true.'" Mannheim seemingly never noted this is a totally meaningless logic unless one first accepts the idea of "truth" independent of observers.⁵⁴ He found it a cogent argument. In the same way, he

⁵⁴See Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 130, 137. It is interesting that one with Mannheim's penetrating mind

granted if all our understandings are merely relative to individual experience, there can be no knowledge. Here too, he conceded the absolutist position instead of operationally defining the word "knowledge"-- that is, defining it according to the way men are found to employ it. Had he done so, he would have concluded there is such a thing for most people, and it varies with, is relative to, their experience.

Other manifestations of Mannheim's inclination to keep a foot in both camps--to push relativism in some things but not in all--include his conviction the course of history is "truly" dialectic, and his assumption that physical scientists can render non-prescriptive, detached findings, that unlike students of economic-social phenomena they are not doomed to an intimate involvement with their materials.⁵⁵ Had he been consistently relativistic, he would have concluded history is "naturally" dialectic only for men with certain kinds of experiences and interests, and "naturally" non-dialectic for those with others; that (as will be observed in Chapter Nine) man thinks in dialectic, either-or terms whenever he assumes a radical alternation of his present, his on-going experience. And he would have concluded that the "scientific" condition of physical science is the result, not of any greater

would miss this point. Using a framework not much more relativistic than Mannheim's, C. Wright Mills quickly grasped it. See C. Wright Mills, "Methodological Consequences of Sociology of Knowledge," The American Journal of Sociology, XLVI (Nov., 1940), pp. 322-23.

⁵⁵Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 296.

detachment, but of the shared experiences and values upon which it is founded.

Pragmatism

The Relativity of "Knowledge" and "Truth"

Mannheim, it was observed, argued a quasi-relativistic understanding of social knowledge and social truth; he saw it as never complete, never final, always and inevitably interest-oriented. He did not, however, hold such a view of "knowledge" and "truth" in general. Instead, he seemed to accept that the knowledge physical scientists obtain is somehow value-free, or at any rate, that there is no reason why it may not be so. Likewise, he appears to have excepted from his thesis much knowledge of a common-sense variety. In support of the contention social knowledge is always held in the service of particular interests, Mannheim urged scholars to test his premise by observing the operational definitions groups engaged in serious disagreement give to words. If this is done, he insisted, the values which are built into the very vocabularies utilized by the disputants will immediately become apparent, and their conflicts will come to be seen as battles not simply over an impartial "truth," but over interests and objectives as well. At the same time, because he was not asserting the pragmatic nature of all our understandings, Mannheim failed to inquire about the operational meanings men give to the words "truth" and "knowledge" in every situation. In this respect, the pragmatists began their

inquiry where Mannheim left off.⁵⁶

According to the pragmatists, twentieth century physics wrought an epistemological revolution of fantastic proportions; in Dewey's estimation it was nothing less than a "Copernican reversal."⁵⁷ Only for some reason, they held, word of the revolution had not gotten around as yet, especially among philosophers, logicians, and social scientists.

As the pragmatists understood it, the central premise of the new metaphysics is that there exists no "real" world, independent of experience, placidly waiting to be discovered and plumbed. Rather, for each of us, the "fact" and the experience are one; "the world as we experience it is a real world."⁵⁸ ". . . things--anything, everything, in the ordinary non-technical use of the term 'thing'--are what they are experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as being."⁵⁹ Now, to grasp this fundamental idea and to accept it, is, as the pragmatists were quick to note, to undertake a "revision of the theory of thinking."⁶⁰

⁵⁶The reader is reminded once more that the bulk of pragmatic literature was produced prior to Mannheim's own work.

⁵⁷John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), p. 295.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 295, 98.

⁵⁹John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (New York: Peter Smith, 1951), p. 227.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 186.

Among other things, it is to cease "constru[ing] knowledge as an attempted approximation to a reproduction of reality."⁶¹ Observations, statements of "fact," even the best "'hypotheses,' 'natural laws,' 'scientific generalizations,' etc.," must henceforth be viewed as nothing more than "short hand expressions of human experience . . . not so much descriptions of an outer and independent 'nature' as ways of summarizing and explaining our experiences."⁶²

Too, since experience can hardly be termed devoid of value, it has direction, our vocabularies, concepts, laws, generalizations and the like, must be equally goal-directed, born of quite specific experiences and aims. The pragmatists were quick to draw this conclusion. "Every way of classifying a thing," said William James, "is but a way of handling it for some particular purpose. Conceptions, 'kinds,' are teleological instruments."⁶³ So too, ideas (which necessitate the use of categories and concepts) now have to be viewed as "functional," as "instruments which enable us to deal fruitfully with our environment."⁶⁴ For Dewey the term idea was to be used "synonymous with 'plan of

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²James Bissett Pratt, What is Pragmatism? (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1909), pp. 13-14.

⁶³William James, Essays in Pragmatism, ed. by Alburey Castell (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 7-8.

⁶⁴Lloyd Morris, William James: The Message of a Modern Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 35.

action' or 'intention to act in a certain way.'"⁶⁵

From the beginning, there was wide agreement (it seemed to be a fact of nearly everyone's experience) that the pragmatists were offering a new understanding of "truth."⁶⁶ Formerly, a "true" statement was felt to be one which reflected some condition or state of affairs possessed of "real" existential form independent of any observer's experience. But if there are no "reals" external to experience, there can obviously be no such independent "truths." What then is "truth"? In the estimation of the pragmatists (and incidentally, James considered the "pragmatic conception of truth . . . so important that no amount of printer's ink spent upon it ought to be considered wasted")⁶⁷ "an idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives."⁶⁸ "If and so far as an assertion satisfies or forwards the purpose of the inquiry to which it owes its being, it is so far 'true.'"⁶⁹

It is easy to see how the pragmatists came to view "truth" as they did. If there are no independently "real" forms to be

⁶⁵Pratt, pp. 17-18; see also Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 137, 166.

⁶⁶In this regard see Moreland Perkins, "Notes on the Pragmatic Theory of Truth," The Journal of Philosophy, XLIX (Aug. 28, 1952), p. 573; also see Pratt, pp. 9-10.

⁶⁷William James, Collected Essays and Reviews (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920), p. 470.

⁶⁸James, Pragmatism, p. 75.

⁶⁹F. C. S. Schiller, "The Ambiguity of Truth," Mind, XV (1906), p. 170.

represented by our descriptive statements (and the pragmatists maintained there are not)--if it is the case man creates as much as he discovers such things as "facts," "laws," and "causes,"--if he cuts his time-space universe up into objects and events according to his liking--it is important that we determine what his liking is; it is important that we determine the criterion by which he dubs some cuts "false" and others "true," the bases on which he declares some cuts to be "knowledge," others mere "speculation." Abiding by their contention words have exactly those meanings individuals give them when tying them to their experience, the pragmatists naturally suggested an empirical approach to the above questions. For them, to ask "What is 'truth'?" or "What is 'knowledge'?" is to pose a meaningless question. Instead, one must ask how man uses these words when he acts, one must inquire as to their operational definitions. And, having looked, pragmatists typically came to conclusions of the sort mentioned. They argued empiricism reveals that for man "Truth is the useful, efficient, workable, to which our practical experience tends to restrict our truth-valuations; if anything the reverse of this professes to be true, it is (sooner or later) detected and rejected";⁷⁰ that "ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts

⁷⁰F. C. S. Schiller, Humanism (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1903), pp. 58-59.

of our experience";⁷¹ that, in short, "the value of an idea and the truth of an idea are names for essentially the same thing."⁷²

There are several interesting characteristics of this pragmatic "truth." Understanding them will, I think, facilitate comprehension of the epistemology as a whole. For one thing, "truth" is ultimately said to be a personal or subjective matter. In Schiller's words, "what works is true and represents a reality, for the individual for whom it works."⁷³ This means, of course, that "truth" will usually be plural.⁷⁴ There will be as many "truths" about a piece of time-space as there are different viewers, having different experiences, promoting different goals. (It will be recalled this was the position Frank Hartung accused Mannheim of taking.)

Secondly, not only is impartiality considered inconceivable, but "'bias' or 'selection' is [described as] a necessary part of the recognition of truth."⁷⁵ If this is not completely clear, let me approach

⁷¹James, Pragmatism, pp. 57-58.

⁷²John E. Russell, "The Humanist Theory of Value," Mind, XIX (1910), p. 548. On the meaning of "truth," in addition to the above, see F. C. S. Schiller, Our Human Truths (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), pp. 9, 34, 59-61; also see F. C. S. Schiller, "The 'Working' of 'Truths,'" Mind, XXI (1912), pp. 532-35; also see Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 816-25.

⁷³Schiller, "The 'Working' of 'Truths,'" p. 534.

⁷⁴See James, Pragmatism, p. 67.

⁷⁵Alfred Sidgwick, "Truth and Working," Mind, XXIII (1914), p. 99.

the reasoning involved from a slightly different angle. An assumption underlying everything the pragmatists argued is that the universe is to be regarded as a single time-space entity. There are no "natural" pieces floating around in it; natural, that is, independent of some goal-directed observer. It is man who cuts out and identifies pieces (objects and events). Further, to identify a piece of time-space is to identify it as something; it is to classify or categorize it. And, according to the pragmatists, all classifications are in the service of specific objectives. For man, "a thing is what it does." All that it can ever mean is just the difference that it can make to some one. There is no genuine difference that does not make a difference."⁷⁶ Consequently, to identify, to "truth"-find, is to be biased. One can grasp now what Schiller means when he tells us "truth is made."⁷⁷ The words "objective" and "true" have long been used synonymously. An "objective" description is said to be a "true" one. Now we are being informed such descriptions are necessarily goal-directed. Perhaps it is not simply a coincidence, then, that in ordinary usage the term "objective" has a dual meaning: "true" and "aim."

Still another attribute of the pragmatist's "truth" is that it is anything but static. "Experience is in mutation," and, since "true" ideas are those which make it possible for us to develop our experience

⁷⁶Pratt, pp. 6-7.

⁷⁷Schiller, "The Ambiguity of Truth," p. 167.

in some desired direction, ("the true . . . is only the expedient in the way of our thinking"), "our psychological ascertainments of truth are [likewise] in mutation."⁷⁸

Finally, pragmatism makes it possible to proclaim possession of "truth." One need not hesitate or hang back. The pragmatists were fond of teasing absolutists with such questions as: "If man can never say with any assurity that he has 'truth,' of what utility is it?" and "how do you know this?"⁷⁹

Just as interesting and revealing are the broader implications of the pragmatist metaphysics. I will briefly review those which, for the purposes of this essay, I consider most consequential. First of all, the scientist, the scholar, is at once portrayed as investigator and promoter; I say "at once," because to play one role is to play the other. For pragmatism, theory and practice, "knowing and doing, are intimately connected with each other."⁸⁰ Pragmatism, writes Schiller,

vindicates man's right to present his claims upon the universe in their integrity as a demand not for Truth alone, but for Goodness, Beauty and Happiness as well, commingled with each other in a fusion one and indiscerptible; and what perhaps is for the moment more important still, it justifies our efforts to bring about such a union as we desire.⁸¹ (emphasis added.)

⁷⁸James, Pragmatism, pp. 222, 226.

⁷⁹See James, Pragmatism, p. 76; see also F. C. S. Schiller, Our Human Truths, p. 9.

⁸⁰Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 214.

⁸¹Schiller, "The Ambiguity of Truth," p. 173.

Talk of this last sort might well alarm individuals contemplating the world through an absolutist framework. After all, if men are encouraged to present every possible variety of theory--and that according to their fancies--who is to protect the public from "false-prophets" ? Having posed this question, we are immediately made aware of a second implication of the pragmatist philosophy. It makes no provision for a "false-prophet," as absolutists have characterized that creature. For the absolutist, to be a "false prophet" is to mislead people about the independently "true" state of affairs, while to the pragmatist's way of thinking, such a state of affairs does not even exist.

One can imagine a community of absolutist scholars moving to suppress a thesis they personally considered in error, one can even imagine their doing it with an air of self-righteousness if the thesis being suppressed happened to be meeting with unexpected approval. One cannot easily envision a group of pragmatists conducting themselves in a like manner. In their estimation, to prohibit any way of cutting up the universe--of classifying, categorizing, and theorizing--must be to prohibit someone's "truth." Moreover, since every way of categorizing and classifying (every "truth") is relevant to a specific complex of objectives, for the pragmatist, such a prohibition would involve restraining the promotion of certain goals, it would entail value-coercion. If carried out in the name of "impartiality," this activity could not help but appear blatant hypocrisy to the pragmatist.

Another ramification of pragmatism, one related to the above,

is that it does not allow for "irrational" or "illogical" arguments or investigators. Instead, it proposes there can be an infinite number of "logics," and that to share another's logic is to share his experiences, word-meanings (keep in mind that "meaning depends upon purpose")⁸² etc.; it is to agree with him. As Dewey writes,

. . . the quality of irrationality is imputed only because of conflict with a prior definition of rationality. Abandon completely the notion that nature ought to conform to a certain definition, and nature intrinsically is neither rational nor irrational.⁸³

For the pragmatist, then, it is never a question of whether someone's arguments are "rational," as though an ultimate and absolute "rationality" existed. Rather, the important question for each of us is "does the other's argument reflect our own experiences, our own fact-value patterns?"

In arguing man's word-meanings are dependent upon his purposes, the pragmatists inform us they do not hold definitions to be arbitrary in the same way persons of an absolutist epistemology do. According to them, by agreeing to use words as other members of a community do, we agree to share the other member's experiences with the things words are being fastened upon. And, since experience has direction, we agree also to share a community's aims. To the extent that we fail to endorse the community's objectives, we will

⁸²Ibid., p. 166.

⁸³Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 210.

refuse to use its vocabulary.⁸⁴

Implications of Pragmatism

If it were subscribed to by the social science community, pragmatism would naturally lead to all of the altered attitudes and practices the Sociology of Knowledge was found to suggest.⁸⁵ It hardly seems necessary to repeat them here. Instead, I would like to point to several experienced phenomena a pragmatistic framework can purport to rationalize.

(a) If we look closely enough at man's employment of any word--be the employer scientist or layman--we will find no two individuals ever seem in complete agreement as to what the word means in operational terms. We noted previously, political scientists cannot agree about the meaning of the word power, behavioralists are unable to reach accord on the precise meaning of behavioralism, and so forth. Just so, catholics dispute the meaning of catholicism, scholars disagree about the essence of scholarship, and poets wrangle over the nature of love. Even those ostensibly agreed upon the meaning of a term usually find, if they probe a bit, that at some point their agreement breaks down. Pragmatism offers to explain this fact of our experience.

⁸⁴For the pragmatist, communication is no simple problem. See Schiller, Our Human Truths, p. 59.

⁸⁵Including a view of the "educator" as one who promotes "values" as well as "facts." See John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916); see also C. M. Gillespie, "The Truth of Protagoras," Mind, XIX (1910), pp. 470-92.

It tells us: Word-meanings are tied to, are part of, and in that way dependent upon, experience. Now clearly, no two individuals can ever have precisely the same experiences with a piece of time-space (object or event), since to do so would require them to exist at the same time and place in space, a sheer physical impossibility. If word-meanings are tied to experience, it follows, then, that no two individuals will ever agree wholly on the meaning of a word. The more they share experiences with whatever they are defining, the more they will agree on the appropriate definition, but they can never achieve complete operational accord. At least, that is what our experience suggests, and it is what pragmatism argues, then explains. The same point can be made, of course, in respect to the ideas and belief systems we build out of our words once we have given them meaning.

(b) Although the nineteenth century paradigm urged investigators to hold their understandings of how things are with a loose grip--and though explanations in every area of inquiry, including political science, have undergone drastic transformation through time--rarely indeed has a scholar been heard to say, "I was wrong." To quote once more a former student, most often changes of mind are expressed something like this: "In light of new information I have improved (or broadened, extended, etc.) my thesis in certain respects." Unlike a nineteenth century paradigm advocate, the pragmatist need not suggest there is any hypocrisy or deception involved here. On the contrary, since theories, like all ideas, are born of particular

experiences (fact-value settings), when our experiences undergo marked shift, so too will our theories. It is not a question of theories being "wrong"--they may have been sound guides for action given our former experiences, hence sufficiently "right"--it is simply a matter of their being "inappropriate" to the new experiences. Like Kuhn, the pragmatist does not witness a scientific progress in which we obtain more and more answers to questions which themselves remain static. Rather, as our experiences change, so too do our questions as well as the answers we find acceptable guides to action.⁸⁶ Ideas, theories, then, are no more static than experience, and in expressing their changes of mind in the above manner, scholars are only reflecting the experienced fact of the matter. The statement "In the light of new information I have improved my thesis" can be read "My thesis, like any other, orders the world of my experience; because that world has altered, so too has my thesis."

(c) A third problem pragmatism is able to provide an answer for has been described by Avery D. Weisman. Weisman muses: "One of life's strange paradoxes is our willingness to believe in something without

⁸⁶Dewey writes: ". . . intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together with both of the alternatives they assume--an abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent interest. We do not solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place." The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 19.

any evidence to support the belief. We may even adhere to a theory, and maintain it, long after it has been disproved."⁸⁷ A pragmatist would describe the phenomenon in question something like this: "We are often willing to believe in something which, from the vantage point of those who do not believe, has no evidence to support it. We may adhere to a theory, and maintain it--because for us it continues to be a meaningful reflection of our experience and a useful guide to action--long after it has ceased to be either of these things for those who reject it, whose personal experience disproves the theory's value." Only for the pragmatist, such an occurrence is neither strange nor paradoxical.

(d) Pragmatism, by making provision for numerous "truths," for multiple "logics," rescues social science from what has always seemed to me an untenable position. Heretofore, it has been necessary either to declare a Marx basically "right," and to thereupon become an adherent of his doctrine, or to label him essentially a false prophet, and to view his followers as misled. What makes the choice of alternatives so patently ludicrous is that it results in a social scientist's smugly writing off as mistaken individuals whose arguments--to one degree or another--are endorsed by countless millions, while he frequently experiences personal difficulty when it comes to impressing a few hundred students with his more penetrating insights. The

⁸⁷Avery D. Weisman, "Reality Sense and Reality Testing," Behavioral Science, III (July, 1958), p. 228.

pragmatistic scholar can grant that aspects of a Marx's thesis may be relevant to the experiences (the fact-value patterns) of some--they may for them be "true"--yet reject them as irrelevant to his personal experience, as "wrong" from where he stands.

In the same way, pragmatism does not require that defunct concepts, theories, and world-views (i. e. the Newtonian) be regarded as erroneous in any total sense. Given the word-meanings of those who upheld them, given the sorts of experiences they referred them to, it can be conceded they were undeniably "true"--they were acceptable programs for guiding action, which is the meaning pragmatists have given to the term "true"--yet, they can also be considered "false" for the kinds of experiences we wish to theorize about. Nor is it necessary to suppose that only one among the many extant social science frameworks can be correct. Natural law theorists, behaviorists, etc., are now seen to aspire to the creation of different kinds of worlds, and their disparate "truths" merely reflect those aspirations.

(e) One of the more intriguing puzzles pragmatism can solve (Mannheim's schema can be used to reach a like conclusion) has to do with the notably obscure writing style of social commentators who have gained wide endorsement. Pragmatism leads to this chain of reasoning: Since word-meanings, hence ideas, are relative to (reflective of) experience, and since men enjoy a great variety of economic-social-political experiences, it follows that ideas which are clear expressions

of one man's experience will be only vaguely reflective of another's and wholly devoid of meaning as expressions of still others. Consequently, as an author's words come to reflect some portion of the social experiences of more and more individuals, they will simultaneously become complete experiential reflections for fewer and fewer persons. Conversely, the more a writer's words reflect the total social experience of one individual or group, the less they will reflect that of others, and the less widespread he can expect his popularity to be. In short, the extremely popular social commentator must offer a bit of "truth" to many people, a great deal of it to none. Pragmatism advises that one who would achieve wide recognition for his economic-social-political observations learn to express himself in the manner of a Marx, a Hegel, a Dewey or a Mannheim. And, since a writer's words are always clear expressions of his own experience, it counsels such a one to develop a highly unique set of economic-social-political experiences. Extending the logic still further: in order to be endorsed by individuals whose experiences are ones of extreme opposition and conflict, a book must be able to reflect that opposition, it must embody all the seeming contradictions of a Koran or a Holy Bible.

(f) Lastly, the pragmatic logic can provide an answer to the question "Why have scholars failed to develop a social 'science'?" Since common ideas are born of common experiences, we would expect that not sharing many social experiences men would fail to share social

ideas with a science-like unanimity. We would further expect greater agreement on economic-social-political matters whenever there is a greater sharing of experience. Thus, we would expect Russians to agree with Russians, Americans with Americans, Frenchmen with Frenchmen, and so on, when it comes to events of concern to them all. (Pragmatism also leads to the accurate postdiction that physical science should have made its greatest strides when men were brought into common experience with the objects and events physical scientists concern themselves with; that is, during the industrial revolution.)

The moment we turn from pragmatism as a general theory of "knowledge" and "truth" to the matter of its use as a tool for understanding social phenomena or developing a social "science," we begin to break with relativism; this is the main reason I have referred to pragmatism as quasi-relativistic.

Though Schiller and James were interested in social questions and problems, they had little to say about the especial relevance of pragmatism to their solution, particularly through the development of a social "science." I suspect James would have opposed trying to render social investigation "scientific." Because he rejected the idea of absolute "truth," he spoke for completely tolerant scholarship in all areas of inquiry, and his own reckoning told him "scientists" were less than tolerant. Lloyd Morris says about James:

Any intolerance of new ideas, of new theories, on the part of scientists . . . aroused his indignation. It persuaded him that

orthodox science had become a symbol of arrogance and vulgar success; that it was all too ready to abuse its power by disparaging and crushing innovations that might threaten its prestige. He felt obliged, then, to attack the smug authority of "Science in the form of abstraction, priggishness and sawdust, lording it over all."⁸⁸

Dewey, on the other hand, fervently believed in and argued for the application of pragmatism to economic-social-political study, which he insisted would result in the creation of new "sciences." I will therefore concentrate on his views in this next section. It will be my contention that when he was done, Dewey had built a "personal pragmatism," a private logic, which was neither absolutistic nor relativistic, and which was, moreover, a logic whose most basic premises now seemed to be at war with one another.

Dewey's Applied Pragmatism

Dewey appeared to begin his argument for pragmatic social study with certain root assumptions. First, "science" is good, and hence desirable. He credited it with providing "the most authentic and dependable knowledge," and with having brought industrialization to Western civilization.⁸⁹ Secondly, "science" has to do with "methods

⁸⁸Morris goes on to remark that James "associated himself with the society for psychical research, and undertook a vigorous public championship of the cause of 'faith-healers' and 'mental healers,' insisting that there is no source of deception in the investigation of nature which compares with a fixed belief--common among orthodox scientists--that certain kinds of phenomena are impossible or irrelevant." Morris, pp. 2, 20. Others of relativistic inclination noted for this same permissiveness regarding matters intellectual include Einstein and Freud.

⁸⁹Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 79.

of dealing with subject-matter."⁹⁰ In Dewey's words, "science signifies . . . the existence of systematic methods of inquiry, which, when they are brought to bear on a range of facts, enable us to understand them better and to control them more intelligently, less haphazardly and with less routine." Under scrutiny, Dewey contended these more "systematic methods" are found to involve the endorsement of a pragmatic approach, the tying up of viewer and viewed, of knowing and doing, the acceptance of a utilitarian conception of "truth," and so forth.⁹¹ Thirdly, social "philosophers" (Dewey did not regard social inquiry as "scientifically" conducted) could take up "scientific methods and reap the same benefits physical scientists had simply by resolving to do so.

Elaborating upon this thesis, Dewey held the Greeks responsible for giving rise to the notion sound ideas are ones which somehow mirror an external "reality." "They called the result science," he writes, "although in fact it fastened wrong beliefs upon Europe for well nigh two thousand years."⁹² Eventually, of course, "men were forced to realize that progress in science depends upon choice of operations performed not upon the properties of objects which were

⁹⁰John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education (New York: Horace Liveright, 1929), pp. 8-9.

⁹¹This constitutes a major theme of Dewey's essay, The Quest for Certainty.

⁹²See Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 185-86.

alleged to be so antecedently certain and fixed that all detailed phenomena might be reduced to them."⁹³ Unfortunately, he lamented, "this conception of knowledge still dominates thinking in social and moral matters." However, "when it is realized that in these fields as in the physical, we know what we intentionally construct, that everything depends upon observation of the consequences which test them, the progress in these affairs may also become secure and constant."⁹⁴

Pragmatic inquiry was for Dewey synonymous with "intelligent" inquiry, while "intelligent action is purposive action . . . " "A man is intelligent," he proposed, "not in virtue of having reason which grasps first and indemonstrable truths about fixed principles . . . but in virtue of his capacity to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act in accordance with his estimate."⁹⁵ Moreover, "if intelligent method is lacking, prejudice, the pressure of immediate circumstance, self-interest and class-interest, traditional customs, institutions of accidental historic origin, are not lacking, and they tend to take the place of intelligence."⁹⁶

We might summarize Dewey's message to the social philosopher as an admonition to throw off an outmoded conception of "science" and

⁹³Ibid., p. 186.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 213, 246.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 265.

gain science in the doing. More than anything else, this would involve understanding that scientists are not concerned with the discovery of independently "real" forms, laws, etc., but with ways of organizing their present experiences which, when acted upon, will make possible the realization of desired future experiences. Dewey spoke of the transition from non-science to science as "a change from knowing as an esthetic enjoyment of the properties of nature regarded as a work of divine art, to knowing as a means of secular control--that is, a method of purposefully introducing changes which will alter the direction of the course of events."⁹⁷ For him science was, by definition, "a knowledge that accrues when methods are employed which deal competently with problems that present themselves."⁹⁸ (He argued "the physician, engineer, artist, craftsman, lay claim to scientific knowing.")

To the inevitable question, "If a pragmatic outlook is so productive, why have individuals (especially social philosophers) frequently been so reluctant to take it up?" Dewey had this to say: Confronted with an often hostile and always uncertain world, man has developed an abiding desire to know what will happen if he acts in one or another particular manner; he has evolved, that is, a "need for security in the results of action." It is this need to stabilize his environment, to make it secure from upset, even by his own acts, which

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 100.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 199.

led him, according to Dewey, to a "quest for cognitive certainty."⁹⁹ In brief, "the need for protection and prosperity in action created the need for warranting the validity of intellectual beliefs."¹⁰⁰ Then too, Dewey argues, there is habit pure and simple. The dominant "theories about the mind, about sensation and perception, about reason, the intellect, conceptions and perception, were framed and established in philosophy before the rise of experimental knowing." Naturally, "it is difficult to break loose from habits thus engendered so as to turn attention in a whole-hearted way to actual inquiry."¹⁰¹ In explaining the greater hesitancy of social investigators to be pragmatic, Dewey also evoked the well-worn argument that "the physical sciences have a much longer past behind them than psychological and social inquiries." In addition, he granted the former "deal with subjects that are intrinsically less complex, involving fewer variables."¹⁰²

Before criticizing Dewey's thesis concerning the application of pragmatism to the development of social "science," (a thesis which, as indicated, I hold to be decidedly non-pragmatistic), I will consider criticisms which have been made of pragmatism in general.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 175.

¹⁰²Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, p. 22.

Pragmatism Under Attack

It has been said of the pragmatists they did not always express themselves clearly.¹⁰³ To this criticism, however, a pragmatist need only reply it takes as settled one of the key issues in dispute. Thus, it is based upon the presupposition words have meanings independent of our individual experiences. "The ideas are clearly expressed for us," the pragmatist might retort. "If you do not find them to be so, it is because you do not share sufficiently our experiences, or as a consequence, our word-meanings." The same response can be made to the suggestion pragmatism is lacking in logical consistency.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, it could even be contended that whereas under the old view of things to say an argument was illogical was to villify its user, according to the pragmatic framework such a comment is, if anything, a self-criticism. It is nothing less than an admission one has failed to discern the logic of the other's thought-system.

In suggesting pragmatism lacks logical tightness one may, of course, be questioning whether the pragmatists' many premises and sub-premises constituted a logical whole even in terms of their own experience. Several observations seem appropriate here. To begin

¹⁰³Robert J. Richman, for example, complains the pragmatists did not make their understanding of "truth" clear. See "Truth and Verifiability: A Reply to Mr. Perkins," Journal of Philosophy, L (Dec. 17, 1953). See also Pratt, p. 26.

¹⁰⁴See Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 1-11. Lovejoy argues the pragmatic "theory of meaning" is incompatible with the pragmatic "theory of truth."

with, none of us has the magical ability to suspend passage of time and alteration of experience while we develop and present a thesis about anything. Hence, if we but grant the pragmatists' two contentions--that word-meanings and logics cannot be separated from experience and experience is always in flux--we have already conceded that our thought-systems (our logics) are themselves in flux. We have also granted that consistency through time--complete logical consistency can never be achieved by any of us even according to our own reckoning. Certainly I know of no one who lays claim to such an accomplishment.

Secondly, when it comes to disagreement among the pragmatists themselves, it seems only fair to note they never pretended to have developed a well-structured framework.¹⁰⁵ They knew full well they failed to agree on many points, some of them major.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, we have no right to demand of them what no other school of thought has offered, be it logical positivist, behavioralist, natural law, or whatever.

Having said the above, I think it is just as fair to suspicion pragmatism was never the kind of coherent schema logical positivism

¹⁰⁵See Philip P. Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 28-29.

¹⁰⁶See the foreword by Bertrand Russell in James Feibleman, An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1946), pp. i-xvi; see also Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, pp. 816-18; see also Morris, William James: The Message of a Modern Mind, pp. 12-13.

and others have been--even in the eyes of its originators. There are such glaring conflicts between the arguments of Dewey and James, for example, that some writers have hesitated to put them into one camp.¹⁰⁷ However, this does not make the task of describing pragmatism a great deal easier, since the conflicts between the various statements of Dewey alone are no less glaring, as we will note.

Another complaint made of the pragmatists was that their arguments constituted an out-and-out denial of "truth's" existence, and of the existence of "reality."¹⁰⁸ If by "truth" and "reality" one refers to forms independent of an experiencing and evaluating subject--independent of his experiencing and evaluating in a very special way--the complaint is well founded. However, it is less a criticism than an observation, and it provides no basis for rejecting their thesis. (Unless one does so by pushing the pragmatistic notion that ideas which do not suit one's purposes are justifiably rejected as "false.") On the other hand, if those registering this particular complaint meant to suggest pragmatism denied the existence of a universe external to man, or denied that the word "truth" has any meaning, they have simply not understood the argument being propounded. As Dewey observes, "the radical empiricist, the humanist, the pragmatist, label him as you will, believes not in fewer but in more 'realities' than the orthodox

¹⁰⁷e.g. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy.

¹⁰⁸James, Pragmatism, p. 233.

philosophers warrant."¹⁰⁹ The pragmatist speaks of "a contrast not between a Reality, and various approximations to, or phenomenal representations of Reality, but between different reals of experience."¹¹⁰ So too, pragmatists did not reject the concept "truth," they merely operationally defined it as the useful. For them, we humans "break the flux of sensible reality into things . . . at our will. We create the subjects of our true as of our false propositions."¹¹¹

Other comments and criticism which similarly reflect a miscomprehension of pragmatism include the following. Arguing against the proposal useful ideas and "true" ideas are one, and that the "true-ness" of an idea is established by our acting upon and thus verifying it, one author suggests: "for the highest social purposes you can get use out of a myth just because it cannot be verified or fulfilled."¹¹² To such reasoning a pragmatist would perhaps respond by asking why anyone might uphold a "myth." Because it works? Because it gets them where they want to go? Then surely they will call the belief "truth" not "myth." In our own dismissing of an idea as "myth" we merely admit it has not the same utilitarian value for us as for those who

¹⁰⁹Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 193.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 228.

¹¹¹James, Pragmatism, p. 254.

¹¹²Vernon Lee, "What is Truth?", Yale Review, I (July, 1912), p. 601.

regard it "truth." If it did, we too would call it "truth." As for not being able to verify a "myth," such a statement makes no sense when placed in the pragmatist's framework. To act upon an idea and to thereby be moved in a desired direction is to verify it. "Truth," states James, "is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them."¹¹³

The author who registered the foregoing criticisms also mentions the "useful lie."¹¹⁴ Again, he misses the pragmatist's point that an idea of this sort, a useful idea, would not be called "lie" by those who found it useful. And in our so labelling it, we reveal its disutility as a guide for personal action. Nor is it possible to rescue the argument by contending we may find it useful to lie about our personal "truth," (about our experience) to some other. In that case the "lie" is not our personal guide to action. Instead, we act upon some other idea, some other "truth," while those who receive what is for us a "lie" (an idea not reflective of our own experience and what we want to do with it) may find it to be the most meaningful expression of their experience--may find it to be the best of "truths" for them. Thus, argues the pragmatist, "truth" remains for each of us--it is by operational definition--an idea which works.

¹¹³James, Pragmatism, p. 218.

¹¹⁴Lee, pp. 601-602.

I doubt if the last two criticisms would have been made had the author involved but asked himself these questions: "Myth in respect to what, some 'real' condition independent of the goal-oriented observer?" "Lie about what, a similar independently 'real' state of affairs?" But the pragmatists began with a denial that any such independently "real" forms exist.

A less subtle misunderstanding of pragmatism led Moreland Perkins to reflect that according to its logic a statement "may be verified or confirmed at one time and falsified or disconfirmed at another-- a statement may be true at one time and false at another."¹¹⁵ Paraphrasing William James, Morris provides this answer, "it is the nature of truth to be temporary . . . we live by truths that are momentarily expedient and never more than temporary, and we must be prepared to call today's truths falsehoods tomorrow."¹¹⁶ But, Perkins argues, "this violates a fundamental rule concerning the use of the word 'true.' A statement cannot be both true and false, according to the law of contradictions."¹¹⁷ To which the pragmatist replies, "We are not using 'true' and 'false' according to any fundamental rule, but according to the way man-in-action is found to use them, and that usage does indeed permit a statement to be now true, now false." (Pragmatists,

¹¹⁵Perkins, p. 575.

¹¹⁶Morris, pp. 40, 43.

¹¹⁷Perkins, p. 575.

it almost seems unnecessary to add, never argued a statement was simultaneously true and false in terms of a single individual's experience.)

The pragmatist, it will be recalled, insisted all word-meanings are assigned in a utilitarian manner. That assertion, James Pratt protests, "cannot be allowed to go unchallenged." "The distinction between a red house and a green house," Pratt intones, "does not consist in a difference in practice."¹¹⁸ However, he makes no suggestion as to what the distinction does "consist in," and I suspect he would find it exceedingly difficult to do so. It seems to me the simple fact of our experience is that man does act in a distinguishing manner toward houses of various hues, including red and green. More will be said about this issue in the next chapter.

Finally, a Marxist writer remarks Dewey talks of "changing existing realities," and adds: "But consciously to change realities supposes the existence of realities for us to change, and a knowledge of their properties, interconnections and laws of motion."¹¹⁹ No pragmatist would dispute this argument were the writer to speak of experienced realities, experienced interconnections and laws, but he does no such thing. Instead, he proceeds to refer to "an objective truth independent of man," and an "objective nature of the things we

¹¹⁸Pratt, pp. 17-18.

¹¹⁹Maurice Cornforth, In Defense of Philosophy: Against Positivism and Pragmatism (New York: International Publishers, 1950), pp. 160-64.

perceive," as though the soundness of his position were self-evident. Here too, the pragmatist's contentions are not argued against, they are argued past, and around.

As I have indicated at several points, the interesting and suggestive thing about most of the attacks on pragmatism is that they evidence their authors' failure to grasp the "logic" of the system they propose to evaluate.¹²⁰ Now, it is precisely at this point Kuhn's thesis becomes exceedingly relevant. Kuhn advanced the idea individuals who reason from mutually exclusive paradigmatic assumptions never manage to confront one another's inferences and deductions fair and square. Rather, under such circumstances debaters spend their time "talking past" each other. The word debate might even be called inappropriate here since, according to Kuhn, when paradigms conflict, ideas and arguments do not. In my estimation--and I offer all of the above polemics as evidence--the battle between the pragmatists and the anti-pragmatists is a first-rate defense of Kuhn's position. Those who witnessed the conflict sometimes seemed to sense its paradigmatic nature. Thus, one scholar wrote of it: "The primary danger in philosophical controversy lies in the very considerable uncertainty whether the disputants are talking about the same things."¹²¹ I

¹²⁰See "The Kernel of Pragmatism," by Hastings Berkeley, in which he argues the opponents of pragmatism have not understood it. Mind, XXI (1912), pp. 84-88.

¹²¹The writer goes on to add: "The real point is not whether pragmatism is able to avoid contradiction when you grant its premises,

suggest it is clear they were not.

Pragmatists rejected the notion reality's forms are independent of an evaluating observer; they proposed there is never the fact or the truth, there are only facts and truths of our experience, and they may be multiple and conflicting. Then they proceeded to build their "logic" upon the assumption both the rejection and the proposal were warranted, that the root issue--are there independent "truths"?--was no longer in dispute. On their part, the anti-pragmatists did the reverse. The bulk of their arguments sprang from an assumption that "truth" there is, independent and inviolable.

At the height of the controversy Schiller was moved to decry the failure of anti-pragmatists to deal with any of pragmatism's "cardinal claims." He called the situation "discreditable to the prestige of philosophy."¹²² "I fear," he complained, "that a really resolute adherent of the intellectualist tradition would be unmoved and unconvinced by anything I or any one could say. He would simply close his eyes and seal his ears, and recite his creed."¹²³ "Exactly," we might exclaim, "that is the essence of paradigm war." What Schiller does not seem to have been aware of, however, is that the pragmatists were

but whether these premises are something that you ought to grant." A. K. Rogers, "Pragmatism vs. Dualism," The Philosophical Review, XXVII (1918), pp. 21-22.

¹²²Schiller, "The Ambiguity of Truth," pp. 175-76.

¹²³Ibid., p. 174.

doing the same thing. They responded to every questioning of their thesis by restating it.

Could the two sides have behaved differently? Not if Kuhn's way of thinking is applicable. A paradigm, he contended, is of necessity defended with "facts" born of the paradigm. Hence, a paradigm and its "facts" are either self-evidently "correct" (are experienced as "correct"), or they are not. One does not win converts with a show of evidence because the evidence has no existence until the paradigm is endorsed. In committing himself to this position, of course, Kuhn places himself largely on the side of the pragmatists.

If the pragmatists held a trump card, it was perhaps this: many of their opponents were old-time advocates of "empirical" investigation. Empiricism means judging by experience; it means defining by experience, defining "operationally." This was just what the pragmatists wished to do with words such as "knowledge," "fact," and "truth." Looking, they said, informs us individuals do not hold as "true" ideas which, when they act upon them, result in injury to their interests. On the contrary, they take up as "true" those ideas which best facilitate their interests, which most expeditiously lead them to their goals. In other words, people judge ideas to be "true" or "false" according to the "value of their consequences." If this is not so, Schiller said testily, "there ought surely to be no difficulty about producing abundant cases in which the truth of a doubtful assertion is

established in some other way. I would ask, therefore, for the favour of one clear case of this kind."¹²⁴

In a letter to James, John E. Russell noted the crux of the matter was that intellectualists believed "truth" to be an idea which "agreed with," "reflected," or "copied," some independently "real" condition, while pragmatists held it to be merely an idea which led to a desired objective. Russell asked of his correspondent:

How can the intellectualist in fairness be asked to define in other terms what he means by "agreement with," by "copying," by "thinking reality as it is"? May he not with more propriety ask the pragmatist by what right he makes these terms mean leading, guiding, getting there, etc.?¹²⁵

The answer pragmatists consistently gave to this question was, "by whatever right you may grant a greater empiricism to bestow." In this instance, at least, the anti-pragmatists appeared to be granting none.

Here, then, the battle was joined. And it seemed to be the kind of conflict Kuhn spoke of as paradigmatic. In short, it seemed to be a question not of "which view is correct?" but of "which view is relevant?"¹²⁶ As we well know, the pragmatists lost the contest.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 175; see also Schiller, Humanism, p. 59.

¹²⁵James, Collected Essays and Reviews, p. 476.

¹²⁶Here again, the similarity between Kuhn's position and that of the pragmatists. When asked if pragmatism was "true," Dewey answered: "the pragmatist claims his theory to be true in the pragmatic sense of truth: it works, it clears up difficulties, removes obscurities . . . etc." The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 164.

A Nineteenth-Twentieth Century Paradigm Conflict

A final point I wish to make in this chapter is that the paradigm conflict which raged around pragmatism was one we have already become familiar with. It was nothing other than a meeting between the absolutistic and relativistic epistemologies (the nineteenth and twentieth century paradigms). This is not to argue pragmatists adhered at all times to a relativistic framework. However, when they were attacked they were almost invariably attacked for their relativistic premises and arguments; and they were attacked from an absolutistic position.

Moreover, the weaknesses Dewey's applied pragmatism can be shown to suffer have to do with his failure either to keep faith with relativism or to revert back to absolutism. For instance:

In arguing the relevance of physical science methods to social inquiry Dewey proposed physical science gives us "the most authentic, and dependable knowledge." What, we must ask, is "authentic and dependable knowledge?" Does it have to do with ideas more reflective of external "reals"? No, because Dewey made it abundantly clear he would "tolerate no 'entities' or 'realities' of any kind intruding as if from behind or beyond the knowing-known events."¹²⁷ Could it be "science" provides us with ideas we can dare to act upon, while non-science does not? Hardly, for Dewey also tells us there is no separation between theory and action, between conduct and belief. "Conduct,"

¹²⁷John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), p. 120.

he says, "is the working out of the commitments of belief."¹²⁸

What is "science"? Dewey the applied pragmatist suggests it has to do with understanding "facts" better. But what possible sense can this argument make unless we think in terms of concrete "facts" independent of the goal-oriented observer; unless, that is, we think in terms of an absolutistic framework?

The "scientist," this other Dewey further decided, uses "intelligent" inquiry. What is "intelligence"? According to Dewey, a man is "intelligent" "in virtue of his capacity to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act in accordance with his estimate."¹²⁹ And one is left to wonder, then, how "intelligence" can possibly distinguish the scientist. Especially when we note that elsewhere Dewey argues mere "consciousness" involves the kind of thing he now calls "intelligence." "Consciousness," he indicated, "means ways of believing and disbelieving. It is interpretation; not merely existence aware of itself as fact, but existence discerning, judging itself, approving and disapproving."¹³⁰ And all "believing," of course, involves acting, since there is no separation between theory and action.

So too, Dewey's suggestion social philosophers have clung to an absolutistic epistemology out of "habit," and his observation that

¹²⁸Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 170.

¹²⁹Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 213.

¹³⁰Dewey, Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 171.

the Greeks "fastened wrong beliefs upon Europe for well nigh two thousand years," clash with the pragmatistic assumption that all ideas are endorsed pragmatically (because they get us where we want to go).

Sometimes Dewey the applied pragmatist appeared to suggest "science" shows us how to achieve our ends, as if in non-scientific fields we were agreed upon ends and differed only over means. Dewey the pragmatistic theorist, however, wrote "means and ends are two names for the same reality." Perhaps reminded pragmatism proposed fact and value, means and ends, are inseparable, Dewey occasionally advised the use of "scientific" methods to locate not only facts but values.¹³¹ In such instances he seemed to advocate a natural law position.

There are numerous other aspects of Dewey's applied pragmatism which make war upon the relativistic assumptions at the heart of the pragmatic philosophy; however, nothing would be gained by going into them here.¹³² It is my suspicion that the necessarily futile

¹³¹See Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, p. 74.

¹³²Dewey, for example, spoke of social phenomena as more "complex." One must suppose he meant there are more variables to be taken into consideration, a meaningless assumption unless one first premises "natural" variables to provide the complexity. He argued that in order to discern the consequences of our beliefs, the beliefs "must be tried out"--else they are "dogmas, not truths," as if one could somehow fail to try out his beliefs, could somehow separate "thought and action," and be other than pragmatic. This, after stating "the pragmatist says that judgment is pragmatic . . ." Nor can anyone argue Dewey considered it possible to refrain from judging and to thus be other than pragmatic, since he insisted "consciousness" itself involves judging. See The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, pp. 164-65, 167, 171.

attempt to marry relativistic epistemological assumptions with a belief that "science" involves superior methodology never ceased to give Dewey conscious difficulty. Certainly he made an unusual number of attempts to explain what "science" is.¹³³

In one of his final efforts at accounting for "science" Dewey concludes: "Scientific knowing is that particular form of practical human activity which is concerned with the advancement of knowing apart from concern with other practical affairs."¹³⁴ With that, he separated "knowing" and "doing" (knowing became a form of doing), and clearly entered the absolutist camp.

By way of preparing the reader for the remaining two chapters, I would like to restate a major theme of this essay, which is that the social scientist has access to essentially two epistemological

¹³³See Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, pp. 8-9, 14, 22; see also Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known. (In this book the authors call "attention to the various features that identify and demarcate science as a concern." These include, they assert, "a work and a work carried on by a distinct group . . . having a special vocation . . . persons who have undergone a highly specialized training . . . the work is done in a special kind of workshop . . . fitted out with a particular kind of apparatus . . ." However, these characteristics describe not only the "scientist," but the witchdoctor.) See also The Quest for Certainty.

¹³⁴Contrast this with Schiller's statement: "I have made the prediction of truth depend on relevance to a proximate rather than an ultimate scientific purpose . . . The ordinary 'truths' we predicate have little or no concern with ultimate ends and realities. They are true . . . if they serve their immediate purpose." "The Ambiguity of Truth," p. 171. To speak of other than an immediate purpose is, naturally, to separate thought and action.

paradigms when it comes to ordering the world of his experience. After demonstrating the tight logic of the absolutist paradigm, I attempted to show that when we look closely a logical positivist approach is found to be the same schema in light disguise. In calling it the same, I indicated that were the logical positivist to become an open advocate of absolutism it would make virtually no difference in terms of what he does. On the other hand, committing himself to a relativistic paradigm would prompt something of a moderate revolution in his behavior.

Further, I have sought to demonstrate that the most compelling natural law arguments--those which do greatest injury to absolutist premises--are at once those arguments prompted by a relativistic world-view. Lastly, I noted the penetrating insights of Mannheim, Dewey, Schiller and James were only those born of a relativistic persuasion; and consequently, they were the only ones critics bothered to analyze in any depth or to attack. When these four authors ran into seeming logical difficulty, it was because at some point they abandoned the relativistic framework.

All along the way, I have also tried to make it clear that the conflict between absolutism and relativism is of a paradigm nature. Because it is, much of the time those who engage in the controversy miss their oppositions' logic, fail to witness its "facts," and debate by continually restating their own hallowed premises. In keeping with Kuhn's proposal that paradigms must be judged by the ease with which

they order our experiences, in Chapter Nine I will put forth in logical-whole form the relativistic assumptions underlying modern physics.

And in Chapter Ten I will draw out that paradigm's implications for the analysis of economic-social-political phenomena, arguing it is a most appropriate framework for understanding (for ordering and rationalizing) the moods and movements of our time.

IX. RELATIVISM: A TWENTIETH CENTURY UNDERSTANDING?

The only theory of knowledge which can be valid today is one which is founded on that truth of micro-physics: the experimenter is part of the experimental system. This is the only position which allows us to get rid of all idealist illusion, the only one which shows the real man in the midst of the real world.¹

--Jean Paul Sartre

The paradigm premises to be described in this chapter are those underlying the most successful of modern sciences, physics. They are the contemporary physicist's "taken for granted." As I have indicated elsewhere, the physicist had to take up such assumptions if he was to carry out his work.²

Naturally, in presenting a paradigm which rejects the notion "evidence" can ever have more merit, can ever carry more weight, than each of us is willing to grant it, I can hardly offer to "prove"

¹Jean Paul Sartre, Search for a Method (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 32.

²Sinclair, p. 69, observes: "The classical physicists were able to carry out their work without reference to an observer, but this was no longer possible after about 1905." On this same subject, Eddington, pp. 5-6, reflected: "For developing the modern theories of matter and radiation a definite epistemological outlook has become a necessity; and it is the direct source of the most far-reaching scientific advances . . . necessity has caused physicists to enter into epistemology, rather against their will."

its worth.³ I can do no more than detail the various assumptions, point to the logical connections between them, indicate their implications for the conduct of scholarship, and then leave it to the reader to decide for himself whether the paradigm is a meaningful reflection of his experience, whether for him it is "relevant" or not.

It will be recalled that when describing the nineteenth century paradigm I began by stating the assumptions made about the universe, then turned to the sub-assumptions concerning the viewer's knowledge of it. This seemed to me quite sensible, since the paradigm posited a natural division between the two. The twentieth century paradigm on the contrary does not; consequently its premises are at once about man and his universe, together and indiscerptible.

The over-riding premise of the twentieth century epistemological paradigm is that the universe is a single time-space entity having no independently "real" or "natural" subdivisions.⁴ By this I mean it is assumed the universe has no subdivisions (objects and events)

³Abiding by the logic of a relativistic epistemology, Sinclair writes: ". . . it is a commonplace that the alleged proofs which abound or used to abound in philosophical writings do not in fact prove anything. In themselves they convince and convert nobody. They are held to be conclusive only by those who have been predisposed to believe their conclusions for other reasons or by other causes." p. 28.

⁴"Our experience does not come wrapped up in perfectly sharp little bundles, with an identity which stays always the same, but these tidy little bundles are an invention of our own which are enormously useful." P. W. Bridgman, The Intelligent Individual and Society (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938), p. 50.

whose forms are "real" independent of the subdivider. Man (or any other creature), it is supposed, relates to the universe as a sculptor to a block of marble; it is "out there"--this seems to be a "truth" of everyone's experience--but it is of whole cloth, passively awaiting our psychological cutting and our manipulating.⁵

This view, by definition, involves the further assumption that if there are no independently "natural" forms, there can clearly be no independently "natural" similarities or categories. Further still, since the belief in independently "real" causes and laws likewise presupposes the existence of "real" objects and events able to cause one another and able to relate to one another in a lawful manner, the twentieth century paradigm also premises there are no "natural" causes or laws.

The second major assumption is that man relates to, or experiences, different areas of his universe, this single time-space entity, in different ways. To say this is at once to say he "cuts up" and categorizes his universe, for as I have also noted, we never simply experience areas of our universe, we experience them as something; as chairs, books, automobiles and wars. Nor is it possible ever to

⁵Eddington, in a now classic argument, likened the physicist to a sculptor working on a block of marble. Indeed, said Eddington, the physicist's work might even be called more creative. The sculptor only removes material, the physicist not only removes, but when required, adds material to gain the desired form. Eddington, pp. 110-11, 121.

avoid the cutting, not if we are to remain alive. As the Harvard anthropologist Marvin Harris has observed, all creatures must engage in this creative enterprise; "the ability to classify, or as it is known in psychology, the ability to 'generalize,' is . . . an endowment common to all grades of animal life."⁶ The logical connection with the first premise is immediately evident. Man contemplates objects and events; therefore their forms are either "true" independently of him, or he is deeply involved in their creation.

A third premise, equally consistent with the others, is that all of the cuts and categorizations we make, the most "scientific" no less than the most "commonsensical," have equal claim to being "real" (dependently "real") entities. Harris makes this point so lucidly I will simply quote his argument. He notes:

Many scientific workers suffer from the delusion that some unit things are more "natural" than others. Thus atoms, species, genes, individual organisms, culture traits are frequently described as "natural units"--again, with the implication that they enjoy some sort of superior reality. [However] . . . the natural units of science, and of ordinary discourse, are essentially customary devices which cannot be justified on purely logical grounds. Take the chair you are sitting on. Why do we consider it a unit? The chair has legs which sit upon the floor. You sit upon the chair. Why isn't "floor-chair-you" a thing, rather than the chair? . . . in everyday discourse, as well as in science, we dismantle a particular field of inquiry into certain units but not into others. Thus, the chair is regarded as a unit thing, whereas "floor-chair-you" sounds as if it belongs in a poem about purple cows. Neither unit, however, is more "natural"

⁶Marvin Harris, The Nature of Cultural Things (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 10-11.

than the other.⁷

A fourth premise is that there exists no "natural" distinction between the segmentations of the universe men call "fact" and those they assert have to do with "value." Having rejected a belief in independent "real" entities, it can hardly be maintained some cuts imposed upon the universe are "naturally" "value" cuts, others matters of "fact," that some acts of man are "naturally" expressive of "values," while others "really" have to do with "fact," or again, that particular statements are "naturally" "value" statements, others revelations of what "truly" is. Still, men are constantly heard to speak of "values" as opposed to "facts," and of expressions of "value" versus expressions of "fact." (That men distinguish "fact" and "value" is a "fact" of all of our experiences.) It is important, therefore, that the twentieth century paradigm be able to account for the use of these terms. The paradigm should be able to indicate how and when men will be found to use them.⁸ It provides the following answers:

First of all, each individual personally separates "fact" and "value" by calling readings derived from present experiences it is

⁷Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁸What follows is not an attempt to show how relativism distinguishes "fact" and "value," or expressions of "fact" and ones of "value"; relativism does not distinguish them. For the relativist statements of "fact" are at once statements of preference (or "value"). The elaborate discussion presented here is only intended to demonstrate why this is so, and to indicate the source of the "fact"--"value" controversy so commonly engaged in by absolutists.

assumed will continue into the immediate future "fact," while labeling statements which in order to be "true" would necessitate alterations in one's present experience, "value." To illustrate: looking at a door, I declare it "fact" that it is an object for keeping out drafts and noises, for opening and entering through, and that it is six feet from me. The "value" of this piece of time-space, I propose, has to do with whether I wish to walk through it (alter my present experiencing of it) now or ever again. In other words I cut up my experience into "fact" and "value" so that I may act with freedom, so that I may choose. But they are not "naturally" distinct. If someone asked me what the "fact" of the door was in times past, I would give him the same answer as if he had asked about its former "value." So, too, if we suddenly decided we would never again "value" doors as objects of entry, the "fact" of what they are is immediately altered. Finally, if the "fact" of such pieces of time-space is to remain the same, we must continue to "value" them in the same way; we must continue our present experiencing of them. Moreover, to maintain the existing "fact" requires as much choosing and willing on our part as would altering it; this is so whether the choosing be conscious or automatic and unconscious. To reason in a different manner is to speak of independent "real" forms for "fact" and "value."

Having explained the distinction men impose between the two, what must be accounted for next is the continuing controversy

individuals, including scholars, engage in over whether a particular way of segmenting (categorizing, etc.) has to do with "fact" or with "value." Relativism furnishes these insights: We established that for each of us the "facts" concerning a piece of time-space (in the above illustration, a door) are dependent upon the way we are experiencing that time-space, on the way we are relating to it. The "facts" "this is an object of entry and for keeping out drafts and noises" were seen to be born of very specific kinds of experiences, which, if the "facts" were to be changed, must themselves be altered. Consequently, whenever the "facts" of one individual's experience do not exist for a second individual having different experiences, and when further they cannot exist unless he alters his present experiences in ways he finds unappealing, he will be likely (if he thinks non-relativistically) to view the expressed "facts" of the first individual's experience as nothing other than statements of "value." From a relativistic standpoint, this is the extent of the "fact"--"value" controversy. Understandably, then, when men share experiences, when they segment in the same manner, the controversy does not take place. With no difficulty whatsoever, they agree their on-going experience is "fact," while "value" has to do with whether and in what manner they wish to alter that experience. A crucial point to be grasped here, however, is that no experiences, including the present ones, take place without our concerted willing and doing; we are not mere spectators of our experiences. In brief,

it requires as much willing and doing, as much choosing and preferring on our parts to maintain existing experiences--and the "facts" which flow from them--as to make what we usually think of as a "value" selection, to alter those experiences and thereby take up new "facts."

Because for many this seems to be one of the most difficult aspects of the twentieth century paradigm, I will remake the point in a slightly different manner. Relativism denies any independent "reals." Once this has been done, once we have discounted the idea of any "natural" divisions whatsoever, even between the viewer and the viewed,⁹ we must conclude individuals' ideas (all ideas, expressed or not) merge with, are part of, their experiences; that altered ideas mean altered experiences; maintained ideas, maintained experiences, and conflicting ideas, conflicting experiences.

To elaborate upon this last, if viewer and viewed are tied, if a given fact only flows from a given experience, it follows that when-
ever we take the fact of a specific experience and label it "the" fact,
or "the" truth, by our very act we presuppose the superior worth of
the experience from which it derives--and we presuppose its continua-
tion at least for the duration of the reading and reporting of the fact,
as was noted in the previous chapter. Needless to say, momentarily

⁹According to P. W. Bridgman, ". . . it is in fact meaningless to try to separate observer and observed, or to speak of an object independent of an observer, or, for that matter, of an observer in the absence of objects of observation." "Science and Common Sense," Scientific Monthly, LXXVIII (June, 1954), pp. 208-10.

continuing any experience requires as much willing and doing on our part as would changing it and arriving at a different fact. And from the vantage point of another observer who does not happen to desire our continuation of the experience in question--not even for a moment--our own assumption that it will continue, as well as our actions which make its momentary continuation possible--are usually taken to be expressions of "value." Putting the argument still another way: upon stating a "fact" or "truth" we do not ordinarily act in ways which promptly deny its worth as "fact," which say it was not "true" after all. That is, we base our actions on our experienced "facts."

Thus, having said our actions will not constitute a denial that our "facts" are factual, that they will not make war upon our "facts," and having said too that each "fact" springs from a certain kind of experience, we have already argued our actions will not make war upon the experiences from which our "facts" derive.

To repeat the important point, to a viewer who does not share the relationships, the experiences, from which a "fact" of ours stems, the very stating of the "fact" stands to be interpreted as a promotion of those experiences, as a statement which is value-laden; and indeed, our statement does reveal our preferred experiencing of the area of time-space in question. A color-sighted individual looks at a pine tree and announces "the 'fact' is that tree is green." But to the "color blind" individual, who shares neither the experience nor

the "fact," such a one is heard to say: "You ought to be like me; you ought to be my kind of measuring instrument, share my neurological equipment, relate as I do to this particular observed." Moreover, it is readily understood his contention "that tree is green" includes the choice, the assumed preference, for remaining the kind of viewer he is, for maintaining certain kinds of relationships he has with the viewed.

Stated quite simply, then, when an individual takes a stand upon some "fact," he stands as well upon the experience from which the "fact" is born. In saying: "I insist upon the worth of this 'fact,' and I will defend with my actions its existence," he says too, "I shall maintain the life experiences from which this reading derives." Quite often another observer is heard to remark, "Oh, no, you will not." And that is what "value" conflict is all about. The conflict over "values" is the conflict over "facts" is the conflict over who will maintain or take up which life experiences.

Each and every time one locates a "value" conflict, he will discover it is of this sort; it is at once a battle over "experienced facts," over word-meanings, categories, and all the rest. As we will note in Chapter Ten, the most virulent "value" conflicts arise when one individual's assumed experiences (the experiences he assumes a continuation of) cannot be maintained if his opponent's are, and vice versa; when their experiences, hence their "facts" and their "values,"

become mutually exclusive.¹⁰

Political scientists have never practiced a consistent policy when it comes to determining the "values" of others. They have gone now by what individuals say, now by what they do, apparently as the fancy suits them. Thus, a Castro is often assumed to desire a classless society because he says he does, while a Hitler, however much he insists he aspires to a utopian community, is judged by what he does and written down as the brutalizer of millions. An absolutist, of course, can follow such a practice with no logical difficulty whatsoever. "Values" are "real" things; they are another kind of independent "fact."

¹⁰See pp. 119-121 this essay. Some writers, it will be recalled (see Chapter Four), have approached this whole issue yet another way. After rejecting the notion of "natural" entities, they asked: "In view of the 'fact' of every man's experience that persons often arrive at conflicting understandings of the 'true' forms, categories, causes, laws and the like (make conflicting readings), what determines which of the conflicting readings an individual will accept at any given time?" And the answer consistently given, the only answer which seemingly can be given unless we chalk our decisions up to caprice, was that man selects those understandings which are in line with his objectives; he decides partly according to his "values." In effect, this is what Kuhn was arguing when he contended that to endorse certain theories is simultaneously to endorse certain "values" and that our "facts" are born of our theories. It is only a matter of simple explication to note he has contended that to embrace particular "values" is to enjoy particular "facts."

In Chapter Four E. A. Burtt and Max Planck were quoted as saying man classifies and categorizes according to his purposes, his aims. There it was also noted that to identify a single entity, to "fact" find, is at once to categorize. (Again, keep in mind we experience a "fact" as something, as a tree, a storm, a bird, in a word, as a member of some category.) Hence, we have said--Planck and Burtt are saying--that our "values" (our aims) are involved in the determination of our "facts."

Hence, it can be concluded one man's "values" are what he declares them to be--he knows his "true" aims. Another's word, however, is absolutely worthless; he is mistaken about his "real" desires (e. g., the radical rightist who only thinks he aims to defend freedom, but who "in truth" is trying to buoy up his status).

According to a relativistic logic, such a practice is unacceptable. It is not a question of what "values" are, but of which of our experiences we wish to associate with that word. We might decide anytime individuals verbalize preferences their words are to be taken as constituting their "value" positions. Clearly, no man has been willing to take that route. And rightly so; one who did would be in a permanent state of confusion. The alternative is to call an individual's acts his "values." But to go back and forth between the two--between expressions of preference and acts--is a course not open to the relativist.

The relativist, then, does not give recognition to "I want" and "I like" statements as necessarily having more to do with "values" than any other kind of statement. Insisting words only have those meanings people give to them in acting upon them, he concludes the words "I would like there to be" when issued by one individual may mean the very same thing as the words "there is" when issued by a second. The relativist would agree with Franz Adler when he says, "What people do is all that can be known about their values."¹¹ This

¹¹Franz Adler, "Value Concept in Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, LXII (Nov., 1956), p. 272.

does not mean an actor's words are to be completely ignored. But they are to be given meaning (his "values" are to be judged) by noting what he does (by observing his actions) when he issues them.

Naturally, the notion that our preferred experiences (or acts), our "values," are revealed in the "facts," categories, causes and laws we use holds whether we are operating as laymen or as scientists. I think I have said enough about "facts" and categories, and I have already made the point with reference to causes. (The reader is referred back to the argument presented on pages 122-23, this essay.) For the twentieth century paradigm adherent the word "cause" does not at all have the old absolutistic meaning. If it did, he argues, we would necessarily live out a lifetime before we finished giving an account of the "cause" of anything. For the relativist our "causes" are all pragmatic ones. The "cause" of anything is simply "that variable(s) we can best manipulate or accommodate to in order to get where we want to go."¹² In view of this we would expect that individuals not sharing aims would also fail to share causal statements, which is precisely what we find. Since laws are but causal sequences, it hardly seems necessary to make the point again in respect to laws.¹³

¹²"The search for 'efficient causes' instead of for final causes, for extrinsic relations instead of intrinsic forms, constitutes the aim of science." Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 103-104.

¹³What is the basis of a scientific law? asks William H. George. Then he answers: "It seems to be neither the external environment alone, nor the human observers alone, but must be considered as a property of the two considered as the whole. By this I mean to

In the view being presented, then, we evaluate as we experience.

Human motives sharpen all our questions, human satisfactions lurk in all our answers, all our formulas have a human twist . . . This applied to the "eternal" parts of reality as well: we shuffle our perceptions of intrinsic relations and arrange them just as freely. . . . We carve out stars in the heavens, and call them constellations, and the stars patiently suffer us to do so. . . . We name the same constellations diversely . . . In all of these cases we humanly make an addition to some sensible reality, and that reality tolerates the addition. All the additions "agree" with the reality. . . . No one of them is false. Which may be treated as the more true depends altogether on the human use of it.¹⁴

Whereas the nineteenth century paradigm encouraged the notion that crucial "values" (for an objective viewer) generally have to do with conscious preferences, the twentieth century paradigm, it should by now be evident, does the reverse. According to the latter, the important objectives men entertain have to do with the experiences they assume a continuation (a recreation) of, preferences reflected in their very categories and concepts and in their causal and lawful statements. In this regard, the

imply very definitely indeed that a law of nature is not something quite independent of human beings." p. 174.

¹⁴James, Pragmatism, pp. 242, 252-53. Schiller argued: "If it is clearly grasped that the 'truth' with which we are concerned is truth for man and that the 'consequences' are human too, it is really superfluous to add either that the consequences must be practical or that they must be good." Quoted in Pratt, p. 22. The "truth" at which science arrives, stated William Clifford, "is not that which we can ideally contemplate without error, but that which we may act upon without fear." Quoted in Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science, p. 129.

reader will recall Wirth's suggestion that "the most important thing . . . we can know about a man is what he takes for granted."¹⁵ It is the dominant assumed goal of staying alive which a jesting friend reveals, for example, when he responds to my inquiry as to how I might reach a distant destination cheaply and quickly (my expressed objective) with the recommendation that I have myself cremated and mailed in an envelope. This is not in any way to suggest we have no conscious preferred experiences, but they are of secondary importance, and they too are to be judged by observing our actions.¹⁶

To return, now, to a point already touched upon, if men segment their universe according to their experience with it; if experience has those characteristics we call "value" as well as those we call "fact," it must be the case that insofar as individuals share experiences with areas of their universe (with areas of time-space) they will do their cutting in the same way--they will agree on what is "fact" and what is "value." In a word, it must also be assumed that shared experiences equal shared "facts" and "evaluations."¹⁷

¹⁵Wirth in Ideology and Utopia, pp. xxii-xxiii.

¹⁶Dewey, it will be recalled, contended that to relate the "fact" of anything was to tell what it was experienced as being, but he wanted to except the "fact" of what men's values were from this requirement.

¹⁷"An examination of human observation shows that agreement between different observers is readily reached without the use of threats or torture if the different observers are set to judge coincidences. These elementary human judgments give the nearest to universal agreement that is ever reached, and are called either coincidence observations or facts." George, p. 99.

In respect to this last, having argued "what we know or experience is reality and we know it directly"¹⁸ (experience and "fact" are one) we have already said that a sharing of "facts" will involve the sharing of experiences. W. Angus Sinclair phrases it thusly:

"Things" and "events" are names for certain kinds of constituents of the situations we experience in consequence of our holding certain attitudes or following certain ways of selecting and grouping in attention . . . [Hence] we are justified in saying that there are ultimate brute facts, if we all hold the same or similar theories in the field in question and thus experience the same or similar facts . . . When I point to my pipe lying on my desk and thus make somebody else aware that it is there, I am causing him to adopt certain attitudes or follow certain ways of selecting and grouping in his attention, and thus to have an experience of a wide situation within which is the sub-situation called the pipe.¹⁹ [Sharing theories is part of sharing experiences is part of sharing "facts." And since to "fact-find" is to act out a preference for certain experiences, it is also part of sharing "values."]

George Lundberg similarly reflects:

Things which all or nearly all men respond to [experience] in very much the same way, i. e., an iron fence, we call relatively objective, physical, material, tangible, etc. . . . The objectivity of any aspect of the universe (situation) as contrasted with another, therefore, depends upon its capacity to evoke uniform responses from large numbers of people.²⁰

¹⁸Sinclair, pp. 42, 146-47.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 78-80, 94, 113-14.

²⁰George A. Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their Implications for Sociology," in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, pp. 58-62. Naturally, because experience is a two-way street, because it involves interaction with the area of time-space experienced, a reaction to it, it also follows that "when several persons react in the same way to a particular situation, the cause [of their similar behavior] must be sought in the experience which such individuals have in common." Ralph Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1945), p. 14.

To share an individual's "facts," then, is to share his experiences. Not only that, but since no gap is premised between the observer and the observed,²¹ to share his experiences and his "facts" is to be like him; it is to be his kind of measuring instrument. Men relate to the sun in a similar manner; they are, in respect to it, similar measuring instruments, deriving similar "facts." However, "if we were sensitive to wave-lengths from one metre to one centimetre, the sun would appear to be twice its normal size, because we should then be able to see the gaseous layers of the sun's atmosphere."²² Likewise, "creatures with senses fine enough to detect the world of microparticles might spend an eternity without discovering the properties common to that sector of the universe which we gratuitously accept as an ordinary chair."²³ "It is quite conceivable that intelligent beings with other biological and cultural categories of understanding would develop forms of mathematics (i. e., deductive systems) quite different from our science of quantities, and consequently other forms of physics."²⁴

²¹It should be evident that none can be without postulating independent "reals."

²²Charles Noel Martin, The Role of Perception in Science (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1963), p. 124.

²³Marvin Harris, pp. 9-10.

²⁴Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "The Psychopathology of Scientism," in Scientism and Values, ed. by Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand & Co., 1960), p. 204. Henry Margenau remarks: "It must be recognized that even so fundamental a discipline as arithmetic has its own limited range of application, and

Once more, I might add that experiencing the sun or a chair in such a drastically different manner means responding (the viewer and the viewed are part of one another--experiencing is responding) to it differently; that is, acting differently towards it, finding different "values" in it from those another observing instrument would find.

An assumption I consider closely related to the one just stated is that to share experiences is at once to share the vocabulary which applies to those experiences. We are automatically led to this conclusion when we reason that having done away with the idea of independent "reals" there remains nothing for us to tack our words on unless we tack them on our experiences, upon the experienced "facts."²⁵ In that case, the sharing of word-meanings (vocabularies) will necessarily involve the sharing of experiences. Having arrived at such a conclusion, we immediately note it accords well with all of our other understandings concerning word usage. Thus, as Harris notes, when experiences are held in common communication is ever a simple matter.

that its truth is contingent upon the acceptance of certain premises called postulates which by virtue of their generality and our familiarity with them, frequently take on the semblance of self-evidence." Margenau, p. 64.

²⁵P. W. Bridgman has observed "any concept is nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations." The Logic of Modern Physics (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 5. "I believe," he also wrote, "that one will find that when he wants to assure himself that he understands the meaning of a term or wants to discover what a question means, he makes an analysis of what he does in using the term or answering the question." The Intelligent Individual and Society, p. 20.

. . . for the most part, the deficiencies of natural language do not intrude themselves so long as discourse is confined to the contexts of experience to which the ordinary speaker is regularly exposed. But when the context is altered, when there is no longer a basis in common experience, common sense fails. Consider what happens when one seeks to describe the behavior of people whose learning experiences have little in common with that of the observer's community.²⁶

This one-to-one tie between experience and word-meaning was at the very heart of Whorf's thesis.²⁷ "Do you not conceive it possible," he asked, "that scientists as well as ladies with cats all unknowingly project the linguistic patterns of a particular type of language upon the universe, and SEE them there, rendered visible on the very face of nature?" "A change in language," he asserted, "can transform our appreciation of the Cosmos."²⁸

So, too, we know that to learn the esoteric vocabulary of any science is to become familiar with the esoteric experiences the vocabulary refers to. Again, as I noted in the previous chapter, students are witnessed to learn most readily the languages of peoples having similar cultural experiences, and the writings of such peoples are

²⁶Harris, pp. 24-25.

²⁷"Every language," Whorf contended, "is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness . . . If asked to invent forms not already prefigured in the pattern of his language, the speaker is negative in the same manner as if asked to make fried eggs without eggs." pp. 252-56.

²⁸Ibid., p. 263.

always the easiest to translate into one's own tongue.

If we bind our words to our experiences, and if to share the one is to share the other, it follows that men will never completely share word-meanings. This because, as I also pointed out in Chapter Eight, to have precisely the same experiences with any piece of time-space would require observers to exist at the same time and place in space, an impossibility. Needless to say, philosophers have long reflected people never seem to mean exactly the same things by the same words.²⁹

In addition, if words are bound to experience, since the latter is clearly never static, since it is always in flux, the meanings of words should also evidence continual change. According to Mannheim:

Only the relative rigidity in the sound of words can hide the fact that behind the same words there is a constant change in the actual meanings. A closer inspection shows us again and again that the historical denotations of the various words are always different.³⁰

Finally, if words take their meanings from our experiences, and if our experiences have relative direction--if they are aim-oriented--our vocabularies ought themselves to reflect and reveal this orientation. Said Kuhn, there neither is nor can be a "scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts."³¹ The finding

²⁹See Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, p. 4.

³⁰Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 113.

³¹Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 145.

that groups engaged in economic-social conflict, groups having different and conflicting economic-social experiences, give words notably different (and conflicting) meanings is also relevant here; as is the observation that they show the same scorn for each other's vocabularies that they evidence for each other's "facts." The conflicting vocabularies of the Bolsheviks and non-Bolsheviks in Russia, and the vocabularies of contemporary left, right and middle in our own society were previously mentioned. (See also the comments on the development of science, this chapter.)

Understandably, in the relativist's lexicon, there can be no such thing as a "meaningless" word or concept. "Meaningless things, words or symbols are a contradiction in terms. . . . We use the expression to designate, of course, phenomena that do not fit in consistently with the frame of reference in which we try to place them."³² If a word exists it means someone has used it; they have tied it to some experience they have had--they have given it meaning. To say a term lacks meaning, then, is to indicate it has no meaning for us, that it is inappropriate or irrelevant to our personal experiences.

The rest of the premises which go to make up the twentieth century paradigm are, in my estimation, best viewed as sub-assumptions; at least they seem to me of lesser import. I will state them as briefly

³²Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their Implications for Sociology," p. 59.

and as concisely as I can. Once more, attention is called to the way in which their logic meshes with that of the primary assumptions.

Reasoning from the latter, it can be deduced that:

(a) There is no "natural" division separating "object" and "event." If the universe is to be viewed as a single time-space entity which man segments according to his liking, it must be so that whether a given segment is labeled "object" or "event" is also up to man. Thus, the piece of time-space I hold in my hand can be treated as an object, a pencil, or it may be contemplated as an event, a particular configuration of molecules which alters from millionth of a second to millionth of a second, never to be repeated. "The character of an event," writes Alfred North Whitehead, "is nothing but the objects which are ingredient in it, and the ways in which those objects make their ingression into the event." Conversely, he notes, "the concrete facts of nature are events exhibiting [for clarity I would add, experienced as exhibiting] a certain structure in their mutual relations and certain characters of their own."³³ Undeniably, from certain perspectives and for certain purposes some pieces of time-space are profitably termed objects, while others are more meaningfully referred to as events. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that, according to the relativistic epistemology, this segmenting and classifying, like

³³Whitehead, pp. 143-167.

any other, is done from a given perspective and in behalf of given aims.³⁴

(b) Every "object" or "event" "is" its relationships. Having said there are no "natural" forms to discover, it is a simple matter to reason that when it comes to describing what something is, all an observer can ever do is state its relationships to other pieces of time-space he has cut out, including his own person. For each of us, a thing is its relationships. To explain: if asked to indicate what the piece of time-space seated across from me is, I might begin by saying it is a man, thereby stating its relationships to those pieces of time-space I do not label men. He is a colleague, as opposed to those who are not. He is six feet tall--his relationship to a yardstick, and to other objects which are more or less than that height. He is young--his relationship to those who are old; married, as opposed to those who are single. He is approximately five feet from me, three feet from the door, eighty feet from the street, and so on. The most scientific of descriptions are in no way exceptions to this rule. To quote Dewey, "There is one common character of all such scientific operations which it is necessary to note. They are such as disclose relationships."³⁵ "We only know

³⁴"Not only does our experiencing this and that thing as this and that particular thing depend on our following certain ways of selecting and grouping, but so also does our experiencing them as things, and not as, for instance, series of events . . . In the independent real there are neither things nor no things, neither events nor no events. 'Things' and 'events' are names for certain kinds of constituents of the situations we experience in consequence of our holding certain attitudes or following certain ways of selecting and grouping in attention." Sinclair, pp. 79-80.

³⁵Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 125.

an electric force by its effects on an electric charge; and we only know electric charges in terms of the electric forces they produce."³⁶ "Relativity," proposes Bronowski, "is the understanding of the world not as events but as relations."³⁷

Since a thing is its relationships, when those relationships change what it is thereupon becomes transformed.³⁸ Moreover, in arguing that an object or event is its relationships to other "things" we distinguish, and that one of the "things" we distinguish happens to be our own person, we have simultaneously argued that to alter the relationships between our person and a piece of time-space (to alter our experiencing of it) is to alter what it is for us. (It should be apparent we are operationally defining is. We are asking, "What does man mean by the term in practice?" "What does he do when he uses

³⁶Eddington, p. 147.

³⁷Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science, pp. 102-103.

³⁸When the pragmatists made this point critics seemed to have difficulty understanding it. Thus, Vernon Lee asked: "But is identity of relations the same as identity of quality? If two men are exactly like a third, they must be exactly like each other; but if two men are in exactly the same relation to a third--say in the relation of a friend, or pupil, or enemy--are they like each other in everything else?" Phrased relativistically, the answer is: "Since they are their relationships, if two men are exactly like a third, they will have exactly the same relationships as the third. Conversely, since they are their relationships, if two men are in exactly the same relation to a third, but not in the same relationship to everything else, they will not be seen as being alike in everything else." See Lee, p. 601. (Keep in mind that according to a relativistic framework having exactly the same relationships, being exactly alike, is an impossibility.)

it?" And the answer is, he points to relationships.)

(c) There is no "natural" distinction between "fact" and "interpretation." The "fact" that "spring is a time of building construction in New York" is based upon a lower level agreement among the fact-finders to interpret certain of their shared experiences in very specific ways and to call them "spring," "building construction" and "New York."

As Sinclair observes:

In much historical research work, as in a court of law, it is possible to discriminate for practical purposes between the events which actually occurred and the interpretation to be put upon these, but this turns out on examination to be a discrimination between interpretations which are agreed by all concerned and hence not mentioned, and interpretations which are not agreed and hence are explicitly discussed.³⁹

Not to conclude this, of course, is to speak of independent "reals." I might add, men call "fact" those readings--those ways of segmenting time-space which are part of on-going experiences they assume a

³⁹ Sinclair, p. 70. Sinclair continues, "The statement of an explanation is . . . like any other statement. The difference between it and a statement which is not an explanation is a difference in the kinds of effects they respectively have on the attitudes, etc., of those who read or hear them. The statement of an explanation causes an attitude to be held which is not merely different from those previously held but is markedly more adequate over a distinguishable field (otherwise we should not call it an explanation), whereas the statement which is not an explanation causes a different attitude to be held which is merely different, or at least is not noticeably more adequate. The difference between simple statement and explanation is one [is experienced as one] of degree." pp. 199-200. Readers who have difficulty with the arguments presented in this chapter might benefit from a thorough reading of Sinclair's essay.

continuation of. The word "interpretation" they use to refer to ways of segmenting the universe which they believe may help them alter in a desirable manner some experience they are having.

(d) Every human "fact" (interpretation) is founded on empirical observation, theory and faith. In saying "facts" always are based on empirical observation, I wish to indicate that because for the relativist there are only "experienced facts," whether one defines "empiricism" to mean the rooting of observations in experience, in the "facts," or in the "experienced facts," he must conclude all readings are empirical.⁴⁰ As for observations being founded on theory, having drawn the above conclusions about "fact" and "interpretation," we have already established this point. After all, what does theory have to do with if not interpretation?⁴¹ Finally, we have consistently noted every observation is based upon a faith assumption that the categories used in making it are relevant and sound. Every observation, however scientific, must of necessity presuppose the worth of the categories which define its boundaries, e.g., to observe "that tree is green" is to take for granted the worth of the categories "trees" and "green things."

⁴⁰See the comments by Margenau on this issue, p. 13. Also see the argument presented on pp. 142-43 this essay.

⁴¹"Theorizing," says Harry Ekstein, pp. 479-80, "plays a role in all kinds of inquiries, even inquiries which pretend to do nothing more than collect data. After all, criteria of selection imply judgments of significance, and what are judgments of significance if not theories?"

"Items of faith," Margenau tells us, "whether they belong to religion, the field of action, or of cognitive understanding, form anchors for the ships of our lives, and science is no exception to that general rule."⁴²

(e) There is no "natural" distinction between knowledge and belief.

"It is sometimes held that there is a difference of kind between knowledge and mere belief . . . That there is this distinction is a theory, and it has to be abandoned for the same reasons and under the same qualifications as before."⁴³ Since our paradigm prevents any reference to "knowledge" and "belief" as independent "reals," the interesting and appropriate question becomes, "Under what conditions do men speak of 'knowledge,' and under what altered conditions do they talk of 'belief'?" Looking tells us there are basically two action-distinctions between the words. Men use the term "knowledge" to refer to those interpretations, theories, categories, etc., which they assume to be valid--whose worth is taken for granted because doing so gets them where they want to go. The word "knowledge" like the word "fact" is

⁴²Margenau, p. 66. On the matter of "faith," even when experience does not uphold their favored theses, men are frequently found to continue believing in them nonetheless. And here again, scientists are not exceptions. While the Michelson-Moreley experiments seemed to destroy the notion space was filled with an ether, "Michelson never gave up his belief that under the proper experimental conditions the ether could be demonstrated to exist." Fox, Garbuny and Hooke, p. 15.

⁴³Sinclair, p. 106.

used to refer to readings which are born of experiences we have an assumed preference for. Once more, the assumed aptness of the categories "trees" and "green things" which underlies the observation "that is a green tree," and the assumed preference for the experiences from which it derives. Whatever hypothesis we may be testing, it will of necessity be based upon numerous assumptions (assumptions which given other experiences, other purposes, may also be treated as hypothetical) which are not being put to the test. Hence, we commonly use the term "knowledge" to refer to the latter, and the word "belief" to indicate the former. In addition, one man's personal bit of "knowledge," his personal "fact," derived from his personal experience, will usually be referred to as a "belief" by a second individual whose own experience does not produce such a conclusion.

(f) There is no "natural" line separating "knowledge" and "action."

To illustrate the difference between an absolutist and a relativist on this aspect of the paradigm, the former, the absolutist, might argue as follows:

It is a piece of "knowledge" that General Ky will run for his nation's second highest office in the upcoming Vietnamese elections (September, 1967). Now, while a Captain in the Vietnamese army and a sympathizer with the National Liberation Front may be acting differently in respect to this piece of "knowledge," one working for his candidacy, the other against, it is nonetheless the same piece of "knowledge" for each. Knowing and acting, then are independent of one another.

To which the relativist would reply something like this:

To be sure, both individuals share certain relationships with Ky, consequently they share certain bits of "knowledge"--they agree he is running for office. However, in respect to this common "knowledge" they act in a common manner. Thus, they both arise each morning, get dressed, and hurry forth to work in connection with the forthcoming elections. But where their actions differ, so too does their "knowledge." After leaving his house, the Captain is witnessed to proceed to the Army officer's club, where he spends much of the day proclaiming in rather loud voice the virtues of General Ky. Ask him what "knowledge" he acts in response to, he will tell you he acts upon the "knowledge" that: "General Ky--defender of freedom--protector of the Vietnamese people--and hope of the nation--is running for the Vice Presidency." The NLF sympathizer, on the other hand, is seen to go among the part-time fishermen and the unemployed who linger around the docks, and to argue for the boycotting of the election. Now ask him what piece of "knowledge" prompts him to act in this way. In no uncertain terms he will inform you: "General Ky--puppet of a foreign imperialist power--brutalizer of his people--and protector of a corrupt army--has declared his candidacy for office." To repeat, to the precise degree that they shared "knowledge," based on shared experiences, they acted in concert. Where their experiences diverged, so too did their "knowledge" and their actions. To conclude otherwise is to reason in terms of independent "reals."

Part of the relativist's position is the notion--one which can readily be defended by reference to experience--that there is no such thing as not acting in respect to any area of our universe. Consequently, at all times we reveal our values in respect to all things.

(g) There is no "natural" logic. It seems to me this conclusion is so blatantly obvious that I will not belabor it. Logic has to do with explicating and unpacking stated premises, with tracing their implications or meanings. Since relativism proposes words have only those meanings men in action give to them, any particular system of logic men share--any common logical train of thought--must be viewed as dependent upon

the shared word-meanings contained in the premises being employed. Furthermore, since men give words meaning by tying them on to their experiences, specific common word-meanings will in turn necessitate specific common experiences. Any logic, in short, is in no wise independent of the logician and his experiences. And there can be as many conceivable logics as there can be different viewers relating in different ways to the things viewed. Indeed, since logics, like word-meanings, are bound to experience, we would not expect any two men to completely share a logic any more than they do the meaning of a word. It follows that to find another's argument "illogical" is only to fail to grasp his logic. But logic as a "thing," pure and simple, does not exist in the world of the relativist.

So, too, logic as a subject is based upon the theory "that there are propositions and inferences and that these have forms of their own which can be studied as such."⁴⁴ Permitting of no "natural" forms, the twentieth century paradigm leads to the conclusion that "the study of logic is the exploration of a blind alley." "In plain language, there is no such subject."⁴⁵

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 139. Sinclair makes the related point that "knowing" and "acting" cannot be considered "naturally" different in kind.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 193-94. Sinclair predicts: "There will be an intervening period during which logic, though abandoned by originating minds, will be retained in the curricula of many universities and seminaries, and it will no doubt long continue to flourish, like the duck-billed platypus and the ginkgo tree, as a survival from an earlier age."

When I speak of the "logic" of the nineteenth and the twentieth century paradigm, therefore, in effect I declare: "It is the logic of my experience to conclude there are essentially two epistemological frameworks in conflict which the scholar can choose from, and they look like _____". Insofar as another individual, say an Angus Sinclair, shares the experience it is expected he will share the logic. One who shares something less of the experience to which the logic refers, e. g., a T. S. Kuhn, will be expected to share less of the logic, and so forth.

Just as there is no place in the paradigm for a logic, neither is there room for a rationality, or a lack of it. If when one individual accuses another of thinking or acting "irrationally," he means to indicate that other acts or thinks in a manner which conflicts with his way of doing things, with the thinking and acting he personally desires, the relativist would not argue. However, he notes the same purpose would have been served by simply saying "we disagree." On the other hand, if this accusation is intended to suggest there is something "naturally" irrational about another's behavior or thought, the relativist does indeed take exception.

(h) Man's "truths" are "true" by virtue of experience and definition.

Because the nineteenth century paradigm assumed the existence of independent "real" forms, it understandably prompted those who used it to conclude a descriptive statement, if "true," was "true" by virtue of

existence and discovery; the independent "fact" existed, an objective observer discovered and described it, therefore his description was "true." The twentieth century paradigm, on the contrary, proposes man cuts up his universe according to his immediate experience (personal "fact"), and his experience-choice for the immediate future (personal "value"). Hence, the descriptions he holds to be "true" (his expressed "facts") are clearly so by virtue of experience.

As for "truths" being "true" by definition, consider the following reasoning: If asked for a thorough statement of what snow "truly" is, we might, for instance, reply "snow 'truly' is cold, white, soft, light and wet." In insisting this particular "truth" is "true," by definition, I wish to indicate we have simply announced to the world we are not going to call any piece of time-space not experienced as cold, white, soft, light, and wet, "snow." We have labeled a specific sort of experience "snow"; we have created a "truth" with our definition. If this is doubted, reflect that unless and until we agree to alter our definition in some manner, it is impossible for a piece of time-space not having the above characteristics to ever become "snow." Should someone put before us a quantity of what is for him grey and "dirty snow," employing our own standard we can only conclude he is in error. After all, snow is cold, white, etc., etc. Moreover, if at any point in the discussion we decide to agree with him, it means we have changed our operational definition of what "snow" is. Clearly,

it now is cold, white-or-dirty-grey, soft, and so on. To take up his "truth" it was imperative that we take up the definition from which his "truth" derived.⁴⁶

Should the reader protest, "Yes, but it was 'really' snow all along," let me remind him we have discarded the notion of "reals." To say it was "really" snow all along is only to concede that all along the reader was using a definition of snow closer to the last. To repeat, then, what anything is depends upon the definitions one employs. Human "truths" are "true" by experience and definition. "What we find out about the world depends upon the kind of definitions we use as well as upon the nature of reality."⁴⁷ (Remember the radical rightist's definition of communism which necessarily led him to the "truth" Eisenhower is a conscious communist.)

It goes without saying that our causes, laws and the like are also "true" by definition. Anyone who has had an introductory course in the philosophy of science has very likely heard about the fate of the law which said, "All swans are white and have long necks." When a black swan was found in Australia, students are told, the law had to be discarded. The relativist's position, of course, is that since the

⁴⁶Dahl has argued: "Nothing can be shown to be true or false about the real world of politics (or economics) simply by definition." See p. 106, this essay.

⁴⁷Richard N. Rosecrance, "Categories, Concepts and Reasoning in the Study of International Relations," Behavioral Science, VI (July, 1961), p. 230.

law explicitly said "all swans are white and have long necks," the black bird from Australia was no more to be called "swan" than was a horse or an alligator. When the law broke, it did so because man changed his mind about what it meant to be "swan"; he changed his definition. Every broken law, it is contended, necessitates a discarded definition.⁴⁸ A law never breaks unless man wills it shall be so.

An important feature of the relativistic conception of "truth" is that it is viewed as always circular. According to it, men cut out pieces of time-space and define what each one is in terms of the others. (Things are their relationships.) Salt is something soluble in water, water is something which will dissolve salt; man is a creature which uses language, language is something used by man. Behaviorists were found to counsel "an objective view is one intersubjectively held by scholars, a scholar is one who is objective." Whereas scholars of an absolutist bent frequently caution against circular reasoning,⁴⁹ the

⁴⁸See Anthony Quinton, "The Importance of Quine," New York Review of Books, VII (Jan., 12, 1967), p. 25. Attention is called once more to the connection between facts and laws. The above argument concerning snow could also be viewed as having to do with the breakdown of a law, one which said all snow is cold, white, etc. . . . To locate a fact is at once to point to a set of lawful relationships between the fact and other identified pieces of time-space, other facts.

⁴⁹E. Bright Wilson, Jr. writes, "Certain types of error are sufficiently common to make them worth discussing at this point. One of these is the use of circular reasoning, in which an alleged proof of a given theorem really involves at some point the assumption of the theorem being proved." An Introduction to Scientific Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952), p. 34.

twentieth century paradigm advocate assumes it is inevitable. With Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley he says of the absolutists, "They evade, ignore, or strive to rid themselves of that 'circularity' in knowledge which we, in contrast, frankly accept as we find it."⁵⁰ "Newton, after all, succeeded with the idea of 'force' which, as Mach pointed out at the end of the nineteenth century after two hundred years of productive utilization of the concept, was sometimes little more than an elaborate circularity."⁵¹

(i) Man's "truths" are pragmatic. Whereas the nineteenth century paradigm saw "truth" as impartial or unbiased, the twentieth century paradigm holds that if by partial one means governed by man's purposes, "truth" is biased in the extreme. Here, the position of the pragmatists is endorsed fully.⁵² Man, it is contended, is not found to call "true" readings which, if dubbed "true" and then acted upon, will do greater injury to his aims than would have been done had he labelled the readings "false" and acted accordingly. He is seen to act out a conviction that "concepts and theories are only instrumental, and the sole test of their validity is the degree to which they 'work'

⁵⁰Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, p. 82.

⁵¹Dahl, "The Science of Politics: New and Old," pp. 79-80.

⁵²"The pragmatic theory of truth rests upon James's doctrine that ideas are functional, that they are instruments which enable us to deal fruitfully with our environment. Our ideas are parts of our experience, and their use is to help us get into satisfactory relation with other parts." See Lloyd Morris, p. 35.

successfully." He is pragmatic. (This point need not be made if we reflect that most people use the words "fact" and "truth" synonymously.)

According to the logic of the twentieth century paradigm, it makes no sense to ask if a proposed description or theory is reflective of "reality," if it mirrors some independent "true" state of affairs.⁵³ Rather, the only questions worth asking are: "Does it reflect my experience," and "Is it a useful 'plan of action'(Dewey) for realizing my objectives?"⁵⁴ The word "my" was given emphasis because viewed this way, judging the worth of a "fact" or "theory" is always a private matter. We may say one theory is a more useful tool than another, that it solves our experienced problems more satisfactorily; "but that means more satisfactorily to ourselves, and individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently."⁵⁵ From the

⁵³"In reality there are not merely the length and breadth and other primary qualities of the traffic signal at the corner but also the red and the green colours that I see in it, and the colours or shades that a colour-blind man sees, and that a passing dog sees, and that any other sentient being could see, and so on indefinitely. Ultimate reality is not bare and dull and meagre, but rich and complex and vivid beyond our imaginings. Each of us knows it directly, but he knows only the selection he makes . . . and these selections are inevitably bare and dull and meagre compared with the richness of reality itself, which is all that it is experienced to be, ever has been and ever will be experienced to be, and more also." Sinclair, p. 155.

⁵⁴"The test of ideas, of thinking generally, is found in the consequences of the acts to which the ideas lead, that is in the new arrangements of things which are brought into existence. Such is the unequivocal evidence as to the worth of ideas which is derived from observing their position and role in experimental knowing." Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 136.

⁵⁵James, Pragmatism, pp. 61-63.

twentieth century paradigm position, for each of us "that fact (or theory) which is 'true' is relevant to our experiences and aims, and that which is relevant is 'true.'"

James and others also stressed the arch conservative nature of man's pragmatism in most things; his apparent tendency to attempt fitting new experiences into old frameworks--altering the latter time and again--in preference to building new ones. Of the individual's desire to keep an established framework, James wrote:

He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives . . . The most violent revolutions in an individual's beliefs leave most of his old order standing. Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one's own biography remain untouched. New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new [experienced] fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. We hold a theory true just in proportion to its success in solving "this problem of maxima and minima."⁵⁶

Relativism, then, encourages the view that man's pragmatism is conservative because it argues "no [experienced] facts and no [experienced] situations constitute in themselves a problem or pose a question. The problem or the question arises only when these facts or situations have to be reconciled with some theory or attitude already held."⁵⁷ And as we know by virtue of our experience, man's initial

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 60-61. Lundberg similarly argues: "In other words, all aspects, segments, parts, or other categories or classifications, including the classification of the sciences, are defined by whatever behavior the organism finds relevant to its adjustment needs." "The Postulates of Science and the Implications for Sociology," p. 60.

⁵⁷Sinclair, pp. 200-201.

impulse is to buoy up existing theories, to restructure the understandings he already enjoys, to be, in short, conservative.

One final observation which seems relevant here is that man does use the words "knowledge" and "truth" as well as the terms "belief" and "hypothesis," however reluctant he may be to identify instances of the former when pressured. Moreover, when we watch him we note he almost invariably applies the words "truth" and "knowledge" to long-standing, internalized theories (or paradigms) and "facts," born in their turn of long standing experiences. And that practice, to call readings derived from "old" experiences the best and truest, is a most conservative thing to do.

(j) "Truth" is always transient. To one who views the world through the nineteenth century paradigm, "truth" has a quality of permanence about it; "truth" is essentially static. Hence, it is supposed insofar as today's scientists have rejected the beliefs of our forefathers, they have done so because those beliefs have been found to be something less than "true," which means our forefathers were mistaken about how things "really" were. Naturally, this attitude is one which leads scholars who hold it to assume their own theories and facts, if "true," may conceivably endure forever. After all, if they reflect "reality," and if reflections of "reality" are what the world is interested in, why should they not endure?

The twentieth century paradigm leads to just the opposite

conclusion. Since it proposes theories and "facts" are born of life experiences, and since these experiences are seen to alter profoundly over time, it is assumed theories and "facts," "truths," cannot help but do likewise. For the relativist, it is never a question of "will this truth last?" but rather one of, "what sort of 'truth' will eventually replace my own?" It is supposed that just as yesterday's truths, "Ptolemaic astronomy, euclidean space, aristotelian logic, scholastic metaphysics, were expedient for centuries,"⁵⁸ so too, our current truths, the useful products of our current experiences, must one day be put aside. Not to think this is to imagine the end of altered experience; it is to suppose we have the misfortune (or fortune, depending upon how one feels about it), of witnessing the end of drastic experiential change.

What this means, of course, is that science can never reveal "the" truth about the universe. The very best it can do is to provide facts and theories--ways of cutting up the experienced universe--appropriate to today's problems and purposes. But of the entire scheme of things, of the universe qua universe, it must remain silent.⁵⁹

⁵⁸James, Pragmatism, p. 223; see also Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 2.

⁵⁹Phillip Frank observes one of the ideas destroyed by modern physics is "the belief that science will eventually reveal the 'truth' about the universe." Modern Science and Its Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 4. Sinclair writes: "We can explain certain elements or constituents of our experience by

(k) "Science" is not a method. Typically, those who continue to think in nineteenth century paradigm terms are heard to remark, "Science is not a body of content, but a method of approach to any content--the only method, some would say, that results in the discovery of verifiable truth."⁶⁰ Interestingly enough, if there is one thing persons in close touch with the most relativistic of modern sciences, physics, seem agreed upon, it is that science most decidedly has nothing to do with method. The scientific method, Peter Laws once commented, has proven itself "as elusive as the abominable snowman." It is, notes Bronowski, "the method of all human inquiry."⁶¹ Nor is it only the layman and the scientist who employ it; even the theologian does so. "Many theologies," argues Lundberg, "are quite as logical, comprehensive, and self-sufficient theoretical systems as is science."⁶² Similarly, Kuhn contended the scientist, because he spends his time trying to force the experienced world into the conceptual boxes he has created, can be said to assume he already knows what the world is like.

reference to other parts, or (in another metaphor) by envisaging the wider whole of which these are parts . . . Of the whole of experience, of reality as a whole, of the universe as a whole, no explanation is possible." p. 201.

⁶⁰Bierstedt, The Social Order, p. 17.

⁶¹Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science, p. 120; also Conant, p. 45.

⁶²Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their Implications for Sociology," p. 63; also Schiller, Humanism, p. xv.

Kuhn further noted all of us employ such boxes, that perception itself requires it; which is to say, we all do what the scientist does, that science is not to be identified by its methodology. What then is science, if not a method? An answer to that question, one very much in keeping with our experience, will be given in a moment.

The Power of a Paradigm

Common Sense, Philosophy and Science

With comparative ease, the twentieth century paradigm offers to solve the many problems which cluster around the concepts "common sense," "philosophy," and "science." Thus, it can tell us when to expect "science," when "common sense," and when "philosophy"; it can explain why we have no "science" of economic-social-political phenomena, why revolutions in science have been rather frequent occurrences, why persons new to a field usually have the most to do with creating new paradigms, and a host of other things. It can do these things, moreover, in terms which are compelling reflections of all of our experiences, in terms of a shared logic.

To begin then: If ideas are bound to experience as the framework asserts--if every "fact" is born of a particular experienced situation--it clearly follows men must agree most readily about what is, as well as about what ought to be, precisely when they come closest to sharing experiences with the areas of time-space they are

contemplating. They do. To illustrate: the way one man relates to an area of time-space he calls "water" (the way he experiences it), is essentially the way every other man relates to it. With such areas of time-space one man washes himself and brushes his teeth, he drinks, combs his hair and cooks his food. And so does every other man. Sharing experiences, they share "facts"; they agree over what water is and over what it ought to be. As human experiences go, an extensive sharing of them seems to be the norm rather than the exception. Most of the pieces of time-space men cut out--most of the objects and events they identify--are ones they relate to in a fairly common (but never identical) manner. The sky, the earth, wood, metal, salt, wheat, fish and bumble bees are all "facts" of this world of shared experience.

When referring to the "facts" of this realm, men generally use the words "common sense." "Common sense," "knowledge," or "fact," then, is simply "knowledge" or "fact" born of widely shared experiences. As such, it is that "knowledge" least likely to be disputed; it is that which we rely upon in the most unquestioning manner; it is "knowledge" reflective of long-standing experiences, experiences men assume a preference for, a continuation of; it is also that "knowledge" most resistant to abrupt and drastic change. Einstein tied up time and space in a way which made the question, "Was there an original cause?" as senseless as asking if we can fall off the edge of the

earth after deciding it is round. Yet, their "common sense" view of time and space, born of multiple everyday experiences, keeps men asking the question nonetheless.

At the other end of the spectrum are those readings, those bits of "knowledge" or "fact" which derive from (are part of, reflect) experiences men do not at all share to any significant extent. General patterns-of-life, for example, vary markedly from individual to individual. One man's life begins, is lived out, and ends in a small mining village of two hundred people. A second is born into a wealthy family in a major industrial city and spends a considerable portion of his time reading and traveling. Still another enters a seminary at fourteen and lives his life through in prayer. Where such notably disparate experiences are involved, we would expect men to embrace decidedly different "facts," and to give decidedly different answers to questions like "What is the meaning, or the purpose of life?" or, "What constitutes the 'good' life?" That they do goes without saying. In regard to these last--in respect to areas of time-space individuals do not at all relate to in a common way, to "facts" born of patterns of experience which are not at all shared--men generally use the word "philosophy." Philosophical "knowledge" or "fact" has to do with those experiences which are the most private. We noted word-meanings are tied to experience. Typically, where philosophical "knowledge" is concerned experiences are so disparate--hence word-meaning so

varied--that communication seldom occurs. Philosophers, those who write about these kinds of experiences, are commonly heard to say of one another, "I don't know what he is talking about."⁶³ Not sharing many experiences or "facts," they usually find themselves unable to agree even as to what constitutes a problem, and what an acceptable solution.⁶⁴ Above any other, this is the realm of disputation and discord.

Between these two extremes lies "science" and scientific "knowledge." Here, conditions are as follows: Whenever a "science" exists, the community of scholars, the scientists, are witnessed to share experiences with the areas of time-space they, as scholars, are concerned with, much as the community of man shares experiences where common sense "knowledge" is concerned. One biologist's experiences with bacteria include looking at them through a microscope. His colleagues share that experience. He cultivates them for examination. So do his associates. He divides them up in a particular manner, categorizing them into different "kinds"; again, his fellow

⁶³Karl R. Popper complains, "Some philosophers have made a virtue of talking to themselves; perhaps because they felt that there was nobody else worth talking to." The Logic of Discovery (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1954), p. 17.

⁶⁴States Popper: Philosophers "cannot appeal to the fact that there is a generally accepted problem-situation; for that there is no such thing is perhaps the one fact that is generally accepted. Indeed it has by now become a recurrent question in philosophical circles whether philosophy will ever get so far as to pose a genuine problem." Ibid., p. 13.

scientists do likewise. Sharing experiences, members of a community of scientists are naturally witnessed to share the "knowledge" to which those experiences give rise. (And, of course, sharing esoteric experiences they share an esoteric vocabulary.)

As for science and the society at large, members of the general community are always found to share a few--an important few--experiences with the scientists. Thus, like the biologist, the layman's throat can be infected by streptococcus; he experiences them that way. He shares the biologist's experience when it comes to health and physical existence, and like him he assumes they should be maintained. He holds in common with the biologist a malevolent attitude toward harmful bacteria, etc. As stated, this sharing by the larger community of certain important experiences, and the assumed goals which they include, is a facet of every scientific situation. And it is precisely because of such commonly held goals that members of the larger community manifest a blind willingness to act upon a scientific community's esoteric "facts," derived from esoteric experiences. They take it for granted, and past experience has demonstrated it is usually safe to do so, that to give scientists an unquestioning allegiance is to be moved toward the fulfillment of their assumed goals. If in time this faith no longer seems warranted, if a scientific community's advice seems to lead away from a realization of community goals, it is thereupon discontinued. The title "scientist" may even be taken away, as

with the phrenologist. On the other hand, if a group of non-scientists are able to demonstrate to the society at large that they can help it achieve some of its crucial goals more readily than can existing sciences, in time they will be accorded scientific status, however much established scientific communities may protest. A case in point here might be the fate of chiropractic.

Science, then, is not a method, any more than philosophy and common sense are methods. Scientists themselves have told us as much. Even less does it have to do with the production of truer "truths," more absolute "knowledge" or anything of that sort. Physics was a science when founded upon systems of thought now regarded as blatantly false. Ptolemaic astronomy was considered as scientific as Copernican, by those communities of people who endorsed it. Besides, we have thrown out the notion of "truer" or "more correct" ways to segment the universe. No, the twentieth century paradigm argues science is neither special method nor special "truth," science is a special situation.⁶⁵ It is a situation of the kind just described.

Once philosophical "knowledge," common sense "knowledge," and scientific "knowledge," are recognized as only the products of differing viewer-viewed situations, other things begin to fall into place. We note, for instance, that not long ago--a matter of but a few hundred

⁶⁵To ask, as Lundberg does, "Can science save us?" is to ask, "Can common sense save us," or better yet, "Can we save ourselves?"

years ago--most of the fields of inquiry now regarded as scientific were called philosophies. Indeed, "all inquiries were once a part of philosophy, that great mother of the sciences . . . and philosophy embraced them all in an undifferentiated and amorphous fashion."⁶⁶ Given our understanding of science, we would expect as much. In the period referred to, the viewer-viewed situation was not of the scientific kind. Individuals, laymen and scholars did not share enough experiences with the areas of time-space involved. Whereas men now relate in many common ways with the areas of time-space we call iron ore, it is used in making our toasters, our refrigerators, our cars, in times past a hunk of the stuff was for one man an obstruction in his field, for another a weight to anchor his fish nets, for still another it was used in making tools, and so on. Not having nearly enough experiences in common, there were no shared "facts" and no sciences. Philosophical situations and philosophical "knowledge" were the order of the day. So too, assuming science is born of the type of situation I have argued, we would postdict astronomy should have been among the first of the sciences, since here the proper situation was very early fulfilled. While all men shared general experiences with heavenly bodies, by taking up certain esoteric experiences with them, looking at them through a glass, charting their movements, etc., scholars were in a

⁶⁶Bierstedt, The Social Order, pp. 3-4.

position to offer "knowledge" useful to the larger population, particularly when it came to long distance travel by land and sea. That astronomy was one of the first sciences is well known.⁶⁷ The same successful prediction can be made with mathematics.⁶⁸ Men all share the experience of cutting the universe up into pieces, of finding it advantageous to keep track of numbers of pieces, to add, subtract, etc., but here again, a group which assumed esoteric experiences was in a position to offer useful advice.

Another accurate prediction we might make is that with the industrial revolution, which greatly increased the number of shared relationships men had with the areas of time-space physical scientists are interested in, those we call chemicals, metals, and so forth, the study of physical phenomena ought to have become much more scientific.⁶⁹

"Following your logic," the reader might be moved to object, "one would expect religion in Europe prior to the coming of industrialization to have been regarded as science." "After all, the life experiences theologians concerned themselves with were of a kind most

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 15.

⁶⁹The French Revolution, one of the indicators the pro-industrialization forces were winning in that country, brought with it the standardization of weights and measures. See Fox, Garbuny and Hooke, p. 27.

people shared." "Not only that, but theologians had the requisite esoteric experiences, and were in a position to offer advice to the populace which was of advantage to it, at least the populace appeared to think so." To which I can only reply, exactly, and during that period "theology was (my emphasis) regarded as 'science' in a peculiar, a unique, sense."⁷⁰

As suggested, the twentieth century paradigm tells us why men have not achieved economic-social-political "science." They have not, simply because their relationships with the areas of time-space they seek to scientize are far too dissimilar. One individual's experiencing of a deprived ghetto may be that he has read about it, and once chanced to drive his Rolls Royce through it, whereupon he was stoned. The experience of a second might be that his brother lives there and has long been unemployed. For a third, the ghetto is home. His experience is that his children are improperly fed and clothed and have never visited a dentist. Not sharing experiences, we would hardly expect them to share experienced "facts." To be sure, scholars sometimes come close to sharing experiences with such as ghettos. And to the degree they do, we find them sharing "facts," and concurring on the appropriate way to deal with it. But their experiences are not at all those of many others in the community, and so these others do not

⁷⁰Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 75-76.

address them as "scientist," and do not pay them heed. As we will note in Chapter Ten, for them to do so would frequently be to relinquish sacred assumed objectives. Note too: the paradigm argues word-meanings are always tied to experience. Not sharing economic-social-political experiences, men are not to be expected to speak a single social language. We would anticipate the lack of a common vocabulary which gives social commentators so much difficulty.

Perhaps one of the things which has enabled contemporary social scientists to often overlook the genuineness as well as the profundity of economic-social-political value conflicts is their inclination to separate ends and means.⁷¹ Quite frequently scholars speak as though social radicals and social conservatives share ends--i.e., both may express a desire to eliminate poverty--they disagree only over the way to go about it, over means. Allowing no "natural" divisions, and insisting values have to do with the objectives men are seen to commit themselves to when they act, the relativist comes to a different conclusion. He might describe the positions of our radical and conservative something like this: the goal of the former is to work at alleviating poverty by altering or eliminating such and such economic-social-political institutions; the conservative's objective, on the other hand,

⁷¹In the relativist's eyes, "means and ends are two names for the same reality. The terms denote not a division in reality but a distinction in judgment." Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: The Modern Library, 1922), p. 36.

is to maintain these economic-social-political institutions and alleviate the poverty. This issue is also one which will be greatly expanded upon in the last chapter.⁷² Understandably, since men label that variable "cause" which they can best manipulate or accommodate to in order to get where they want to go, and since radical and conservative do not want to go to the same place, they are not witnessed to agree as to the "causes" of such as poverty.

One of the interesting things a relativistic epistemology does is to make occasional revolutions in physical science the expected state of affairs. Members of a scholarly community, it was observed, are elevated to the status of "scientists" because they share crucial experiences with most members of the society of which they are a part. Moreover, their work is premised upon the assumption some of these experiences will be maintained; the example given was the biologist's assumption that a maintenance of human life is a worthy objective. In respect to other experiences, it is assumed certain changes are desirable; e. g., an altered experience with bacteria which threaten life. In effect, then, a society says "yea" to a scientific community (a) because its statements are relevant to crucial experiences of society's members, and (b) because its statements are relevant to

⁷²Remember it is being contended value conflicts have to do with a conflict between experiences men assume they will continue to have, experiences reflected in their very "facts."

fulfilling, or moving in the direction of fulfilling, assumed goals of the society.

Now the scientists themselves, and this is a necessary aspect of the story, have other, ancillary, assumed objectives which members of the larger community do not share. Paramount among these is the aim of maintaining the position of respectability to which society has elevated them. In the search for "truth," it is generally taken for granted finding it will not bring personal, social or economic injury. Relevant here is the pragmatic principle that says individuals do not accept as "true" outlooks which, if they do so, will bring them harm. The reader who doubts this is an important assumed aim of scholars might attempt to locate the names of persons who, when a new "truth" came into vogue, greeted it warmly (or for that matter even accepted it) if doing so meant throwing out significant portions of their life's work. No conscious willingness to reject "truth" in the interest of status need be suggested; our experience argues scholars, like non-scholars, merely take for granted "truth" will not lay them low. Scholars themselves have frequently recognized this. Chauncey Wright said of Darwin's work:

I have become a convert, so far as I can judge in the matter. Agassiz comes out against its conclusions, of course, since they are directly opposed to his favorite doctrines on the subject; and, if true they render his essay on Classification a useless

and mistaken speculation.⁷³

As we will see in a moment, a relativistic analysis of scientific revolutions makes it appear even more certain few scholars involved in one are guilty of any dissimulation.

There is an immediate tie, we said, between ideas, logics, and experiences. Hence, upon finding the ideas and the logic of a group of scholars relevant to protecting and enhancing some of their fondest experiences and stopping other, undesired ones, societies are seen to elevate them to positions of authority, in academic and social institutions, and not infrequently in political institutions as well. Proponents of the Ptolemaic world view, for example, once found themselves thus empowered by their community. All of this seems a most reasonable and safe practice as far as we have gone. But there is a flaw contained within it if the avoidance of revolutions in scholarship happens to be one's aim.

The difficulty, or flaw, is that human experiences are never

⁷³Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism, p. 33. Lundberg proposes: "The application of every advance of the physical and biological sciences has been similarly opposed by those who had vested interests in the ignorance, the superstition, or the fraudulent reform movements antedating the development of scientific solutions." Couched in relativistic lingo, Lundberg's argument might read: "The application of every advance of the physical and biological sciences has been similarly opposed by those who had vested interests in alternative ways of viewing things." Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? p. 9. See also Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 7.

wholly static; they are perhaps better characterized by the word "flux." Over the long haul, man's experiencing of some areas of time-space, his relationships with them, are seen to undergo fairly drastic transformation. Because one's experience with an area of time-space involves cutting it up in a particular way, relating it to other objects and events in a particular way, objects and events whose specific forms are also the products of his pragmatic cutting, to say that in time man's experiences undergo shift is to say that in time his ideas, his logics will alter accordingly. The rub, however, is that quite often those whose personal experiences led to a given dominant logic come closest to maintaining a static set of experiences with the areas of time-space they as scholars investigate. As a result, for them the old logic may continue to be the only appropriate logic, long after it has lost its utility for many members of the community. Scholars continued to push Ptolemy's framework, or again, non-Darwinian theses, when they had long since lost their relevance for rather large segments of their societies.

Keeping in mind all communities of scholars which have found their own positions threatened by new frameworks in this manner have been essentially absolutistic--have thought in terms of independent "truths"--how might we expect them to respond? It seems to me we might expect them to insist individuals who promote the new outlook are "illogical," and that they misrepresent the "facts." After all,

the logic and the facts involved are products of experiences they themselves do not share. They are quite right to characterize them as they do. Moreover, if they begin to witness the gradual acceptance of a new logic, if it begins to show itself more dynamic than their own when it comes to winning converts, would we not expect scholars might take steps to suppress it, especially in view of their conviction that it is in absolute "error," that those who take it up are being sorely misled?⁷⁴

In the same way, once a new paradigm wins out over its predecessor, as good absolutists we would expect its backers to conclude those responsible for the old outlook must have been insufficiently empirical. Is it not obvious that looking shows their position to be blatantly in "error"?

But there is more. The nineteenth century framework proposed an "objective" view was one which scholars found themselves inter-subjectively agreed upon. This is a virtual guarantee any unique logic, born of unique experiences, will be rejected as "unobjective." The prevailing paradigm further argued one becomes an "objective" viewer by undergoing extensive training at the hands of individuals currently speaking for a field. If vocabularies, ideas and experiences are part of one another, it follows that the good trainee--he who learns well the vocabulary and logic of a field--is also one who shares most thoroughly the community's experiences. This too makes for extreme

⁷⁴Consider the Velikovsky affair.

conservatism when it comes to facilitating change within an area of investigation.⁷⁵

Still another paradigm premise which helps prepare the ground for revolutions in scholarship is that which emphasizes the need to build directly upon what other scholars in the area have done. Usually, this is interpreted to mean one will generously quote these others, yet refrain from "distorting" their positions. The twentieth century paradigm insisted no "facts," including the arguments and ideas of others, have "natural" boundaries. Like any other object or event, an idea is its relationships, and to alter those relationships is to alter the idea. It is necessarily to "distort" it away from its former condition, to make of it something its author would not accept. In short, to take another's "fact" and place it in a different setting is to inevitably expose oneself to charges of "distortion." And again, rightly so; one has "distorted" it, not away from some "absolute" or "natural" condition, but away from the condition as experienced by some other. On the other hand, if to avoid the dilemma one proposing a new thesis attempts to refrain from quoting, he is likely to be informed this too denotes poor scholarship.

Finally, there is the disadvantage Kuhn observed proponents

⁷⁵"The conventional wisdom having been made more or less identical with sound scholarship, its position is virtually impregnable. The skeptic is disqualified by his very tendency to go brashly from the old to the new. Were he a sound scholar he would remain with the conventional wisdom." Galbraith, p. 19.

of a new framework always suffer. Just because their framework is new, its implications will not have been extended very far. This understandably diminishes its potency and makes it easier to reject.⁷⁶

As I have already indicated, I suspect much suppression of alternative systems of thought leading up to scientific revolutions has been done in an extremely subtle and wholly unconscious manner. I do not agree with Bronowski that physical scientists are more tolerant than social scientists of radically new proposals. On the contrary, I think it probable that the homogeneous experiences and "truths" physical scientists enjoy predispose them to be far less flexible than social investigators when it comes to such matters. Yet even in social science inquiry one quite often sees a subtle suppression of radically "different" proposals taking place; even more disturbing, one sometimes finds he has played an unintended hand in the process. On several occasions I have heard graduate students complain they felt--whether or not the feeling was warranted--that to uphold one or another unpopular position would result in their being regarded by their professors as less than scholarly. To quote a colleague's reflection on the matter:

When students hear social scientists who are to judge their abilities dismiss a William A. Williams or a William F. Buckley with a confident and even condescending air, the moral is not lost upon them. To uphold such positions

⁷⁶Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 153-158.

themselves is to be met with the same derision.⁷⁷

It seems to me most unlikely professors write as enthusiastic and glowing recommendations for students holding positions they personally consider to be grossly in "error" as for ones they basically agree with. Nor do I consider it likely a faculty committee meeting to consider applicants for a teaching position will be especially interested in an individual who in their estimation is completely "misreading" the "true" state of affairs and who will, if hired, pass on those "misreadings" to large numbers of students. I think it probable a protege of Dewey Larsen--however bright and alert he might be--would not get anywhere near the kind of serious consideration from most university physics departments that a follower of a more orthodox outlook would.⁷⁸

Naturally, the twentieth century paradigm does not suggest alterations in experience are always, or even usually, going to be so marked within any short span of time as to provoke what is experienced as a revolutionary change in paradigms. Many changes in experience and conceptual framework seem to be exceedingly gradual; for instance, the shift from the feudal-theological to the industrial-scientific

⁷⁷Winnett Hagens, Department of International Relations, San Francisco State College.

⁷⁸It is my suspicion that the subtle suppression of which I speak is less likely to occur where an exceptionally bright radical is involved. Most scholars would be apt to recognize the outstanding ability of a C. Wright Mills or a William F. Buckley, Jr. It is the "just average" radical who seems most likely to feel the pressure.

Weltanschauung of which Mannheim spoke. Neither does the paradigm argue scholars will always respond so repressively.⁷⁹ What the paradigm does do is explain how it has been possible for them to occasionally engage in such repression--with clear consciences--and in the name of scholarship. Moreover, it provides some basis for discerning when a scientific revolution is in process. Because it makes no provision for "wrong" analyses, or "false prophets," it instructs us to simply note the extent to which some alternative thesis is being put down as in "error." To the precise degree there is such a one, it tells us, a revolution--though it may never occur--is at least potentially in the making.

Another feature of scientific revolutions the twentieth century paradigm helps order is the tendency for builders of new paradigms to be relatively new to a field, oft times younger persons. Kuhn suggested this was because "practice has committed them less deeply than most of their contemporaries to the world view and rules determined by the old paradigm."⁸⁰ Now we can add it also appears they are less committed to the complex of experiences, including the assumed values, which are part and parcel of the old understanding.

⁷⁹The radical scholar is also apt to encounter repressive mechanisms when it comes to publishing.

⁸⁰Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 89-90, 143.

Incidentally, this tying up of experience and thought enables us to explain the phenomenon of simultaneous discovery by two or more persons of the same new "truth," e.g., Darwin and Wallace. Sharing complexes of experience, men would often be expected to formulate like ideas.

Those who promote a new paradigm, Kuhn noted, occasionally have their motives questioned.⁸¹ This too, now becomes anticipated behavior. Since every "fact," every category and framework, is constructed for some purpose--because it has utility in the eyes of its employers--a conflict between "facts" and frameworks is always a conflict over values as well.⁸² Hence, when confronted with an alternative schema, one having obvious value implications, proponents of an established paradigm who think non-relativistically are apt to conclude not that it promotes different values, but simply that it promotes values whereas their own framework does not. Aware of the value-ladenness of the alternative schema, they might well be expected to question its creator's motives.

The twentieth century paradigm raises a fascinating question in connection with the phenomenon of "genius." One notes the individuals every society seems to herald as its most outstanding "geniuses" are

⁸¹Ibid., p. 158.

⁸²When the transition in paradigms is over, observes Kuhn, "the profession will have changed its view of the field, its methods, and its goals." Ibid., pp. 84-85.

those same persons who pushed views long subtly repressed, and sometimes not so subtly at that, although scholars have seldom resorted to methods more direct or brutal than those referred to above. One also notes such individuals were not saying anything so very different from what many others had been saying for quite some time. Once more, the Copernican thesis, and that of Darwin are cases in point. Or again, the close parallel between the arguments of Marx and the German historicists. The fascinating question, then, is this: Is it just possible that the individuals society dubs outstanding "geniuses" are simply the ones who happen to be arguing a new thesis most cogently and vehemently when the resistance of the old forces is finally broken? Is it possible a democratic process which insured that as a society's experiences altered the ideas which claim to represent those experiences (which claim to be "truth") were permitted to alter as readily, might result in the very concept "genius" becoming a relic of past ages? Could it be that it is a non-democratic selection of "truths" which accounts for not only scholarly revolutions, but "genius" as well?

Another phenomenon which has long perplexed man, and which the paradigm quickly explains, is how it is intelligent men can so often come to such drastically different conclusions, and why they so frequently fail to convert one another. Reality, the framework argued, is known directly; it is experienced as it is. Therefore, it follows men must "disagree because they severally know or experience

different parts, or parts differently grouped."⁸³ It means, too, that when we say someone is in "error" we mean "he selects parts and groups them in ways which, by the criterion referred to in earlier contexts, are unsatisfactory."⁸⁴ This whole understanding, I might add, accords well with the way we all behave when attempting to convince another of the worth or "accuracy" of a physical description we are making. If looking out the window I see a cat in the road which a friend standing in the next room describes as a rabbit, I respond by imploring: "Come over here and look, take up my experience, be my kind of observer, and you will share my 'truth.'" In this instance, of course, I can be fairly well assured my friend will come around. We already share a standard for judging this "truth" and countless other relevant experiences. However, this is not always or even most often the case for areas of time-space social scientists concern themselves with. To illustrate: A racial bigot and a non-bigot might debate forever how many "humans" were killed in automobile accidents during a given year. As long as the bigot insisted upon placing Negroes and Orientals in the "non-human" category--his prerogative, since our categories are selected pragmatically and one represents reality as well as the next--they would continue to arrive at their separate "truths" however much evidence each amassed.

⁸³Sinclair, pp. 42, 147-48.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 147.

Note what the above says about the possibility of "predictive error," and "predictive accuracy." In predicting events will take a certain course a year or ten years from now, one is predicting as well that persons living at that time will be having particular kinds of experiences and will be using particular kinds of standards for judging the "truth" about those experiences. Is there any way to judge now which predictions are more likely to become the "experienced facts" of the future? At the moment I am inclined to agree with Mannheim on this issue. It seems to me consistent to suppose predictions which are based upon the most comprehensive syntheses of yesterday's and today's "experienced facts" are more likely candidates for becoming tomorrow's "experienced facts."

There are numerous additional implications of the paradigm which, while in my estimation less significant than the ones already given, add to its potency nonetheless. I do not think the order of their presentation matters much, so I will merely list them as they come to mind.

For one thing, by disavowing any independently "natural" forms, the relativist framework forces us to take the position that the lines between a debate over a "fact" and a full-scale paradigm conflict are themselves imposed. It may be a meaningful and useful expression of our experience to describe some intellectual disputes as mild conflicts within a single paradigm, and others a clash between two distinct

systems of thought, but the lines do not represent an independent "real" state of affairs.⁸⁵

Similarly, having denied independent "truths," if asked whether relativism is "true" one can only answer it is the "truth" of my experience. He might also reply as Dewey did when asked the same question in regard to pragmatism: the theory is "true in the pragmatic sense of truth: it works, it clears up difficulties, removes obscurities, puts individuals into more experimental, less dogmatic, and less arbitrary sceptical relations to life; aligns philosophic with scientific method; does away with self-made problems of epistemology; clarifies and reorganizes logical theory, etc."⁸⁶ And I would add what Dewey seldom added, "It does all of these things for me."

The twentieth century paradigm tells a world of things about the problems men have with communication, some of which have been covered in other contexts. Two which have not been are: The discovery many of us have made when, in search of enlightenment, we picked up the works of a renowned classical philosopher only to find his arguments hazy and obscure in the extreme, his proofs, which he insisted were so compelling, unconvincing and on occasion even embarrassing in their faulty logic and their error. Relativism counsels us that having

⁸⁵Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 91-92.

⁸⁶Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 164.

vastly different life experiences from the individual whose wisdom we seek to tap, our languages and our logics are almost certain to clash; we are virtually assured we will fail to understand much of what he is talking about.⁸⁷ Relativism also tells us the difficulties we encounter when trying to communicate with children have to do with the different experienced realities we live in, one no more "real" than the other, simply different.⁸⁸ At one time or another most people have noted this same gap in experienced worlds exists between their own generation and that of their parents.

The finding that a change in paradigms (or an individual "fact") involves a value shift helps explain why men, individually and in social organizations, are often willing to use subtle repression against alternative ways of looking at things. "Every social organization," Harry Ekstein reflects, "has a tendency to isolate and punish the eccentric, to compel conformity to its dominant conceptions of ultimate truth."⁸⁹ Schiller felt the problem of dogmatism was even more serious than that. Schiller wrote: "Society exercises almost as severe a control over the intellectual as over the moral eccentricities and nonconformities of its

⁸⁷For the same reason, "Despite their good intentions, those very people who believe themselves to be the most faithful spokesmen for their predecessors transform the thoughts which they want simply to repeat; methods are modified because they are applied to new objects." Sartre, p. 7.

⁸⁸Sinclair, p. 175; also Piaget, pp. 30-33.

⁸⁹Ekstein, p. 482.

members; indeed it often so organizes itself as to render the recognition of new truth nearly impossible."⁹⁰ One cannot help wondering if Schiller's stronger sentiment perhaps resulted from the fact that he was engaged in pushing a drastically new truth, Ekstein has not been.

The absolutist position was found to have considerable difficulty with "truth." On the one hand it described it as beautiful and worthy; on the other it insisted one could never confidently claim its possession. This immediately posed the problem of how one might then be confident of either its beauty or its value. So, too, one was left to ponder why, if he could never declare he had it, he ought to bother seeking it out; or again, how he was to know when he had found it. The relativist position avoids all such dilemmas by operationally defining "truth." It does not ask, "What is 'truth'?", rather it asks "In what contexts do men speak of 'truth,' to what kinds of concepts do they apply that label?" And the answer given was that men call "true" those readings which if acted upon as "true" will best promote their immediate interests. Thus "truth" was shorn of its will-'o-the-wisp characteristics and made a tangible, useful thing.⁹¹

Absolutism also had trouble with the "false prophet." He

⁹⁰Schiller, "The Ambiguity of Truth," pp. 168-69.

⁹¹Relativism is concerned with what actuates man, and in what manner. If he can never be sure he has independent "truth," then it is not independent "truth" which moves him. What does? His understanding of a situation. How is this obtained? It is relative to his experience.

was described as one who, if not cautiously guarded against, might lead a society from the path of "truth" and "knowledge." Yet, when we looked for the basis of this fear, when we tried to determine who had so seriously misled us in the past, we found the "false prophets" were none other than those individuals societies continue to revere. By contemporary standards of "truth," yesterday's false prophets turn out to be the Newtons, Rutherfords, and Priestleys, etc.⁹²

This dilemma is also resolved by a relativistic framework. It eliminates the problem posed by the "false prophet" by denying his existence. It argues men do not take up or reject theories according to whether they reflect some independent "real" conditions, but according to how well they reflect their experienced "facts," their experienced needs and purposes.⁹³ In defense of this position it offers the following kinds of observations:

There are instances in present day physical theory of the existence of two theories which are both "correct" in their match with observed facts and predicted outcomes. The physicists don't throw out one and keep the other; they use one or the other according to what is convenient to their empirical problems of the moment.⁹⁴

⁹²Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 138. "Fortunately," notes Kuhn, "instead of forgetting these heroes, scientists have been able to forget or revise their works."

⁹³To be accepted, James B. Conant observes, scientific findings must be in keeping with the demands of society. On Understanding Science: An Historical Approach (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), pp. 1-30.

⁹⁴Charles A. McClelland, "Some Comments on Whitaker's Explorations," p. 14. (an unpublished essay.)

Theories are even maintained when they are known to have serious logical flaws in them. Such was the case with Newton's scheme.

It first postulates that the position and velocity of any particle can be determined in isolation from all others. Then it postulates that there is a complete and continuous interaction of all these particles with one another. Logically, the two postulates nullify each other. But as long as the principles involved gave satisfactory results this objection was brushed aside or ignored.⁹⁵

D. W. Sciama notes the criticisms Ernst Mach used to effectively down Newton's scheme were little more than an elaboration of arguments presented against it by Berkeley, yet Newton's views had gone unquestioned despite Berkeley.⁹⁶ Einstein's formulations have been attacked for housing similar inconsistencies.⁹⁷ The important question, according to relativism, is not "is the theory 'true,' but is it useful?" Indeed, it continues, the "true" theory--"true" in that it most effectively reflects one's experiences and aims--is at once that theory which is most useful. While Newton may be a "false prophet" for the modern submolecular physicist in action, it is clear what would ensue were we able to transport ourselves back in time to the era of his greatest

⁹⁵Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 202; see also Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 23. Kuhn contends: "Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute."

⁹⁶Sciama, p. 98.

⁹⁷For an account of the questionable way in which Darwin defended his thesis, see Gertrude Himmelfarb, Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1959), pp. 154, 316-320.

popularity. Einsteinian formulations in hand, we might entreat scientists of the day, "Wait, don't waste your time. Newton will only mislead you. If you follow him you will forfeit two hundred years. Take a look at this. We have brought you 'truth' straight out of the future." Would they listen? Not a chance. If they were decent enough to go over Einstein's theorizing with us they would very soon reach a conclusion something like this: "It may be as you say that two hundred years from now creatures of the kind you label submolecular physicists will roam the earth. And it may be that the world of their experience will be best reflected in the concepts, constructs and word-meanings of this person you call Einstein. But if we take them up now, we go no place. Given the world of our experience, and given what we wish to do with that experience, our objectives, Newton is both relevant and true." The same vigor one uses to suppress a "false prophecy," relativism tells us, one simultaneously employs to suppress a "truth"; a "truth" as reflective of independent reality as any other.

There is a criticism of the relativist position (based once more on a misunderstanding), which it seems appropriate to deal with here. It is sometimes argued that even if one accepts the notion theories are taken up for pragmatic reasons--because they "work"--it must clearly be possible for an individual to choose a "wrong" theory, to endorse one which he "believes" to be in line with his aims, but which, "in

reality," is not.⁹⁸ This misunderstanding results from the attempt to maintain an absolutist view of "values" when judging the relativist framework. Values, relativism contends, have to do with the immediate choices people make--our values are our choices. We are pragmatic in the immediate sense. The decision to accept or reject a theory is made by contemplating the consequences of acting upon it now. If to call a theory "true" and to act accordingly is to be moved in a direction not presently desired, we will not be found to call it "true."

In defending the above criticism through illustration, those who make it again persist in thinking absolutistically. Generally, an example of this sort is presented: A Haitian witch doctor may have as his objective the cure of a particular disease. To effect the cure, he performs a certain rite. His rate of cure is approximately forty per cent. If an American pharmacist is able to provide a pill which will effect a cure rate of ninety or one hundred per cent, and the witch doctor refuses to use it, he has obviously selected a method and a theory out of keeping with his goal. The answer, of course, is that his goal was not simply to cure the disease in question. Our goals are never independently "natural" things. They are what we do, and are revealed by examining what we do. In this instance, one might surmise the witch doctor's aim is: maintain certain social relationships which his rite

⁹⁸Note such a criticism cannot be made unless one first premises independent "real" forms.

is a veritable part of, remain independent of foreign "medicine men," maintain his status as a figure of authority (and it goes without saying the maintenance of the witch doctor's status is part of maintaining the entire social fabric), etc. Given such a complex of goals, the pill, in comparison with the rite, is an obvious failure.

Ironically, Dewey made the same unpragmatic kind of argument as the aforementioned in behalf of social "science," and it was the non-pragmatist Reinhold Niebuhr who used against him the argument I have presented. In extolling the glories of social "science," Dewey spoke of values as though they were independent "things"; and not only that, but "things" everyone in society held in common. Thus, he appeared to believe social scientists only needed to demonstrate certain economic-social structural conditions were the basis of social problems society expressed a desire to solve, and presto, an altered structure would thereupon be taken up. Niebuhr said of Dewey he appeared unaware social inertia is due to "predatory self-interest," that "the traditionalism which the social sciences face is based upon the economic interest of the dominant social classes who are trying to maintain their special privileges in society."⁹⁹ In brief, members of society most decidedly

⁹⁹ Reinhold Niebuhr, "Moral Man and Immoral Society," in Pragmatism and American Culture, ed. by Gail Kennedy (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1950), p . 62-63. Niebuhr continues: "Since reason is always, to some degree, the servant of interest in a social situation, social injustice cannot be resolved by moral and rational suasion alone, as the educator and social scientist usually believe. Conflict is inevitable, and in this conflict power must be challenged,

do not share common objectives.

Even trying to deal with the matter of scholars said to be in "error" can give one employing the absolutist framework noticeable difficulty. Does being "wrong" indicate poor scholarship? If the answer is yes, then how is one to know when he is "right," particularly when he has been warned against presuming to have certain "truth"? If the answer is yes, we must draw the appalling conclusion most scholars have been poor in the extreme, since the "facts" and theories of nearly every area of investigation little resemble those they were pushing only fifty or sixty years ago. On the other hand, if the answer is no, wherein lies the difference between a "false prophet" and a scholar in "error"? Is it only that the former is successful in getting his ideas accepted while the latter is not? Or does it have to do with magnitude of error? And if so, how much "error" is required to put one in the "false prophet" category? If the answer is no, one must also ask about the tendency in many areas for scholars to villify those declared to be "wrong," to question their scholarship? Marxists and radical rightists are again cases in point. These problems, too, do not exist for the relativist.

Though it argued the independent existence of "true" categories, the nineteenth century paradigm was always confronted with

with power. That fact is not recognized by most of the educators, and only very grudgingly admitted by most of the social scientists."

the "fact" of everyone's experience that it is never possible to point to any. When one looks closely the lines between the various categories men employ always become hazy and indistinct. This is so even with the most common sense kinds of categories. It is never possible to distinguish a sharp line between a pile of sand and a mountain, between objects which are food and those which are not, between water which is cool and water which is hot, etc. Relativism argues the sharp lines are not found because they are not there; that is, they are not there independent of the viewer's creative act; it argues whether something is different in degree or kind or whether it is different at all, depends upon the observer, his experiences and his purposes.

If the nineteenth century paradigm is used to look at the world through, one is moved to conclude social scientists in general and political scientists in particular are not a very "objective" lot. While they worry far more than physical scientists about keeping "values" out of their work, we found them continually accusing one another of failure in this respect. Even more perplexing, physical scientists themselves may have little difficulty reaching accord when dealing with physical phenomena, but they quickly fall out when they turn their eyes to the social. And one is left to ponder what it is about the social world which does such sure and immediate damage to one's scholarly capacities. The twentieth century paradigm confronts no similar problem. Rooted in the premise "value" conflict is "fact" conflict,

is the conflict in experience, it correctly predicts that precisely in the economic-social-political arena--where disparate and conflicting experiences abound--will we expect to find the battle over "fact" and "value" raging.

Perhaps the most Gordian-like knot faced by the nineteenth century paradigm advocate has to do with determinism. However much he may dislike it, the world as seen through his epistemology is a completely determined one with, as May Brodbeck observes, the future laid out and predictable.¹⁰⁰ Thus, the social scientist employing the paradigm rationalizes his very existence as a social scientist by proposing to look for the "true" forms, causes and laws which govern the universe of economic-social-political events. If such things do not exist what is it he proposes to seek? At the same time, of course, this very deterministic understanding of things renders his scholarly efforts seemingly futile. Why bother searching for causes and laws if they will not profit us, if the course of events is already set? Relativism provides a way out of the dilemma by abandoning the assumptions from which it sprung. As Sinclair points out, to inquire whether man's actions or will are determined in this sense is a question which simply cannot be asked of a relativistic framework.¹⁰¹ The idea of

¹⁰⁰May Brodbeck, "On the Philosophy of the Social Sciences," Philosophy of Science, XXI (April, 1954), pp. 140-56.

¹⁰¹Sinclair, pp. 60-61. Dewey argued: "The doctrine of 'free-will' is a desperate attempt to escape from the consequences of

a determined will is part of an epistemology which holds the universe to be composed of independent "real" forms, causes and laws. Once this assumption is rejected, what is there left to do the determining? To use an analogy for a second time, to ask of relativism if man's will is determined is like asking of the round-world thesis if one may fall off the edge.

While it seems unnecessary to repeat them here, the twentieth century paradigm can take credit for all of the insights both the Sociology of Knowledge and Pragmatism were found to provide. They are, it was demonstrated, simply insights stemming from the relativistic bent of those philosophies. Finally, the paradigm can accurately postdict the rapid decline pragmatism suffered at the onset of World War I, and the lack of interest in Mannheim during World War II. A nation about to embark on a war is most unlikely to find such theses pragmatic.

The last general implications of relativism to be discussed in this chapter are those which bear on the conduct of scholarly investigation. The twentieth century paradigm gives us the following instruction: First, it proposes any attempt by a community of scholars to solve the problem of disagreement among members by eliminating

the doctrine of fixed and immutable objective Being. With dissipation of that dogma, the need for such a measure of desperation vanishes." The Quest for Certainty, p. 250.

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all words which evoke strong emotions from their vocabulary is doomed to failure. Word-meanings are tied to experiences; it is not the words alone which prompt the emotions, but the experiences to which men relate them. Thus, if we did away with the words "communism" and "democracy" and spoke instead of ideologies A and B, individuals would promptly transfer all of their old feelings to these new designations. Moreover, it adds, variations in word-meanings which are part of minor variations in experience are not the sort which trigger the conflict. It is when the disagreement over words is part of a dissimilarity in experiences serious enough to make concerted action impossible that the real difficulty begins. But playing around with words is no solution.

In the first chapter I asked by what right men create the schemas they do. The answer the twentieth century paradigm gives is "by the right of their experiences and their aims." The paradigm tells the scholar not to fear cutting loose, although it warns him that if in building his structures he ignores the works of others, if he pays no heed to the products of their experiences, he is that much less likely to carve out a system which represents anyone's experience but his own.

At the same time, it reminds him that on occasion he may find the cost of communication greater than he is willing to pay. Word-meanings cannot be separated from our experiences and our aims as the pragmatists, Mannheim and the natural law theorists

also noted.¹⁰² Consequently, to make communication with one's colleagues the foremost aim is to bow to their principles. One may deem it more desirable to go ahead with one's own interpretations, representing one's own principles, and trust they will in some small way stimulate and perhaps even enlighten persons whose experiences are of a kind to make that possible. Where economic-social-political matters are concerned, electing to speak only about issues in respect to which men use a common language (share common experiences and aims) is inevitably to talk of things they also consider trivial.¹⁰³

The paradigm argues an individual's assumed goals are built into--and therefore, revealed by--his very methods and his vocabulary.

¹⁰²Anatol Rapoport has reflected: "So many discussions go astray because the same words are used in different senses by adherents of different points of view that it seems imperative to start practically every discussion by clarifying the meanings of terms." Unfortunately, he adds, "Clarification of meaning (whether couched in formal definitions or in illustrative examples) takes place only if the terms defined are actually geared to the experience of the people concerned." "Various Meanings of Theory," American Political Science Review, LII (Dec., 1958), p. 972.

¹⁰³"A retreat into the trivial, formal, methodological, purely theoretical, remotely historical--in short, apolitically irrelevant--is the unmistakable sign of a non-controversial political science which has neither friends nor enemies because it has no relevance for the great political issues in which society has a stake. . . . If we want the social sciences and humanities to catch up with the physical, we want Orwell's 1984. Truth, existence, behavior, control and right become one." Sidney J. Slomich, Manager, Arms Control Study Group, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, from a paper presented at the International Studies Association, Western Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, Tucson, Ariz., March 16-18, 1967, pp. 23-24.

Hence, it proposes scholars interested in studying social phenomena look first to the operational definitions conflicting groups give to words, and to their causal statements, etc.

On this last matter, the identification of "causes," the paradigm also offers these insights; or perhaps I should say the paradigm points the way to them: If there are no "natural" independent forms, then, to say the "causes" of a phenomena are many and complex can be no more representative of a "true" state of affairs than to insist they are few in number. Here, too, one's decision must in part reflect one's objectives. Thus prepared, very little investigation is required to locate the key. To the degree an individual--scholar or layman--presupposes a continuation of the greater part of his on-going experiencing of the phenomenon he is investigating, he will view it as complex, and as the product of numerous "causes." Insofar as he presupposes a prompt and radical alteration of his on-going experience he will do the reverse. In short, a conservative will speak of multiple causes, while the radical will talk of few.¹⁰⁴ To offer another of my homely illustrations: Imagine that we--the reader and I--are standing by the side of a road and suddenly witness a car about to run down a child. Thereupon the reader shouts something like,

¹⁰⁴"The poor man has always a precise view of his problem and its remedy: he hasn't enough and he needs more. The rich man can assume or imagine a much greater variety of ills and he will be correspondingly less certain of their remedy." Galbraith, p. 13.

"That car is going to kill the boy," and prepares to take action. I, on the contrary, protest: "What do you mean the car will bring the boy's death, much too simplistic a causal explanation." And I go on to talk about gravity, the heartbeat of the lad, the sun's rays, and so forth. Is it not clear my argument reflects an assumption on my part that our on-going experience in this case will go on, that there will be no drastic altering of it? It is no different with economic-social-political phenomena, i. e. , when nations go to war (when they wish to radically alter an experienced situation), they use the simplest of causal statements.¹⁰⁵ In any society, radicals of right and left do likewise. The United States is the dominant world power, and as such, the most status quo oriented. Consequently, we would expect and we find that the prevailing view in the United States argues economic-social-political phenomena are complex, and the products of numerous "causes";¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵As Saul Alinsky once remarked: "On the front of action, we always think in blacks and whites." Address to the student body, San Francisco State College, March 9, 1967.

¹⁰⁶C. Wright Mills said of American social science, "If there is any one line of orientation historically implicit in [it], it is the bias toward scattered studies, toward factual surveys and the accompanying dogma of a pluralist confusion of causes. These are essential features of liberal practicality as a style of social study. For if everything is caused by innumerable 'factors,' then we had best be very careful in any practical actions we undertake. We must deal with many details, and so it is advisable to proceed to reform this little piece and see what happens, before we form that little piece too. And surely we had better not be dogmatic and set forth too large a plan of action: We must enter the all-interacting flux with a tolerant awareness that we may well not yet know, and perhaps will never know, all the multiple causes at work." The Sociological Imagination, pp. 85-86.

behaviorism is principally an American methodology.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, powers bent on radically restructuring relationships within the world community continually employ simple schemas.¹⁰⁸

Finally, on the issue of "causes," the paradigm points the way to the conclusion individuals interested in radically restructuring their experiencing of an area of time-space will also be less likely to render teleological explanations than persons assuming a preference for the continuation of that experience. Our causal statements are manipulative or accommodative; they are goal-directed. It is difficult to manipulate a "motive" or a "drive." In line with this, note that as physical sciences became more manipulative, as they sought to alter their experiences with metals, chemicals, and so on, they cast aside teleological explanations.

¹⁰⁷And it is investigations of a behavioral kind which the United States Government has shown itself most interested in supporting. See Yale Brozen, "The Role of Government in Research and Development," American Behavioral Scientist, VI (Dec., 1962), pp. 22-27; also see Hubert H. Humphrey, "A Magna Carta for the Social and Behavioral Sciences," The American Behavioral Scientist, V (Feb., 1962), pp. 11-14; also William W. Ellis, "The Federal Government in Behavioral Science: Fields, Methods, and Funds," American Behavioral Scientist, VII (May, 1964), pp. 3-26.

¹⁰⁸Ptirim Sorokin remarks that American sociologists generalized far more during the 1875-1920 period, while between 1920-1965 they have been principally concerned with fact finding. If we were going to fix a date for the beginning of the status quo orientation in the United States, it would doubtlessly be 1920, or shortly thereafter. See "Sociology of Yesterday and Today," American Sociological Review, XXX (Dec., 1965), p. 833.

About definitions, the paradigm has this to say: Objects and events are their relationships. Consequently, a single entity may be defined in terms of its private relationships; Henry, for instance, may be defined as bipedal, a user of tools, the employee of Mr. X, an auto mechanic, etc. However, when defining a category, one refers only to those relationships members of the category have in common. If asked to define man, we might well describe him as bipedal and a user of tools, but we would not mention auto mechanics or employers. The reason is obvious. Since a thing is its relationships, like things are alike only to the extent they have like relationships. To place things in a single category and then proceed to define in a manner which takes them back out again is an exceedingly strange thing to do. This simple rule of definition, a rule followed not only in building scientific definitions, but those of common sense as well, is quite often ignored by political scientists, e.g., nations are sometimes defined in terms of characteristics--relationships--which are anything but shared by all nations, such as a single language, a unified culture, etc.

The rule referred to is also to be followed when it comes to labeling "causes." If we wished to indicate the "cause" of Henry's using tools, we might for certain purposes, include his employment as an auto mechanic. But we would not do so if asked the "cause" of man's tool using. Again, political scientists occasionally answer queries about such as the "cause" of war with reference to

relationships not common to all wars, instead of answering "we can find no common relationship to name 'cause.'" "

Since any object or event is its relationships, the paradigm contends that to alter what something is, relationships must themselves be altered. In order that a desired change in an idea may occur, for example, it is necessary to alter the situation of which the idea is an integral part. Dewey sometimes recognized this conclusion followed. He wrote:

To change the working character or will of another we have to alter objective conditions which enter into his habits. . . . We may desire abolition of war, industrial peace, greater equality of opportunity for all. But no amount of preaching good will or the golden rule or cultivation of sentiments of love and equity will accomplish the results. There must be change in objective arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment not merely on the hearts of men. To think otherwise is to suppose that flowers can be raised in a desert or motor cars run in a jungle. Both things can happen and without a miracle, but only by first changing the jungle and desert.¹⁰⁹

As for the categories men employ, the paradigm again reminds us of their pragmatic character. Man distinguishes because he intends to act in a distinguishing manner, and when he does not act in a distinguishing manner he does not distinguish. An interesting instance of this comes to mind. During World War II the Nazis made the word "race" synonymous with "culture"; Hitler spoke of Czechoslovakian, Polish, Jewish, and other races.¹¹⁰ At the time

¹⁰⁹Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 19-22.

¹¹⁰Hitler, p. 123.

we dismissed such categories as without any basis, and spoke of Caucasian, Oriental, etc., races in their stead. Now, as of late, biologists have decided even these cannot be defended, since no set of characteristics has been identified which does not leave many persons in the twilight zone. This change in attitude, I propose, is not so much an indication of some newly discovered "truth" as it is an indication of man's (at least the biologists') declining bigotry. The argument presented, that the lines are not neat holds for any and every category man uses, animate vs. inanimate, food vs. not food, etc. We maintain them not because they mirror an independent reality--but because they mirror an experienced reality and what we wish to do with it. Other examples might be the rightist inclination to make no distinction between Socialism and Communism, or the leftist inclination to place liberals and rightists in a single pile.¹¹¹ Piles are never "right" or "wrong" except in the sense that they are "relevant" or "irrelevant" to experience and aim.

One of the questions posed elsewhere was whether definitions

¹¹¹Or again, the tendency of many American scholars to place Mannheim with the Marxists. The basis on which they do so is one which evades me. I suspect it may be due to the belief in historical determinism both held, along with the notions every social stage sows the seeds of its own destruction and ideas are culturally determined. However, if one reasons in this manner he will end by placing nearly all of the German historicists in the same heap, not to mention many French philosophers, i.e., St. Simon, or, for that matter; the father of American sociology, Auguste Comte. Schwartz, p. 139. Also Bash, p. 198. For distinctions between Marx and Mannheim, see Bottomore, p. 54.

are perhaps not so arbitrary after all. When viewed through the twentieth century paradigm, in a certain sense they are not. Each of us is born into a population having particular kinds of experiences and using particular words to identify them. If along the way we come to have like experiences we will assume the appropriate vocabularies. But if we do not have the one we will not take up the other.

Another question asked was why scholars so often ignore one another's arguments, why they so infrequently even bother to learn enough about one another's vocabularies to begin to grasp their opposing logics. The answer here, of course, is that men are not particularly interested in word-meanings and logics which do not lead in the direction they want to go; a finding which demonstrates the desirability of having as many views as possible presented to the community. I suppose it is also the case that adherence to the nineteenth century paradigm encourages scholars to dismiss positions other than their own as "illogical," rather than to seek to discover their logic.

Naturally, since to understand the logic of another as he understands it is to share his experiences and vocabulary and to endorse the logic; this sort of comprehension of another's position is not open to us. However, it is possible to draw the link between another's vocabulary and his experience--as seen from one's own vantage point--and in that way to be able to predict how he will respond in certain kinds of situations.

Although it should hardly be necessary, to help make the distinction between the two paradigms clearer, I will very briefly redefine the words found in the glossary at the end of Chapter One. The first word was objectivity. It may be that in time this word, like the term phlogiston, will be dropped from the scholar's dictionary. However, certain usages are acceptable. It can be used simply to identify one's own view, or the view of one's scholarly community. In this case, to accuse someone of being non-objective is but to charge him with disagreeing with one's personal position. So, too, the word subjective can be employed to identify a position out of accord with one's own. Reality may be used to denote the universe external to the viewer. Since all men cut out their own persons as independent entities, no confusion would result if the term were given that meaning. It may also be prefaced with the word "experienced"; the "experienced reality" simply meaning the "experienced fact" or "experienced truth." Cause, as stated, means "that variable(s) which can best be manipulated or accommodated to, in order to get where one wants to go." To understand means to relate an "experienced fact" to other "experienced facts," or to a complex of them, just as one might say he understands why water is boiling on the stove if told the gas has been lit. It does not have anything to do with information about some independent "real" state of affairs. The word reason can be used to identify the mental processes which all men engage in. Or, it may, like the term

objective, be used in identifying positions one personally accepts. Bias has to do with disagreement. To be biased is to be biased away from the way another individual segments his universe. Ditto with error. As for relevant, to be relevant an "expressed fact," a reading, must be in line with one's own experiences and objective. Relevancy is a personal matter. Dogmatic may conceivably be employed to identify the manner in which men think; the process which Kuhn describes as creating paradigm boxes and then cutting up the world to meet the dimensions of those boxes--once again, in a pragmatic way. Creativity and genius must be taken as community products. An individual becomes a genius precisely at that moment the community recognizes him as one. And the community will do the latter when it finds his ideas and arguments suddenly relevant to its aims and interests.

So much for the twentieth century paradigm and its more obvious implications as I understand them. None of the ideas presented here is in any way new, as should be evident merely from a reading of Chapter Eight. Indeed, I suppose I might have chosen to talk about a conflict between absolutism and pragmatism. However, my main reason for not doing so is that the pragmatists were mostly concerned with philosophical implications of their epistemology rather than with its implications for the study of social phenomena. Dewey, as I noted, was an exception here. At the same time, from the outset Dewey's pragmatism and that of James and Schiller were notably different, and

the differences were accentuated as time passed. I doubt if either Schiller or James would have seen much of the old pragmatism left in much of Dewey's later works.

Right from the beginning, the premises involved have apparently been contemplated as somewhat radical. According to James, the general reaction of critics was:

A universe with such as us contributing to create its truth, a world delivered to our opportunisms and our private judgments! Home-rule for Ireland would be a millennium in comparison. We're no more fit for such a part than the Filipinos are fit for self-government.¹¹²

Others have viewed the assumptions of the framework as a persuasive argument in support of democracy.¹¹³ Here, however, we are primarily concerned with questions of this sort: Of what use is it to the political scientist? Is it a pragmatic tool? Can it order the phenomena we experience as economic-social-political with greater facility than the nineteenth century framework? That it can and does is the principal thesis of the next and final chapter.

¹¹²James, Pragmatism, p. 261.

¹¹³In particular, it seemed that the most salient elements of recent physical science, namely its progressive dynamism implying a disavowal of stagnant truth and its surrender of mechanistic determinism, when translated into moral and social terms, mean precisely the same as the word democracy." Margenau, p. v.

X. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY PARADIGM:

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE

I have no doubt that a considerable part of the present content of the social sciences will turn out to be pure phlogiston. That fact will be discovered as soon as someone attempts operational definitions of the vocabulary which at present confounds these sciences.¹

--George A. Lundberg

The enemy of the conventional wisdom is not ideas but the march of events. . . . Ideas are inherently conservative. They yield not to the attack of other ideas but to the massive onslaught of circumstance with which they cannot contend.²

--John K. Galbraith

Of the many trends which can be said to characterize our time, I think three in particular appear bold to political scientists. One is that while nationalist sentiments are reaching new pinnacles of enthusiasm in some countries, especially the underdeveloped, the day of the nation-state as the dominant economic-social-political entity is fast drawing to a close. Debates about this mainly have to do with how long it will take, and not whether it will occur. Another is that "ours is by all accounts a revolutionary age. The market place is filled with the

¹Lundberg, "The Postulates of Science and Their Implications for Sociology," p. 44.

²Galbraith, pp. 21-26.

clamor of voices proclaiming convictions which to be effective would require radical change in existing societies."³ Here again, scholars discuss not the likelihood of revolutionary change in much of the world, but whether such changes will be peaceful or bloody, whether the United States can adapt itself, and how it might best go about it.⁴ Finally, there is a general recognition that the radical upheavals in experience peoples of the world are undergoing is being accompanied by an equally radical upheaval in their very ways of thinking; in their ideas and their ideologies.⁵ In effect, then, political scientists have already granted that the economic-social-political world of their experience is undergoing drastic alteration. What has not been granted is that an equally drastic change in categories, concepts and vocabularies will be called for if we are to come to terms with this altered

³Carl Friedrich, ed., Revolution (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 3.

⁴This is also a view expressed by the United States Government much of the time; e.g., The Alliance for Progress "fact sheet on achievements," released in commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the alliance, states: "This initial period of growth has been accompanied by the emergence of what could be called 'an Alliance for Progress generation,' men and women who are determined that the old order must change, and that human rights and political freedom must flourish if peaceful revolution is to be substituted for bloody conflict." Public Affairs Office, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, Aug. 17, 1966, p. 3.

⁵We would expect as much. Writing about science, Anthony Standen observes, "Lenin said, 'there can be no revolutionary practice without revolutionary theory,' and this is as true of anything scientific as it is of revolutions." Science is a Sacred Cow (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950), p. 41. See also Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 46.

world. In the last analysis, this is the sort of thing each scholar must decide for himself. However, in my estimation--for all the reasons given in this chapter--the development of new frameworks is a critical necessity.

As I see it, our present schemas do not reflect the very state of affairs we claim to be experiencing.⁶ Thus, in a world in which the nation-state is said to be dying, political scientists usually speak not of political man, but of political Nazi Germans, political Maoist Chinese, and political Castro Cubans. We do not write of the conditions under which political man is found to foster freedom of speech and assembly, but of the attitudes of political Russians, British, Egyptians and French on these matters.⁷ In the same way, we have not concentrated on the conditions under which political man turns to thoughts of war and revolution, and why he is found to do so now in so many parts of the world. We speak, instead, of why this or that people seems to have done so. In short, we seem to take for granted the uniqueness of nationalities, despite our insistence the nation is on its way out.⁸ It may be argued no new frameworks or sub-frameworks

⁶It is a given that they have, and do, reflect the experiences of those who continue to abide by them.

⁷Nor have we analyzed the manner in which political man endorses or rejects given ideas or ideologies because they are found by him to be appropriate or inappropriate to his experience.

⁸See in this regard: Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations," in The Role of Theory in International Relations, ed. by Horace V.

are required to do the kind of thing I speak of, that we can turn to the study of political man within the going paradigm. I, frankly, do not believe it, and the following analysis is itself an explanation why.

My purpose in this chapter might be described as one of simply tracing the implications of a relativistic epistemology for the study of politics, and in particular, for the study of political man. I shall begin with the assumption political man, like non-political man, segments his universe according to his experiences and his aims--that to segment in a common manner is for political men to have common experiences--that the objectives closest to the heart of political man are those he takes for granted, his assumed goals--and that as his economic-social experiences undergo transition, the ideas he holds about such experiences, his ideologies, do likewise. In addition, I shall be concerned with the way political man is seen to employ various words in his vocabulary; words like propaganda, education, communism, and so on. In the last section of the chapter, I will briefly consider implications of a relativistic epistemology for our understanding of various less significant, but nonetheless significant, political phenomena.

Harrison (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 99-118. Morgenthau criticizes contemporary International Relations theory for being far too narrow in scope, and for using assumptions which "create the illusion of the viability of the nation-state in the nuclear age."

Politics--The Art of Defense

In Chapter Three it was proposed the logic of the nineteenth century paradigm encourages an understanding of political action as principally offensive. An "objective" individual knows the "facts." He is also one who keeps separate "fact" and "value." This means he will not only know the "facts," but his "values" as well, else he may confuse the two. Consequently, the "objective" individual's "values" are expected to be what he says they are. And, it was noted, when we ask individuals why they are engaging in political activity--not only those scholars are most apt to consider "objective," but the others as well--they almost invariably talk of acquiring, of gaining some position not now held, of improving their own lot or that of others, etc.

In the same way, the twentieth century paradigm encourages the idea political action is mainly defensive. Important goals are assumed goals, it argued, the ones we build our very concepts, categories and vocabularies around. Now when we look, we find it appears to be assumed by all groups of political actors--for that matter, nearly every individual political actor--that come what may, their existing economic-social status will not be diminished.⁹ Lipset has written: "I believe with Karl Marx that all privileged classes seek to maintain and enhance their advantages against the desire of the underprivileged

⁹See Roberto Michels, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. III, IV (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1930), pp. 230-32.

to reduce them."¹⁰ It will be my contention that the former, the desire to preserve, is an assumed objective of all elements, privileged or not, and as such invariably takes precedence. Indeed, I will further propose that when it comes to understanding political action, to understanding the activities of political men, linking the desire to preserve interests with the desire to enhance them as Marx and Lipset do, will confuse scholars more than enlighten them.

After noting political scientists act out an endorsement of the hypothesis political action is principally offensive, I argued this hypothesis is directly contradicted by the facts of their experience, but that instead of discarding it they have talked of training their variables; of educating the poor, reforming the legislative committee system, encouraging statesmen to formulate long-range plans, etc. In beginning with the opposite hypothesis, that political action is essentially defensive in nature, I offer as evidence the following kinds of "experienced facts":

(a) Individuals are witnessed to seek, to gain and to employ political power in amounts which correspond with the magnitude of their economic-social power. Thus, as observed in Chapter Five, those with little or nothing in the way of economic-social power are at once the politically apathetic. Persons at the other end of the economic-social scale constitute the political giants, and there is a

¹⁰Lipset, Political Man, p. xxii.

correspondence all along the way between amounts of political activity and economic-social wealth.

(b) The legislative committee system is in its entirety defensive first and foremost. To repeat the main aspects of this argument: There are committees corresponding to existing dominant interests, not to weak interests with great aspirations; the process by which one becomes a member of a committee is wholly conservative of existing interest structures; the process by which legislation is enacted is equally defensive, bills going to committees representing interests most likely to be negatively affected by their passage; and, committee operations are interest partisan, party non-partisan.

(c) The structure of our foreign aid program, regardless of what one may believe its intent to be, is, in its application, such that it works to prohibit any attack upon existing United States interests abroad, for example, the expropriation of raw material holdings. This, regardless of whether their expropriation would advantage the nation involved, and as I will subsequently contend, regardless of whether it would work to our nation's benefit.

(d) Union activity--generally considered political in kind--has varied according to how secure workers' existing economic-social positions were. In the United States it reached its zenith in the 1930's when workers' fortunes were plummeting, then declined during and after World War II as threats to those fortunes themselves declined.

(e) All of the subsequent arguments in connection with the political activities of the radical right and Negroes, the politics of depression, war and revolution, and political vocabularies. In saying political man assumes a maintenance of his existing socio-economic status, I mean to indicate that whenever it comes to considering ways to solve the social and economic problems of others, the cab driver, no less than the Texas oil millionaire, is found to take for granted the doing will not involve personal economic-social injury; i. e. the Texas oil millionaire assumes that however Michael Harrington's "Other America" is eliminated, when it is, he will still possess his millions. The middle class college professor assumes he will still have his home in the suburbs, and the lower class individual whose worldly goods amount to a battered fifteen-year-old car and a worn suit, takes for granted that in the process his car and his suit are not to be forfeited.¹¹

If political action is defensive of the economic-social status-quo, and if this objective is so critical, it is simply taken for granted, two questions become of paramount importance. First, does it ever happen that for one group to maintain its economic-social status it must deny the right of some other group to do likewise? And second, if the answer to the first question is "yes," what, then is the outcome?

¹¹It is to be understood I am speaking of "group" phenomena, "group" activity, throughout this chapter. As with the tightest rule of the physical scientist, there are always individual exceptions.

The answer to the first question is "yes," undeniably. Probably the classic instance is a depression when, however much men may dispute the reasons for it, in everyone's estimation the pie to be shared gets smaller. Because it does, in immediate terms some group, some element, must consume less. The answer to the second question, I contend, is that when thus afflicted, a society begins to move toward a state of crisis which, if the decrease is severe enough, can end in revolution or war.

In times of tranquility, the government (the State) appears to defend every group's economic-social position with roughly equal vigor. Business, for instance, does not find it possible to launch a full-scale assault upon the position of labor; labor, too, is provided its protection, as are agricultural interests, the military or the aged. In a time of economic-social crisis, however, when the productive pie is notably diminished, this is no longer the case. Since individuals seek and gain political power in amounts corresponding to their economic-social power, and since political power means economic-social protection, in a period of crisis it is always the lower socio-economic elements who begin to feel the pinch first. In such as the Great Depression, workers find themselves unemployed and unable to consume at their former levels, small farmers have their mortgages foreclosed, and so on. There being no "natural" categories, it is pointless to debate how much of this power to defend one's

socio-economic position from injury is political, and what of it is economic or social. Depending upon one's definitions, it has attributes which might be put in any of those categories. But no matter how one defines the power, there is nothing particularly subtle about its use. A large new expense such as the 25 billion for the Vietnam war each year initially makes its impact upon all concerned in the form of taxes. However, upper elements immediately find it possible to remove the money from one pocket and then promptly return it to another, by increasing prices for products, charging higher rents on commercial property, etc. In like manner, middle elements are able to strike for higher incomes and to increase the price of their services. In this way, the bulk of the cost is passed down to the least protected, those unable to raise prices, or strike, or to charge more for their services; namely, the under-employed and the unemployed; the lower socio-economic elements in general. When depression strikes, possessing fewer skills and having had little education, lower socio-economic elements find themselves ill-equipped to compete for whatever employment exists, not to mention their relative powerlessness when it comes to exerting pressure on governmental agencies, organizing in unions, etc.

Precisely because political action is defensive, depressions--situations in which the pie gets smaller--are those situations no political system is equipped to handle. In normal times, when the

productivity of a nation is growing, it is possible for a government to deal constructively with the special problems of deprived elements. This because it can be done gradually, over the long run, with all elements continuing to be maintained. If the thirty per cent of the population on the lower end of the socio-economic scale only receives fifteen per cent of the society's output, it can be promised thirty. If the middle forty per cent of the populace receives thirty-five per cent of the produce, it can be promised seventy. And there need be no threat whatsoever to anyone, not even to the upper segments. Do the latter receive the remaining fifty per cent of the wealth, then they can be promised one hundred. All this can be done, one-hundred per cent pies can be turned into two-hundred per cent pies, gradually, over the long run. However, in a depression, when a significant portion of the population has had its economic-social position diminished, it does not think in long-run terms. Rather, it thinks in terms of the most immediate present. This poses a special problem because, as political scientists have themselves observed, in immediate terms the pie has only certain dimensions, and "a gain for one group must normally represent, in the short run at least, loss for others."¹²

To suggest that because upper socio-economic elements can best afford it, the Government ought to insure they suffer the brunt of

¹²G. Lowell Field, Governments in Modern Society (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1951), p. 371.

the deprivation is to forget the defensive nature of political activity. Persons farther up the economic-social ladder will have sought and gained greater political power with which to defend their positions. Under such circumstances governments find themselves incapable of creative activity.

In a depression, then, unable to hold on, a segment of the society (made up primarily of lower class elements) goes into economic-social decline. When it does, it begins simultaneously to move toward a point at which it will commit itself to violence in an attempt to remedy the situation. I use the words "move toward" a commitment to violence because groups engaged in economic-social decline invariably try other, less drastic measures first. Moreover, which measures are deemed appropriate appears to be a function of the severity of the decline. Groups whose star has begun to fall begin by writing letters of protest to local authorities, Congressmen, the President, to newspaper editors, etc. If the decline continues nevertheless, protest rallies, marches and the like are held. If conditions still continue to worsen, the latter will turn into acts of civil disobedience, and finally, into outright violence against the system. This packet of more and more drastic measures seems to be one employed by all socio-economic elements as the occasion may require.

Clausewitz once sagely observed war is simply the

continuation of politics by other means.¹³ This is so, even of the very minute quasi-guerilla wars which occur during a depression. It was this kind of political action small farmers engaged in when in the 1930's they hung judges for foreclosing the mortgages on their farms. Detroit factory workers took similar political action when they beat and sometimes killed scab workers who threatened their jobs. We can say of political man that when his existing economic-social status is no longer made secure--when indeed he is being permitted to endure severe injury--he has consistently shown himself willing to perpetrate violence in behalf of stopping the injury.

To very quickly restate the dilemma of depression, then, a segment of the community is seen to undergo economic social decline. This experience constitutes a failure to achieve an objective so all-important its realization is simply taken for granted; a goal which, in effect, is the central purpose of political activity. What makes the problem so exceedingly vexatious is that the element suffering the decline--made up of lower socio-economic individuals in the main--is precisely that element with least political power. Having had so little to defend, such persons have not sought it out with the same vigor evidenced by middle or upper segments. Now, as a consequence, the Government finds itself unable to respond to their plight quickly

¹³See Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by O. J. Matthijs (New York: Modern Library, 1943), p. 596.

or creatively.

As we know, caught in the dilemma discussed, some nations have opted for war, some have undergone revolution while still others have seemed to find pacific alternatives. What determines the course a nation will take is the subject I will turn to next.

The Politics of Revolution and War

In trying to understand why a nation takes the specific path it does, I believe it is important to keep in mind the function of the nation-state. In line with my argument that politics has chiefly to do with defense, I propose experience tells us the nation-state is, can best be defined as, "the largest political entity to which individuals give allegiance in order to maintain their economic-social selves." What each individual is in economic-social terms, he is by virtue of his membership in the nation-state community. As a consequence, the nation-state has shown itself to have great resiliency. If at all possible, when a crisis of the kind we are concerned with occurs, the citizens of a nation-state will draw together and seek a way to export their problem--if need be through war.¹⁴

¹⁴"The increase of any estate must be upon the foreigner, for whatsoever is somewhere gotten is somewhere lost." Sir Francis Bacon, "Of Seditious and Troubles," 1628, quoted in The Contours of American History (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961, William A. Williams), p. 27. If a segment of a society is threatened with marked decrease despite all efforts to prevent it, the individuals involved will be found to sever their allegiance to the nation: Frenchmen proclaim

In presenting my arguments here, I will refer to the practices of the United States, Germany and Japan when submerged in the Great Depression of the 1930's. Initially in the United States, and in Germany and Japan as well, there was a vigorous debate over the "causes" of the crisis. We would expect this. The twentieth century paradigm told us men call "cause" those variables they can best manipulate or accommodate to in order to achieve their objectives. Since man's main political objective is the maintenance of his economic-social self, it is understandable the causal statements upper socio-economic elements found most appealing were such as the conclusion depression is an inevitable and necessary part of the system, or that the plight of the workers resulted from a lack of motivation, or intelligence, or both.¹⁵ It is equally understandable that lower elements, those most negatively afflicted, found the suggestion the cause had to do with the avarice of upper elements grew daily more alluring. Had either of these general attitudes "won out," the upshot would almost certainly have been revolution, especially in Germany and Japan. Revolutions, however, are the costliest of all wars, both in terms of lives and in

"better Hitler than Blum," Comprador Vietnamese fight for the return of a foreign colonial power, and the expropriated leave a Russia, a Cuba, or a China to take up residence abroad, refusing any longer to pay allegiance to the nation as it is then constituted. (They will only sever their allegiance, of course, if to do so means to defend their economic-social status more effectively.)

¹⁵The battle over the "causes" of the depression was an intimate part of the struggle to determine who would suffer the decrease.

terms of raising havoc with nearly everyone's immediate economic-social status; being conservative, men are seen to undertake them only as the last resort, only when all other avenues of economic-social defense are finally closed. This theme will be elaborated upon later.

In many respects, the pattern of events which unfolded during the early stages of the depression were rather standard for all three countries mentioned. Initially, there was a tendency for the communities to start polarizing.¹⁶ Moreover, those who moved to the left began to engage in sporadic violence (though in the United States, at least, not a well organized violence), and to speak of possible greater violence to come. And in all three countries governments came to the fore with welfare-state programs whose essential theme was that nobody, no element, was going to suffer marked decline. This was the essence of Hitler's economics, of Roosevelt's proposals, and of the military group which took power in Japan. All were arch

¹⁶Marx's argument to the effect that the State is always an instrument of repression wielded by the economic elite to exploit the workers, could not be more irrelevant to the experiences of everyone in times of tranquility. Clearly, as I have observed, when there is no crisis the political structure, the State, will work to defend the economic-social interests of all elements. However, when a crisis occurs of the kind in question, those being permitted to suffer decline would be expected to, and do, find Marx's argument a more cogent proposal. After all, it is now the "truth" of their experience that their economic-social status is no longer being preserved. Moreover, if they act to alter conditions through violence, the State machinery is moved against them. Who is it then protecting? Clearly the economic-social elements above.

conservative programs, in that they were designed not to alter relationships between economic-social groups, but to freeze the ones which already existed.¹⁷ There was, of course, an obvious potential fly in the ointment. If the pie was notably smaller, and if no one at home was to take a markedly smaller share, what was to be done?

When it came to answering this last question, the United States was in a most favorable position. Just as wealthier individuals within a nation are better equipped to weather depression, so, too, the wealthiest nation in a community of nations can more readily hold its own. When the chips were down, it was possible for the United States to charge less for finished products than either Japan or Germany; and in countries like China, we were able to begin easing Japan out of her former markets.¹⁸ There was no offensive or aggressive intent on our part. It was just good business at a time when good business was the alternative to domestic upheaval.

What was sound business for the United States, however, proved to be disastrous for Japan and Germany. In effect, we threw

¹⁷See Kennedy, Pragmatism and American Culture, p. 34.

¹⁸See, for example, Elizabeth B. Schumpeter, ed., The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940), especially pp. 8-10, 21-36, 879-907; also see Harold G. Moulton, Japan: An Economic and Financial Appraisal (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1931); also see Michimasa Soyeshima and P. W. Kuo, Oriental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925); also see Thomas F. Millard, China: Where It Is at Today and Why (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928).

them the hot potato, or a good portion of it. Japan, for instance, had an estimated eight trust companies--controlled by no more than a few hundred families--dominating the economy. While she possessed a middle class, it was notably small in proportion to the total population. For Japan's elite the alternatives were clear: to maintain their present economic-social positions would either require their taking more out of those below, which, given the degree of restiveness lower elements were already manifesting, was a virtual guarantee of revolution, or they must unify the society around a military establishment and go abroad in the hope of forceably gaining back their sources of lost income. The lower segments were faced with a comparable pair of options. They could seek to maintain themselves by expropriating some of the upper segments--a revolutionary act--or they could back the military establishment and go abroad. Germany confronted a like dilemma.

Given the choices before both Japan and Germany, it was understandable they would opt for foreign war. As stated previously, the alternative was revolution, and revolutions are the costliest of all wars. I suppose one might suggest the elites involved ought to have passed reforms injurious to themselves in the interest of world peace. But no group in any nation has ever been witnessed to act in that manner, and to suggest it is to ask of these two countries something we ourselves in this country have never been willing to

do.¹⁹ Similarly, to propose the choice made was a foolish one because they would eventually lose the war and suffer injury anyway is to forget political action has to do with defending economic-social status in immediate terms, against an immediate threat. Moreover, even in retrospect it is not at all clear this was not the least expensive alternative. The economies of both nations went up markedly and continued to do well far into the war.²⁰ And while they were destroyed in the end, the United States soon recognized it was imperative for us that they be restored.

Given the assumed goal of political man everywhere, if it was to be realized with a minimum loss of life, Germany and Japan made the right decisions. Adolf Von Thadden, head of the neo-Nazi

¹⁹"Few things have been more productive of controversy over the ages than the suggestion that the rich should, by one device or another, share their wealth with those who are not. With comparatively rare and usually eccentric exceptions, the rich have been opposed. The grounds have been many and varied and have been principally noted for the rigorous exclusion of the most important reason, which is the simple unwillingness to give up the enjoyment of what they have." Galbraith, p. 69.

²⁰Galbraith, p. 138. Galbraith rejects the notion wealthy nations have an advantage when war breaks out because they can "belt tighten." This, he proposes, is the very thing they fight to avoid. In regard to the U. S. during World War II, he notes: ". . . the consumption of goods in the aggregate was not reduced. On the contrary, it increased in every year of the war. Measured in constant (1947) prices the supply of consumers' goods available to and purchased by consumers increased from \$122.5 billion to \$145.2 billion worth or by about \$23 billions from 1940 to 1945. In the next five free and unrestricted peacetime years, the increase was not overwhelmingly greater--it was a little under \$38 billion."

National Democratic Party, has recently expressed this same sentiment: "Adolf Hitler gave us back our army," he asserted. "I was only 12 years old, but I remember it as if it were today. Hitler came, established the new order and nobody talked of taking our castle any more."²¹ That this willingness to kill in preference to sustaining economic-social injury is repugnant I would wholeheartedly agree with. It is, however, a repugnant characteristic peculiar to political man, and not just to Germans, Japanese, Russians or any other national grouping.

What if a nation endures a drastic reduction in its economic-social wealth, but has neither the ability to embark upon a military adventure nor to push the cost abroad with economic competition? As I have indicated, if the decrease is severe enough, it will undergo revolution. In our time, the perfect examples are Russia, China and Cuba. The first two nations were economies virtually destroyed. The suffering in Russia and the widespread famine in China hardly need to be recounted here. Cuba's affliction came upon her less abruptly. It was of a more chronic, but nonetheless progressive, variety. None of the three had before it the option of going abroad to war. Russia had done so for a time. But by 1917, with her economy collapsing, with her ability to continue fighting gone, the problem had to be

²¹Ferris Hartman, "Nazi Revival," San Francisco Chronicle, April 7, 1967, p. 6.

dealt with at home. In the words of Alan Moorhead, "Looking back, one sees that in the end revolution in Russia was probably inevitable."²² Similarly, China was already an exhausted land; upon whom might she have tried to make war? As for Cuba, it goes without saying. . .

Perhaps the greatest irony of a revolution, especially those which have been carried out in the name of communist equalitarianism, is that they are arch conservative; they take place as an alternative to greater sharing. When revolution comes, and none of the three countries mentioned is in any way an exception, the bulk of the society draws together and cuts off and expropriates just that much of the top which must be expropriated if everyone else is to remain largely where they are. Western political scientists are right; there has been no giant step toward classlessness in Russia, China or Cuba. At least the move in that direction has been no more profound in those nations than in other, non-"Communist" states; and they have shown the same reluctance to take it. These three revolutions were no different in kind from the revolutions of past eras; they were in no wise radical.

It is not because revolutionary leaders would have it so that all revolutions wind up being conservative. It is simply due to the defensive nature of political activity. A revolutionary leader who would be genuinely radical, who would cut-off and expropriate more of the

²²Alan Moorhead, The Russian Revolution (New York: Bantam Books, 1959), p. 31.

upper segments than is necessary to maintain the status quo for the remainder of society--perhaps with the aim of elevating lower elements-- will soon discover those who are to benefit from his actions will cheer him on, they will love him, but they will not fight; while those to be expropriated will take up guns and he is on his way out. In our time, he is a Trotsky, a Che Guevara, a Ben Bella or an N'Khruma.²³

Because it is conservative in nature, once a revolution is over its leaders learn to be politicians or they are replaced. Their first lesson includes the discovery that as those who fought the revolution approach the socio-economic level from whence they had fallen, they begin to lay down their guns; they are willing once more to work through systems, and to live on their hope for a brighter future. It also includes the discovery that the individuals who go to make up the new socio-economic elite possess the indispensable "know-how" needed to run and direct factories, schools, raw material complexes, etc.; but they will not offer it if their economic-social status is to be threatened. Since revolutionaries are often utopians who believe their movements to be radical and who attempt to make it so, quite commonly they leave the scene shortly after the firing stops.

²³Our own revolution was no exception. Charles S. Sydnor has remarked that the suffering which the patriots suffered at Valley Forge was simply the result of a lack of sufficient popular support to provide them with requisite clothing and food. See American Revolutionaries in the Making (New York: The Free Press, 1952), p. 14.

Revolution as a political act, then, is as conservative as any other. This is why so few individuals are ever engaged in the actual fighting.²⁴ When a decrease comes of sufficient magnitude to prompt a revolution, the revolutionary fighters are drawn primarily from among the lower segments, those who are suffering the greatest deprivation. Better able to maintain their economic-social selves, middle segments seldom become involved in significant numbers. Prior to a revolution, they are typically heard to argue reform is a necessity else violent change will ensue.²⁵ But they almost never reach the point of saying, "I told you so," and joining the revolutionaries. When the revolution arrives, they still appear to feel it unnecessary; usually, theirs is a position of "A plague on both your houses" throughout and once more their choice of positions is an ideal defense. Whether a marked decrease in a society's wealth leads to revolution or not, the middle elements are relatively secure. If revolution comes, they are not to be among the expropriated. If it does not, they always find themselves able to pass the decrease down to those below. They are most defensively pragmatic in their pacificistic inclinations.

²⁴John Gerassi has stated that Che strongly objected to wage incentives; he argued instead for "moral incentives." The loss of this issue, according to Gerassi, resulted in Che and his supporters leaving Cuba. From a speech made at San Francisco State College, April 1, 1967.

²⁵"Liberals, above all, make a cult of advocating little changes to prevent big ones." Waldo Frank, Cuba: Prophetic Island (New York: Marzani and Munsell, Inc., 1961), p. 22.

If by revolution one means the expropriation of a portion of the economic-social elite in a community (which is what I mean by it here) revolutions are even today the exception rather than the norm. Though a society may experience the sort of economic-social squeeze being discussed, more often than not upper elements will find it possible to defend against any armed attack upon their interests. This is so because only those individuals who are themselves in decline will offer their bodies to revolutionary violence. In other words, the number of revolutionaries will always be in proportion to the magnitude of the economic-social decrease a society or some portion of it is being made to suffer. Generally, it will not be so great as to force a revolution. And, of course, elites always have a decided edge in that they possess not only much greater economic-social power, but political as well.

If a society confronted with a decreased economic-social pie takes the cut out of lower socio-economic elements, it will move towards a police state. If instead upper socio-economic elements pay the cost, if there is a revolution, the movement will be away from a police state condition. There is nothing very mysterious about this. When upper elements are expropriated they go abroad; e. g., Russia in 1917, China in 1949, and Cuba in 1958. Since in that case the bulk of the enemy is out of the country, there is no necessity for strong repressive measures. However, when the decrease is taken out of lower elements, as in Russia during the 1930's or during the years

immediately preceding the 1917 revolution, there is a decided need for a police state. The poor cannot leave; therefore, they must be guarded against. Social scientists often appear to miss that Stalinist Russia was a significant move to the right, though many novelists have not.²⁶

In The Case of Comrade Tulayev, one of Victor Serge's characters reflects about the revolutionaries of that period:

They live by the most enormous and revolting lie history has known since the cheat of Christianity--a lie which contains a great deal of truth . . . They call their completed revolution to witness, and it's true that it is completed; they fly the red flag, and so they appeal to the strongest and rightist instinct of the masses; they catch men by their faith, and then cheat them out of their faith, turn it into an instrument of power. Their most terrible strength lies in the fact that they themselves believe they are continuing the Revolution, while they are serving a new counterrevolution, a counterrevolution such as has never existed before, and set up in the very rooms where Lenin worked. . . .²⁷

Precisely because there was to be a move to the right, because the increasing deprivation of that period was to be passed down, the old utopian revolutionaries became tragically irrelevant. Another of Serge's characters laments:

We never had a sense of the stability of the social world; we never had a belief in wealth; we were never the puppets of bourgeois individualism, dedicated to the struggle for money; we perpetually questioned ourselves about the meaning of life

²⁶See Nicholas S. Timasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1946).

²⁷Victor Serge, The Case of Comrade Tulayev (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1950), p. 122.

and we worked to transform the world . . . It was impossible for us to adapt ourselves to a phase of reaction; and as we were in power, surrounded by a legend that was true, born of our deeds, we were so dangerous that we had to be destroyed beyond physical destruction, our corpses had to be surrounded by a legend of treachery.²⁸

In any age, radicals of left and right hold for many a certain glamor, but it is always the conservatives who command the throne of political power, even in a revolution.

To sum the main points of my argument thus far: (a) Political man is found to assume the maintenance of his existing socio-economic status under all circumstances. (b) He acts at all times to defend it in immediate terms against immediate threats. (c) He interprets economic-social-political events, decides upon their "causes," and selects standards for judging related "truths," in the manner which best accords with the realization of this aim. (d) In behalf of his objective, he is found to employ a wide variety of political mechanisms including, in the last analysis, violence.

The current "Negro revolution" is a first-rate illustration of the thesis being presented.²⁹ The statistics compiled on conditions in the ghetto argue it is nonsense to propose the Negro is in revolt

²⁸Ibid., p. 304.

²⁹In the Negro's case, he is suffering decline in a non-depressionary period, but the problem this poses for the Government is no different; to give more to Negro elements in immediate terms, is to take from some other socio-economic element possessing more economic-social, hence more political, power.

because he has tired of waiting, or because he has been made promises which have not been fulfilled. If such statistics were used as the standard by which the "truth" of Negro rebellion is to be judged, the conclusion is clear. It would be decided Negroes have turned to violence for the same reason I have argued all collectivities turn to violence, because they are losing what they have.³⁰ Martin Luther King recently voiced concern that "America has failed to hear the plight of the Negro has worsened in the past few years."³¹ Understanding the defensive nature of political knowledge and political action, we might expect as much. If the primary political goal is the maintenance of one's socio-economic position for the white community to endorse the notion Negroes are rioting because they are suffering serious socio-economic decline is not a happy alternative. To repeat Bacon's words, "Whatsoever is somewhere gotten is somewhere lost." How much more

³⁰"Between 1940 and 1950 the South lost 1,597,000 Negroes. Of this total, 632,000 went to the North Central states, mostly to Chicago and the surrounding industrial area; 489,000 to the Northeast, mostly in the New York area; the balance to the West and elsewhere. Between 1950 and 1960, 1,457,000 Negroes went from the South to the North, 541,000 to the Northeast, 558,000 to the North Central states . . . While no recent figures are available, the migration is believed continuing at about the same rate." Marquis Childs, "The Casting About for Reasons," The Washington Post, July 31, 1967, p. A14. In all, the Negro population in the North rose from 3,000,000 in 1940 to 10,200,000 in 1966. U.S. News and World Report, Aug. 21, 1967. There now is "over 40 per cent of unemployment among the ghettos' adult males, and . . . something like 50 per cent of the able-bodied youths also without work." Joseph Alsop, "Matter of Fact," Washington Post, July 31, 1967, p. A15.

³¹Martin Luther King, C. B. S. Report, July 28, 1967.

pleasant, then, to view the explosion in the ghettos as the result of broken promises (with the implication promises should not be made), the work of outside agitators, or the result of inadequate legal barriers to riot.³² (If my argument is sound, we would expect reform-minded individuals--those who argue for dealing with the Negro rebellion by meeting some of their socio-economic demands--to be drawn principally from the middle sector, made up of individuals whose existing socio-economic positions are most easily defended, are least likely to suffer decrease, whatever eventuates.)

This is not to argue I expect nothing constructive to be done about the Negro's plight. As I have indicated, violence is a political act. Moreover, like any political act, people engage in it because it works. If the Negro rebellion continues to grow--and my understanding of rebellion leads me to suppose it will--the very defense of the socio-economic interests of a sizeable proportion of the white community will make a positive response to Negro demands imperative.³³ Who

³²Congressman George H. Mahon (Dem., Texas), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, gave a speech on the floor of the House on July 31, 1967 in which he lauded the Congress for all it has done in meeting the needs of the poor. Mahon concluded, "The more we have appropriated for these programs, the more violence we have had. This refutes the idea that money alone is the answer to this problem." U. S. News and World Report, Aug. 14, 1967, p. 46.

³³I discount the possibility Negroes might be dealt with as Jews were in Nazi Germany. The Jews, as a community, did not have their socio-economic positions assaulted all at once. Rather, they were attacked piece-meal, now this segment of the community, now

will suffer the cost? I suspect the bulk of it will find its way abroad, in the form of lower raw-material prices, etc. Many have suggested it be paid for by pulling the troops out of Vietnam and cutting related military expenditures. I judge the socio-economic interests this change would necessitate attacking, to be powerful enough at present to preclude the success of such a venture. (An interesting aside: Simply on the basis of what has been said so far, one would predict that if one of the two major U. S. political parties was consistently more responsive to demands of lower socio-economic elements, it would of necessity act in a manner more likely to get us involved in foreign conflict and might come to be known as the party which involves us in war.)

While I have already dealt with it to a limited extent, I would like to turn now to the matter of political vocabularies. If vocabularies are an intimate part of experiences and aims, and if political man's primary aim is the preservation of his socio-economic self, it follows his vocabularies ought to reflect this conservatism.

Vocabularies of Socio-Economic Defense

It was pointed out the most popular vocabulary among American political scientists includes the contention economic-social-political

that. As a result, no unified opposition ever came into being. Enough Negroes have suffered socio-economic decline to fairly well unify them and make them willing to do battle. Consequently, the cost of liquidating such a community makes it highly unlikely any attempt would be made in that direction.

phenomena are "complex, " just as we would expect of that country which is the world's principal defender of the status quo. Moreover, one finds the epistemology of which this assumption is part, logical positivism, came into vogue in the United States around the turn of the century when Manifest Destiny was being replaced by a more cautious posture.

Behaviorism in political science is usually traced to a speech made by Charles Merriam at Chicago in 1925--another era noted for its conservatism. It is also worth noting this positivistic world-view was extremely popular among academicians in Germany up to and, for some, even during World War II.³⁴ And it was the world view which constituted the best defense of their personal economic and social positions. By speaking a language of economic-social-political absolutes, by consistently refusing to recognize, as Mannheim would have had them do, that there were conflicting economic-social-political "truths" at war in their society--"truths" which were reflective of the particular interests in conflict--academicians found it possible to continue talking as though the problem were simply one of educating the misled of left and right, of revealing the "truth" to the ignorant warring factions. When one element, the fascists, began to dominate the scene, this same epistemological approach enabled academicians to deny themselves any immediate responsibility for what was taking

³⁴See Hallowell.

place, to attribute the Nazi movement to the insane machinations of a small group or to "irrational" elements in general. Thus absolved of the personal responsibility a more existentialist approach would have nurtured (the kind of approach the U. S. fostered at Nuremburg), it was possible for academicians to study other things and wait for the world to return to its sanity, all the while lending their daily assistance to the scheme of things for which they so anxiously denied responsibility. To have done otherwise, to have adopted a non-positivistic attitude, would have engaged them in activities that would have indeed threatened their very way of life.

A more impressive example of the defensive nature of political vocabularies has to do with the word "communism." For a relativist, it is not a question of what communism is, but rather, of what it is to any particular individual, group, or national-community. In other words, it is a matter of observing how the word is employed, of noting how political men relate it to experience. When we look, we find it is used defensively indeed. Among anti-communists, the term has a standard meaning: "Communism is that policy or program which if enacted now would do damage to one's economic-social status." Thus, nouveau riche rightists declare the liberal's welfare state to be a "communist" society; and we note if it were brought into being today (albeit the liberal does not envision bringing it into being today), it would take from nouveau riche elements and give to those lower-down

on the scale. In the Southern United States, Martin Luther King's program is frequently called a "communist" tract by members of the white community; and one observes that if it were acted upon today, it would take from the white community and give to the Negro. (In South Africa, almost any scheme designed to help the Negro community at the expense of the white is dubbed "statutory communism.") Middle socio-economic elements are somewhat more reluctant to use the term. But one observes that when they do they refer to proposals as over-communistic or "too far left" which, if realized immediately, would remove the second car from their garage or threaten their house in the suburbs.

On their part, pro-communists have behaved no differently. Countries calling themselves "communist" have taken up that appellation when experiencing economic-social decline, and they have called "sufficiently communist" precisely those policies and programs which brought the decline to a halt. As I said, their movements have been no less conservative than revolutions of times past.

Experience, then, tells us ideologies play no important creative role when it comes to economic-social institutions. Here, too, "ideas are inherently conservative. They yield not to the attack of other ideas but to the massive onslaught of circumstances with which they cannot contend."³⁵ Political man is seen to be strictly eclectic

³⁵Galbraith, p. 21.

when endorsing ideologies. "The aim to conserve the social organism is the common end of every imaginable political activity; the conserving purpose therefore does not serve to distinguish one special kind of political theory from another."³⁶ If a group is suffering economic-social injury it begins to cast about for a system of ideas which, if acted upon (as the pragmatists observed, our ideas are plans for action), will remedy matters. Once again, that things work out this way has nothing to do with the desire or intent of any specific political authority. They work out this way because of the conservative inclinations of political man, and they do so whether a given leader offers his blessing, his indifference, or his opposition.

Political man, then, takes up ideologies which are relevant to a defense of his socio-economic position. In behalf of that objective, he unconsciously bends and warps the ideas to which he pays tribute to meet the needs of the moment. If his socio-economic experiences alter so drastically that no extant ideology is as useful a tool for their protection as some new "ism" being proposed, his old faith is unsentimentally put aside.³⁷

³⁶Michels, p. 231.

³⁷Henry Miller once wrote: "As Democrats, Republicans, Fascists, Communists, we are all on one level. That is one of the reasons why we wage war so beautifully. We defend with our lives the petty principles which divide us. The common principle, which is the establishment of the empire of man on earth, we never lift a finger to defend. We are frightened of any urge which would lift us

Naturally, because man's socio-economic experiences undergo drastic alteration through time, no ideology has lasted very long. That we can trace the concept "democracy" back to Athens is in no way a refutation of this point. Athenian democracy had almost nothing in common with our own.³⁸ Its central features included: no separation of powers, no court of appeals, no special educational requirements for holding political office, no binding documents--such as a written constitution, etc. We neither practice, nor even speak in favor of, much that went to make up the Athenian system.

It follows, that when political men have turned to Marx for guidance, they have done so because his philosophy proved to be more relevant than other extant doctrines to a defense of their socio-economic selves; being more relevant, for such individuals Marx was "right."

As Galbraith has written:

Had Marx been mostly wrong, his influence would quickly have evaporated. The thousands who have devoted their attention to demonstrating his errors would have turned their attention elsewhere. But on much he was notably right, especially in relation to his time.³⁹

To be sure, advocates of Marxism have made of his

out of the muck. We fight only for the status quo, our particular status quo." The Air-conditioned Nightmare (New York: New Directions Press, 1945), p. 29.

³⁸See Arnold H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (New York: Praeger Books, Inc., 1958).

³⁹Galbraith, p. 65.

philosophy something Marx himself would be unable to recognize. But that is only to say he was not completely relevant to their experience and so they have done a great deal of manipulating. Just as understandably, they have not all manipulated in a common manner; insofar as Russians and Chinese have not shared socio-economic experiences, we would not expect them to share an ideology. Conflicts over interpretations of ideology, like conflicts between ideologies, are part and parcel of the struggle over whose socio-economic interests are most important.

Having granted Marxism, and I would add anti-Marxism, have in the past shown themselves to be admirable instruments of socio-economic defense, I now intend to argue their utility has been about exhausted. One finds it is not the writings of Marx which are quoted endlessly in China, but those of Mao. So, too, when radicals meet in Latin America, they look not to the ideas and examples of Marx, but of Fidel Castro. It is further revealing that Marx presently seems to be given greatest attention in Russia, the most conservative nation in the so-called "communist bloc." In my estimation, anti-Marxism is an even less productive philosophy for the United States to embrace, assuming we wish to respond creatively to the changes occurring in the world around us. Just why I believe this to be so is the subject I will turn to next.

The United States and Spain--An Instructive Analogy

In arguing the United States would be advantaged by abandoning its concern with "anti-communism" around the world, I will begin by drawing what I consider to be a very appropriate analogy between present U. S.--underdeveloped-area relations and those Spain had with the New World between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. The analogy goes like this: Spain first became a hegemonic world power through the establishment and promotion of mercantilist relationships. Under the terms of mercantilism, the New World was discouraged from producing any notable amount of raw materials. Indeed, discouraged is probably too mild a word, for Spain went to great lengths to prevent such an eventuality.⁴⁰ Raw materials, after all, were of little use to her. At the time, she was a non-industrialized nation similar in structure to those now found throughout the underdeveloped world. She had a small landed aristocracy in control of the country's wealth, a large military establishment bound in interest to the aristocracy, weak and hard-to-distinguish middle-class, and a large, politically powerless peasantry. What Spain did want from the New World was gold, silver, and an outlet for a growing population which the socio-economic structure at home could not accommodate without crisis. All these things she found.

⁴⁰See Robert J. Shafer, The Economic Societies in the Spanish World, 1763-1821 (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1958).

For the first couple of hundred years, the relationships thus established were profitable for everyone concerned. Everyone that is, except the New World Indian, but then he was hardly considered human and posed no major problem. When it was not advantageous to work him, he was simply done away with. Things went along relatively smoothly until well into the eighteenth century.

By that time, however, the ties between Spain and the New World began to manifest signs of decay--they were fast becoming anachronistic. The chief difficulty was that the New World had begun to suffer a population explosion. Given the lack of any significant raw material production, there was little in the way of work to be done. As a result, when the half-Indian, half-Spanish Mestizzo population began to grow in leaps and bounds there was no way for the existing socio-economic structure to incorporate it. Survival itself required the Mestizzo population to resort to violent measures. They became the gauchos, bandits who roamed the hills and pampas of the Americas in groups from small-gang to small-army size. They pillaged and plundered, and quite often took on in battle the defenders of the established system.

During the decades which followed, this initially chronic socio-economic malady reached acute proportions. In time gaucho wars swept most of the inhabited regions of Latin America. An important point, one worth repeating, is that the problem was not

simply a domestic one. It was domestic insofar as the gaucho wildmen were spawned by a socio-economic structure which could not assimilate them. But it was also a problem born of New World relationships with Spain; it was by dint of Spain's efforts as well as those of New World aristocrats that the now-defunct system was maintained.

In retrospect, the near-insoluble nature of the dilemma becomes apparent. The New World aristocrats were fighting not an offensive, but a defensive engagement. They sought but to maintain themselves and their interests, and to do this it was necessary that the socio-economic structure not be altered. On the other hand, the gauchos too strove only for the preservation of their socio-economic selves. Only in their case, this necessitated challenging, and eventually destroying, the existing socio-economic organization. The conditions were those under which I have argued men always turn to battle; namely, the defense (not the enhancement) of one element's socio-economic "self" required injury to the other's. And so they fought.

Initially, the weight of support of liberal elements was enjoyed by the aristocracy. While those in the middle socio-economic range found it progressively more difficult to enhance their fortunes within the going structure, it was nevertheless possible to maintain themselves, to keep from falling. As a result, they might suggest reform, they might even verbalize demands for it, but they did not act upon those verbalizations, they did not go into the field with the

gauchos, and they did not obstruct the efforts of those who fought against the latter.

As time passed, however, persons located higher and higher on the socio-economic ladder became increasingly disaffected. Like the Mestizzo population, their numbers grew, and the system was less and less able to provide for their maintenance at the levels which were part of their very "selves." Hence, they became more open to alternative arguments, to talk of rebellion against the establishment.

It was precisely at this juncture that England and France entered the picture with revolutionary impact. These two countries were just beginning to proceed full-steam-ahead with their industrial revolutions. To do this, they needed large quantities of raw materials of the kind the New World was ideally suited to furnish. They turned to Latin America with a happy solution to its dilemma. "Produce raw materials," they entreated, "we will take all you can provide."

At this particular moment in history, then, we are justified in concluding Spain had essentially three alternatives before it. If that country wished to remain a dominant world power, it would either have to subjugate England and France in war, thereby preventing their industrialization and the establishment of the new viable relationships with Latin America, or, it would be necessary to industrialize itself, in order to capitalize upon these new relationships. The first was a physical impossibility, although the reader may recall the many steps

taken in that direction. As for the second, under the Bourbons Spain toyed with the idea of effecting the kinds of internal reforms needed if she was to industrialize, but she never made it. The third alternative was to become a declining world power, fighting a battle of retreat and attempting to hold off the new relationships--to fend off the future--as long as possible. This, as we know, is the course Spain ultimately followed. In doing so, she established military bases around Latin America, all the way up into California. She busied herself with trying to sink as many as she could of the English and French vessels engaged in carrying "illegal" (by Spanish declaration) materials, or bringing in products of manufacture. The heavy cost of Spain's confrontation with history, both for herself and for the New World, is common knowledge.

Eventually, of course, Spain lost her crusade against the future. By the turn of the past century she had been completely removed from Latin America. The new relationships had taken root and were prospering. The gaucho wars abated as these renegades were assimilated into the new raw-material-producing socio-economic structure, mostly as peasants, but also as packing-house employees, dock-workers, and the like. And for a time the New World knew relative peace.

Moving on to the second half of the analogy, I might begin by noting the United States followed the lead of England and France in

promoting the new relationships, eventually coming to dominate them. In climbing to our present position as the world's foremost industrial nation we encouraged Latin and Middle-American states to produce more and more of the requisite raw materials. Having helped Spain remove itself from the hemisphere, we set about encouraging the fortunes of those interested in the new relationships and discouraging those who were not. As we know, at times our encouragement included the use of troops.

An important point, one it is necessary for the reader to grasp fully, is that however much one may feel Latin Americans failed to get quite the same advantage from the new relationships as did the United States and other industrial nations, they nevertheless did benefit from them. Their establishment made it possible for the average Latin American to return to the socio-economic level from whence he had fallen during the last decades of Spain's hegemony, at times even to improve his lot. That we profited is evident. All went fairly well until the 1930's or thereabout. At that time the new relationships themselves began to show signs of increasing decay. By the 1960's the handwriting was on the wall; they would have to be replaced by something more fruitful, and soon.

There are several reasons why the existing relationships between Latin America (and for that matter all of the so-called under-developed states) and the industrialized countries of the world have

become dysfunctional and must be radically transformed. First, and perhaps most important, there is the phenomenal population growth these states are experiencing; once again, given the existing socio-economic structures in most underdeveloped areas it can appropriately be termed an "explosion." In one of his foreign aid messages to Congress, President Kennedy observed that in view of its rate of population growth Latin America would have to double its income over the next thirty years merely to stand still. Unfortunately, since World War II most Latin American nations (read underdeveloped nations) have been going the other way. Their incomes have been declining. Needless to say, the result is that the economies of such countries daily grow more stagnant.

Another aspect of the underdeveloped-area dilemma--one of the prime reasons for the decline in raw-material prices--is that since World War II the countries in question have begun to compete with one another on a new and improved scale. African states compete with those of Latin America, and the latter with each other in obtaining markets for their products. Then, there is the harsh competition between underdeveloped area raw materials and modern synthetics, such as nylon, polyethylene products, etc. Here, too, the prospects for the future are bleak.

Finally, there are the problems of increased import prices for manufactured goods, in Latin America's case, a growing

indebtedness to industrialized nations, especially the United States, and a fall in the rate of foreign investment.

We noted that among American political scientists it has been a popular notion that there is a revolution of "rising expectations" occurring in the underdeveloped world. It is my contention, one overwhelmingly supported by evidence of the above sort, that the very reverse is actually the case. As the estancia holder has obtained a smaller price for his goods, in attempting to stay where he is on the economic-social ladder he has been prompted to push some of the peasants off the land, to work others longer hours, to pay them a smaller wage, or, in rarer instances, to begin mechanization. In so doing, he is not trying for more; he aims only to retain what he has.

On the peasant's part, forced off the land he moves to the outskirts of some large city and becomes a citizen of one or another favilla--the many shack-cities springing up throughout Latin America. Where previously he was assured his two bowls of beans daily, or its equivalent now he is confident of nothing except the likelihood his star will continue to decline.

Just as important, as previously noted, both the family of the land-holder and that of the peasant are increasing in size. In each of their cases, to stay where they are on the economic-social ladder they need much more money; they are obtaining less. With declining

income, with more severe living conditions, the favilla dweller and his peasant counterpart become open to thoughts of revolution. But it is a revolution not of "rising expectations" but of decreasing realization.

The lesson which worsening conditions in the have-not nations teaches--a lesson revolutionaries in these areas are fully cognizant of--is that there exists no alternative to a radical transformation of the relationships between their countries and industrialized states, and this must go hand in hand with equally drastic socio-economic structural changes at home. It is not possible to solve the problem with moderate reform, to make the underdeveloped areas more productive of raw materials (which will not sell), carry out a land reform program, or some such thing. The have-not nations would continue their fall, they would continue to be unable to obtain enough for their produce, to stimulate a sufficient demand, to do anything meaningful in the way of remedying their problem. As once before, theirs is not a difficulty which can be remedied by merely fooling with the trees; it is the forest which must be changed. The next obvious question is "how?"

In my estimation, in the future the viable relationships between have and have-not countries will look as follows: The have nations will encourage rapid industrialization of the have-nots, and will make their profits by selling them the heavy equipment--including entire factory complexes--to do it with. That this describes the trend

of things to come is clearly evidenced, I believe, by events during the past decade.⁴¹

Whenever I have presented the above thesis, certain criticisms have been offered. It is suggested the United States already encourages industrialization in Latin America and elsewhere. While I will subsequently make clear the reasons for our failure in this regard (essentially the same reasons Spain neglected to promote replacement of mercantilist relations), let me simply note that failure here. Our aid has either been in the form of military equipment to aristocratic regimes whose interests are such that they oppose the sort of changes needed, or, it has involved the improvement of communications and transportation systems which, though they will unquestionably be useful when industrialization comes, are nevertheless aimed almost entirely at increasing raw material production or facilitating its processing and shipment abroad. As it is constituted, the Alliance for Progress program makes it virtually impossible for an underdeveloped nation

⁴¹I refer to daily reports such as these: "In Asia, the West Europeans not only are criticizing U. S. action in Vietnam, but also are busy building up a small but brisk trade with Red China. A West European consortium headed by West Germans is negotiating the construction of an ultramodern steel plant in Red China. Britain has sold Red China a data-processing computer. French firms provide helicopters, heavy equipment, trucks and parts, precision tools." U. S. News and World Report, May 29, 1967, p. 50. "Official sources say that Britain, France and Spain have extended much of the credit that enabled the bearded Cuban dictator [Castro] to prop up the economy that was crumbling a year ago . . . U. S. analysts estimate that, in addition to deals with Britain, France, Spain and Italy, Castro has at least 100 millions in credit offers from other European countries, on which he can draw as he wishes." U. S. News and World Report, Aug. 21, 1967, p. 86.

to obtain loans or grants aimed at building industry. Moreover, as John Gerassi points out in his analysis of the Alliance (See The Great Fear in Latin America), even the aid given for raw material related purposes is of paltry proportions and mostly in the form of loans, not grants. This much is certain; the burden of proof is on those who contend the United States does indeed follow policies which encourage the industrialization of the underdeveloped world, for the evidence is exceedingly hard to come by.

A second, and more worthy criticism is that the type of changes recommended--national control of raw material production and a concerted effort to promote industrialization--would have adverse impact upon the United States. Thus, it is reasoned, the raw material holdings of United States corporations would have to be nationalized, resulting in serious injury to our economy. This, because we would no longer be able to obtain important materials, or if we could, their cost would be prohibitive. Like the other, this argument runs counter to our experience. Britain and France have largely lost their empires, yet their economies have not gone down, but up, and today they continue to buy raw materials from essentially the same old sources, even where they have been nationalized. So, too, the United States could continue to buy Cuban sugar if it were interested. The second part of this last argument is sound enough; nationalization of our present holdings abroad would no doubt result in increased raw

material costs. However, this misses the point; the purchase of cheap raw materials is not going to be the source of profit for have nations under the new relationships. Rather, as I noted, they will make their money by industrializing the have-nots.

Still another counter given is that the underdeveloped nations of the world are too poor to capitalize on such relationships. They do not have the money required to purchase large quantities of heavy industrial equipment, not to mention whole factory complexes. Now, this is a rather strange argument to be given by a Westerner, particularly an American. We live in a society which is literally fueled by credit. Only a few decades ago a "responsible" young man growing up in the United States thought in terms of eventually buying a home with cash; a car, too, if he was in that category. Credit was hard to come by, and only the fiscally irresponsible sought it out for everyday wants and needs. Within very few years after World War II, however, it had become abundantly clear that unless we reconstructed such values and practices our socio-economic system must collapse. By the 1950's our productive machinery was so amazingly efficient that to maintain anything even approaching full employment necessitated finding a way to enable the masses of people to consume what the cornucopian economy was turning out. Under the circumstances, long-term credit was a notably conservative solution. As a result, today cars are paid for over a period of from two to five years, homes

ten to thirty, and with a little ingenuity, clothes, jewelry, bicycles, vacations, and every imaginable household item can be financed and refinanced almost indefinitely. Furthermore, despite these changes, economists are frequently heard to argue the problems resulting from over-productiveness remain to be effectively dealt with (see, for example, Robert Theobald, Free Men and Free Markets). What is important here is that the same productive forces which have made the foregoing imperative are creating the necessity for long-term financing of the industrialization of underdeveloped areas. Again, I hardly need to point out the trend is already under way, although the United States has yet to get on the bandwagon.

Previously I noted that had Spain moved to capitalize on the relationships which replaced those existing between Latin America and the outside world under mercantilism she would have had to undertake extensive internal reform. This would have included some sort of open confrontation with the landed aristocracy and with the military elements whose interests were compatible with the former. The analogy with our own present experience holds even here. If we are ever to face our dilemma squarely it will be absolutely necessary for us to do all of the following: (a) We must come to accept that to continue to defend U. S. owned or controlled raw material interests abroad will keep us fighting against the revolutionary trends which are developing; (b) We must realize that to give up their defense is

to give up the rationale for perpetuating the military industrial complex;

(c) We must grasp that to challenge this particular skein of extremely powerful interests is at once to confront as a myth the whole idea of a great communist--non-communist confrontation taking place in the world.

What I am suggesting, then, is that the United States now confronts a situation in which the national interest and certain powerful sub-national interests are not simply different, but are in many respects manifestly incompatible. Initially, when the present ties between the United States and the underdeveloped world were first established, it was possible to argue they benefited not only the businessmen involved, but our nation as well; in short, at that time the policies and postures which best defended and enhanced the interests of the North Americans who encouraged raw material production in Latin America and elsewhere were at once those policies and postures which most effectively defended and enhanced the interests of our nation's people, not to mention the populations of the underdeveloped countries themselves. But this, I propose, is no longer the case. Admittedly, sugar interests in the Dominican Republic, aluminum interests in British Guiana and banana interests in Guatemala are most effectively defended by our labelling all revolutionary groups in those areas "communist" and aiding the governments concerned in suppressing them. And, as indicated, this practice is certainly the one which most effectively

defends United States military-industrial complex interests. However, for all of the reasons previously given, I contend it would benefit our nation far more to greet revolutionaries such as Mao and Castro as progressive conservatives, as men who are simply in step with their time, to encourage the industrialization of their countries, and to conclude the notion that there is a communist-noncommunist confrontation taking place in the world is only a "myth."

Scholars who have remarked our Government's inclination to oppose progressive revolutionaries in underdeveloped areas have had difficulty explaining this inclination.⁴² Frank Tannenbaum, for instance, decides businessmen have somehow been able to beguile or dupe those who formulate policy.⁴³ Applying the thesis political activity is principally defensive, we would simply predict that persons whose socio-economic status is dependent upon a continuation of the going

⁴²"The aim of American foreign policy," states Robert Hutchins, "is to prevent social and political change. We have no objection to the efforts of other countries to gain independence or achieve prosperity. But those efforts must be carried on within a framework that we find comfortable. This framework is, in general, the one that already exists." San Francisco Chronicle, Sunday, March 19, 1967, Editorial section, p. 2.

⁴³Tannenbaum writes: "We have found it difficult to draw the line between dictators and others because businessmen whose interests are in the present and whose commitments are to the status quo have been able to beguile our policy makers into believing that all was for the best and that any change would be for the worse." "Considerations for the Latin American Policy," in The Liberal Papers, ed. by James Roosevelt (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1962), p. 279.

state of affairs, individuals with raw-material holdings abroad or with large investments in war-machinery production at home, will at once be those persons who most actively concern themselves with the formulation and administration of related Government policies, and that as a consequence such policies will be founded on the assumption the interests in question are to be preserved.⁴⁴ One would further predict a demand for the kind of altered policies I have argued are imperative in the long run will be made by the people of the United States precisely when to continue trying to maintain the existing structure of things proves too costly, when to do so makes it impossible to maintain the socio-economic status of the greater number of the United States citizens. Here again, the expectation of defensive political action. Having already lost their empires, it is to be expected France and Germany will foster the new viable relationships and concomitant attitudes before the United States does, perhaps for a time with the latter's continued opposition.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Understandably, our Government has made a practice of labelling anything which threatens existing vested interests abroad "communist." Bernard S. Morris recently observed, "There is a particular connection between communist revolution and revolution in general, which is pertinent but which has not received much explicit elaboration by students of American foreign policy. Stated simply, this is the tendency to identify all revolutions with communism and moreover to regard revolutions as bad or hostile to our interests." International Communism and American Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 130.

⁴⁵The thesis being expounded leads to the prediction that the U. S. may well move far to the right in the not too distant future.

It should now be grasped why I consider relativism appropriate to an understanding of the economic-social-political events of our time; or perhaps I should say to the understanding which I believe will come to dominate and direct those events. To begin with, the very profundity of the changes in outlooks and attitudes which I hold are required will encourage relativism, much as for Mannheim. A relativistic epistemology makes it easier to explain how others have been arriving at such notably different conclusions from one's own. Then, too, those who present the sort of theses referred to above may find their "objectivity" questioned. If so, they will be moved to treat with epistemology and I think it probable they will arrive at relativistic conclusions. Again, at a time when the nation-state and therefore nationalistic frameworks are fast becoming dysfunctional, a relativistic epistemology seems to me a "natural" for the investigation of economic-social-political phenomena. (There is, of course, an element of presumption in my prediction, as there is in any prediction. Half a century ago Schiller predicted a similar revolution in thought. He spoke of "a thorough-going voluntarism that unsparingly uproots the intellectualist tradition."⁴⁶ Twenty years later the essence of pragmatism, as Schiller understood it, had all but been forgotten.)

⁴⁶Schiller, "The Ambiguity of Truth," p. 161.

General Comments on Ideology, Propaganda and Totalitarianism

If by an ideology one means a set of assumptions pertaining to economic and social experiences and used to give form and meaning to those experiences, relativism argues we are all ideologists. Political man "interprets" his economic-social experiences, and to do this is of necessity to employ interpretive frameworks. Such frameworks, chosen because of their relevance, their utilitarian appropriateness, constitute what are usually called ideologies. To be sure, individuals having similar experiences and therefore employing similar frameworks are often inclined to forget they are ideologists, particularly if a set of assumptions continues to be used over a long period of time. However, one who employs different assumptions will be quite aware of the ideological nature of another's thought. Thus, to an American each statement made by a Chinese statesman is obviously strained through a set of ideological premises, just as the Chinese citizen will be cognizant of the alternative ideological premises which give shape to an American statesman's thought. "The end of ideology" would necessarily involve the end of economic-social-political experience and interpretation.

"Things are their relationships." Therefore, areas of time-space which we relate to in a common manner will be seen as the same, those we relate to in dissimilar ways will appear different. Usually a Caucasian has relationships with other Caucasians which are, by

his own reckoning, extremely varied, while the way he relates to one Oriental is likely to be pretty much the way he relates to any other. As a result, we would expect Caucasians to find Orientals more homogeneous in appearance than they do Caucasians (and Orientals to find Caucasians a more homogeneous lot). For the same reasons we would expect citizens of the United States to experience members of other cultures as more conformist-minded than they are themselves, etc. For the relativist, one cannot ask if this or that group is homogeneous in aspect or outlook; one can only inquire if they are such when contemplated from a particular vantage point, when experienced in a particular way. Were we somehow able to create a society of peoples so alike in every regard they seemed to us identical, upon entering that society and taking up a variety of relationships with its members (that is, relating to some in ways markedly different from the way we related to others), we would quite soon be remarking the individuality and uniqueness characterizing our society's citizens.

As for the distinction between propaganda and education, there is no longer any basis for arguing the latter has to do with "truer" ideas, or with ones which are less implicitly prescriptive. Similarly, we have rejected any basis for suggesting propagandistic arguments are more "one-sided." What, then, does distinguish propaganda from education? Here, too, the question can only be put in this way: "Under what circumstances are men found to refer to

statements as propagandistic, and under what altered circumstances are they heard to speak of education?" The answer should come as no surprise. I contend men call propaganda those readings and analyses which, if they were to act upon them as "true," would not get them where they want to go. Propaganda has to do with arguments that have poor utility, ideas which are not meaningful reflections of one's personal experiences and aims. Thus when interests are in opposition, what is propaganda for one individual is education for another; so, too, what is called education during one era may be regarded as the most repugnant kind of propaganda during a subsequent period. In the last analysis, I propose, the ideas most certain to be labelled propaganda are those which do not presuppose a defense of assumed values. It is inconsistent with this view of propaganda to suppose men can somehow be made to take up ideas which are inconsistent with their experiences if the one peddling them is but crafty enough.⁴⁷

On the subject of totalitarianism, the use of a relativistic framework makes possible the formulation of general statements about

⁴⁷Note how this understanding of propaganda accords with the work of scholars investigating the process of communication. Cartwright, for instance, observes: "Any effort to change behavior through a modification of this cognitive structure must overcome the forces tending to maintain the present structure. Only when a given cognitive structure seems to the person to be unsatisfactory for his adjustment is he likely readily to receive influences designed to change that structure." "Some Principles of Mass Persuasion," in Public Opinion and Propaganda, p. 386.

the conditions under which political man acts in a totalitarian manner, denying others the right to speak, assemble, to publish, etc., and when he is found to propose freedom for everyone. Relativism further enables the scholar to predict the likelihood a given society will become increasingly totalitarian in the foreseeable future or that it will become less so. Once again, the key, in this instance to man's totalitarian proclivities, is to be found by concentrating on his assumed political values, the maintenance of his socio-economic self. We can say of political man that to the degree the words of another constitute an attack upon his own economic-social status--and to the degree this other stands a chance of being heeded (to the degree his words are a meaningful reflection of his fellow-citizens' experiences; to the extent they must act upon them to maintain their own socio-economic positions), political man will play the totalitarian, denying such an other the freedoms he generally pays such profound tribute. In predicting the likelihood any specific group will become totalitarian, then, we should ask this kind of question: Is their socio-economic situation such that for them to maintain themselves they must deny the right of some other element to do likewise? Does this other element stand any chance of becoming dominant, of winning out, if it is not actively suppressed? Does the first group have the ability, the strength, to suppress the second?

Experience argues individuals sometimes differ in their

willingness to behave in a totalitarian manner; there are persons who would suffer death in preference to denying freedom to others. However, there does not appear to be any basis for supposing national groups differ significantly in this respect. Insofar as individuals in any country have found themselves in a situation such that their immediate economic-social interests were incompatible with those of another group they have shown themselves willing enough to act in a totalitarian manner.⁴⁸ It should hardly surprise us that political man has few compunctions about suppressing speech, written words, and the like when they constitute threats. He has consistently been willing to deny others the right to life in defense of his economic-social status, why then would we expect him to hesitate when it comes to denying another the right to speak or to assemble? It is perhaps a sad comment on political man that he is most enthusiastic about political freedoms when they are least important, but it is a comment well deserved.

In Chapter Three we noted political scientists have been concerned with keeping their work as non-prescriptive as possible. Relativism argues that for the individual political scientist this is an aim which cannot be realized. In an implicit sense, every scholar's

⁴⁸In the U. S., self-proclaimed "communists" have frequently been denied what we think of as basic freedoms. Indeed, at times it has been easier for "communist" parties to get on the ballot in one or another Latin American state considered by us essentially despotic.

descriptions will be equally prescriptive, however much he might wish it were otherwise. By the same token it is possible to prevent the political science community from fostering a restricted set of economic-social-political objectives in preference to others. This can be done by providing platforms for given viewpoints according to their popularity (which is to say their relevance) as judged by the population at large. Thus, if ten per cent of the society is found to endorse radical right analyses, ten per cent of all university political science positions would be held by radical rightists. If one per cent of the population endorsed Marxist interpretations, one per cent of all political science chairs would be held by self-proclaimed Marxists, and so on. Ideally, this practice would be followed at all educational levels, though I suspect this is asking too much.

As C. Wright Mills once observed, there is always the possibility social scientists will be drawn from too restricted a socio-economic milieu. Mills argued "their experience and the points of view from which each of them views society are too similar, too homogeneous."⁴⁹ In times past academicians have sometimes been sufficiently homogeneous economically and socially to render them irrelevant. Those who were correct about the course of events in Russia in 1917, for example, were largely outside academic institutions. At that time, if one wished to acquire a relevant understanding

⁴⁹Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p. 88.

of on-going economic-social-political events, he would find the appropriate institutions were the factories, the breadlines and the slums.

Today, it seems to me an American sociologist concerned with events in the Negro ghettos must at times wonder if perhaps the appropriate education for a solution of the ghetto dweller's problems is not to be gained in the ghetto itself, rather than in the sociology classroom.

While time alone will reveal whether this is so, opening the university podium to as many diverse preachments as possible would help social inquiry to remain relevant (and for each of us the relevant is the "true.")

It should never be forgotten that to say the analyses and arguments of Western political scientists have largely been ignored by the general community is to say their work has been found essentially "irrelevant," or "false."

To do the above does not mean the political scientist must personally endorse radical right or left activities and arguments just because they may happen to come into vogue; it does not mean he must forsake all values save those which currently dominate; however it does suggest he ought to be willing to give individuals with values drastically different from his own the same opportunity to make themselves heard, or else grant that he is less interested in freedom of inquiry and argument than he is the promotion of particular value systems. To suppress any view is, according to a relativistic understanding, to suppress someone's "truth."

An optimist by temperament, I would like to end on a positive note. I think what impresses me most about the twentieth century paradigm is the freeing and creative impact it could not fail to have on economic-social-political inquiry. As I commented when discussing the implications of pragmatism and the sociology of knowledge, relativistic assumptions would goad scholars into looking for the "rationality" of radical left and right arguments rather than casually dismissing them as "irrational." It would discourage what I consider the fruitless, certainly it is presumptuous, concern with "sound perception" and "objectivity."

Relativism would make possible a more effective grasp of economic-social-political movements, more effective because it provides a basis for sound prediction. I have spoken at some length about the important assumed goal of maintaining one's economic-social power, and the defensive nature of political activity. I suspect that in time it will be concluded the most forceful mechanism for economic-social-political change (perhaps the only one worth commenting on), is man's attempt to stay right where he is in a world of flux and altering experience. Throughout the underdeveloped world, with populations growing and incomes declining, the desire to maintain socio-economic status is nothing other than a revolutionary one. There is a need for investigations of underdeveloped economies which are based upon an understanding of political action as defensive and conservative.

Such inquiries would analyze the values implicit in the outlooks of various political factions. They would disclose when and whether such implicit values make the very readings and analyses of a specific socio-economic element inappropriate to the demand of the majority to have its economic-social status maintained (e.g. the analyses of Latin American aristocrats).

There is a need for investigations which relate the willingness of nouveau riche elements to enter Minute Men organizations when their socio-economic status is threatened, promising to kill if it is diminished, and the inclination of others, for example, ghetto Negroes, to take like action in like situations. Socio-economic deprivation itself does not appear to have anything to do with prompting group violence.

Wealthy elements seem to be as ready as the most poverty-stricken to kill in order to maintain themselves at an existing level. In India, despite appalling socio-economic deprivation, riots of a quasi-revolutionary kind have only occurred when the monsoons failed and a sudden socio-economic decrease had to be experienced by some portion of the population. Convinced a war with the U. S. is almost certain, China has been expending an increased proportion of her GNP on military preparedness, especially thermonuclear capacities and missile delivery systems. I strongly suspect analysis would show that the present "cultural revolution" in that country has to do with which socio-economic elements are to pay this large immediate cost

through socio-economic decline. At the moment, it appears there is to be some expropriation of the new elite groups. That the battle is carried out in the name of equalitarian "communism" should strike us as no more incongruous than the many battles which have been waged in the name of equally equalitarian Christianity.

Readers who find unacceptable my contention that persons always commit themselves to revolutionary violence because they are declining in socio-economic terms, never because they simply "want more," would do well to ask themselves under what specific circumstances they would go into violent opposition to their Government. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that when revolutionary leaders have done no more than restore lost socio-economic status their followers have been content to put aside their guns and accept such leaders' guidance and direction.

Returning to the idea that the most potent force providing for socio-economic change is the desire to maintain, Dr. Eugene M. Singer, a New York economic consultant who advises businessmen on the process of merger, contends

in almost all cases the acquiring company is worried about its future. Looking ahead five or ten years, it foresees a decline in earnings or even losses if it continues to rely on its present products and markets. Conditions are changing rapidly. So the company looks around for new products, new markets, as a protective measure.⁵⁰

⁵⁰U. S. News and World Report, Sept. 11, 1967, p. 78.

In the previous chapter I argued proponents of an outlook or paradigm found relevant by the general population are given seats of authority because of their outlook's relevance. As community experiences alter, it was noted, such individuals (including scholars) are sometimes able to wield their authority in a manner which prevents those presenting ideas appropriate to the new experiences to make themselves heard. At a certain point, when the conflict between community experience and socially dominant ideas becomes sufficiently severe, the society transfers its allegiance to proponents of a new understanding, and this in a somewhat revolutionary manner. This point of transference may itself be one at which to go on acting upon the old understanding is to begin pronounced socio-economic decline. Merely on the basis of Kuhn's book, The Copernican Revolution, one might suggest that it was when the populations of Europe had grown to a point at which trade abroad was a necessity if the socio-economic conditions of the greater number were to be maintained without any revolutionary structural changes in their societies that Ptolemy was abandoned and Copernicus embraced. The former's scheme did not make a ready navigation of the seas possible.

Relativism would result in a view of political man as more sincere than he is often portrayed. Frequently, when individuals pushing what American scholars have judged to be absurd socio-economic arguments have been granted "rationality," their "honesty" and

"sincerity" have been brought into question. Hitler is but one example. I can recall hearing more than one scholar refer to his comments about the efficacy of a "great lie" in order to support the notion he sought only power and was willing to use any sort of conscious deception in order to gain it, thus forgetting, or ignoring, the central theme of Mein Kampf which was that a Marxist-Jewish conspiracy had successfully misled the German people and that he, Hitler, must dedicate his life to re-establishing "truth." Granted, Hitler was perfectly willing to lie in the service of what he considered an overriding, all-important, "truth," but which national leaders have been unwilling to do likewise? I suspect leaders who come to the fore in troubled times are always far more sincere in their arguments than those who govern in a tranquil period, regardless of the direction they wish to take. This because they risk much in promoting their movements, including their very lives; and the likelihood is always scant they will be victorious in the end. For every Hitler or Mao, there are thousands upon thousands of brilliant persons who spend their lives plotting and preparing for a revolution of right or left which, the times "out of joint," never arrives.

Finally, it can be said that to one who endorses relativistic premises the behaviorist position with its insistence upon "value-free" investigation, as well as the reluctance of its adherents to comment on the major issues of our day, can be reduced to an admission that:

"We evaluate and act, but we never think about what we want or what we are doing." Questionable in any time, in our own unsettled era this posture seems to me nothing short of disastrous.

To be sure, relativism asks a great deal of scholars in the way of tolerance and democratic disposition. Clearly, one of the principal mechanisms members of societies (including scholars) have used to suppress ideas found unpleasant, is the absolutistic epistemological framework I have so painstakingly attacked. By calling certain readings and analyses "irrational," "non-objective," and the like, it has often been possible to deprive their originators and promoters equal time in the market place without acquiring a guilty conscience in the doing. Still, the problems which confront mankind in the mid-twentieth century are of a magnitude never before encountered. On this nearly all scholars seem agreed. It is my conviction, even more my hope, that their solution will require a tolerance and an understanding--a democratic attitude--of no smaller dimensions.

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